Effect of public policy on the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards by Al-Talhuni, Hussam Sameer Shehadeh.




THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
2002
Abstract
This thesis is an attempt to trace the legal implications of the application and interpretation of
the doctrine of public policy as a ground for refusing to enforce arbitral awards in
international commercial arbitration. This requires an analysis of the extent to which public
policy can be a proper defence against the enforcement of foreign awards. In this respect,
Article V (2)(b) of the New York Convention is particularly important. The distinction which
is being examined throughout this thesis is that between applying domestic or international
public policy rules as grounds for refusing to enforce a foreign arbitral award.
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter One provides a general overview of the
subject, and a background study of the source and nature of arbitral awards. This includes
highlighting the differences between national and foreign arbitral awards and the means
available for executing them, or resisting their enforcement. Chapter Two examines the
nature and characteristics of the notion of public policy. It also deals with the role of public
policy in private international law as a ground for excluding the normally applicable law or
for refusing to recognise or enforce an otherwise enforceable foreign judgement and arbitral
awards. The main object of this Chapter is to illustrate the influence of public policy rules on
the functioning of conflict of laws rules. Chapter Three examines the proper procedural and
substantive law that should be applied in international commercial arbitration, and deals with
the duty of arbitrators to determine the applicable public policy rules as part of their duty to
provide the parties with an enforceable arbitral award. It is argued that when conflict between
domestic and international public policy rules occurs during the arbitration proceedings,
arbitrators must comply with the international public policy rules as the most proper rules to
govern in international commercial arbitration. Chapter Four examines in detail the
supervisory powers of the courts in the country of origin over international arbitral awards
and the applicable public policy rules. The effect of setting aside an international arbitral
award for considerations of public policy in the country of origin, on enforcement in other
countries pursuant to Article V (l)(e) of the New York Convention will be examined.
Chapters Five and Six seek to analyse key cases that have arisen before the courts in regard to
the application of public policy as a ground to refuse enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
A number of aspects will be examined which mainly relate to procedural public policy rules
and issues concerning the subject matter of the dispute. Evidence will be found to support the
argument that the notion of 'international public policy' is becoming increasingly recognised
by courts as a basis for interpreting Article V (2)(b) of the New York Convention.
i
Declaration




I wish to acknowledge my debt of gratitude to Mr. Adnan Amkhan of the University of
Edinburgh for his help in this study, his advice on the area of research and continuous
encouragement.
I remain eternally grateful to my mother and father for their confidence, motivation and
support. And of course to my extended family and all those who helped me throughout.
111






Table ofCourt Cases x
Introduction 1
Chapter One
Arbitration and Arbitral Awards 7
I. Definition of arbitration and arbitral awards g
A. Definition of arbitral awards j j
B. The legal nature of arbitral awards 14
II. International Commercial Arbitration and International Arbitral Awards jg
A. Domestic arbitral awards and international arbitral awards 23
B. Foreign arbitral awards 24
1. The geographical criterion 25
2. The applicable law criterion 27
III. Executing Arbitral Awards 29
A. Voluntary execution 30
B. Resisting the enforcement of an arbitral award in the country of origin 32
1. Appeal from arbitral awards 33
2. Challenging the arbitral award to set it aside 37
IV. Executing and Resisting the Enforcement of a Foreign Arbitral Award 40
A. Recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards 41
IV
B. The applicable rules to the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral Awards .. 43
1. The New York Convention of 1958 46
2. Grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement 49
a. Article V(l) 50
b. Article V (2) 54
i. The relationship between arbitrability and public policy 54
ii. Article V (2)(b), public policy 56
Chapter Two
The Notion of Public Policy and its Role in International Commercial Arbitration 59
I. The Notion of Public Policy 60
A. Definition of Public Policy 62
B. Mandatory rules and public policy 66
C. Public policy is a relative concept 69
II. The Conflict of Public Policy Rules 71
A. International and domestic public policy y,
B. The role of domestic public policy in private international law .
III. The Development of International Public Policy Rules gi
A. Public policy in international conventions g6
B. Statutory and judicial trends towards international public policy 90
Chapter Three
Deciding on Public Policy Rules by the Arbitral Tribunal 101
I. Applicable Rules in International Commercial Arbitration 104
A. Parties choice of procedural rules 106
B. Deciding the applicable procedural rules 109
C. Parties choice of substantive rules 116
D. Deciding the applicable substantive rules by the arbitral tribunal 119
1. Searching for the tacit choice 120
2. Deciding the proper rules to govern the substance of the dispute 123
V
II. The Duty to Respect the Applicable Rules 128
A. Mutual obligations imposed by the arbitration agreement 129
1. Duties of the parties
2. Duties of the arbitral tribunal 121
B. The duty of respecting public policy rules ^3
C. The applicable public policy rules 12g
1. Public policy rules of the law chosen by the parties 12^
2. Searching for the proper public policy rules ^9
D. Applying the international public policy rules 147
Chapter Four
Public Policy as a Ground to Set Aside International Arbitral Awards Before the Court of
°riSin 151
I. Finality of the Award and Courts Control 152
A. The conflict between finality of the award and courts control 153
B. Courts control over arbitral awards 159
II. The Extent ofPublic Policy as a Ground to Attack the Award ^
A. The applicable public policy rules to domestic arbitral awards 162
B. The applicable public policy rules to international arbitral awards 163
III. The Consequences of Setting an Arbitral Award Aside in the Country of Origin
170
A. The concept of binding arbitral award under article V (l)(e) 171
B. Enforcing nullified arbitral awards 174
Chapter Five
Public Policy as a Ground to Refuse Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 184
I. Procedural Public Policy Issues jgg
A. Equity and Fair Opportunity to Present the Case 187
B. Considerations of due process and the parties' right to present their case 195
VI
II. Lack ofReasons in the Award 203
III. Lack of Impartiality 211
A. Impartiality and independence of arbitrators 214
B. Other Procedural Requirements in the Arbitral Tribunal 223
1. Uneven number of arbitrators 224
2. All arbitrators should participate in the deliberations 227
3. The requirement of nominating the arbitrators in the arbitration Agreement 232
IV. Concluding Remarks 235
Chapter Six
Public Policy in relation to the Subject Matter of the Dispute 239
I. Issues ofmorality 240
A. Generally 240
B. Corruption and purchase of influence in international trade 242
II. Political Issues 250
III. Economic Issues 257
A. Generally 257
B. Intellectual property rights 262
C. Trade Restrictions 268
Chapter Seven
Summary and Conclusion 278
Annexes
2g8
Annex A The New York Convention 288
Annex B The Egyptian Law No. 27 of 1994 293
Annex C The Egyptian Law No. 9 of the year 1997 Amending Certain Provisions ofArbitration Law




AAA American Arbitration Association
ABA American Bar Association
ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution
ADRLJ Alternative Dispute Resolution Law Journal
AJIL American Journal of International Law
All ER All England Law Reports
ALR Australian Law Reports
AM. Bus. L. J American Business Law Journal
AM. J. Comp. L American Journal of Comparative Law
Am. Rev. Int'l Arb American Review of international Arbitration
Arb.Int Arbitration International
Arb.J Arbitration Journal
Brooklyn J.Int.L Brooklyn Journal of International Law
BYIL British Yearbook of International Law
Can.Bar.Rev Canadian Bar Review
Ch. D Chancery Division
CJQ Civil Justice Quarterly
CLJ Cambridge Law Journal
CLOUT Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts
CMLR Common Market Law Review
Code of Ethics Code of Ethics 1977 for Arbitrators in Commercial
Disputes, prepared in 1977 by a joint committee consisting of a
special committee of the American Arbitration Association AAA
and a special committee of the American Bar Association ABA;
(1985) X Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, p. 239.
Colum.J.Trans.L Columbia Journal of Transnational Law
Const.L.J Construction Law Journal
Cornell L.Q Cornell Law Quarterly
CRCICA The Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration
Croat. Arbit. Yearb Croatian Arbitration Yearbook
Harv.Int.L.J Harvard International Law Journal
Harv.L.Rev Harvard Law Review
IBA Rules International Bar Association Rules
IBL International Business Lawyer
ICC International Chamber of Commerce
ICCA International Council for Commercial Arbitration
ICSID Rev.-FILJ ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal
ILA report International Law Association report "Final report
on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of
Arbitral awards," London Conference (2000)
ILM International Legal Materials
ILR International Law Review
vm
Int. Handbook on Comm. Arb International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration
Int.Law Internationa] Lawyer
Int'L & Comp. L. Q International and Comparative Law Quarterly
Iran-US CTR Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Report
J. INTL. L. BUS Journal of International Law & Business
J.Int.Arb Journal of International Arbitration
JBL Journal of Business Law
JCI Arb Journal of Chartered Institute ofArbitrators
JMLC Journal ofMaritime Law and Commerce
JWT Journal ofWorld Trade
Law&Pol'ylnt.Bus Law and Policy in International Business
LCIA London Court of International Arbitration
LMCLQ Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly
LQR Law Quarterly Review
MAL Quarterly Model Arbitration Law Quarterly
Mich.J.Int.L Michigan Journal of International Law
MLR Modern law Review
N Y LI J Int'I L & Pol New York University Journal of International
Law and Policy
N.Y.L.J New York Law Journal
Netherlands Int'l L.R Netherlands International Law Review
NYIL Netherlands Yearbook of International Law
Ohio ST. J. Disp. Res Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution
Stan. L. Rev Stanford Law Review
Tex. Int'l L.J Texas International Law Journal.
TUL.L.REV Tulane Law Review
UNCITRAL Model Law United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
Y.B. COM. ARB Yearbook Commercial Arbitration
tx
TABLE OF COURT CASES
Egypt
Arabic Continental Navigation v. Arabic Gulf Contractors. Cassation Court, Decision No. 714/
47 k, the Collection ofCassation's Decisions. 26 April 1982. Vol. 32, p. 422.
Egypt Insurance Co. v. Alexandria agency for navigation. Decision No. 1259/49,13 June 1983,
Collection ofCassation's Decisions. Vol. 34, p.1416.
Egyptian Court of Cassation (13 January 1986), Case No. 326. 51st.
Egyptian Court of Cassation (April 5. 1967), the Collection of the Cassation Decisions (Civil
department) s 18 1967, p. 79.
Egyptian Court ofCassation, (12 April 1956), Case No. 369 - 22nd.
Egyptian Court of Cassation, (13 June 1983), Case No. 1259. 49th.
Egyptian Court of Cassation, (17 of January 1979), Publication of Cassation Court Decisions.
(1979).
Egyptian Court of Cassation, (21 January 1985), Case No. 245. 50th.
Egyptian Court of Cassation, (26 April 1982), Case No. 714, 47th.
Egyptian Court ofCassation, Case No. 06.01.19976, year 27, p. 138.
Egyptian Court ofCassation, Case No. 15.02/1972, year 23, p. 168.
Egyptian Court of Cassation, Case No. 2994/1970 year 57.
Egyptian Court of Cassation, Case No. 97/ 1977 year 28, p. 511.
Egyptian Court of Cassation, Case. No. 24.05/1966, year 17th, page 1224.
Egyptian Court ofCassation, Decision No. 274/ 1982 year 49.
Egyptian Court of Cassation, Decision No. 521/1944, Collection ofCassation's Decisions., year
29, p. 472.
M.V. Lela v. Gulf Contractors, Court of Cassation (Egypt), April 26, 1982, (Case No. 714 -
judicial year 47). Mediterranean andMiddle East Arbitration Quarterly 1988, No. 2, at 1.
Misr Insurance v. M.V. Dominion Trader, Court of Cassation (Egypt), June 13, 1983, (Case No.
1259 - judicial year 49 ), Mediterranean and Middle East Arbitration Quarterly 1988, No. 2, at 8.
The Cairo Court ofAppeal's, (11 August 1996), Commercial Case No. 61.
France
Compagnie d'Armement Maritime v. Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation, Court of appeal of
Pans, April 28 (1976), Rev. Arb. 1978, at 154.
x
Courreges Design v. Andre Courreges, 5 Apr. 1990, (1992) Rev. Arb. 110. The Paris Court of
Appeal.
Denis Coakley Ltd. v. Sle. Michel Reverdy, Court of Appeal of Reims (Civil Chamber),
Judgement of 23 July 1981, Yearbook Vol. IX (1984) at 400 (France No. 6).
Denis Coakley Ltd. v. Ste. Michel Reverdy, judgment of 23 July 1981, Yearbook Vol. IX (1984) at
400 (France : Vol. 6).
European Gas Turbines SA v. Westman International Ltd, 30 Sept. 1993, ( 1994) Rev. Arb. 359,
and reported in (1995) XX Yearbook 198. The Paris Court of Appeal.
European Gas Turbines SA v. Westman International Ltd., the Paris Court of Appeal in Decision
dated 30 Sept. 1993, (1994) Rev. Arb. 359, and reported in (1995) XX Yearbook 198; ILA report,
London Conference (2000), op. cit., p. 32.
La Republicpie Arabe d'Egypte v. Chromalloy AeroServices Inc., Paris App., First Chamber,
Section C, published in 12 Mealey's Int'l Arb. Rep. (April 1997) at B-l.
Messageries Maritimes, decided on 21 June 1950, R. 1950. 609. French Court of Cassation.
OTV v. Hilmarton, Cour de Cassation, June 10, in JDI, 1997, no. 4.
OTV v. Hilmarton, Cour de Cassation, June 10, in JDI, 1997, no. 4. French Court of Cassation.
India
India Organic Chemicals Ltd v. Chemtex Fibres Inc., April 1977. All India Report (1978)
Bombay 106; Gaja V.80; Yearbook IV (1979), p. 271.
Italy
Alarcia Castells v. Hengstenberge e Procurtore general presso la Corte di appello di Milano,
Italian Court of Cassation in RDIPP XIX (1983), 346.
Efxinos Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Rawi Shipping Lines Ltd. Judgement of 2 May 1980 of the Court of
Appeal ofGenoa, Yearbook Vol. VIII (1983) at 381, 383 (Italy No. 51).
S.A. Tradax Export v. S.p.a. Carapelli e Court of Appeals of Florence judgement of 22 October
1976, see Yearbook Vol. Ill (1978) at 279 (Italy No. 18).
S.P.A. Paulo v. Augusto Miserocchi, Tribunal ofRavenna, April 15, 1970, Italy no. 3.
Scherk v. Grandes Marques, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration IV (1979) 289. Italian Supreme
Court (1978). (Corte di Cassazione 12 May (1977).
XI
Netherlands
North American Soccer League Marketing Inc. (US) v. Admiral International Marketing,and
Trading BV and Frisol Eurosport BV. Court of First Instance, Dordrecht (Netherlands), August
18, (1982), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 1985, vol. X, at 490.
Sweden
GNMTC v. Gotaverken, Supreme Court, Augest 13, 1979 (Sweeden no.l).
Switzerland
Hilmarton v. OTV. Reported in (1994) XIX Yearbook 214. Geneva Court of Appeal.
Inter Maritime Management SA v. Russin & Iiecchi, Swiss Federal Supreme Court decision in 9
January 1995, reprinted in (1997) XXII Yearbook 789.
Societe des Grands Travaux de Marseille (SGTM) v. People's Republic ofBangladesh and the
Bangladesh industrial Development Corporation (BIDC), Swiss Tribunal Federal, May 5, 1976,
Arrets du Tribunal Federal 102 la 574, summarised in yearbook Vol. 5(1980) p. 217.
United Kingdom
Agroexport v. NV Goorden Iport SA [1956] Lloyd's Rep 319.
Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation v. Kuwait Insurance Co. (1987) A.C. 50.
Arab African Energy Corp. Ltd. v. Olieprodukten Nederland B. V., 2 Lloyd's Law Report [1984],
419,423.
AT&T Corp v. Saudi Cable Co (CA) [2000] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 625.
Bank Mellat v. Helliniki Techniki SA [1984] Q.B. 291. 301.
BankMellat v. GAA Development & Constriction Co., 2 Lloyd's Rep. 44, 49-51 (1988).
Bermer Handelsgesellschaft mbHv. Westzucker GmbH (No. 2); (1981) Lloyd's Rep. 130 CA.
Birse Construction Ltd v. St David Ltd [2000] B.L.R. 57; 70 Con. L.R. 10.
Bowman v. Secular Society (1917) A. C. 406.
Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. ETS Soules et Cie [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep 160.
Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v. South India Shipping Corporation Ltd. [1981]
AC 909. p. 964; [1981] 2 W.L.R. 141; [1981] 1 All E.R. 289, H.L.(E.); [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep.
253.
Brodin v. A/R Seljan, 1973 S. L. T. 198; 1973 S.C. 213.
Bulk Oil (Zug) AG v. Sun International Ltd [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep 587; [1984] 1 W.L.R. 147
(C.A.); 2 C..M.L.R. 91 (High Court).
Xll
Cargill International SA v. Sociedad Iberica de Moltnracion SA [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 489.
Carlisle Place Investments Ltd v. Wimpey Construction (UK) Ltd. (1981), 15 B.L.R. 109.
Catalina (Owners) v. Norma (Owners) (1938) 61 LI. L. Rep. 360, D.C.
Cie Tunisienne v. Cie d'Armement (1971) A.C., p. 572.
Compagnie d'Armement Maritime S.A. Appellants v. Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation S.A.
Respondents (1971) A.C. 572.
Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation SA v. Compagnie d'Armement Maritime SA,
[1971]A.C.576; [1970] 3 W.L.R. 389; [1970] 3 All E.R. 71; [1970] 2 Lloy'ds Rep. 99; (1970)
114 S.J. 618.
Connal & Co. v. Loder (1868), 6 M. 1095.
Corocraft v. Pan American Airways Inc. [1969] 1 Q.B., p. 616.
Dallal v. BankMellat, [1986] Q. B„ p 441; (1985) 1 All ER„ p. 239.
Dalmia Cement v. Nat Bank ofPakistan [1975] Q.B., p 9.
Dalmia Dairy Industries Ltd v. National Bank ofPakistan (1978) 2 Lloyd's Rep., p. 223; (1977)
121 S.J. 442.
Damond Lock Grabowski v. Laing Investments (Bracknell) Ltd, (1992) 60 BLR 112.
Davies v. Davies, (1887) Ch. D. 36., p.364.
Davies v. Davies, [1986] 1 F.L.R. 497; Ch. D. 36.1887, at p. 364.
De Wutz v. Hendricks (1824) 2 Bing. 314.
Deutsche Schachtbau und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH v. Ras Al-Khaimah National Oil Co, [1988]
3 W.L.R. 230; [1988] 2 All E.R. 833; [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 293.
Eckersley v. Mersey Docks [1894] 2 QB. 667.
Egerton v. Earl Brownlow (1853) 4 H.L.Cas. 1, H.L.(E.).
Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. v. The Football Association Ltd. (1971) Ch. 591, 606; [1971] 1
All E.R. 215.
English v. Donnelly, 1958 S. C. 494.
Ertel Bieber &amp; Co. v. Rio Tinto Co. Ld. [1918] A.C. 260; 34 T.L.R. 208.
Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd. (1968) A.C. 269; [1967] 1 All E.R.
699.
Estcheap Dried Fruit Company v. N.V. Geroeders Catz' Handelsvereeninging [1962] 1 Lloyd's
Rep. 283.
European Grain v. Johnston [1983] Q.B. 520; [1983] 2 W.L.R. 241.
Feist v. Sco. Beige d'Electricite [1934] A.C. 161.
Fender v. ST. John-Mildmay. (1938) A.C. 1.
Foster v. Driscoll [1929] 1 K. B., p. 470 C.A.
Xlll
Fox v. P.G. Wellfair Ltd [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep 514.
Gbangbola v. Smith & SherriffLtdGbangbola v Smith & SherriffLtd, (QBD) [1998] 3 All E.R.
730.
GKN Centrax Gears Ltd. v. Matbro Ltd [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep 555.
Government ofCeylon v. Chandris [1963] 2 Q.B 327.
Government ofCeylon v. Chandris [1963] 2 QB 327, [1963] 2 All ER 1, [1963]2 WLR 1047.
Grell v Levy (1864) 16C.B. (N.S.) 73.
Hagop Ardahalian v Unifert International SA (The Elissar), [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep 84, at 89.
Hagop Ardhalian v. JJnifer International SA (The "Elissar") [1984] 2 Lloyd's Law Rep. 84.
Hamilton v. Bankin (1850) 64 ER 703; (1850) 3 De G. &amp; Sm. 782.
Hamlyn &amp; Co. v. Talisker Distillery. [1894] A.C. 202, H.L.(Sc.)
Henry Bath & Son Ltd v. Birgby Products (1962) 1 Lloyd's Rep 389.
Hiscox v. Outhwaite [1992] 1 A.C. p. 562; [1991] 3 W.L.R. p. 297; [1991] 3 All E.R. p. 641;
[1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep. P. 435.
International Tank v. Kuwait Fuelling, [1974] 3 W.L.R. 721; [1975] 1 All E.R. 242; [1975] Q.B.,
p. 224.
Irvani v. Ir\>ani, [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 412; [2000] C.L.C. 477.
James Miller & Partners, Ltd. v. Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester), Ltd., [1970] AC 583,
[1970] 2 Weekly Law Review, p. 728 (H.L.); [1970] 1 All E. R. 796.
Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines Ltd (1902) A.C. 484.
Janson v. Mines (1902) A. C. 484, 491, 497; 18 T.L.R. 796.
Japan Line Ltd v. Aggeliki [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep 288.
Kahlerv. Midland Bank Ltd. (1950) A. C. 24; [1949] 2 All E.R. 621.
Kaufman v. Gerson [1904] 1 K. B. 591; [1903] 2 K. B., p 114.
King v. International Trustee etc. [1937] A.C. 500.
Kingv. Thomas McKenna Ltd. [1991] 2 Q.B. 480; [1991] 2 W.L.R. 1234; [1991] 1 All E.R. 653,
C.A.
Kirkawa Corporation v. Gatoil Overseas Inc. [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 158.
Kuenigl v. Donnersmarck. [1955] 2 W.L.R. 82; [1955] 1 All E.R. 46.
Lemenda Trading Co. Ltd v. African Middle East Petroleum Co. Ltd., [1988] 2 W.L.R. 735;
[1988] 1 All E.R. 513 ; [1988] 1 QB 448.
Leroux v. Brown (1852) 12 C. B. 801.
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co. (1988) 1 Lloyd's L. Rep. 259, 268-269; [1989] 3
W.L.R. 314; [1989] 3 All E.R. 252.
London Export Corporation Limited v. Jubilee Coffee Roasting Co. Limited [1958] I Lloyd's
Rep. 197; [1958] 2 All ER411; [1958] 1 WLR 661.
xiv
Lord v. Lord (1855) 5 E. &amp; B. 404.
Lucas Pic v. Welsh Development Agency [1986] Ch. 500, (1986) 15 C.S.W. 374.
MacKenderv. Felda A.G. (1967) 2 Q. B. 590, 601; [1966] 3 All E.R. 847.
Mansouri v. singh 1986 1. W. L. R. 1393; [1986] 2 All E.R. 619.
Marine Contractors Inc v. Shell Petroleum Development Co ofNigeria Ltd, [1984] 2 Lloyd's
Rep, p. 77.
Maxim Nordenfelt Guns andAmmunition Co. v. Nordenfelt (1893) 1 Ch. 630, 666.
Merrifield Ziegler & Co. v. Liverpool Cotton Association Ltd. (1911) 105 Law Times 97.
Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C) Ltd. Lannon [1969] 1 Q.B. 577; [1968] 3 W.L.R. 694;
[1968] 3 All E.R. 304.
Minmetals Germany GmbH v. Ferco Steel Ltd, [1999] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 315; [1999] C.L.C.
647; (1999) XXIV Yearbook 739.
Mitsubishi Corpn v. Alafouzos (1988)1 FTLR 47; (1988) 1 Lloyd's Rep 191.
Monklandv Jack Barclay Ltd (1951) 2 KB 252; (1951) 1 All ER714.
Montefiore v. MendayMotor Components Company, Limited, [1918] 2 K.B. p 241.
Montrose Canned Foods Limited v. Eric Wells (Merchants) Limited, [1965] 1 Lloyd's Rep 597.
Moran v. Lloyds 1983, Q.B. 542; [1983] 2 W.L.R. 672: [1983] 2 All E.R. 200, C.A.
Moran v. Llovd's (1983) The Times 3 March; [1983] Q.B. 542.
Multiservice Bookbinding Ltd. v. Marden (1979) Ch.D. 84; [1978] 2 W.L.R. 535; [1978] 2 All
E.R. 489.
Naviera Amazonica Peruana S.A. v. Compania Internacionial de Seguros Del Peru,
[1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 116(CA.); [1988] 1 F.T.L.R. 100.
New Brunswick RY. CO. v. British and French Trust Corporation. (H.L.(E.)) 1939, A.C. P 16.
Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition cofl 894) AC 535.
NVKwik Hoo Tong Handel Maatschappij v. James & Co. Ltd, [1972] AC 604 HL.
O'Sullivan v. Joseph Woodward & Sons Ltd [1987] I.R. 255.
Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation SA v. Hilmarton Ltd, [1999] 2 All E.R. (Comm), p 146;
[1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 222.
Orion Compania de Seguros v. Belfort (1962) 2 Lloyd's Rep 257.
Owens Bank Ltd v. Bracco, [1994] Q.B. 509; [1994] 2 W.L.R. 759; [1994] 1 All E.R. 336.
Owners of Cargo on Board the Morviken v. Owners of the Hollandia (The Hollandia and the
Morviken), [1982] Q. B. 872, at p. 884; [1983] 1 A.C. 565; [1982] 3 W.L.R. 1111.
Paczy v. Haendler & NatermamT [ 1981 ] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 302.
Peter Buchanan LD. andMacharg v. Mcvey. (1955) A.C. p. 516.
xv
Pioneer Shipping Limited v. B. T. P. Tixoxide Limited, "The Nema", (1982) A. C. 724 (H.L.);
[1981] 3 W.L.R. 292; [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 239.
Quarrierv. Colston (1842) 1 Ph. 147.
R Pagnan and Fratelli v. Corbisa industrial Agropacuaria Ltd., (1971) 1 All ER 165; [1970] 1
W.L.R. 1306.
R v. Cough (1993) A.C. 646.
R. v. International Trustee [1937] A.C. 500.
Ralli Brothers v. Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920] 2 K. B. 287.
re Missouri Steamship Co. (1888) 42 Ch. D. 321.
Regazonniv. KC Sethia Ltd., 1958 A.C. 301; [1957] 3 All E.R. 286; [1956] 2 W.L.R. 204.
Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 2 Bing. 228; [1824-34] All ER Rep. 258.
Robinson v. Bland (1760) 1 W. BE, p. 256; (1759) 1 Blackstone 234, 246.
Rossano v. Manufacturers' Life Assurance Co., [1963] 2 Q.B. 352; [1962] 3 W.L.R. 157; [1962]
2 All E.R. 214.
Rousillon v. Rousillon (1880), 14 Ch.D., 351.
Rslerv. Rottwinkel (E.C.J.) [1986] Q.B. 53.
Rustal Trading Ltd v. Gill c£ Duffus SA, [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 14; [2000] C.L.C. 231.
Santos v. Illidge (1860) 8 C.B. (N.S.) 861.
Save and Prosper Pensions Ltd. v. Homebase Ltd (Ch D) [2001]L.&T.R. 11.
Save and Prosper Pensions Ltd. v. Homebase Ltd (Ch D) [2001] L. & T.R. 11.
Saxby v. Fulton (1909) 2 K. B. 208.
Sayers v. International Drilling Co. (1971) 1 W. L. R. 1176; [1971] 3 All E.R. 163.
Scrimaglio v. Thornett and Fehr (1923) 17 LI L Rep 34.
Sharifv. Azad(\961) 1 Q. B. 605; 1966] 3 W.L.R. 1285; [1966] 3 All E.R. 785.
Shield Properties & Investments v. Anglo-Overseas Transport Co., (1985) 273 E.G. 69.
Soleimany v. Soleimany, Court of Appeal, February 19, 1998. [1998] 3 W.L.R. 811; [1998]
C.L.C. 779.
Tatem Steam Navigation Co Ltd v. Anglo-Canadian Co Ltd (1935) LI. L. Rep. 161.
Taylor Woodrow civil Engineering Ltd v. Hutchison IDH Development [1998] CILL 1434; 75
Con. L.R. 1.
The Government ofCeylon v. Chandris [1963] 1 Lloyd's Rep 214.
Toprak Mahsullri Ofisi v. Finagrain Compagnie Commercial Agricole et Financiere S. A. (1979)
2 Lloyd's Rep. 98, p. 106.
Tracomin SA v. Gibbs Nathaniel (Canada) Ltd, [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep 586.
xvi
Trave Schiffahrts GmhHv. Ninemia corp [1986] Q.B. 802 at 808; [1986] 2 W.L.R. 773; [1986] 2
All E.R. 244.
Tzortzis v. Monark Line A/B (1968) 1 All E.R. 949; [1968] 1 WLR406.
Union Nationale des Co-opratives Agricoles de Cereciles v. Robert Ccitterall and Co. Ltd
[1959] 2 Q.B. 44; [1959] 2 W.L.R. 532; [1959] 1 All E.R. 721.
United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd. v. Royal Bank ofCanada (1983) A. C. 168;
[1982] 2 All E.R. 720.
Universalpetroleum v. Handels Unci [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 517.
Westacre Investments Inc v. Jugoimport SPDR Holding Co Ltd., [1998] 3 W.L.R. 770; [1998] 4
All E.R. 570; [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. Ill; [1998] C.L.C. 409.
Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. v. James Miller &amp; Partners Ltd. [1970] A.C.
583; [1970] 1 All E.R. 796.
Woolridge Timber Ltd v. Branntorps Travaru (1982) The Times 14 June.
Zivnostenska Banka National Corporation v. Frankman (1950) A. C. 57.
United States
AAOT Foreign Assoc. Technostoryexport v. International Dev and Trade Services Inc., No. 97-
9075 (2d Cir. Mar. 23, 1998).
American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir. 1968).
Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co.407 U.S. 1 (1972) at 9.
Chromalloy AeroServices and the Arab Republic ofEgypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996).
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
Compagnie d Armement Maritime v. Ompagnie Tunisienne de Navigation, Court of Cassation
(France), March 18 (1980), Rev. Arb. 1980, at 496.
Fertilizer Corp. ofIndia v. I.D.I. Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948 (1981); 530 F. Supp. 542
(SD Ohio 1982), Yearbook Vol. VIII (1983) at 419 (USA No. 41).
Fotochrome Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 Federal Report 2d 512 (2d Cir. 1979).
Generica Ltd. v. Pharmaceutical Basics Inc. 125 F3d 1123 (7th Cir. 1997).
Imperial Ethiopian Government v. Baruch Foster Corp, 535 Federal Report 2.d (1976), p 334;
Yearbook II (1977), p. 252.
Iran Aircraft Industries v. Avco Corp. 980 F2d 141 (2d Cir. 1992).
Konkar Indomitable Corp. v. Fritzen Schiffsagentur and Bereederungs-GmbH, No. 80 Civ. 3230
(S.D.N.Y., 1 May 1981).
Laminoirs-Trefderies-Cableries de Lens SA v. Southwire Co., 484 Federal Supplement (1980), p.
1063; Yearbook VI (1981), p. 247.
Libyan American Oil Company (Liamco) v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482
Federal Supplement (1980), p. 1175; Yearbook VI (1981), p. 248.
xvn
MitsubishiMotors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
National Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Corp. 733 F. Supp. 800 at 819, District Court, D. Del,
March 15, 1990, 85 American Journal ofInternational Law 178 (1991.
Northrop Corporation v. Triad Financial establishment, 593 Federal Supplement 928 (1984).
The Californian Federal District Court.
Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generate de /'Industrie du Papier RAKTA
and Bank ofAmerica, 508 Federal Report. 2d. (1974) p. 969; Yearbook I (1976), p. 205.
re Aimcee Wholessale Corp. & Tomar Prods., 21 N.Y 2d 621, 626-27, 237 N.E, 2d 223, 225
N.Y.S. 2d 968, 971 (1981).
Scherk v. Alberto- Culver Co. (417 US 506).
Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek Inc, 120 F3d 16 (2d Cir. 1997).
XVlll
INTRODUCTION
Arbitration has become a reality at the heart of international commercial relations. As
every modern society seeks to meet the needs of the international market and to integrate
fully into the international commercial community, arbitration has become increasingly
important. This has been recognised in several legal systems, and therefore legal rules that
regulate arbitration are now part of every modem legal system; international arbitral tribunals
are instituted in every region around the world; and international conventions are organising
and harmonising the arbitration rules between states.
The importance and increasing popularity of arbitration in international business, in
preference to litigation, stems from its many advantages. In arbitration, parties hope to use
arbitrators who have some technical knowledge of the subject matter of the dispute, which
may not be expected in the case of ordinary judges.1 They expect to settle their dispute in a
manner more suited to commercial matters: they appreciate the fact that in arbitration there
will be less solemnity and less bureaucracy, the procedures will be less rigid and less
expensive, there will be less publicity and the discussion will take place in a more peaceful
climate.
1 Some times arbitrators are chosen on account of their technical knowledge, e.g. to give a final
decision on the question of whether the goods which have been delivered are of the quality specified
in the contract or to which extent the contract price ought to be reduced. For more information, see
Rene David, Arbitration in International Trade, Kluwer Law and Taxation, (1985), p. 12.
2
See, Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 2nd ed.,
London: Sweet & Maxwell (1991), pp. 53-57; Rene David, op cit., pp. 10-12; Okezie Chukwumerije,
Choice ofLaw in International Commercial Arbitration, Library of Congress Catalog, (1994), p. 6-9;
Wolfgang Peter, Arbitration and Renegotiations of International Investment Agreements, Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers (1986), p. 94.
1
Nevertheless, despite its attractions, the ultimate measure of success in an international
commercial arbitration case will depend on the enforceability of the resulting arbitral award,
otherwise all of the arbitration process will be no more than a waste of time and money.
Therefore, efforts have been made to guarantee international respect for the enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards, by means of international conventions and domestic arbitration laws.
The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
of 1958 (hereafter the New York Convention)3 is the most important international treaty
relating to international commercial arbitration. It paved the way for the recognition and
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, as opposed to enforcing a foreign court judgement,
thus establishing one of the greatest advantages of international commercial arbitration over
conventional court settlement. Moreover, the New York Convention has led to a substantial
degree of uniformity between the different enforcement proceedings of various legal systems.
The unifying effect of the New York Convention has turned enforcement proceedings into a
more or less mechanical approval process which has little in common with adversarial court
proceedings.
However, an arbitral award cannot be expected to be recognised and enforced without being
subject to some control by the competent authority in the country in which enforcement is
sought. This could be established upon various grounds, the violation of which may lead to
the refusal to enforce a foreign arbitral award. Such grounds are not the same in every legal
system, therefore the New York Convention has introduced a list of internationally
recognised grounds, and imposes on its parties an obligation to limit the grounds upon which
an arbitral award can be refused to those set out in Article V paragraphs (1) and (2). One of
3 United Nations Treaty Series (1959) Vol. 330, p. 38, No. 4739. See Annex A, p 288. The New York
Convention was prepared and opened for signature on 10 June 1958, the United Nations Conference
on International Commercial Arbitration, convened in accordance with Resolution 604 of the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, adopted on 3 May 1956. It entered into force on
7th of June 1959, in accordance with Article 12 of the Convention.
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these grounds provides that enforcement of the award may be refused if such enforcement
"would be contrary to the public policy of the country in which enforcement is sought."4
Unfortunately, public policy is an ambiguous notion that could be interpreted in various
ways. This may leave the door widely open for national courts to exercise ultimate control
over foreign arbitral awards, which may expose a foreign arbitral award to additional
grounds, contrary to what had been intended by the drafters of the New York Convention.
Moreover, the rules that could be considered to be of a public policy nature vary from state to
state. Thus, what could be considered to be a valid action under one legal system, could be
contrary to public policy under another. Accordingly, an arbitral award that was correctly
made under a particular national law, may not be recognised and enforced, because it violates
the national public policy rules of the state in which enforcement is sought. This may lead to
uncertainty and confusion, since it will be difficult to secure the enforceability of foreign
arbitral awards under the New York Convention, the consequence of which may undermine
the effectiveness of international commercial arbitration.
This work discusses the role of public policy in the domain of international commercial
arbitration and identifies the problems that may arise from applying the public policy ground.
In dealing with these problems, relevant suggestions and proposals will be presented in light
of recent developments. In the process, a distinction will be drawn between domestic
arbitration and international arbitration. Emanating from this will be an exploration of the
existence of international public policy rules that are more suitable to govern international
commercial disputes - an approach that has already become a trend in cases decided under the
New York Convention.5 In this regard, relevant arbitration rules and court decisions of
4 Article V (2)(b) of The New York Convention.
5
See the International Law Association Report, "Final report on Public Policy as a Bar to
Enforcement of Arbitral awards," London Conference (2000), p. 18. (Hereinafter " the ILA Report").
3
various legal systems will be discussed in order to determine the extent to which courts are
prepared to apply a narrow interpretation of the public policy ground. This will include
examining decisions where enforcement has been refused, and also decisions in which
applications based on public policy have been rejected. However, since it would be difficult
to examine all national arbitration rules of the various legal systems, the research will focus
on the situation in two countries (England6 and Egypt7). The reason for choosing these
countries is that one of them is a Common Law country (England); and the other is a Civil
Law country (Egypt), although Egypt's civil law system at the same time, has its roots in
Islamic law. In addition, the Egyptian legal system may be considered to be the leading legal
system by most of the Arab countries.
This study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter One examines the source of a foreign
arbitral award.8 This chapter aims to give a general background of international commercial
arbitration and the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. It is therefore necessary to begin
by defining 'arbitration' and 'arbitral awards', then to place this subject in the framework of
international commercial arbitration. A distinction will further be drawn between national and
international arbitration and arbitral awards. The execution and resisting to enforce national
and foreign arbitral awards will also be considered in relation to the relevant provisions of the
New York Convention, particularly Article V (2)(b).
6 The English Arbitration Act of 1996, came into force on 31 January 1997. See web site address:
(http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/actsl996/1996023.htm ).
7 The Egyptian Law No 27 of 1994, published in the Egyptian Official Gazette No. 16, 21 April 1994
and became effective on the 22nd of May 1994. Intl. Handbook on Comm. Arb. Suppl. 19. August
1995, Egypt, Annex B, p. 14. See ahead Annex B, p. 293.
8
See, Chapter One, p. 7.
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Chapter Two examines the notion of public policy.9 Several important topics will be
discussed in this chapter: what constitutes a public policy rule; how can a court distinguish
between public policy rules and mandatory rules; the role of public policy in private
international law and international commercial arbitration; and finally a distinction will be
drawn between national and international public policy. The latter distinction will be put in
perspective throughout the following chapters.
Chapter Three deals with the question of whether or not arbitrators are required to consider
the application of public policy and how an arbitrator can determine the applicable public
policy rules in the domain of international commercial arbitration.10 The importance of
examining this subject refers to the duty of an arbitrator to provide the parties with an
enforceable arbitral award.
Chapter Four concerns the degree of control that can be exercised by the courts in the country
of origin over international arbitral awards, and the role of the public policy ground in
extending such control." The importance of examining this subject relates to the fact that
setting aside an international arbitral award for considerations of public policy in the country
of origin is a ground that may lead to a refusal to enforce foreign arbitral awards, under
Article V (l)(e) of the New York Convention.
The effect of public policy on the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under Article V
(2)(b) of the New York Convention will be examined in Chapters Five and Six.
Chapter Five is confined to examination of whether or not the public policy ground could
lead to the refusal of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards if the award was based upon
12
procedures that violate public policy of the country in which enforcement is sought. A
9
See, Chapter Two, p. 59.
10
See, Chapter Three, p. 101.
11
See, Chapter Four, p. 151.
12
See, Chapter Five, p. 184.
5
number of examples and judicial decisions that have been considered as constituting a
violation of procedural public policy will be reviewed. This includes examining whether the
right of the parties to be treated equally is a public policy issue, whether the absence of
reasons in the award can be a valid ground to refuse the enforcement, and finally whether the
lack of impartiality of an arbitrator could be raised under Article V (2)(b) of the New York
Convention.
Chapter Six is devoted to analysing particular examples which concern public policy as a
ground to refuse the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards for reasons that concern the
subject matter of the dispute.13 This includes morality issues, political issues and economic
issues. A summary and conclusion will be provided at the end of this work in Chapter
Seven.14
13
See, Chapter Six, p. 239.
14
See, Chapter Seven, p. 278.
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CHAPTER ONE
ARBITRATION AND ARBITRAL AWARDS
Chapter One
Arbitration and Arbitral Awards
In order to discuss the role of public policy as a ground for refusing to enforce
foreign arbitral awards, it is necessary first to consider the process of international
commercial arbitration and the nature of the resulting arbitral award. This study will start
by examining the nature of the arbitral award and identifying the main characteristics of
the so-called 'foreign arbitral awards'. Therefore, it is important to search for a
comprehensive definition of arbitration, as this would help to discern the bases on which
a resulting award is founded. Then, in examining what constitutes an enforceable foreign
arbitral award, various questions will be posed: First, from where does the resulting
award acquire its compulsory power? Second, on what basis can we determine whether
arbitration is domestic or international in nature, and whether or not we can use the same
basis to determine the character of foreign arbitral awards? What are the reasons behind
enforcing the award voluntarily and on what grounds may the losing party resist the
enforcement of an award in the country of origin? Finally, what are the core grounds and
rules that govern the execution and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. At the heart
of this discussion lies the New York Convention as the most important convention
governing the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. In discussing the New York
Convention the grounds on which recognition and enforcement of an award can be
refused will be highlighted.
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I. Definition of arbitration and arbitral awards
Finding a comprehensive definition for arbitration is problematic. In this regard
Rene David said that:
"It is impossible to devise a definition for arbitration by taking into account the different
national laws, it will be in some ways too broad and in other way too narrow." 1
Then he defines arbitration thus:
"Arbitration is a device whereby the settlement of a question, which is of interest for two
or more persons, is entrusted to one or more other persons the arbitrator or arbitrators
who derive their powers from a private agreement, not from the authority of a state, and
who are to proceed and decide the case on the basis of such an agreement."2
Ahmad Abu al Wafa defines arbitration as: "an agreement to refer the dispute to a
specific person or persons to decide on it. According to this agreement, a party waives his
right of litigating before the national courts, as the arbitrators' decision shall be binding
on the parties."3
It is outside the scope of this work to provide a comprehensive list of all definitions
that have been provided in this regard. However, one can recognise that arbitration has
general features; it is an agreement between two parties who accept by their consent to
resolve their future or existing disputes by an arbitrator or arbitrators.4 The agreement to
1
David, Rene, op. cit., p. 5.
2
Ibid., p. 5.
3 Ahmad Abu al Wafa, Compulsory and Voluntary Arbitration, 5th Ed., Monsha'at al Ma'arif,
Alexandria (1988), p.15 (in Arabic); also see, Samia Rashed, Arbitration in Private International
Relations, First Book (Arbitration Agreement)., Dar al Nahdah al Arabiah (1984), p. 75 (in
Arabic); Ibrahim Ahmmad Ibrahim, Private International law, 3 ed. Dar Al Nahdah Al Arabiah,
(2000), p. 40. (in Arabic). He defines arbitration as: "a legal system which enables the parties to
resolve their dispute without resorting to the courts."
4
It has been said that the consensual nature is the cornerstone of arbitration. See Redfem and
Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 6.
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arbitrate will normally establish the constitution of the arbitral tribunal and its
jurisdiction5; parties must comply with the resulting arbitral award as a final and legally
binding decision, or otherwise, an award may be enforced with the assistance of the state
authorities.
Several legal systems and international conventions provide definitions of the
arbitration process, and these generally comprise the same features as stated above. For
example, Article 7(1) of the Model Law provides a general description of what may
constitute an arbitration agreement:6
"[an] agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which
have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal
relationship, whether contractual or not. An arbitration agreement may be in the
form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement."
Section 6 (1) of the English 1996 Act provides that:
"In this part an 'arbitration agreement' means an agreement to submit to arbitration
present or future disputes (whether they are contractual or not)."7
Article 4 (1) of the Egyptian Law No 27 of 1994 provides that:8
5 The arbitration agreement may be drafted in a simple way, by referring the dispute to be
resolved by an arbitral tribunal or it may be extremely detailed, where parties may include in the
arbitration agreement the procedures according to which the arbitrators should administrate and it
may include the law or the rules that shall govern the substance of the dispute.
6 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, adopted by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law on June 21, (1985). The UNCITRAL Model Law, is a
system of arbitration laws which plays a significant role in establishing rules of arbitration that
are acceptable in countries with different legal, social and economic systems in order to develop
and harmonises these legal systems. See, Gerold Herrmann, "The UNCITRAL Model Law - its
background, salient features and purposes," 1 Arb.Int., (1985), p. 6.
7 V. V. Veeder, "English Arbitration Act of 1996 (ENGLAND)," Int. Handbook on Comm. Arb.,
Suppl. 26, February (1998), Binder 2, p.l. The writer states that: "English courts have considered
arbitration as a contractual method of resolving disputes, by which parties can agree to entrust
their dispute to the final decision of an arbitral tribunal. The arbitral tribunal is required to be
impartial and parties should bind themselves to accept and implement the resulting decision."
8 See Annex B, p. 293.
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"For the purpose of this Law, the term 'arbitration' means voluntary arbitration
agreed upon by the two parties to the dispute according to their own free will,
whether or not the chosen body to which the arbitral mission is entrusted by
agreement of the two parties is a permanent arbitral organisation or centre."
The New York Convention refers to the arbitration agreement in the context of
recognition and enforcement of such agreements. Article II (1) of the Convention
provides:
"Each contracting State shall recognise an agreement in writing under which the
parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or
which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether
contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by
arbitration".
One should recognise that Article II (1) of the New York Convention requires that
an arbitration agreement be made in writing. This requirement is necessary since
arbitration is based upon the will of the parties, and accordingly both parties have an
interest in proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. Also, having a valid
arbitration agreement obliges the court to refer the parties to arbitration.9 Therefore, a
party cannot claim before the court on the same subject matter unless the court finds that
the arbitration agreement is null and void, incapable of being performed or contrary to
public policy.10 A written arbitration agreement is also necessary to guarantee the
9
See Article II (3) of the New York Convention. This also depends on a request which should be
made by a party not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute.
In this regard, the Egyptian Court of Cassation referred to such request as a plea that must be
raised by a party before any discussion of the merits of the dispute. Case. 24.05. 1966, year 17th,
page 1224; see also Case. 15.02.1972, year 23, p. 168; Case. 06.01.19976, year 27, p. 138. See,
Abdul Hamid El Ahdab, "The New Egyptian Act in Civil and Commercial Matters," 12 J. Int.
Arb., June (1995), p. 65 at 75; the same has been provided in Article 13 of the Egyptian law of
1994; also see Article 8 (1) of the Model Law.
10 Mohamed I.M. Aboul-Enein, "The principles on which arbitration is based and practiced in
Arab and African Countries adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law of Arbitration," 1 Journal of
Arab Arbitration (1999), p. 4.
10
recognition of such agreement as this is required by some legal systems.11 The difficulty
that may arise from this requirement is that national laws differ as to when the written
12form of the arbitration agreement is met. Several legal systems and the Model Law
provide a clear guide of what may constitute a written form. Article 7 (2) of the Model
Law includes, "telex or other means of telecommunication which provide a record of the
agreement".13 The Model Law considers the reference in a contract to a document
containing an arbitration clause as constituting a valid arbitration agreement, providing
that the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that clause part of the
contract.14
A. Definition of arbitral awards
Having defined the general features of what may constitute an arbitration
agreement, one must seek to find a definition of the arbitral award itself. Scholars agree
11 Not including an arbitration agreement in a written form could be a reason to invalidate the
arbitration agreement in countries which consider such requirement as fundamental. See, for
example, Article 12 of the Egyptian law of 1994: "The arbitration agreement must be in writing,
on penalty of nullity. An arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in a document signed
by the parties or in an exchange of letters, telegrams or other means of written communication";
to the same conclusion this was decided by the Netherlands' Courts in North American Soccer
League Marketing Inc. (US) v Admiral International Marketing,and Trading BV and Frisol
Eurosport BV. Court of First Instance, Dordrecht (Netherlands), August 18, (1982), Yearbook
Commercial Arbitration 1985, vol. X, at 490. An arbitral award was invalidated for lack of
written form of the arbitration agreement. Cited by Rubino Sammartano, M., International
Arbitration Law, Kluwer, 1990, p. 151.
12 See for example, Section 5 of the English Act of 1996; Article 12 of the Egyptian Law No. 27
of (1994).
13 The same approach was considered by the English Court of Appeal in Birse Construction Ltd v
St David Ltd [2000] B.L.R. 57; 70 Con. L.R. 10.
14 It has been reported that the New York Convention also includes an exchange of letters or
telegrams as agreement made in writing, regardless of whether or not it was signed by one of the
parties. See Berg, van den A. J., The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958, The Hague
Deventer, Netherlands: kluwer (1981), p. 171.
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that there is a lack of clear definition as to what may constitute an award.15 It has been
reported that during its deliberation on the Model Law, the Working Group repeatedly
emphasised the great significance of defining the term arbitral award, as this was
intended to determine which kinds of decisions would be subject to recourse under
Article 34 of the Model Law. However, several proposals were rejected, as it was not
clear whether the questions of procedure should be treated as arbitral awards, and the
Working Group decided not to include a definition in the Model Law.16
Nevertheless, there are general features that may constitute what could be considered as
an arbitral award.17 An arbitral award is the final procedure in the arbitration process, by
which the arbitral tribunal determines all of the issues that have been submitted by the
18.
parties to arbitration in a certain and final order. The arbitral tribunal's decision then
terminates the arbitral proceedings and shall be binding on the parties.19
15 There is no internationally accepted definition of the term "award". Redfem & Hunter provide
that none of the international conventions which deal with arbitration provide a definition of the
arbitral award, including the Geneva Treaties, the New York Convention or the Model Law. Even
though the New York Convention is specifically directed to the recognition and enforcement of
awards, the nearest it comes to a definition is: "The term 'arbitral awards' shall include not only
awards made by arbitrators appointed for each case but also those made by permanent arbitral
bodies to which the parties have submitted"; Article I (2) of the New York Convention; See, A.
Redfem and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 3ed,
London: Sweet & Maxwell (1999), p. 364.
16
See, Berger, Klaus. P. International Economic Arbitration, Denver Boston: Kluwer, (1993), p.
588, referring to the UN Doc. A/CN.9/246, para. 194; A/CN.9/264, Article 34, para. 3.
17 One should keep in mind that these general features vary according to what the applicable rules
will state.
18
In Tatem Steam Navigation Co Ltd v. Anglo-Canadian Co Ltd (1935) LI. L. R 161. The court
defined the meaning of "All matters within the arbitrator's jurisdiction" as: "... all matters that
have in fact been raised before him; that is, upon which either party relied. Points which have not
specifically been raised by either party or argued will not invalidate an award."
19 This includes both the arbitral tribunal's decision and the parties' agreement to resolve the
dispute in a settlement award. The legal nature of settlement awards will be examined later in this
chapter. See ahead, p. 13.
12
One should take into consideration here that the arbitral tribunal may render orders or
70
awards during the arbitration proceedings, such as interim or partial awards. However,
examining such awards is outside the scope of this research, since they do not meet with
the requirements of a final and binding arbitral award that could be enforced in foreign
countries. There have been doubts about the enforceability of such pre-award orders
under the New York Convention. Many writers consider such orders or awards to be non-
enforceable under the New York Convention, due to the lack of finality of the award and
the possibility that a reverse decision could still be taken by the arbitrators on the same
issue.21 This does not meet the requirement of Article V (l)(e) of the New York
Convention that the award contain a conclusive decision which is not subject to further
22revisal by the tribunal within the arbitral proceedings. The focus of this study concerns
only the final award which puts an end to all of the issues that have been submitted to
arbitration, and which is ready to be enforced as a foreign arbitral award, rather than
examining such other orders or awards as may be made by the tribunal during the
arbitration process.
20 There are several types of decisions that can be made by the arbitral tribunal. In the course of
the arbitration procedure, the arbitrators may have to render several decisions either procedural or
substantive, such as, injunctions, procedural orders, interim awards, interlocutory awards, partial
awards, consent awards, final awards etc. For example, Article 2 (iii) of the ICC Rules, defines an
award as it includes, inter alia, an interim, partial or final Award; also see, V. V. Veeder, op. cit.,
p. 47.
21 Klaus Peter Berger, op. cit., p. 345.
22 See Micheal Pryles, "Interlocutory Orders and Convention Awards: the Case of Resort
Condominiums v. Bolwell," 10 Arb. Int., (1994), p. 385. However, other scholars consider that
interim or partial awards are also enforceable under the Convention as long as theyfinally resolve
a part of the dispute. See Pierre-Yves Gunter, "Enforcing Arbitral Awards, Injunctions and
Orders," Internet Address: http://www.psplaw.ch/Publications/AMBAR-l .html.
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B. The legal nature of arbitral awards
It is important to understand the obligatory power of arbitration and its resulting
award by analysing the legal nature of the arbitral award. Two questions arise here: first,
where does arbitration get its obligatory power; and second, whether the decision of an
arbitral tribunal is to be regarded as equivalent to a court decision, or is it to be treated as
a private agreement? This problem creates a great deal of complexity, especially in the
case of foreign arbitral awards.23 It is, therefore, important to decide whether these
awards are to be considered as having the character of a contract, or of a foreign
judgement.
Two issues have to be considered in this regard. On the one hand, since arbitral
awards derive their binding force not from the sovereignty of the state, but from private
contract24, and therefore the tribunal's decision should be considered to be no more than
25
supplemental to the arbitral agreement. On the other hand, arbitration could be regarded
as part of the judicial system of the state. According to the latter view, it has been argued
23 This is important in order to determine the law that should be applied to the enforcement of the
award and the possibility to apply an international convention for the enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards, such as, the New York Convention, or otherwise, to apply other Treaties that
relate to the enforcement of foreign judgements.
24 See Jan Paulsson, "Arbitration Unbounded : Award Detached From the Law of Its Country of
Origin," 30 INT'L & COMP. L. Q., (1981), p. 362. He states that: "An arbitrator derives his/her
power from the powers conferred by the parties. His/her authority is entirely a private matter "and
it would be a rather artificial interpretation to deem his/her power be derived, and very indirectly
at that, from a tolerance of the State of the place of arbitration."
25 Carlo Croff, "The Applicable law in an International commercial Arbitration: Is It Still a
Conflict of Laws Problem?" Int.Law., (1982), p. 613. This was the trend followed by the
Egyptian courts. In a judgement rendered by the Giza Court on 27 January 1987, cases No.
10063/83 and 5795/85, the court held that: "Arbitration belongs to the category of contracts
consensual, which come into existence through the exchange of an offer and acceptance without
requiring any special form whether in respect of the arbitration clause or the submission
agreement"; Ahmed S. El-Kosheri, "EGYPT," Int. Handbook on Comm. Arb., Suppl. 26.
February (1998), Binder, 2., p. 8.
14
that the arbitral award may not become legally binding and ready to be enforced unless it
has been confirmed or declared enforceable by a competent authority, mainly by a court
order. Proponents of this view argue that if such confirmation is required and the award
was confirmed or declared enforceable by a court in the country where it was made, then
the award should be regarded as having the nature of a judgement. Moreover, the
supporters of this view argue that the competent authority to undertake justice in a state is
a function which belongs to the public authorities of the state where this authority derives
its jurisdiction from the law. An arbitral tribunal also derives its authority from the same
source, as the law permits the parties to oust the jurisdiction of the courts and agree to
resolve their dispute by private persons. Thus the law, in permitting such ousting of
jurisdiction, is what makes the arbitral award equivalent to a judicial decision made by a
state court.27
Without exploring the above two opinions in depth, one may say that an arbitral
award has a mixed nature.28 It is based on an arbitration agreement between the disputing
parties and it ends by a decision made by the arbitral tribunal. This distinctive nature of
the arbitral award makes it different from an agreement, as it could be enforced without
requiring the merits of the case to be reviewed by a state court. Also, arbitration is not
part of the judicial system provided for by the state, since the decision arrived at by a
court is different from an arbitral award. The Court decision is rendered by judges who
derive their authority from the state, whereas the power of the arbitrators is derived from
26
Merrifield Ziegler & Co. v. Liverpool Cotton Association Ltd.(2) (1911) 105 Law Times 97.
27 Ahmed S. El-Koshen, "EGYPT," op. cit., p. 8.
28 Rene David, op. cit., p. 78 and 133. Ele considers arbitration as having a mixed nature. "It is an
institution both within the law of contract and within the law of procedure"; also Ibrahim
Ahmmad Ibrahim, 3ed., op. cit., p. 28. He considers that arbitration has its own nature.
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a commission given to them by the parties. Also, the rules applying to the enforcement
of arbitral awards are generally different from those applying to the enforcement of court
30 ...decisions , especially ifwe consider the role of the international conventions that govern
the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, such as the New York Convention of 1958.
Legal nature ofAwards in agreed terms
One should consider the different nature of settlement awards or what is known as
awards in agreed terms. During the arbitration proceedings parties may decide to resolve
their dispute by a settlement which ends the dispute and may ask the arbitrator to record
the settlement agreement in the arbitral award.31 The trend in most of the internal and
international arbitration rules is to consider settlement awards as arbitral awards that can
be enforced like any arbitral decision. Several legal systems and the Model law have
followed this trend.33 For example, Section 51 of the English 1996 Act regard such
29 Parties to arbitration enjoy a greater degree of control which may be passed to the arbitrators.
Therefore, the consensual basis of an arbitration thus radically different from that of plaintiff and
defendant in litigation in the courts. See Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v. South
India Shipping Corporation Ltd. [1981] AC 909. p. 964; [1981] 2 W.L.R. 141; [1981] 1 All E.R.
289, H.L.(E.).
30 One should consider here that there are exceptional cases, as some legal systems provide the
same rules for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and foreign judgements. This is the case
in some countries, for example, the Jordanian law for the Enforcement of Foreign Awards No 8
of 1953 is applicable to both the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and foreign court
decisions.
31 Parties may prefer to see their agreement ratified and confirmed by an arbitral tribunal as an
award on agreed terms, or as an award by consent. See Rubino Sammartano . M., op. cit., p. 438.
32 Settlement awards can be enforced under the New York Convention. See Van den Berg, op.
cit., p. 49.
33 Article. 30 of the Model Law of (1985) provides that: "An award on agreed terms... shall state
that it is an award. Such an award has the same status and effect as any other award on the merits
of the case"; also see, Article 26 of the ICC Rules of 1998; Article 26 (8) of the LCIA Rules of
1998; Article 41 of the Egyptian law of 1994; also see, Ahmed S. El-Kosheri, "EGYPT," op. cit.,
p. 38.
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agreed awards as having the same status and effects as any other award on the merits of
the case. Section 51 provides a non-mandatory rule that, unless otherwise agreed by the
parties, the tribunal shall terminate the substantive proceedings and if so requested by the
parties, and not objected to by the tribunal, shall record the settlement in the form of an
agreed award.34
One may conclude here that recording in the award that it is an award on agreed
terms gives a settlement award the same legal nature as a decision made by the arbitral
tribunal. This also explains the power of the arbitral tribunal over the settlement award, as
the tribunal could refuse to confirm the parties' settlement if it violates public policy35,
such refusal may deprive the settlement award from its legal nature as a final arbitral
award ready to be enforced.
In the light of the definitions explored above, the study will now turn to the
question of how and on which bases the character of foreign arbitral awards can be
determined. To address this matter, it will be necessary first to distinguish between
domestic and international commercial arbitration, and then to determine whether the
34 Section 51 (3) of the English 1996 Act. One should mention in this regard that a signature of
the two parties is required. See Section 52 of the English 1996 Act. For the question of what
happens when a dispute arises from the settlement agreement itself (would it be settled by the
former arbitration clause or does it necessitate a new arbitration clause?) see, Klaus Peter Berger,
op. cit., pp. 583- 587.
33
Ibid., p. 584. The writer states that arbitrators can refuse to render the award on agreed terms if
"the terms of the settlement are illicit or utterly unfair, or obviously violate mandatory norms or
the order public international"', also see, Andrew Tweeddale and Keren Tweeddale, A Practical
Approach to Arbitration Law, Blackstone Press Ltd. (1999), p. 169; D Mark Cato, Arbitration
Practice and Procedure, Lloyd's of London Press Ltd (1992), p. 88; The drafters of the
UNCITRAL expected the tribunal to refuse to record as awards those settlements that they deem
unlawful or against public policy at the place of arbitration. See UN Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1976,
p. 179.
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criteria that are used in distinguishing between domestic and international arbitration
could also be used to determine the character of foreign arbitral awards.
II. International Commercial Arbitration and International
Arbitral Awards
Domestic arbitration is known as such because it has a close connection with the
place in which arbitration procedures took place. There are several factors that link the
nature of the arbitration process and resulting final award with the state in which the
arbitration took place. For example, where the transaction which is the subject of
arbitration has been constituted and ought to be performed in a given state, and the
arbitration procedures and the substance of the dispute are governed by the law of that
state, the arbitral award will be made and enforced in the territory of that state. According
to this example all elements point to a sole and particular state.36
International commercial arbitration on the other hand, indicates that one or more
foreign elements are involved in arbitration which, therefore, make it not wholly
connected to the state in which arbitration proceedings take place. One should here
consider that in international commercial relations, parties may have different
nationalities, or they may be domiciled in different countries, and the transaction may
relate to goods to be delivered in a country other than the country where they made their
contract. Therefore, determining the context of international commercial arbitration
36 Howard M. Holtzmann & Joseph E. Neuhaus, A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration: Legislative History and Commentary, Deventer: Kluwer
Law and Taxation Publishers, (1989), p. 1055.
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requires consideration of a number of key connecting factors: the nationality of the
parties; the seat where the arbitration took place; the law applicable to the dispute; and
whether or not the award is intended to be enforced within the jurisdiction of the national
courts.
Generally, there are two main criteria that have been used to determine the nature
of international commercial arbitration. The first criterion mainly considers the parties
to an arbitration, that is, their nationality, their habitual place of residence, or, if the party
is a 'corporate entity', the seat of its central control and management. However, this
criterion disregards the fact that sometimes parties of the same nationality or parties who
are resident in the same country may be engaged in international business transactions.
Therefore, it may not be sufficient to determine the nature of international commercial
arbitration by relying on this criterion alone. The second criterion involves analysing the
nature of the dispute, so that arbitration will be treated as international if it involves the
TO
interests of international trade, regardless of the parties' nationality. The latter approach
is followed in the ICC Rules, Article 1(1) of which uses 'the nature of the dispute' as a
test in order to determine the jurisdiction of the International Court of Arbitration of the
ICC. It provides that:
"The function of 'the Court' is to provide for the settlement by arbitration of
business disputes of an international character..."
37 Other less popular criteria could be mentioned here: The nationality of the arbitrators; The
country where the principal place of the arbitral organisation is situated; and the country whose
courts would have had original Jurisdiction to hear the case. However, all of these criteria have
been heavily criticised. Mahmoud S. El-Sharkawi, "The Terms International and Commercial
under the New Egyptian Arbitration Law," 1 Journal ofArab Arbitration (1999), p. 11 at 14.
38 Redfern and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 15; Andrew and Keren, op. cit., p. 4.
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Accordingly, the ICC prefers to rely upon the character of the dispute rather than relying
on the parties' different nationality. This was confirmed by an ICC publication:39
"By virtue of its object the contract can nevertheless extend beyond national
borders, when for example a contract is concluded between two nationals of the same
state for performance in another country, or when it is concluded between a state, and a
subsidiary of a foreign company doing business in that state."
In one particular case the ICC tribunal held that the arbitration before it was truly
international because the arbitration was based on a contract involving the parties of
different nationalities, the movement of equipment and services across national frontiers,
and the payment in different currencies.40
Through a review of the different international and domestic law rules, one could
recognise that there are different ways to identify the international nature of a particular
arbitration. In this regard Article 1 (3) of the UNCITRAL Model law provides various
tests for determining when arbitration is international. It uses both the different place of
business of the parties and the nature of the dispute as tests and provides two additional
criteria. Firstly, the situation of the arbitration proceedings outside the place of business
of one of the parties.41 Secondly, if the parties expressly agree that the subject matter of
the arbitration agreement relates to more than one country. The latter criterion may create
some difficulties, as parties who are nationals of the same state could declare an
otherwise domestic arbitration to be international by merely stating that the subject matter
39 The International Solution to International Business Disputes- ICC Arbitration, (ICC
Publication No. 301, 1977) at 19.
40 ICC Award 5029/1986, Volume II, 1986-1990, Sigvard Jarvin, Yves Derains, Jean-Jacques
Amaldez, Collection ofICC Arbitral Awards, p. 69.
41 Article 1 (3)(a) and (b) of the Model law; also see the criteria provided in paragraph (b) of the
same Article.
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of their arbitration agreement relates to more than one country.42 They may do that in
order to benefit from the liberal treatment of international commercial arbitration or to
circumvent mandatory rules that are specifically designed to regulate domestic
arbitration.43
The Egyptian arbitration law of 1994 has set several criteria to determine when
arbitration is international, and is broad enough to cover a wide range of cases. Article 3
classifies arbitration as international:
"Whenever its subject matter is a dispute related to international commerce in any
of the following cases:
First: if the principal places of business of the two parties to the arbitration are
situated in two different states at the time of the conclusion of the arbitration
agreement. If either party to arbitration has more than one place of business, due
consideration shall be given to the place of business which has the closest
relationship with the arbitration agreement. If either party to the arbitration does not
have a place of business, then the place of its habitual residence shall be relied
upon. Second: If the parties to the arbitration have agreed to resort to a permanent
arbitral organisation or to an arbitration centre having its headquarters in the Arab
Republic of Egypt or abroad.44 Third: If the subject matter of the dispute falling
within the scope of the arbitral agreement is linked to more than one country.
Fourth: If the principal places of business of the two parties to the arbitration are
situated in the same state at the time of the conclusion of the arbitration agreement,
but one of the following places is located outside said state:
(a) the place of arbitration as determined in the arbitration agreement pursuant to
the methods provided therein for determining it; (b) the place where a substantial
part of the obligations emerging from the commercial relationship between the
42 See Article 1 (3)(c) of the Model Law.
43 This subject will be examined in more depth in Chapter Three, see p. 101.
44 The Egyptian Court of Cassation held on various occasions that arbitration can take place
abroad, in spite of the fact that Egyptian courts would have certainly had jurisdiction if the parties
had not agreed to arbitrate abroad. Decision of 12 April 1956. Case No. 369 - 22nd; Decision of
26 April 1982 Case No. 714, 47th; Decision of 13 June 1983. Case No. 1259. 49th; Decision of
21 January 1985, Case No. 245. 50th; Decision of 13 January 1986. Case No. 326. 51st; Decision
of 5 May 1975. Case No. 450, Collection of Court of Cassation Decisions (26), p. 535. See
Ahmed S. El-Kosheri, "EGYPT," op. cit., p. 50; Ashraf al Rifaie, Order Public and Arbitration of
Private International Relations., PhD thesis, Ein Chams University, Egypt (1996) (in Arabic), p.
179.
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parties shall be performed; (c) the place with which the subject matter of the dispute
is most closely connected."
It should be noted that the Egyptian law has adopted the same approach provided
for in the Model Law. The above article adds however, that an arbitration is
'international' if the parties agree to hold the arbitration proceedings in a permanent
arbitral institution situated in Egypt45, in reference to the Cairo Regional Centre for
International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA)46 or even abroad, such as the (ICC)47,
(AAA)48, (LCIA).49
In England the distinction between domestic and non-domestic arbitration
agreements is based on the nationality, habitual residence, place of incorporation or
central control and management of the parties. This approach was first introduced in the
1975 English Act and repeated in the 197950 and 1988 Acts. Section 85 (2) of the 1996
Act defines domestic arbitration as:
43 Mahmoud S. El-Sharkawi, op. cit., p. 14; Ahmad Sharaf al Deen, Arbitration in Disputes of
International Contracts, Abna'a Wahbah Hassan publishers (1993), p. 74 (in Arabic); Ashraf al
Rifaie, op. cit., p. 112 (in Arabic); Mohamed I.M. Aboul-Enein, "The Development of
International Commercial Arbitration Laws In the Arab World," a paper presented to the
conference of "International Commercial Arbitration" Cairo, January 28. 2000, p. 7.
46 The Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA). Under the
Auspices of the Asian African Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC). See Internet address:
(http://www.crcica.org.eg).
47 International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Court of Arbitration. See Internet address'.
(http://www.iccwbo.org).
48 The American Arbitration Association (AAA) Commercial Arbitration. See Internet address:
(http://www.adr.org).
49 The London Court of International Arbitration 1998 (LCIA). See Internet addres:
(http://www.lcia-arbitration.com).
30 Article 3 (7) of the Arbitration Act of 1979 defines as domestic arbitrations which take place in
the United Kingdom, if the parties to them are UK citizens at the time they enter into the
submission agreement. See, Rubmo-Sammartano. M., op. cit., p. 15.
22
"An arbitration agreement to which none of the parties is- (a) an individual who is a
national of, or habitually resident in, a state other than the United Kingdom, or(b) a
body corporate which is incorporated in, or whose central control and management
is exercised in, a state other than the United Kingdom, and under which the seat of
the arbitration (if the seat has been designated or determined) is in the United
Kingdom."
Accordingly, any arbitration, which is not domestic according to this definition, is
therefore by implication, international in character. However, Section 85 (2) was not
brought into force since it establishes the distinction between national and international
arbitration on the parties' nationality, which was considered as violating Article 6 and 25
of the Treaty of Rome51 for creating direct or indirect discrimination against foreign
citizens and legal persons of the European Union.52
The question now is to what extent are the criteria thus far considered applicable in
regard to determining the character of arbitral awards? The following section will explore
this question and argue that international arbitral awards may be seen as such because
they result from international arbitration and therefore they should be distinguished from
foreign arbitral awards.
A. Domestic arbitral awards and international arbitral awards
Generally, there are two types of arbitral awards - domestic arbitral awards and
international arbitral awards. The first type, are known as such because they result from
31
Treaty Establishing the European Community as Amended by Subsequent Treaties Rome, 25
March, 1957. Article 6 provides that: "Within the scope of application of this Treaty, and without
prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on the grounds of
nationality shall be prohibited. The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to
in Article 189c may adopt rules designed to prohibit such discrimination."
32
See, V. V. Veeder, op. cit., p. 5; Philip Alexander Securities and futures Ltd v Bamberger
(1996) 22 Y.B. Com. Arb., 872; Andrew and Keren, op. cit., p. 273.
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domestic arbitration as explained above. The second type, international arbitral awards,
should also be considered as such because they result from international commercial
arbitration, therefore, determination of their nature should be based on the same criteria
that are used in deciding the international nature of arbitration.53 The distinction that can
be drawn between these two types may relate to the courts' treatment of international
arbitral awards. International arbitral awards that result from international arbitrations
should be treated under more liberal standards than purely domestic awards- (for
example, by giving greater weight to the parties' autonomy by applying a foreign law to
govern the procedures or the substance of the dispute if this was agreed upon by the
parties). This may lead to the application of more liberal standards when national courts
of the country in which the award was made are asked to set the award aside for
considerations ofpublic policy, as will be explored in more detail later.54
In light of the above, foreign arbitral awards should be distinguished from
international arbitral awards. A foreign arbitral award is known as such because the
award will be enforced in a country that considers it foreign regardless of whether it is
considered a domestic or international arbitral award in the country in which it was made.
B. Foreign arbitral awards
One cannot determine the nature of foreign arbitral awards on the same criteria
used above in deciding the nature of international arbitration. As explained above,
53 See Article 1 (3) of the Model Law; Article 3 of the Egyptian law of 1994; Section 85 (2) of the
English 1996 Act.
34 National courts are only expected to exercise a limited degree of control over international
arbitral awards. This will be explained in more depth in the following chapters.
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deciding the international nature of arbitration may rely on the existence of several
elements, such as the different nationality or domicile of the parties. Using such elements
may not be suitable in deciding the nature of foreign arbitral awards. For example, the
nationality of the parties is an irrelevant factor to determine the nature of foreign arbitral
awards, since the New York Convention is applicable to the situation where an award is
made abroad in an arbitration between parties of the same nationality.55 This can also be
inferred from the title of the New York Convention as it refers to "the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards" and not to enforcement of international arbitral
awards.
However, determining the nature of foreign arbitral awards can be achieved through
using two different criteria. The first is the geographical criterion, and the second is
according to the applicable procedural law.56
1. The geographical criterion
Various international conventions and arbitration rules of national laws and
international institutions indicate that there is a preference for the nationality of the place
55 One should mention here that the application of New York Convention to cases which involve
parties of the same nationality may cause problems in jurisdictions that require in an international
arbitration to be between foreigners. See Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 16. The writer states that:
"This was the case under Article 2 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure, where on the base of
this Article, the court of First Instance ofRavenna refused to enforce an award made in London in
an arbitration between two Italians. S.P.A. Paulo v. Augusto Miserocchi, Tribunal ofRavenna,
April 15, 1970, Italy no. 3. However, the Italian Supreme Court reversed this decision on this
point and in subsequent decisions the Italian courts have affirmed the decision of the Italian
Supreme Court, where this issue seems to be settled."
36 The New York Convention is established on these two criteria, Article 1(3) provides that; "This
Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory
of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought,
and arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to
arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and
enforcement are sought."
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where the award was made. For example, Article 1 of the Geneva Convention of 192757
deals with awards made in the territory of another contracting state. Article I (1) of the
New York Convention deals with recognition of awards made in the territory of a state
58other than that in which recognition is applied for. This means that an award is national
if it was made within the territory over which the courts of that state exercise their
jurisdiction, otherwise the award will be a foreign arbitral award if it was made out side
of the territory of the state.59
However, the geographical criterion is not always satisfactory, as parties of the
same nationality may agree to arbitrate abroad on a domestic transaction, in order that
they can enforce the resulting award in the country of their origin under the provisions of
the New York Convention. Moreover, applying the 'geographical criterion' may lead to
problems concerning arbitrations which have been held in one country, but have been
subscribed by the arbitrators in another country. This type of problem can occur in
international commercial arbitration. In the case of Hiscox v. Outhwaite,60 the House of
Lords held that an award which had been signed in Paris is a French award,
notwithstanding the fact that the entire arbitration had been conducted in England under
77 Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Awards, September 26, 1927, League of
Nations Treaty Series (1929-30) Vol. XCII, p. 302.
58 This may include awards that have been rendered in countries which are not party to the New
York Convention, unless a member state has elected to apply the convention on "reciprocity
basis", by declaring that it will apply the Convention only to arbitral awards made in the territory
of another Contracting State. See Article I (3) of the New York Convention.
59 This criterion is adopted in many laws and also by the New York Convention, although this
convention recognise that some arbitral awards rendered within the territory of the state, may not
be regarded as national awards in the state according to Article I (1), as will be explained in the
second criterion.
60 Hiscox v. Outhwaite [1992] 1 A.C. p. 562; [1991] 3 W.L.R. p. 297; [1991] 3 All E.R. p. 641;
[1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep. P. 435.
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English law. Consequently, the award was considered 'foreign' in terms of the New York
Convention. According to this decision, the English courts were deemed competent not
only to set the award aside but also to determine the enforcement of the award as a
foreign arbitral award. This decision was criticised as leading to "the dilution of the
territoriality principle".61
2. The applicable law criterion
The second criterion is also provided in Article I (1) of the New York Convention,
which defines foreign arbitral awards by including both the first and the second criteria.
Part two of Article I (1) of the Convention provides that: "it shall also apply to arbitral
awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and
enforcement are sought".62 The formula used in Articles I (1) was intended, as the
Convention considered that some countries may regard arbitral awards, which have been
made under foreign arbitration rules, as foreign awards.63
According to this criterion the nationality of an arbitral award can be determined
according to the applicable law. For example, if an award was made in state A, but
governed by the procedural law of state B then, it will be considered as having the
nationality of state B. Accordingly, if the arbitration procedures were governed by a
61 See Klaus Peter Berger, op. cit., p. 657.
62 Also see, Article V (1 )(e) of the New York Convention, which provides that enforcement of the
award could be refused if the award had been set aside "in the country in which, or under the law
ofwhich, that award was made".
63
Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 23, referring to France and Germany as examples; also see, the
ECOSOC Draft of 1955, the UN DOC E/ 2704.
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foreign law the resulting award will then be regarded as a foreign arbitral award, even if
it was made within the territory of the state where arbitration took place.
In conclusion, foreign arbitral awards are different from purely domestic and
international arbitral awards. This distinction becomes relevant when enforcement of the
award is confronted. As on the one hand, resisting the enforcement of national arbitral
awards can be achieved by means of appealing or challenging to set the award aside,
which may take place before the competent authority of the country in which or under the
law of which the award was made. In contrast, recognition and enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards takes place in a country that considers the award foreign, and thus subject
to different rules which includes the application of international conventions.64
The distinction between national arbitral awards and foreign arbitral awards has
been recognised by several national and international arbitration rules which are mainly
based on the procedure that should be followed in resisting the enforcement of each type.
For example, Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides grounds for setting a
national arbitral award aside separate from the grounds set forth under Article 36 to
refuse the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. The same distinction is
known to several national arbitration laws, for example: Sections 67, 68 and 69 of the
1996 English Act concern challenging arbitral awards which were made in England,
whereas Sections 99 to 104 concern the applicable rules to the recognition and
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Likewise, the Egyptian Arbitration Law of 1994
provides in Article 58 grounds to recourse against a national arbitral award different from
64 Such as the rules provided in the New York Convention.
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those which are provided in Articles 60 to 63 which concern the enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards.
Finally, the extent of control practiced over national arbitral awards may be different
from the control practiced over foreign arbitral awards. Various national legal systems
demonstrate that foreign arbitral awards should be subject to merely formal control by the
courts, by ensuring that certain minimum standards have been observed in the making of
the award.65 This, however, will be explained later in the context of applying the public
policy ground as a means to resist the enforcement of arbitral awards, which will be
demonstrated in the course of this study.
III. Executing Arbitral Awards
A party who succeeds in a commercial arbitration will expect to be able to enforce
the award without any further delay.66 However, if the losing party refuses to carry out
the award voluntarily, then the award, if necessary, can be enforced by a court order.67
65Georges R. Delaume, "Relfections on the Effectiveness of International Arbitral Awards," 12
J.Int.Arb 1, 1995, p. p. 6. He provides an additional distinction based upon the effect of the
court's decision on the validity of the arbitral award: "Judicial review at the place of making
concerns the validity of the award and is of direct relevance to its finality since an adverse
decision may lead to the annulment of the award. At the stage of recognition and enforcement of
foreign awards, the scope of judicial review is limited to deciding whether the award should be
granted or denied recognition. In other words, a denial of recognition may affect the effectiveness
of the award but has no bearing upon its validity."
66 An arbitral award is binding on the parties, not only by the rules applied to the arbitration but
also by their agreement. For example, Article 32. (2) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules states
that the award shall be final and binding on the parties and that the parties undertake to carry out
the award without delay; also see, Article 24 of the ICC Rules of 1998; Article 32 of the LCIA
Rules of 1998.
67 Hazel Fox, "States and the Undertaking to Arbitrate," 37 Int'l & Coinp. L.Q., 1988, pp. 2-3.
She provides that: "the enforcement powers of the state are made available through its courts to
back up the effectiveness of the arbitration process."
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This section considers the mechanisms available to ensure that the losing party complies
with the terms of the award.
A. Voluntary execution
Voluntary execution may arise in particular cases, such as in business relations
which are likely to continue, or when the arbitration has been administered under the
auspices of some trade association ofwhich the losing party is a member.
Commercial pressure is one of the main reasons to ensure the voluntary submission to the
arbitral award.68 This may particularly occur if parties belong to the same social milieu,
where they may fear that their reputation would be jeopardised if they do not perform the
award voluntarily. They may also fear loss of some of the advantages attached to
membership of the association under the auspices of which the award was made.69 Non¬
performance may also be interpreted as evidence that one's business is in a critical
financial situation. Execution of the award may also be guaranteed by a security
constituted when the contract was made or by the fact that property belonging to the
losing party is in the hands of the winner.70
68 Abu Zaid Redwan, General Sources in International Commercial Arbitration, Dar al Fihkir al
Arabi (1981), p. 49, (in Arabic).
69 For example, some associations, notably the 'London Com Trade Association and Grain and
Feed Trade Association G.A.F.T.A', can make it easier to obtain an award that is voluntarily
executed. See, Pierre Lalive, "Enforcing Awards, in Sixty Years of ICC Arbitration; A Look at
the Future", ICC Int'l Court ofArbitration ed., 1984, p. 318, 319.
70
See, Rene David, op. cit., p.357.
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The most powerful pressure that may be brought on the reluctant party involves
sanctions of a financial nature.71 If a continuing trade relationship exists between the
parties, it may well be in the interests of the losing party to perform the award
voluntarily, otherwise he risks the possible future business with the winning party. Other
sanctions may take the form of preventing the defaulting party from being authorised in
future to resort to arbitration administered by the chamber of commerce or the relevant
• • 72 • • • 73trade association. This can also be found in the ICSID arbitration , and where the
losing party was a state, it may risk not being able to obtain further loans from the World
Bank.74
Pressure may also be exerted by the threat of adverse publicity. This method is
mainly used by trade associations who may also exclude the recalcitrant parties from the
relevant association or market.75 Thus, the trade association to which a party belongs will
71 Redfern and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 418.
72 For example, according to the standard contract for the sale of 'cereals' drafted by the
Economic Commission for Europe of UNO facilities for arbitration may be refused by a
defendant if it is known that the plaintiff has refused to perform any arbitral award in a previous
case.
73 International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. The ICSID was established
under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States which came into force on October 14, 1966.
74
Moreover, it has been reported that, during recent years, commercial companies and
businessmen from 83 countries were able to freeze Saudi assets outside the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia on the basis of international arbitral awards. These awards should have been executed in
Saudi Arabia. However, this was not possible and this led businessmen and companies to freeze
Saudi Arabia assets abroad. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia decided to ratify the 1958 New York
Convention on the Recognition and Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, by issuance of Royal
Decree No. M/l 1 dated 29 December 1993, adopted by the Council ofMinisters on 27 December
1993 and published in the Official Gazette (Umm A1 Qura) on 21 first January 1994. See, Abdul
Hamid El-Ahdab, "Saudi Arabia Accedes to the New York Convention," J. Int. Arb., p. 87.
73
Henry P. De Vries, 'International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute For
National Courts', 57 Tul.L.Rev., (1982), p. 44. He states, in footnote 9, that: "In domestic and
international commerce, there are sectorial associations or commodities exchanges that inflict
sanctions on members who do not observe arbitral awards pronounced according to their
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be informed of non-performance so that sanctions may be imposed against him. In such
case, publicity may take the form of posting the defaulting party's name on a notice board
at the seat of the chamber of commerce, or it may be by a letter circulated to members of
the association, or it may adopt any other form, which is regarded as appropriate. Many
rules specify that it is within the discretionary power of the governing body of the
chamber of an association to act as they think fit in such cases.76
The ultimate action for non-performance of an award voluntarily, is execution or
enforcement by court proceedings. In addition to that, the arbitral award can also be
sufficient to attach the assets of the recalcitrant party. Depriving the losing party of his
assets may persuade him to enforce the award without further court procedures.
B. Resisting the enforcement of an arbitral award in the country of origin
If the losing party does not carry out the award voluntarily, then winning the
arbitration will only be the first step. Litigation may continue, and become more involved
(as the winning party will attempt to enforce the award and the losing party will seek to
resist the enforcement). In this scenario, the losing party may challenge any attempt by
the winning party to obtain recognition or enforcement of the award, by appealing or
challenging the arbitral award in order to set it aside in the country where it was made.
regulations. The sanctions very according to the case: they might involve expelling the defaulting
member from the association, imposing a penalty, refusing his inscription to stock exchange,
blacklisting him, refusal by the association to extend its services to defaulting member, etc."
76
See. Rene David, op. cit., p. 358.
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In the following sections, an examination will be made of challenging the award in
the country of origin. As they vary widely in their details, a survey of the various national
legal systems' procedures for attacking an award would require a deep comparative
analysis of the various national statutory provisions which is outside the scope of this
study. Therefore, the following material will provide a general examination of these
procedures. A detailed analysis of using public policy as a ground to challenge the award
in the country of origin will be handled in Chapter Four.
1. Appeal from arbitral awards
The final decision made by the arbitral tribunal can be subject to an appeal process,
which may take place either before another arbitral tribunal or before a court of law.
The first type of appeal could take place if the parties agree to have the merits of the
dispute reconsidered by a superior arbitral tribunal.77 This kind of appeal procedure is a
notable feature of the rules of associations specialising in the trade of specific types of
78
goods. Where the parties agree to an appeal procedure to a higher arbitral hearing, the
procedure before both tribunals constitutes a uniform arbitration and an action to have the
77 If the parties agree to appeal to another arbitral tribunal, then the award could be reconsidered
on the merits by an appellate arbitral tribunal. See, Redfem and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 419.
78
Rene David, op. cit., p. 359, at footnote, 118. He states that: "the possibility of recourse to an
arbitration appeal tribunal is envisaged by the law in Austria Article 594, in Belgium Article
1702, and by various articles in the Dutch law of 1984"; Ahmed S. El-Kosheri, "EGYPT," op.
cit., p. 43. He provides that in Egypt parties can agree for an arbitral appeal, however, such
possibility is uncommon in the Egyptian business community; also see, Section 30 (2) of the
English 1996 Act; Rubino-Sammartano . M., op. cit., p. 511. He proposed to institute an
"International Arbitration Court of Appeal" under the auspices of an international convention.
However, this proposed solution is difficult to be achieved, not only because it needs international
co-operation through international convention but also because of the diversity of legal systems
between different states.
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award set aside may be initiated only against the last final award made by the appeal
tribunal.
The second type of appeal takes place before a state court. Allowing appeals from
arbitral awards to a court has its advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage is
that appealing against arbitral awards to a court may help to ensure a measure of judicial
control over the decisions of arbitral tribunals so that, for instance, an award which is in
clear violation of the law could be corrected on appeal. On the other hand, there are a
number of disadvantages. The first is that the decision of the court might be substituted
for the decision of an arbitral tribunal specifically selected by or on behalf of the
parties.79 Second, a party who agreed to arbitration as a private method of resolving
disputes may find himself brought unwillingly before courts which hold their hearings <n
public. Third, and most importantly, the appeal process may be used simply to postpone
the enforcement of the award, so that one of the main purposes of international
commercial arbitration the speedy resolution of disputes is undermined.
Since parties to international arbitration want to avoid court procedures as much as
they can, some arbitration contracts provide for a condition whereby parties can waive
the right of appeal to courts. This is achieved by means of an exclusion agreement
RO
especially in cases where the arbitration agreement is international. Such exclusion
clauses are now found in most of the international institutional rules, which require the
79
See, Redfern and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 421.
80
An exclusion agreement may be contained in, or incorporated by reference into, the parties'
arbitration clause. See Rubino-Sammartano. M., op. cit., p. 462.
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parties to carry out the arbitral award without delay and to waive the right to any form of
appeal. For example, Article 28 (6) of the ICC Arbitration Rules provides that:
"Every award shall be binding on the parties. By submitting the dispute to
arbitration under these rules, the parties shall be deemed to have waived their right
o i
to any form of recourse insofar as such waiver can validly be made".
The question here is whether the parties are allowed to contract out of any right of
appeal. The answer to this question depends on the applicable law. For example, in
England, Section 69 (1) of the 1996 Act permits a party to arbitral proceedings (upon
notice to the other parties and to the tribunal) to appeal to the court on a question of law
arising out of an award made in the proceedings.83 However, parties to arbitration held in
England are allowed under Section 6984 to contract out of any right of appeal to the
85
court. Under section 69 of the 1996 Act a court can unquestionably give effect to such
81 Also see, Article 26 (9) of the LCIA Rules; Article 25 of The Rules of Conciliation Arbitration
and Expertise of the Euro-Arab Chamber of Commerce, which explicitly provides that: "Any
award made under these Rules should be final and may not be the subject of any form of appeal".
82
In Egypt, appeal from an arbitral award to a court was abolished in 1968 under Article 510 of
the Code of Civil Procedures, and this has been confirmed in Article 52 (1) of the 1994 law,
which states that: "Arbitral awards rendered in accordance with the provisions of this Law may
not be challenged by any of the means of recourse provided for in the Code of Civil and
commercial Procedures"; Ahmed S. El-Kosheri, "EGYPT," op. cit., p. 43; Abdul Hamid El
Ahdab, "The New Egyptian Act...," op. cit., p. 96. He provides that this rule was adopted from
the Italian Code ofProcedure.
83
An appeal could be established under Section 69 (2)(b) with the leave of the court. According
to Section 69 (7), if leave is granted or the parties agree on the appeal, the court may confirm,
vary or set aside the award. See, Taylor Woodrow civil Engineering Ltd v Hutchison IDH
Development [1998] CILL 1434; 75 Con. L.R. 1. A party may lose its right to apply to the court
under Section 73, and its exercise is subject to the restrictions under Section 70(2) and (3). For
example, the 28 day time limit for application to the court. This 28 day time limit may be
extended by the court under Section 79. See, V. V. Veeder, op. cit., p. 59.
84 Section 69 of the 1996 English Act provides: "(1) ... An agreement to dispense with reasons
for the tribunal's award shall be considered an agreement to exclude the court's jurisdiction under
this section."
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It has been held that the English 1996 Act has abolished the statutory restrictions on pre-dispute
exclusion agreements for domestic arbitration agreements and the special categories under
Section 4 (1) of the 1979 Act. See Georges R. Delaume, op. cit., p. 11, emphasising that the
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exclusion agreements and to any other written agreement in similar terms, such as Article
26 (9) of the LCIA Rules.86
However even if the losing party gives up his right to appeal, he is not precluded
from initiating setting-aside proceedings before a domestic court against the award that
became final with the party's waiver of appeal. Exceptions can be found; some countries
- such as Switzerland - may permit the parties to waive all grounds of challenge,
including the public policy ground. According to Article 192 (1) of the Swiss Federal
Private International Law Act.87, if the parties are not domiciled or resident in
Switzerland and have no business established in that country, they may exclude all
setting-aside proceedings or limit such proceedings to one or several of the grounds listed
in Article 190(2). This can be made by means of an express stipulation in the arbitration
treatment reserved to the 'Special Categories' has been the object of controversy. So much the
more, since the parties soon found effective ways of getting around the problem by the simple
device of stipulating the law of Bermuda 'based on English law' as the proper law of the contract,
while retaining London as the seat of arbitration. However, it has been held that the waiver of any
right of appeal contained in the ICC Rules constitutes a valid exclusion agreement under the
English 1979 Act. This was held in two cases, before the 1996 Act. The first case was the Arab
African Energy Corp. v. Olieprodukten Nederland B. V. [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 419. The second
was the Pioneer Shipping Limited v. B. T. P. Tixoxide Limited, "The Nema", (1982) A. C. 724
(H.L.); also see, Marine Contractors Inc. v. Shell Petroleum Co ofNigeria Ltd [1984] 2 Lloyd's
Rep, p. 77; See, V. V. Veeder, op. cit., p. 62; Redfern and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 422.
86 Article 26(9) of the LCIA Rules: "All awards shall be final and binding on the parties. By
agreeing to arbitration under these Rules, the parties undertake to carry out any award
immediately and without any delay (subject only to Article 27); and the parties also waive
irrevocably their right to any form of appeal, review or recourse to any state court or other
judicial authority, insofar as such waiver may be validly made". See, V. V. Veeder, op. cit., p. 59.
87 Article 192 (1) provides: "If neither party is domiciled, habitually resident or has a place of
business in Switzerland, they can, by an express declaration in the arbitral agreement or in a
subsequent agreement in writing, exclude the right to bring proceedings to set aside the arbitral
award; they can also exclude the right to bring setting aside proceedings on the basis of any one
or more of the grounds set out in Article 190(2) [of the Act]". Klaus Peter Berger, op. cit., p. 709;
Georges R. Delaume, op. cit., p. 13.
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agreement or a subsequent agreement. This is also the situation under Article 1717(4) of
the Belgian Code Judiciaire.89
2. Challenging the arbitral award to set it aside
Challenging an arbitral award90 is a procedural action whereby a party who is
disappointed by the solution given in an award, attacks the validity of the final award
before the competent authority in the country in which, or under the law of which, the
award was made. Generally this procedure takes the form of an application to a court91
asking the court to set the award aside. The court may either: (a) confirm the award by
granting it a recognition order; (b) set the award aside by pronouncing it of no effect
88 When parties have exclude all setting aside proceedings, the resulting award will be treated as a
foreign award and its enforcement in Switzerland will be governed by the provisions of the New
York Convention (Article 192 (2)). Willliam W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice:
Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in International Arbitration, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 647, 694-95
(1989).
89 Article 1717 provides: "Courts of Belgium may hear a request for annulment only if at least
one of the parties to the dispute decided by the award is either a physical person having Belgian
nationality or residence, or a legal entity created in Belgium or having a Belgian branch or other
seat of operation. Law of March 27, 1985". The difference between Article 192 (1) of the Swiss
Act and Article 1717(4) of the Belgian Code is that Belgium has eliminated any kind of judicial
control over arbitral awards rendered in Belgium when non of the parties is connected with that
country whereas Article 192 (1) of the Swiss Act requires an express stipulation in the arbitration
agreement.
90 Civil law countries uses the term, recourse against an award, and this term is used in the Model
Law which in Article 34 refers to recourse to a court against an arbitral awards; Redfern and
Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 430. The writers prefer the term challenge; See, Lucas Pic v Welsh
Development Agency [1986] Ch. 500, (1986) 15 C.S.W. 374; Moran v Lloyds 1983, Q.B. 542;
[1983] 2 W.L.R. 672; [1983] 2 All E.R. 200, C.A.
91 For the problem of determining the competent court. See Rubino-Sammartano . M., op. cit., p.
462-465; in Egypt, Article 9. (1) of the Egyptian law of 1994 provides: "competence to review
the arbitral matters referred to by this law to the Egyptian judiciary lies with the court having
original jurisdiction over the dispute. However, in the case of international commercial
arbitration, whether conducted in Egypt or abroad, competence lies with the Cairo Court of
Appeal unless the parties agree on the competence of another appellate body in Egypt."
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92either in whole or in part; (c) remit the award to the arbitral tribunal ; or (d) execute the
award by attaching assets of the losing party.
In order to constitute a successful attack, the losing party has to establish his
petition upon one or more of the grounds, provided for in the law of the country in which,
or under the law of which, the award was made.93 Such grounds are not the same in
every legal system, but rather vary from state to state.94 However, due to the growing
recognition of international commercial arbitration as a means to resolve international
commercial disputes, most, if not all national arbitration laws now tend to provide limited
grounds for challenging international arbitral awards that takes place in their territories.
Certain factors have emerged as prerequisites which could be considered as
common to many modern jurisdictions.95 The reasons for which an arbitral award may be
challenged can be grouped into three categories. The first category relates to the validity
of the arbitration agreement and arbitrability of the dispute, because the arbitration
agreement embodies the basis on which the award is instituted, and the subject matter of
the arbitration agreement should be capable of settlement by arbitration. The second
category of reasons relates to procedural irregularities. Perhaps the tribunal was not
92
In England the jurisdiction to remit an award has been described as "a safety net to prevent
injustice". See, King v. Thomas McKenna Ltd. [1991] 2 Q.B. 480; [1991] 2 W.L.R. 1234; [1991]
1 All E.R. 653, C.A.
93 For convenience the competent authority to set the award aside will be referred to herein as
'court of origin' or 'court in the country of origin'.
94 One should mention here that there is no international convention to govern the extent of
national courts' control over national arbitral awards. The Geneva Convention (1927) and the
New York Convention (1958) do not deal with enforcement in the state of origin, since they both
govern the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards which takes place in a state that considers this
award as foreign. See Redfem and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 429; Pieter Sanders, "Consolidated
Commentary", Yearbook Vol. VI (1981), p. 204.
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properly constituted, the parties were not given a proper opportunity to present their case,
the award was based on evidence which was not admissible, the award was not made
within the time limit or not all arbitrators took part in the deliberation. The last group of
reasons relates to the award itself, if the award is contrary to public policy.96
The purpose of such grounds is to situate the award in the context of a statutory
framework that provides the state courts with jurisdiction to exercise some degree of
control over arbitral awards made within their territory.97 The difficult question is, to
what degree can a national court exercise control over an arbitral award?98
One should recognise, however, that when a national court is asked to set aside an
international arbitral award it cannot re-examine the merits of the dispute, since the
arbitral tribunal already made its decision on this matter, whose decision should be
regarded as final.99 Presuming otherwise will bring the parties back to the starting point,
and may force them to bring their dispute before a national court, which is the thing that
they were trying to avoid in the first place by resorting to arbitration.100
95
Rene David, op. cit., p. 370; Redfern and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 434; Andrew and Keren,
op. cit., p. 290.
96 John H. Laugbein, "Comparative Civil Procedure and the Style of Complex Contracts", (1987)
35 AM. J. Coinp. L., p. 381 at p.390; Adam Samuel, "Arbitration in Western Europe - A
Generation ofReform," (1991) Arb. Int. 319, pp. 352 and 353.
97 It is therefore worthwhile to find out what the law of the seat says on the requirements and
procedures for enforcement as one of the most important factors is the role of the country's courts
in the arbitral process. See Jan Paulsson, "The Role of Swedish Courts in Transnational
Commercial Arbitration", (1981) 21 Virginia Journal ofInternational Law, p. 211, at p.215.
98 This will be examined in more depth in Chapter Four.
99 This was confirmed by the Egyptian Court of Cassation in decision No. 274/ 1982 year 49.
Cited by Mahmoud Hashim, General Theory in Arbitration, Dar A1 Fiker A1 Arabi (1990), p.
267, (in Arabic).
100 Redfem and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 435. The writers emphasised that: "If a court is allowed
to review this decision on its merits, then the speed and, above all, the finality of the arbitral
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The ultimate effect of a successful challenge is to render part or all of the original
decision, null and void. This will affect the enforcement of the award in the country in
which it was made, since the arbitral award will lose its legal effect and will not be
considered binding on the parties.101 This also affects the enforcement of the award in
any country which has adopted the New York Convention, since the setting aside of an
arbitral award in its country of origin is a ground for refusal of recognition and
enforcement under Article V (l)(e).102
IV. Executing and Resisting the Enforcement of a Foreign
Arbitral Award
In order to enforce an arbitral award in a foreign country, the award must travel
from the state in which it was made under one system of law to other states under
different systems of law. This operation does not happen randomly. The successful party
should first determine the country in which he will carry out the enforcement: generally
that in which the unsuccessful party's assets are located. If these assets are situated in
different countries, then he will enforce the award in the country in which he can obtain
process is lost"; Stephen M. Schwebel and Susan G. Lahne, "Public Policy and Arbitral
Procedure," Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in International Arbitration,
Kluwer Law and Taxation, Pieter Sanders ed. (1987), p. 223. The writers state that: "Extensive
judicial review of arbitration awards would frustrate the basic purposes of arbitration, which is sit
to dispose of disputes quickly and avoid the expense and delay of extended court proceedings";
also see, Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 349; Bentil, J.K., "Commercial Arbitrators Authorised not to
Apply Strict Rules of law and Judicial Reviews," (1992) Journal ofBusiness Law, p 26, at p. 29.
101 Paolo Contim, "International Commercial Arbitration: The United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral awards", (1959) 8 AM. J. Comp. L., p. 283 at
290.
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the best possible results. Two issues have to be taken into account to achieve this result.
The first is the existence of a legal system, whether by the New York Convention or by
some other relevant treaty or convention, which facilitates the enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards between the prospective place of enforcement and the place in which the
award was made. The second issue is the attitude of the local courts to requests for
recognition and enforcement of foreign awards, that is, whether their outlook is likely to
be internationalist or parochial.103 In addition to that, one should consider the question of
what attitude the prospective country of enforcement may adopt on applying more liberal
standards of public policy rules to foreign arbitral awards a question which will be
examined throughout this research paper.
After determining the country in which the winning party can get the best possible
results, then the question will be whether he need first seek the recognition of the award
or whether he can enforce the award directly.
A. Recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards
The terms 'recognition' and 'enforcement' of arbitral awards are sometimes linked.
That is the case in Article 1 (1) of the New York Convention of 1958:
"This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards..."
The terms are distinct, however. For example, Article 1 of the Geneva Convention of
1927 speaks of'recognition or enforcement':
102
However, an award which has been set aside in the country of origin may still be enforceable
in other countries if the court where enforcement of the foreign arbitral award is invoked accepts
to enforce the award. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four, at p. 170.
103 Redfern and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 451.
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"... an arbitral award made in pursuance of an agreement whether relating to
existing or future differences... , shall be recognised as binding and shall be
enforced in accordance with the rules of the procedure of the territory where the
award is relied upon ...."
The same distinction has been made in Article 35 of the Model Law of 1985:
"An arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was made, shall be
recognised as binding and, upon application in writing to the competent court,
shall be enforced subject to the provisions of this article and of article 36".
Recognition must be distinguished from enforcement since the latter is intended to oblige
the losing party to carry out the award, while the purpose of recognition is different and
more limited.104 Recognition requires recognising that the award made by the arbitral
tribunal is equivalent to that of a judgement issued by a court of law in the state in which
recognition is taking place. Recognition may occur if the losing party asks the court to
decide on the dispute although it has already been determined by an arbitral award. In
this case the party in whose favour the award was made will object on the grounds that
the dispute has already been determined, and to prove this he will seek to produce the
award to the court and ask the court to recognise it as valid and binding upon the parties.
Thus, recognition frustrates the losing party's attempt to obtain a new decision by the
courts of the state requested to enforce an award. Enforcement, by contrast, is a positive
step compelling the losing party to carry out the award which he is unwilling to carry out
voluntarily.105
The distinction could also be recognised if we consider that an award may be
recognised without being enforced, but if it is enforced, then it has necessarily been
1H4 Rubino-Sammartano. M., op. cit., p. 484.
I0:' One should recognise here that recognition is generally less useful, for this reason the large
majority of applications concern enforcement. Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 244.
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recognised by the court that orders its enforcement. In other words, a distinction must be
made between 'recognition' and 'recognition and enforcement'.106 A court when it grants
enforcement of an award, recognises at the same time that the award is validly made, that
it is binding upon the parties to it and, therefore, that it is suitable for enforcement.
B. The applicable rules to the recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards
Recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is basically governed by
domestic laws. As these different national rules are very often unpredictable, it was
deemed necessary to remove recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards from
the jurisdiction of domestic laws into a more international environment. This was also
necessary given that certain countries do not have separate rules for the recognition and
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in their territories.107 Rather, these countries apply
the same rules to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards as they do for the
enforcement of foreign judgements. This approach has many disadvantages. For instance,
it requires that an award must be enforceable in the country where it was made before it
can be made enforceable in the country where execution is sought. Moreover, as a matter
of 'reciprocity', the party requesting the enforcement must provide the court with the
proof that a similar domestic award could be enforced in the country where the award
was made, under conditions which are no more restrictive than those of the domestic law.
Therefore, if enforcement in that country is deemed possible but under more strict
106 Redfem and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 448.
107
For example: the Jordanian Law for Enforcement of Foreign awards. No. 8 of 1953.
43
conditions, then the request for enforcement shall be treated in the same manner in
implementation of the reciprocity requirement.108
The disadvantages that result from the assimilation of foreign arbitral awards to
foreign judgements explains why efforts have been made to improve this situation by
means of international conventions or regional conventions providing for the recognition
and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.109 This provides a much more developed and
wide spread network system, better than any national provisions for the recognition and
enforcement of arbitration awards. Also, such conventions help in establishing
considerable uniformity in national laws governing the recognition and enforcement of
international awards after being recognised as part of the state's domestic law, which
ultimately leads to secure a considerable degree of uniformity in recognition and
enforcement of arbitration awards between different states.110
The first of these conventions concerning recognition and enforcement of
international arbitration awards was the 'Montevideo Convention' of 1889, a regional
convention which provided for the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements
between Latin American states.111
108 This was the situation under Articles 296-299 of the Egyptian rules of the Code of Civil and
Commercial Procedures, Law No. 13/1968, if the applicability of the New York Convention or
any other relevant treaty is not invoked. However, Law No 27 of 1994 has abandoned this
requirement. See, Ahmed S. El-Kosheri, "EGYPT," op. cit., p. 49.
109 A. Nussbaum, "Treaties in Commercial Arbitration, A Test of International Private, Law
Legislation", 56 Hai-vard Law Review, (1942), p. 219.
110
Generally, the applicability of international conventions in a given state is regulated by
provisions of law of that state, for example, in Egypt Art. 301 of the Code of Civil and
Commercial Procedures of 1968 provides that: "The application of the rules stated in the above-
mentioned articles dose not prejudice the applicability of the international treaties concluded or
which will be concluded between the Republic (of Egypt) and other states in this respect"; also
this was upheld by the Egyptian Court of Cassation in case No. 2994/1970 year 57, which
concerns recognising an arbitral award under the New York Convention. Cited in, Nariman Abd
al Khader, The Arbitration Agreement, Dar A1 Nahdah A1 Arabiah (1996), p. 147. (in Arabic).
111
Treaty concerning the Union of South American States in respect of Procedural Law, signed at
Montevideo, January 11, 1889, published in English translation in, "Register of Texts of
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The first international convention in respect of enforcing foreign arbitral awards
112
was the Geneva protocol on Arbitration Clauses, September 24, 1923. It had two main
objectives. The first was to ensure that arbitration clauses were enforceable
internationally, the second was to ensure the enforcement of arbitral awards in the
territory of the state in which they were made.
The Geneva Protocol was followed by the Geneva Convention on the Execution
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, September 26, 1927.113 The purpose of this convention was
to widen the scope of the Geneva protocol awards within the territories of the contracting
states.
The Geneva Treaties still deserve a place in the history of recognition and
enforcement of international arbitration agreements and awards, but their field of
application is limited as they only relate to awards made in the territory of a contracting
state and those involving parties belonging to contracting states. Also, under the Geneva
Convention, a party seeking enforcement had to prove the conditions necessary for
enforcement, such as proving that the award is final. This creates the problem of 'double
execution' - which will be explained later in this paper.114
Conventions and other Instruments concerning International Trade Law, Volume II" (1973)
United Nations, p. 5.
112 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, League ofNations Treaties Series (1924) Vol. XXVII
p. 158, No. 678.
113 Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Awards of 1927.
114 In order to show that the award had become final in its country of origin, the successful party
was often obliged to seek a declaration in the courts of the country where the arbitration took
place to the effect that the award was enforceable in that country, before it could be enforced in
the courts of the place of enforcement. See Chapter Four, p. 171.
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In addition to those international conventions there are a number of regional and
bilateral conventions which may also have a significant bearing on the recognition and
enforcement of foreign awards.115
The most important international treaty relating to international commercial
arbitration is the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, 1958. It therefore deserves close attention in order to understand how
enforcement of international commercial arbitral awards can be achieved, as well as to
find out what obstacles that may place in the way of the recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards.
1. The New York Convention of 1958
During the last four decades the New York Convention has played a very important
role by making it possible for foreign arbitral awards to be easily enforced in most
countries around the world. By rendering foreign awards enforceable with minimum
court intervention in the countries that have acceded to it, the Convention has helped in
'13 Mention could be made, in regard to the regional treaties between Arab countries, for example,
the Inter-Arab Convention on the Enforcement of judgements and Awards, entered into by the
states belonging to the Arab League on September 14, 1952; The Convention on Investment of
Arab Capital, November 27, 1980; The Convention for Juridical Corporation Between States
Belonging to the Arab League, Riyadh, April 4, 1983; The Amman Convention of 1987; for
further information see, Jalili, "Amman Convention on Commercial Arbitration" (1990) 7,
Journal of International Arbitration, p. 139. Other important conventions are the European
Convention of 1961; the Inter-American 'Panama' Convention of 1975; the Moscow Convention
of 1972.
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establishing a deep confidence in the efficiency of arbitration throughout the international
business community. This confidence was an essential element for its widespread use.116
The New York Convention made considerable improvements on the Geneva
protocol and the Geneva Convention, since it provides for a much more simple and
effective method of obtaining recognition and enforcement of foreign awards, and has
been described as the single most important pillar on which the edifice of international
arbitration rests.117 The general level of success of the Convention may be seen as one of
the factors responsible for the rapid development of international arbitration over recent
118decades as a preferred means for resolving international disputes.
To achieve its objects, the text of the New York Convention places obligations on
contracting states to recognise, as binding, arbitration agreement and awards.'19 In order
to enforce arbitration agreements, the New York Convention adopts the technique found
in the Geneva Protocol of 1923. In Article II (3) the New York Convention requires the
contracting states to refuse to allow a dispute which is subject to an arbitration agreement
to be litigated before its courts, if an objection to such litigation is raised by any party to
the arbitration agreement.
116
Jacques Werner, "The trade explosion and some likely effects on international arbitration", 12
J.Int.Arb., (1995), p. 15. He states that: "The New York Convention should not be seen, as an
intangible monument, but as a living mechanism, which can evolve in order to meet new needs of
the international trading community."
117
Wetter, "The present status of the International Court of arbitration of the ICC: appraisal", 1
American review ofInternational Arbitration (1990), p. 91.
118 The New York Convention has been ratified, acceded or succeeded to by over 120 countries.
See the ILA Report, London Conference (2000), op. cit., p. 2.
119 Article II (1) of the New York Convention.
47
The Convention also replaces the requirement for a final award in the country of
origin with the requirement of a binding award120, and agrees to recognise it even if it has
been challenged in its country of origin.121 Moreover, it simplifies the requirements for
obtaining recognition of an award and puts the burden of proving the existence of
122
negative grounds on the party opposing the application for its recognition. It confirms
the parties' freedom in the choice of the arbitral authority and of the arbitration
procedure. It gives the authority before which the award is sought to be relied upon the
right to order the party opposing the enforcement to give suitable security.123 It further
grants to the parties the right to apply either the Convention rules or other provisions, if
more favourable, except for the 1923 protocol and the Geneva Convention (1927).124
The latter point may raise a question about the coexistence of different international
conventions which are applicable to the enforcement of the arbitral award. A problem
could arise, for example, if the Geneva Convention is applied to two states which have
adhered to it, but only one of which is a member to the New York Convention. The
relationship between those Conventions is regulated under Article VII (1) and (2) of the
New York Convention, which provide that:
"1- The provisions of the present Convention shall not affect the validity of
multilateral or bilateral agreements concerning the recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards entered into by the contracting states nor deprive any interested
party of any right he may have to avail himself of an award in the manner and to
the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the country where such award is
sought to be relied upon.
120 Article V (1 )(e). Also see, Chapter Four, p. 171.
121 Article VI of the New York Convention.
122 Article V of the New York Convention.
123 Article VI of the New York Convention.
124 Article VII (2) of the New York Convention.
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2- The Geneva protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923 and the Geneva
Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards shall cease to produce
effects between the contracting states on their becoming bound and to the extent
they become bound by this Convention."
However, the Geneva Treaties are still applicable when they are not excluded by
1 7 S
the application of the New York Convention. In any event, the Geneva Convention has
a more limited scope than the New York Convention in as much as it concerns awards
rendered only in the territory of a contracting state and involving parties belonging to
contracting states, while the New York Convention has abandoned the nationality
requirements and takes into account the place where the award is made.
The most significant achievement of the New York Convention is that it imposes on its
signatories an obligation to limit the grounds upon which the enforcement of an arbitral
award can be refused, to those set out in Article V paragraphs (1) and (2). This greatly
facilitates enforcement in Convention states.
2. Grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement
In order to be enforced according to the New York Convention, a foreign arbitral
award must: (i) have resulted from a valid arbitration agreement126; (ii) comply with the
applicable procedural law as agreed by the parties or the law in the country of origin127;
(iii) have become binding in its state of origin128; (iv) concern a dispute which is
123 Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 117; Rubino-Sammartano. M., op. cit., p. 491.
126 Article V (1 )(a) of the New York Convention; also see, Article II (3).
127 Article V (1 )(b) and (d) of the New York Convention.
128 Article V (l)(e) of the New York Convention.
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arbitrable according the law of the country where enforcement is required129; and (v) its
enforcement must not be in conflict with public policy.130
a. Article V (1)
Article V (1) sets out, in paragraphs (a) to (e), five grounds upon which
enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused. Each of these grounds must be asserted
and proven by the party seeking to rely upon it in resisting the enforcement of the
award.131
The first ground concerns the parties' capacity and the validity of the arbitration
132
agreement. Under Article V (l)(a) the Convention specifies that enforcement of the
award may be refused if the parties were under some incapacity, and provides that the
capacity of the parties should be determined according to the law applicable to them,
without specifying the applicable law.133 Also, the second part of Article V (l)(a)
indicates that the award could not be enforced if the agreement of the parties was not
valid. The Convention here emphasises that the validity of the agreement should be
determined according to the law "to which the parties have subjected it", which confirms
129 Article V (2)(a) of the New York Convention.
130 Article V (2)(a) of the New York Convention.
131 The burden of proving a ground for refusing enforcement is clearly placed on the party
claiming under that ground. If he fails to discharge this burden, the other party will be permitted
without further argument, to enforce the award. See Article V (1) of the New York Convention.
132 Article V (l)(a) provides that: "The parties to the agreement referred to in Article II were,
under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under
the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of
the country were the award was made."
133 Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 276. He states that, the capacity of a natural person may depend on
his nationality or on his place of usual residence. For corporations, it may depend on the place
where the legal entity practises its business. The capacity of the parties, particularly when one of
the parties is a state or a public body, requires many details which cannot be discussed in this
research.
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the principle of the "parties' autonomy" where parties are free to designate the law
applicable to the arbitration agreement. In the absence of such agreement, Article V
(l)(a) provides that the validity of the agreement shall be decided according to the law of
the country where the award was made.
The second ground concerns the denial of a fair hearing134, where a party can prove
that he was not properly notified of the appointment of the arbitrators or of the arbitration
procedures. In addition, the last part of Article V (l)(b) "or was otherwise unable to present
his case" could be interpreted to include several procedural irregularities, and may vary
from state to state. For example, this may include issues that concern the denial of a party
of an equal opportunity to be heard, inequality of arms, or want of appropriate
representation. Issues may also arise from the arbitral tribunal's discretion to grant or
refuse orders for production of documents, and from its right to rule on the admissibility
of the evidence - whether from witnesses, experts, or documents - upon which the parties
seek to rely. Such defects could also be raised under the public policy ground, for
example on the ground of lack of procedural fairness, as will be explained later.135
The third ground concerns excess of authority or lack of jurisdiction.136 This may
occur if the arbitral tribunal has dealt with a dispute which does not fall within the scope
134 Article V (l)(b): "The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of
the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to
present his case".
133 The relationship between Article V (l)(c) and Article V (2)(b) will be explained in more depth
in Chapter Five, p. 186.
136 Article V (1 )(c): "The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not failing within
the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of
the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration
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of the arbitral clause, or if the arbitral tribunal has given decisions on matters which are
137
beyond or outside the question submitted by the parties. This ground does not concern
the case where the arbitrator had no competence at all because of lack of a valid
arbitration agreement as the latter situation should be determined under Article V (l)(a),
which concerns the validity of the arbitration agreement. The second part of Article V
(l)(c) provides for the possibility of isolating that part of the award which contains the
decision that has been made within the arbitrator's authority and enforce that part of the
award, while refusing to enforce that part of the decision which falls outside of the
arbitrator's authority.138
The fourth ground concerns procedural irregularities arising from the composition
of the arbitral tribunal or from the arbitral procedures.139 Article V (l)(d) provides that
determining the validity of an arbitral award should be established upon the compliance
of the arbitral procedures with the parties' agreement, or, failing such agreement,
according to the law of the country in which the arbitration took place. One should
recognise here that Article V (l)(d) asserts the role of the parties' autonomy in deciding
the rules that will govern the arbitration proceedings. It has been reported that the drafters
of the Convention preferred to rely on the parties' agreement in order to decide on the
irregularity of the composition of the arbitral tribunal and the arbitral procedure,
can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on
matters submitted to arbitration may be recognised and enforced."
137 For Example, if the tribunal has awarded more than, or differently from, what was claimed by
the parties. See Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 314.
138 See Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 318.
139 Article V (l)(d): "The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance
with the law of the country where the arbitration took place."
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providing that the law of the country in which the arbitration took place can be relied
upon only where the parties had not agreed on these matters.140
The fifth ground concerns the binding effect of the arbitral award. Enforcement of
the award may be refused if the party against whom the award is invoked proves to the
court that the award is not yet binding, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent
authority in the country of its origin.141 The extent of the binding nature of an award is
still subject to a wide debate142, although Article V (l)(e) indicates that the time at which
an award can be considered as binding should be determined according to the law of the
country where the award was made or the law under which the award was made. It will
be important for this study to examine whether or not a court can enforce an award
despite its having been set aside in the country of origin. The question arises where the
court of enforcement finds that the award was set aside in the country of origin for
considerations of public policy which relate only to the national law of the country of
origin, and that the same issue does not violate public policy in the country of
enforcement.143
140 Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 323.
141 Art V (l)(e): "The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that
award was made."
142 It is submitted that, the New York Convention regards the binding effect of the arbitral award
in a quite different way from the Geneva Convention 1927. Under the latter, to enforce an award
in other states, it had to be no longer capable of being challenged in the state of origin. See,
Article 1 (2)(b) of the Geneva Convention of 1927 which amounted to the system of the so-called
"double exequatur". See, Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 333.; see ahead, Chapter Four, p. 171.
143
See, Chapter Four, at p. 174.
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b. Article V (2)
Article V (2) may be raised, on its own motion, by the court requested to enforce
the award.144 The Article refers to the 'competent authority' as having the right to raise
the objection, since it includes issues that concern public policy. However, the party
against whom the award is invoked may also challenge the enforcement of the award
upon this ground. This is due to the character of public policy as a notion which relates to
both the interest of the public and the interest of the parties, therefore the right to raise
such ground must not be confined to a specific authority. Also, as will be explained in the
following chapters, this is due to the inevitable connection between Article V (2)(b) and
the rest of the grounds which have been mentioned in Article V (1).
i. The relationship between arbitrability and public policy
Article V (2) comprises two grounds. The first concerns the non-arbitrability of the
dispute under the law of the state requested to enforce the award145, and the second
concerns public policy.146 It has been argued that the two grounds are actually two sides
of the same coin, as some writers consider mentioning arbitrability separately from public
policy as merely 'superfluous'.147 However, other writers do not consider arbitrability as
144 Article V (2): "Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that ..."
145 Article V (2)(a); "The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law of that country."
146 Article V (2)(b): "The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public
policy of that country."
147
It has been reported that the distinction has been kept for historical reasons since the
distinction was mentioned in the Geneva Convention of 1927 and was kept by the New York
Convention without discussion in spite of an objection raised by the French delegate, see UN
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necessarily identical with public policy rules. The latter view could arguably be true,
especially if we take into consideration that there are several points that distinguish
arbitrability from public policy.
Firstly, arbitrability concerns certain fields of law or kinds of disputes which by their
subject matter are reserved for state courts. For example, the legislators in a given
country may wish to prohibit arbitration for certain categories of disputes, such as certain
anti-trust matters. Therefore, arbitrability is mainly a question of which issues arbitrators
are not competent to settle. The same issues which are deemed to be not arbitrable, may
often quite properly be litigated before the courts. Accordingly, questions that are not-
arbitrable do not necessarily themselves constitute a violation ofpublic policy.
Secondly, one can examine the notion of arbitrability by answering the question of what
can be arbitrated.149 Therefore, arbitrability only relates to the subject matter of the
dispute, whereas public policy covers a wide range of issues, relating both to the subject
matter of the dispute and to procedural irregularities. Accordingly, public policy is a wide
concept which includes the concept of arbitrability.
The importance of arbitrability, as part of public policy, will appear later in this
research when dealing with public policy issues relating to the substance of the dispute as
a ground to refuse the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under Article V (2)(b).150
Doc. E/CONF. 26/ SR.ll; see Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 360; P. Sanders, "The New York
Convention", International Commercial Arbitration Vol. II, The Hague 1960, 293, 323.
148 Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, "Public Policy and Arbitrability," International Council for
Commercial Arbitration public policy in arbitration (ICCA) New York Arbitration Congress,
Pieter Sanders ed., (1986), p. 183.
U9
Ibid., p. 181.
130 See Chapter Six, p. 239.
55
ii. Article V (2)(b), public policy
Article V (2)(b) states that recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may be
refused if it would be "contrary to the public policy of that country". It is believed that
including this ground in the New York Convention was inevitable, since public policy is
a traditional ground for the refusal of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and foreign
judgements.151 Also, it has been reported that providing this ground as it is in a simple
formulation was intentional by the drafters of the Convention, in order to induce the
prospective members to enter into the Convention and adopt its provisions without fear of
being deprived ofjurisdiction and supremacy over foreign arbitral awards.152
One should also recognise the main object of Article V (2)(b) in protecting the vital
interests of the states which become member to the Convention. Such interests could be
moral, political, social or economic. However, the simple formulation of Article V (2)(b)
has led some writers to consider Article V (2)(b) as the greatest single threat to the use of
arbitration in international commercial disputes, since the background of Article V (2)(b)
does not provide a clear illustration of how it should be applied.153 In its report to the UN
Conference, the United Nations committee that prepared the draft convention indicated
131 Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 360.
152
See, Gerald Aksen, "United States Implements United Nation Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards," 3 Southwestern University Law Review (1971), p.
13.
153 Richard A. Cole, op. cit., p. 373. He describes Article V (2)(b) as a loophole, he states that:
"Courts and commentators alike have worried that the expansion of this loophole could negate the
effectiveness of the Convention. Yet, it appears that while the defense is often raised, it is rarely
successful"; P. Sanders, "A Twenty Years Review of the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards," 13 Int.Law., (1979), p. 269-270; see the ILA Report,
London Conference (2000), op. cit., p. 35. The report provides that public policy exception would
undermine the objectives of the Convention; Hakan Berglin, "The Application in United States
Courts of the Public Policy Provision of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards," 4:2 Dickinson Journal of International Law (1986), p. 167 at 168;
Parsons and Whittemore Overseas Co. Inc. v Societe Generale du I'Industrie du Papier
(RAKTA) (1974) 508 F 2d 969 at p. 975 (U.S. no. 7).
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its intention to limit the application of public policy "to cases in which the recognition or
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award would be contrary to the basic principles of the
legal system of the country where enforcement of the award is invoked".154 Working
Party No. 3 proposed to limit this ground by referring to the term "public policy" alone,
and this limitation was accepted by the Conference, rejecting by that a proposal by Brazil
which referred to "fundamental principles of law".155 Thus, it is apparent that the drafters
of the New York Convention did not seek to harmonise public policy or to establish a
common international standard. The drafters of Article V (2)(b) deliberately kept the
formula as simple as possible in order to persuade all the states to become members to the
New York Convention, and this has been considered as providing an "escape clause
which was necessary for ratification of the Convention by the member states."156
The conclusion which can be drawn from this background is that public policy is a
ground to refuse the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards which may be raised by either
party or by the court where enforcement is sought. The historical background of Article
V (2)(b) shows that there have been several attempts to limit the scope of applying this
1 S7
ground to international public policy, but that these were merely recommendations ,
and that the exact scope of how this ground should be applied was not clearly identified
in the New York Convention. The absence of a legislative text, which defines and
enumerates those matters that can be considered as public policy issues, leaves the door
154 The U .N. ESCOR. Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of International Arbitral
Awards, U.N. Doc. E/2704 and Corr. 1. E/AC.42/4/Rev. 1 (1955); Richard A. Cole, op. cit., p.
373, footnote 46.
155 UN DOC E/CONF.26/SR. 17; J. D. Bredm, "The New York Convention of June 10th 1958 for
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards," 87 Journal du Droit International
(1960) p. 1003 at p. 1027; Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 361.
156
Barry, "Application of the Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards Under the New York Convention: A Modest Proposal," 51 TEMPLE L. Q. 832. 839
(1978); Richard A. Cole, op. cit., p. 374, footnote (50); Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 366.
157 See the Statement of the Chairman ofWorking Party No. 3, UN DOC E/CONF. 26/SR.17. He
provides that: "the provision should not be given a broad scope of interpretation."
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widely open for domestic courts to determine the extent of those matters which are
158deemed contrary to public policy according to their notion of the concept. This may
undermine the objects of Article V of the New York Convention, as giving the national
courts such discretionary power may expose the award to additional conditions other than
the limited grounds provided under article V (1).
As will be seen through this study, the extent of public policy is subject to a variety of
interpretations by the courts of different nations. The questions that need to be settled will
be whether it is possible to achieve a comprehensive definition of this concept, especially
in cases concerning the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, and whether it is
conceivable to find acceptance of the notion of international public policy?159
There are many issues that still need to be addressed in this regard. The following
chapters will examine the general content of public policy. A distinction will also be
drawn between the public policy test in purely national affairs and the public policy test
to be applied in international agreements as understanding the concept of international
public policy would restrict judicial interference with international arbitral awards to a
minimum.
158 Gerald Aksen, op. cit., p. 13. He states that: "The applicability of Article V (2)(b) has been
left to the good faith of the contracting countries."
159
However, it is impossible to provide a conclusive definition of public policy, but I believe that
there must be a concept that may give general indications as to the ideas underling the
international arbitration public policy. If a workable definition of international public policy
could be found, it would be an effective way to protect foreign arbitral awards in an international
arbitration from being set aside for purely domestic considerations.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE NOTION OF PUBLIC POLICY AND ITS ROLE IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
Chapter Two
The Notion of Public Policy and its Role in International Commercial Arbitration
Public policy as a notion affects the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in
various ways, as the application of this notion may occur at different stages of the
arbitration process. Initially the arbitral tribunal may find that it is imperative to apply
public policy rules that might have a considerable consequence on the validity of their
verdict.1 Secondly the court in the country of origin, which has jurisdiction over the
arbitration process, may refuse to assist the arbitration process or to recognise the validity
of the arbitration agreement and the resulting award if it considers that the award violates
its national public policy rules.2 Finally if the award was considered as a foreign award,
then the court where the enforcement is taking place may not recognise or enforce the
award if it contradicts with public policy as conceived in that state.3
The final stage has a special significance. This is due to the nature of foreign arbitral
awards in that they were rendered outside the scope of the states' supervision and
therefore, courts may reinvestigate the validity of an arbitral award according to its
conformity with the mandatory rules in the state of enforcement. This may expose the
award to a wide range of possible grounds on which the award will be nullified and set
aside.
1 It is a common thing to find public policy rules which cannot be contracted out of by the parties
or which cannot be disregarded by the arbitrators. See, Chapter Three, p. 101.
2 See Chapter Four, p. 151.
3 See Chapter Five, p. 184; Chapter Six, p. 239.
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In this chapter, the study will firstly focus on the concept of public policy. Secondly
the focus will be upon the traditional classification of public policy rules, both domestic
and international, which deserves a careful analysis. Therefore, a distinction between the
different forms of public policy will be drawn to illustrate the different applicable public
policy rules to relationships that involve a foreign element. Finally, we will examine the
development of the concept of international public policy, and the approach towards
accepting the existence of international public policy rules, as distinct from domestic
public policy rules.
The Notion of Public Policy
There are different terms used to give expression to this notion. The term public
policy is used in the common law system4, whereas the civil law system uses the French
term ordre public.5 When analysing the two terms one may recognise that the word
public is mutual. It generally implies reference to the majority of a particular community.
The other two words, policy and ordre are different, although they could arguably have a
similar interpretation. The two terms may indicate that there are fundamental interests or
essential values significantly important to the community, the public, which should be
protected at all times. Many scholars distinguish between public policy and ordre public,
4
For example, in England, the Arbitration Act 1996 uses the term public policy in Section
68(2)(g) and Section (103)(3).
5 For example, the literal translation of Article 53(2) of the Egyptian Law No. 27 of 1994,
indicates that the Arabic text refers to 'orderpublic'.
as the latter has a wider application than the common law term public policy.6 However,
the general trend in international commercial arbitration is to use the two terms
interchangeably as they ultimately lead to the same meaning, and therefore they will be
used interchangeably in this study.7
The rules that reflect the public policy interests mark the boundary line between
those conducts which are permissible in a given community and those which are not. In
the domain of contractual relations, public policy controls the will of the parties and
supervises the limits of their autonomy, which may lead to nullify any agreement that
o
violates public policy in order to protect the community from any injurious agreements.
6 Julian Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Commercial
Arbitration Awards, Oceana Publications, Inc., Dobbs Ferry, N.Y, (1978), p. 401. He states that:
"the Civil Law term 'ordre public' is generally given a wider application than the Common Law
term 'Public Policy'"; ILA Report, London Conference (2000), op. cit., p. 10. It provides that:
"... public policy, as understood in Common Law jurisdictions, might not cover all cases of
procedural injustice"; Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, "Public Policy and Arbitrability," op. cit., p. 179;
Nadelmann and Von Mehren, "Equivalencies in Treaties in the Conflicts Field," 15 AM. J. Comp.
L. 195, 200 (1967); Richard A. Cole, op. cit., p. 375; Christopher B. Kuner, "The Public Policy
Exception to the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States and West Germany
Under the New York Convention," 71 J.Int.Arb. (1990), p. 71 at 72; Howard M. Holtzmann &
Joseph E. Neuhaus, op. cit., p. 911.
7 The same concept has been recognised in Lemenda Ltd. v. African Middle East Co. [1988]
(Q.B.D.) 453, where Phillips J., referred to 'order public' in the Qatar Civil law. Phillips J stated
that: "The reference in these articles to 'public order' is the equivalent of the more familiar
English term public policy"; also see, Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, "Public Policy and Arbitrability,"
op. cit., p. 179; Van den Berg, op, cit., p. 359 He states that: "... as both terms are frequently used
interchangeably, the term 'public policy' will be used with the understanding that it has the same
meaning as the term 'order public'."
8 Hartwell Geoffrey illustrated the existence of certain categories of conducts that a community
may not allow, and therefore are prohibited by public policy rules. He provides that: "Societies
may decide that certain pacts should not exist, or that, if they are allowed to exist, it will not
support them. Law will give effect to such matters of social or political policy. Thus, there are, in
the various jurisdictions of the world, pacts that the state will allow to exist but will not enforce
(gambling arrangements, for example) pacts that can be destroyed by intervention of the state
(violable contracts) pacts that are not permitted in law to exist at all and the extreme category of
pacts the formation of which is, of itself, an offence against the state." Geoffrey Beresford
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A. Definition of public policy
The notion of public policy is, in itself, ambiguous and therefore there is no
definitive identification of this notion. Accordingly different national courts may vary in
their decisions on matters that involve consideration of public policy.
Parke B. in Egerton v. Brown low' stated that this ambiguity leads the court to
confusion and uncertainty:
"Public policy is a vague and unsatisfactory term, and calculated to lead to
uncertainty and error, when applied to the decision of legal rights; it is capable of being
understood in different senses; it may, and does, in its ordinary sense, mean 'political
expedience', or that which is best for the common good of the community; and in that
sense there may be every variety of opinion, according to education, habits, talents, and
dispositions of each person, who is to decide whether an act is against public policy or
not. To allow this to be a ground of judicial decision, would lead to the greatest
uncertainty and confusion."
Lord Davey described this ambiguity as:10
"... a treacherous ground for legal decision...a very unstable and dangerous
foundation on which to build until made safe by a decision."
Kekewich, J. mentioned in Davies v. Davies , the famous decision of Mr Justice
12
Burrough J. in Richardson v. Mellish. Kekewich, J. stated that:
Hartwell, "The New York Convention of 1958: A Basis for a Supra National Code," Internet
address'.
(http:www.hartwell.demon.co.uk/nyc_asa.htm) at p. 1.
9
Egerton v. Brownlow, (1853) 4 H. L. C. 1, p.123; also see, Fender v. ST. John-Mildmay. (1938)
A.C.,p. 10.
10
Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines Ltd (1902) A.C. 484, 500, p. 507; also see, Janson v.
Mines (1902) A. C. 484, 491, 497.
" Davies v. Davies, (1887) Ch. D. 36., p.364.
12 Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 2 Bing. 228; [1824-34] All ER Rep. 258.
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"I cannot but regard the jarring opinions as exemplifying the well-known dictum of
Mr. Justice Burrough in Richardson v. Mellish, that public policy "is a very unruly horse,
and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you", public policy
does not admit of definition and is not easily explained".
However, Lord Denning in Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. v. The Football
Association Ltdn showed a more optimistic view of this notion:
"With a good man in the saddle, the unruly horse can be kept in control. It can jump
over obstacles."
Notwithstanding these difficulties various definitions have been formulated.
Mark A. Buchanan stated that:14
"Domestic public policy represents those local standards or rules that are not
subject to alternation or derogation by the parties and stand as an outside limit to the
parties freedom to contract."
Ashraf A1 Rifaie1displayed several definitions contained in Arabic and French
doctrines16, including those of the French writer, Philippe Malaurie.17 These included
almost twenty definitions of public policy given by several authors, leading to the
13
Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. v. The Football Association Ltd. (1971) Ch. 591, 606.
14 Mark A. Buchanan, "Public Policy and International Commercial Arbitration," 26 AM. Bus.
L.J., (1988), p. 513; also see, John Y. Gotanda, "Awarding Punitive Damages in International
Commercial Arbitration," 38 Harv. Int.L.J. 1, 1997, p. 102.
13 Ashraf A1 Rifaie, op. cit., p 11.
'6 Also see, Abdul Hamid El Ahdab, "General Introduction on Arbitration in Arab Countries,"
Int. Handbook on Comm. Arb., (1993), p. 12. He defines the concept of public policy according to
Moslem Law as: "[it] is based on the respect of the general spirit of the Shari 'a and its sources
(the Koran and the Sunna, etc.) and on the principle that individuals must respect their clauses,
unless they forbid what is authorised and authorise what is forbidden."
17
Philippe Malaurie: Les Contracts a L'order Public, Thesis, Paris, 1953, p. 69. Cited in Ashraf
A1 Rifaie, op. cit., p 16.
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conclusion that none of these definitions can give an accurate identification for this
notion. Ashraf A1 Rifaie then defines public policy as:18
"The body of rules that intends to protect the political, economic and moral
standards of a state, by giving public interests the priority over private interests, without
disregarding the private rights entirely."
Julian Lew initially observes that a totally comprehensive definition of public
policy has never been proffered. However, he then goes on to state that:19
"It is clear that [it] reflects the fundamental economic, legal, moral, political,
religious and social standards of every State or extra-national community. Naturally
public policy differs according to the character and structure of the State or community to
which it appertains, and covers those principles and standards which are so sacrosanct as
to require their maintenance at all costs and without exception."
In the context of enforcement of an arbitral award, the English Court of Appeal in
D.S.T. v Rakoih (1987) Sir John Donaldson MR stated that:20
"Considerations ofpublic policy can never be exhaustively defined, but they should
be approached with extreme caution. ... It has to be shown that there is some element of
illegality or that the enforcement of the award would be clearly injurious to the public
good or, possibly, that enforcement would be wholly offensive to the ordinary reasonable
18
Ibid., p 12. Likewise, the Egyptian courts provided a general definition for public policy. The
Egyptian Court of Cassation defined public policy as: "... the rules that intends to fulfil the high
interests of the state, whether it is political, moral, social or economical, and relates with the
substantial and moral status of the community, where public interests has a prominence upon
privet interests." Egyptian Court of Cassation, 17 of January 1979, Publication of Cassation Court
decisions; also see, Abid al Razag al Sanhuri, Illustration of the Civil Law, 2ed, Dar al Nahdah al
Arabiah (1964), p. 399. (in Arabic); Hussam-al Dean Fathi Nasif, National Law of the Judge and
Deciding Private International Law Disputes, Dar al Nahdah al Arabia (1994), p. 459. (in Arabic)
He defines public policy rules as: "the selected mandatory rules which cannot be disregarded by
the agreement of individuals."
19 Julian Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Commercial
Arbitration Awards, op. cit., p. 532; also see, Egerton v. Brownlow (1853) 4 HLC 1. The House
of Lords described public policy as: "that principle of law which holds that no subject can
lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public, or against public good"; see
Cheshire and North, Private International Law (13th ed., Butterworths, 1999), p. 123, referring to
"some moral, social or economic principle so sacrosanct ... as to require its maintenance at all
costs and without exception."
20 Deutsche Schachtbau-und tiefbohrgesellscaft mbh v. Ras Al Khaimah National Oil Company
[1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 246 at 254.
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and fully informed member of the public on whose behalf the powers of the state are
exercised."
Accordingly, public policy rules play an important role in protecting the substantial
rights and principles of the community, primarily because these principles have a
political, moral, economic or social importance or because of any other public goals
which relate to the justice and morality as conceived in a given community.21 The rules
that contain these rights are mandatory and should prevail over any other provision or
rule.
All of the above then begs the following questions: what can be considered as a
public policy rule in a given community? How can a court distinguish between public
policy rules and other legal rules? How could a court decide that a specific rule has an
important value for the public? In other words, are these public policy rules situated and
identified in provisions of law, where a court can easily locate them and apply them
accordingly?
It must first be considered whether there are rules of law that have a significant
importance and are mandatory in their application. These are the mandatory rules, which
22exist in both statutory provisions and in common law rules. It is necessary in this
21 Public policy in this context represents the interest of the community and therefore must be
distinguished from the policy of a particular government. See Egerton v. Earl Brownlow (1853) 4
H. L. C. 1, 148; 23 L. J. (Ch.) 348, per Lord Truro; Monkland v Jack: Barclay Ltd (1951) 2 KB
252; (1951) 1 All ER 714; Regazzoni v. KG Sethia [1958] A.C. 301; [1957] 3 All E.R. 286; also
see, Halsbury's Law of England, 4th ed., Lord Mackay of Clashfern, Butterworths, (1973), p. 844.
22 See William Holdsworth, History ofEnglish Law, 3ed., London: Methuen, (1922), p. 55. He
states that: "... in fact, a body of law like the common law, which has grown up gradually with
the growth of the nation, necessarily acquires some fixed principles, and if it is to maintain these
principles it must be able, on the ground of public policy or some other like ground, to suppress
practices which, under ever new disguises, seek to weaken or negative them"; also see, Chitty on
Contracts, The Common Law Library, Number 1. Twenty Sixth Ed. 1989. Vol. 1. p. 685.
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respect to examine the extent of the obligatory force of such mandatory rules. A
mandatory rule could be restrictively fundamental to the public, and thus any agreement
that violates such a rule will be considered as offensive to the policy of a given
community and therefore must be void. Conversely, not every mandatory rule always
constitutes fundamental principles as not every mandatory rule contains an essential
value to the community. In this respect, it is necessary to decide when a mandatory rule
forms part of public policy rules which represent the fundamental interests in a given
23
community. To achieve this balance, an illustration of mandatory rules should take
place in order to understand their limits and to be able to distinguish mandatory rules
from public policy rules that embody the fundamental issues.
B. Mandatory rules and public policy
Mandatory rules are known as such, in the domain of statutory framework, to
distinguish between the obligatory rules, which parties cannot derogate from by their
agreement, and other rules, which are discretionary. The latter are known in civil law
systems as supplementary, complementary or directory rules.24 Supplementary rules are
23 It has been reported in Chitty on Contracts that the scope of public policy could be classified
into five groups: "Firstly, objects which are illegal by common law or by legislation; secondly,
objects injurious to good government either in the field of domestic or foreign affairs; thirdly,
objects which interfere with the proper working of the machinery of justice; fourthly, objects
injurious to marriage and morality; and, fifthly, objects economically against the public interest."
The Common Law Library, Number 1. Chitty on Contracts, op. cit., para. 1134, p. 686. However,
it has been added that this classification is not perfect; "This classification is adopted primarily
for ease of exposition. Certain cases do not fit clearly into any of these five categories." Ibid.,
para. 1134, p. 686.
24 Abid al Hakeem Foudah, Nullification in Civil Law and Private Rules, Dar al Matboat al
Gam'iah, (1993), p. 27. (in Arabic).
66
applicable whenever the parties neglect or do not organise some of the contractual
conditions of their agreements. Supplementary rules thus complete the parties' consent if
their consent was ambiguous or incomplete, with the priority given to the parties'
consent, excluding what might contradict with the public policy. On the other hand,
mandatory rules are applicable at all times and have priority over the parties' consent.
Their function is to control the parties' autonomy, under the penalty of nullification of
any agreement that violates or contradicts with such mandatory rules.
Usually neither provisions nor statutes contain separate lists for mandatory rules
and for supplementary rules, but rather the distinction between the two types can be
drawn from the way that they have been formulated. Mandatory rules always have an
obligatory formula, providing an order to do or to forbid certain actions.25 The reason
why these mandatory rules have such obligatory force is due to the importance of the
interests that these rules are designed to protect, which explains why mandatory rules are
usually mixed with public policy rules.26 Okezie Chukwumerije27 referred to the
relationship between the concept of public policy and mandatory rules. He provided that
mandatory rules embody the concept ofpublic policy:
"...there is a close relationship between the concept of public policy and that of
mandatory rules. Mandatory rules would include those aspects of public policy and rules
25 Abid al Hakeem Foudah, op. cit., p. 27.
26 Professor Mayer described mandatory rules as: "... a mandatory rule (loi de police) is an
imperative provision of law which must be applied to an international relationship irrespective of
the law that governs that relationship. To put it another way: mandatory rules of law are a matter
of public policy (ordre public), and moreover reflect a public policy so commanding that they
must be applied even if the general body of law to which they belong is not competent by
application of the relevant rule of conflict of laws." P. Mayer, "Mandatory Rules of Law in
International Arbitration." (1986) 2 Arbitration International, p. 274 at 275.
27 Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit., p. 180.
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of national law that are couched in an imperative manner because they embody the vital
socio-economic policies of the state involved. These include currency and exchange
regulations, boycotts and blockades, embargoes, and environmental protection laws."
One should consider however, that mandatory rules have a broader application than
public policy and that "every public policy rule is mandatory, but not every mandatory
rule forms part of public policy".28 This can be recognised for example, in procedural
rules, where several procedural rules are deemed mandatory although they do not form
29
part of the public policy of the state. Therefore the importance of the interests which
such rules aim to protect should be established, owing to the fact that public policy
embodies the most essential and fundamental interests in the community.30
Due to the ever-changing and developing nature of communities, and our
understanding of what the term community represents it is entirely understandable that
what is deemed appropriate for one community may not be appropriate to other
28
See, ILA Report, London Conference (2000), op. cit., p. 18.
29 Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, "Public Policy and Arbitrability," op. cit., p. 177 at 183. He states that:
"mandatory rules are not necessarily identical with public policy rules. Public policy requires
further additional qualifications."
30
See, Fender v. ST. John-Mildmay, 1938, A.C. 1. This case is one of the cases where the notion
of public policy was carefully analysed and illustrated; Lord Thankerton, in page 22, states that:
"One of the constant principles of public policy in this country, which it is the duty of the Courts
to maintain, is that of freedom of contract; but it is certain that there are some classes of contract,
whose characteristics are such that their enforcement by the Courts is barred by a paramount
principle of public policy. Generally, it may be stated that such prohibition is imposed in the
interest of the safety of the State, or the economic or social well being of the State and its people
as a whole. It is therefore necessary, when the enforcement of a contract is challenged, to
ascertain the existence and exact limits of the principle of public policy contended for, and then to
consider whether the particular contract falls within those limits."
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communities.31 This explains why public policy is a changeable notion32, changing from
place to place and from time to time.33
C. Public policy is a relative concept
Public policy rules vary according to that which the respective states may consider
as fundamental.34 By virtue of the fact that public policy represents the fundamental
standards in a given community, such standards could only be applicable in the place in
31 In Davies v. Davies Kekewich, J. stated that: "one thing I take to be clear, and it is this - that
public policy is a variable quantity; that it must vary and does vary with the habits, capacities, and
opportunities of the public." Davies v. Davies, [1986] 1 F.L.R. 497; Ch. D. 36.1887, at p. 364.
32
See, Chitty on Contracts, op. cit., para. 1133, p. 685, "public policy is not immutable. .. Rules
which rest on the foundation of public policy, not being rules which belong to the fixed
customary law, are capable, on proper occasion, of expansion or modification. Circumstances
may change and make a commercial practice expedient which formerly was mischievous to
commerce." See Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co. v. Nordenfelt (1893) 1 Ch. 630,
666; Multiservice Bookbinding Ltd. v. Marden (1979) Ch.D. 84. And vice-versa, a practice which
was once permissible maybe prescribed. See, Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. V. Harper's Garage
(Stourport) Ltd. (1968) A.C. 269, 322-324, 333.
33 Even in the same country, what can be permissible in one time may become illegal in other
time. See, Davies v. Davies, op. cit., p. 397, Kekewich, J. provides that: "contracts which at one
time were deemed - and I dare say justly deemed - to be contrary to public policy, at another time
have been deemed to be consistent with public policy, and for the public benefit." For example, it
was provided that in the nineteenth century Christianity was part of the law of England and that,
accordingly, a contract to hire a hall for meeting to promote atheism was contrary to public policy
but fifty years later this view was decisively rejected. See Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns
and Ammunition co.{\ 894) AC 535, per Lord Watson p 553; Cheshire Fifoot & Furmston, Law of
Contract 7lh N. Z ed., p. 311; Bowman v. Secular Society (1917) Ac 406; Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel,
"Public Policy and Arbitrability," op. cit., p. 180. He states that: "national public policies have
changed over the years, influenced by a number of factors such as national developments in the
political and legal system the involvement of the national economy in international trade, political
decisions such as the promotion of foreign investment, or international developments."
34
See, Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 360. He provides that: "the reason why the concept of public
policy is so difficult to grasp is that the degree of fundamentality ofmoral conviction or policy is
conceived differently for every case in the various states"; also see, Halsbury's Law of England,
4th ed., op. cit., para 842; Redfern and Hunter, 2nd ed., op, cit., p.443, stating that: "the concept of
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which they were made. Accordingly, if a public policy rule of a given state, was referred
to or raised with the intention of application in another state, and was contrary to the
public policy rules of the latter, 'host' state, then the application of this rule would not be
granted.35 Lord Kingsmill Moore J. clearly expressed this view in Peter Buchanan LD.
andMacharg v. Mcvey:36
"In deciding cases between private persons in which there is present such a foreign
element as would ordinarily induce the application of the principles of a foreign law,
courts have always exercised the right to reject such law on the ground that it conflicted
with public policy or affronted the accepted morality of the domestic forum. Contracts
valid according to what would normally be considered "the proper law" of the contract
will not be enforced if in the view of the court they are tainted with immorality of one
kind and another."
Importantly, what could be termed a 'conflict of international public policy rules'
will take place in deciding which public policy rules are to be applied in private
international law relations. According to the traditional conflict of law theory, it has long
been accepted that such circumstances are subject to the qualification that imperative
37laws of the forum may apply to a contract irrespective of the proper law of the contract.
public policy (or order public, in the civil law terminology) is general; but the actual requirements
of public policy vary from one state to another."
33 Yves Derains, "Public Policy and the law Applicable to the Dispute in International
Arbitration," International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA) New York Arbitration
Congress (1986), Pieter Sanders ed., pp. 227-228. He explained that: "In domestic law, public
policy forms a set of rules that parties may not contract out of. In private international law, public
policy known as 'international public policy' enables the judge to exclude the foreign law that
would otherwise be applicable when it infringes on social or legal concepts considered to be
essential in his legal system. In this connection it is known as overriding public policy"; to the
same extent this has been explained by the Egyptian doctrines, see Ashraf al Rifaie, op. cit., p. 23;
Ahmad Abid al Khreem Salamah, Summary in Private International Relations, 1 Ed, Dar al
Nahdah al Arabiah, p. 225. (in Arabic); Article 28 of the Egyptian Civil Law.
36
Peter Buchanan LD. andMacharg v. Mcvey. [1955] A.C. 516 at p. 528.
37 Hussam-al Dean Fathi Nasif, op. cit., p. 454. He considers public policy in international private
law as having an exclusion role which protect the community from foreign rules that may
contradict with its system, he also describes the conflict of law rule, when it refers to apply a
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Therefore, applying foreign laws in a given state will be determined according to its
harmony with the public policy rules of that state. This opinion was given by Lord Justice
Clerk Patton in Connal & Co. v. Loder?%
"Everybody knows that the fundamental principle upon which we introduce foreign
law affecting the rights of contracts or otherwise, is only to the effect of introducing such
law when it is not in direct contradiction to the principle upon which our law is
governed."
The following material explains the conflict of public policy rules, and the
distinction between national public policy and international public policy.
II. The Conflict of Public Policy Rules
To understand the meaning of the conflict of public policy rules one should
distinguish between the traditional conflict of laws, as it is known in private international
law39, and the conflict of public policy rules. Simply, a difference between the two
concepts is that the conflict of public policy rules occurs after deciding the applicable
law, illustrated in the following hypothetical example. A dispute arose in which different
international elements were involved. If the parties did not agree on the applicable law,
foreign legal system, as a step to the uncertainty which justifies the intervention of public policy
in private international law; also see, Hisham Sadik, Conflict of Laws, Monsha'at al Ma'arif,
Alexandria (1993), p. 29, (in Arabic); Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit., p. 180.
38 Connal & Co. v. Loder (1868), 6 M. 1095; also see, Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit., p. 181.
39 J. G. Collier, Conflict of Law. 2nd ed., Cambridge University (1987), p. 3. He defines the
English conflict of law rules as: "a body of rules whose purpose is to assist an English court in
deciding a foreign element."; also see, Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or Truly International)
Public Policy .." op. cit., p. 260. He defines private international law as: "... a branch of the law
which is based on a fundamental distinction between 'domestic' situation and 'international'
situations (i.e., those which include one or more foreign elements sufficiently relevant to call for a
particular treatment and the intervention of the private international law of the State.)."
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the court that had jurisdiction to adjudicate such a dispute would decide the applicable
law according to the conflict of law rules or that which it may find as an appropriate or
proper law to be applied to the dispute.40 The hitherto chosen applicable law, in
accordance with the conflict of law rules, may include what could be deemed a violation
of the public policy of the forum or the public policy of a third country. In other words, a
conflict of public policy rules indicates that a relationship involving two different public
policy rules, each of which belongs to a different legal system, should be determined by
the courts or arbitral tribunals by choosing the applicable public policy rules, favouring
one over the other.
The problem that arises from the conflict of public policy rules can be viewed from
the perspective of the role of public policy in private international law. Generally, when a
private international law rule permits the application of a foreign law rule, it does not
give a green light to apply the foreign law regardless of the effect of applying that law in
the state.41 Public policy here intervenes in order to exclude the application of the foreign
rule that the 'choice of law rules' refers to as having jurisdiction to be applied.42
40 There are different factors that have to be taken into consideration in this respect; the nature of
the dispute that it involves international relationships, the will of the parties that they can choose
the applicable procedural and substantive law; and finally, the involvement of different laws,
where different laws may relate to the case which posses a foreign element. For the question of
who decides the applicable law in international commercial arbitration, see Chapter Three, at p.
104.
41 See for example, Article 28 of the Egyptian Civil Law, it provides that: "The provisions of a
foreign law determined by virtue of the preceding provisions shall not be applicable if those
provisions contravene the public order or morality in Egypt."
42 Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 262.
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To decide the applicable public policy rules in private international law relations, it
is necessary, first of all, to distinguish between the role of public policy in domestic and
private international law relations, drawing attention to the trend towards the
development of international public policy rules, which will be discussed in the following
sections.
A. International and domestic public policy
In domestic relations, national courts apply domestic public policy since the effect
of such relations will only take place in their territory, where they have the responsibility
ofmaintaining and protecting the public policy of the community from being violated by
private agreements.43 In relations that have an international dimension, where foreign
elements may be involved, such as in the conflict of laws or in the enforcement of foreign
awards, the court of the forum may also resort to apply the domestic public policy rules
in order to protect the national fundamental issues of the state from being violated by
foreign elements.44 The following section will illustrate the role of domestic public policy
in private international relations.
B. The role of domestic public policy in private international law
National courts are bound by the public policy rules of a state since such national
public policy rules are designed and intended to be applicable by the court as part of their
43
Yves Derains, op. cit., p. 235. He defines domestic public policy as "... a set of rules within a
given legal system which parties cannot contract out of."
44 Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Private International Law, Oceana Publications, Inc. (1967), p. 153. He
states that: "... all through the history of conflicts law, public policy has been used to limit a
potentially all-embracing autonomy of the parties."
73
legal system. A national court may, therefore apply national public policy rules to all
disputes that fall within the scope of the court's jurisdiction, regardless of the proper law
of the contract.45 Accordingly, a court may nullify a foreign contract, disregard a foreign
law46, or set aside a foreign award by virtue of its contradiction with the national public
policy rules.
The flexible nature of the concept of public policy has previously been noted. It is
this flexibility that makes it hard to discern the limitations to applying domestic public
policy rules to private international law relations. This could be illustrated by viewing
four different examples. In these examples it will be presumed that the English courts are
the courts that have the jurisdiction to decide the applicable public policy rules.
Example One: It should be noted in this hypothetical example, that the applicable
law to a given contract is the English law and the place where the contract will be
performed is in England. The contract here is closely connected to one state, particularly
that the contract will be performed and will take its effect in England. The applicable
public policy rules in this example should be the domestic English public policy rules, as
45 See Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit., p. 181. He states that: "The court system is one of the
vehicles through which a society expresses and protects those fundamental values that underlie its
social fabric; thus national courts generally apply imperative rules that invariably represent the
essential values of their societies, even in cases where the forum's law does not govern the
contract."
46 Hussam-al Dean Fathi Nasif, op. cit., p. 460. He states that: "Public policy in private
international law could be used in a negative sense. It could provide the national courts with a
legitimate reason to change the jurisdiction of the applicable foreign law by permitting the court
to disregard the jurisdiction of the foreign rule that the conflict of law rule indicates points to, and
replace it with its national law"; Albert A. Ehrenzweig, op. cit., p. 154. He states that: "each
country ignores its choice-of-law rules whenever the difference between the foreign applicable
rule from its own internal rule seems sufficiently offensive to justify an exception from the
general rule of choice."
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conceived by the English community according to their traditions and interests.
Therefore, an English court may nullify the contract if it finds that it violates the English
public policy rules, even if the same contract would be considered as valid in other
countries.47
Example Two: In this example, one can take as given that the law of the contract
was English law, but the contract will be performed in another country. Courts should
consider that a foreign element is involved here, which requires consideration of the
validity of the agreement according to the public policy rules of the country in which
performance of the agreement will take place.48 Also, one should consider that the
agreement is governed by English law, and therefore, courts should simultaneously
consider the application of English public policy rules, assuming this is possible.49 This
conclusion was reached by Chitty on Contracts when he stated that:50
"English courts will not enforce a contract where performance of that contract is
forbidden by the law of the place where it must be performed. This proposition is
undoubtedly correct where English law is the proper law governing the contract, but there
does not appear to be any overriding requirement of English public policy rendering such
contacts unenforceable where they are governed by a foreign system of law and are not
regarded as illegal under that system."
47
As was previously stated, communities differ in their policies, as some countries permit some
actions such as gambling, and yet others prohibit such dealings and consider this as a violation of
public policy. If we also take for example, that in some Islamic Countries polygamous marriage is
valid, yet this will be considered as against public policy and morality in other countries.
48 In Soleimany v Soleimany [1998] 3 WLR 811 the Court of Appeal refused to enforce an award
of the Beth Din on the grounds of public policy. The decision could be explained on the basis that
the act was illegal in the place of performance.
49 The application of the foreign public policy rules will depend on the courts knowledge of the
foreign rules and the legal system of that state, in addition to what evidence of such rules the
parties may provide to the court.
50
Chitty on Contracts, op. cit., p. 703; see Ralli Brothers v. Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar
[1920] 2 K. B. 287; Grell v Levy (1864) 16 C.B. (N.S.) 73; also see, Dicey and Morris, The
Conflict ofLaws (11th ed.), London: Stevens, (1987), p. 1214; J. G. Collier, op. cit., p. 373.
75
Likewise, in Lemenda Trading Co. Ltd. V. Africa Middle East Petroleum Co. Ltd.,
Phillips J. stated that:51
"English courts would not enforce an English law contract which falls to be
performed abroad where: (1) it relates to an adventure which is contrary to a head of
English public policy which is founded on general principles of morality; (2) the same
public policy applies to the country of performance so that the agreement would not be
enforceable under the law of that country. In such a situation international comity
combines with English domestic policy to militate against enforcement".
Example Three: In this example, according to a choice of law made by the parties,
or the conflict of law rules upon which the court found that the contract is governed by a
foreign law and the agreement will be performed in England. According to this example,
it will be expected from the court to consider the application of the public policy rules of
the law of the contract (the foreign law, which the conflict of law rules refers to), in
addition to the English public policy rules, but the latter would be considered in a less
restrictive manner. Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston illustrate such a situation, with the
same view, providing that:
"The substance of the obligation - the essential validity of the contract - must be
governed by what is called the "proper law", i.e. in effect the law of the country with
which the transaction is most closely connected. Nevertheless, the rights of the parties as
fixed by the proper law, if put in suit in England, are subject in general to the English
doctrine of public policy. If the contract, though valid by the foreign law, is repugnant to
what has been called the stringent domestic policy of England, it cannot be enforced in
England. This, however, does not mean that each individual rule comprised in the
comprehensive doctrine of public policy applies to a foreign contract. That doctrine
strikes at acts which vary greatly in their degree of turpitude."
51 Lemenda Trading Co. Ltd. v. Africa Middle East Petroleum Co. Ltd.{ 1988) 2 W. L. R. 735; Q.
B. (1988), p. 448, p 459.
32 Fifoot and Furmston, The Law of Contract:, 11th ed., p. 370; the same was determined in
Lemenda Ltd. v. African Middle East Co. [1988] (Q.B.D.), p.460.
76
One should bear in mind here that determining when to consider the application of
public policy rules of a foreign law will be difficult to put into practice, since this will
depend on the circumstances of each individual case. Prior to determining this issue, a
competent court should give due consideration to all relevant circumstances, such as: the
fact that the transaction has a close connection with the foreign country, the law ofwhich
has been violated; that such foreign law is mandatory or has vital importance to that
country, and that the aim of such foreign law is to protect a serious interest for that
state.53
One must consider two possibilities when applying a foreign law according to the
preceding example:
1. The court may find the contract unenforceable due to illegality under the public
policy rules of the applicable foreign law. The contract will then, not be enforceable in
England unless the degree of illegality under the proper law is one that the English court
refuses to recognise because, for example, performance of the transaction imposes an
unfair discrimination upon one or both of the contracting parties.54
2. The court may recognise that the contract is valid by its applicable foreign law, but
that it fails to comply with an English regulatory statute rendering similar domestic
contracts void or unenforceable and accordingly may55, or may not, elect to enforce the
33
See, Chitty on Contracs, op. cit., para 1154, (Illegality and Foreign Law), p. 700.
54 See Kahler v. Midland Bank Ltd. (1950) A. C. 24; Zivnostenska Banka National Corporation v.
Frankman (1950) A. C. 57; MacKender v. Felda A.G. (1967) 2 Q. B. 590, 601.
35
Quarrier v. Colston (1842) 1 Ph. 147; Saxby v. Fulton (1909) 2 K. B. 208; Sayers v.
International Drilling Co. (1971) 1 W. L. R. 1176.
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agreement.56 It is thought that the principle is that such agreements should be enforced,
unless the social policy expressed in the English statute is of such fundamental
importance that it must be applied even to a transaction with foreign elements or that the
contract, or its breach, has a substantial link to national interests.57
The principle which can be deduced from such a situation, is that courts should
recognise the effect of such a contract, as long as it is legal under the applicable foreign
law and should to some extent, enforce such a contract, as long as it does not violate vital
interests, morality and justice as conceived by the national law of the court.
Example Four: Finally, the contract may be governed by a foreign law, and will be
performed in a foreign country. The contract here does not relate to England, except that
English courts have the jurisdiction to decide the dispute. Primarily, it can be said here
that there is no reason to apply English public policy rules, so long as this contract will
not effect the English community. The important question here is: what if the foreign
contract, intended to be performed in a foreign country, was contrary to the public policy
56
Leronx v. Brown (1852) 12 C. B. 801; English v. Donnelly, 1958 S. C. 494; Brodin v. A/R
Seljan, 1973 S. L. T. 198; Peter Buchanan LD. and Macharg v. Mcvey. (1955) A.C. p. 528, in
which the court hold that: "In deciding cases between private persons in which there is present
such a foreign element as would ordinarily induce the application of the principles of a foreign
law, courts have always exercised the right to reject such law on the ground that it conflicted with
public policy or affronted the accepted morality of the domestic forum. Contracts valid according
to what would normally be considered the proper law of the contract will not be enforced if in the
view of the court they are tainted with immorality of one kind and another"; also see, Rousillon v.
Rousillon (1880), 14 Ch.D., p 351. The court based its decision on equity, provided that: "If an
agreement contrary to the policy of the English law is entered into in a country by the law of
which it is valid, an English Court will not enforce it."
57 Mitsubishi Corpn v. Alafouzos (1988)1 FTLR 47; (1988) 1 Lloyd's Rep 191. In which it was
alleged that the contract is illegal under some foreign law, the test was based on whether or not
the contract would be legal when applying the English public policy.
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of England? This question was considered by Wright J. in Kaufman v. Gerson5S, where
the same was raised:
"The question to be determined in this case, as it stands at present, is whether the
courts of this country ought to enforce a contract made, and intended to be performed in,
a foreign country, and according to the laws of that country, the contract being valid and
enforceable according to those laws, but such that, if it were an English contract, the
courts of this country would refuse to enforce it on grounds of public policy or of undue
influence."
In this regard, Wright J. reviewed several cases where the same point was raised.59 He
then decided to consider principles of public policy and morality as conceived by the
English Community. Therefore, the contract will be void if it on any ground could not be
validly made in England and consequently could not be performed there.60
The above example also begs a further question, if it is considered that the contract
violates neither the law of the contract nor English law, but violates the public policy of a
third country. The question then will be; would the court in such a case recognise or
enforce the contract?
One should bear in mind that it is not expected of a court to be knowledgeable of the
various legal systems of different states. In the light of this, a court may not refuse to
enforce such a contract except in the case where there is an obvious violation to the
38
Kaufman v. Gerson (1903) 2 K. B., p 114.
59
re Missouri Steamship Co.(1888) 42 Ch. D. 321, p. 325.; Santos v. Illidge (1859-60) 6 C. B.
(N.S.)., p. 841; Quarrier v. Colston( 1842) 1 Ph. 147.; Robinson v. Bland (1760) 1 W. Bl., p. 256.;
Grell v. Levy (1864) 16 C. B. (N.S.)., p. 73.
60
According to this example, the contract can be invalidated, only if the contract violates the
cardinal interests, justice or morality of the English community, also see, Sharif v. Azad (1967) 1
Q. B. 605; Mansouri v. singh 1986 1. W. L. R. 1393; United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd. v.
Royal Bank ofCanada (1983) A. C. 168, 188-191; Rossano v. Manufacturers' Life Assurance Co.
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public policy of that third country, for example, performance of the contract would
involve a criminal breach of the foreign law. This was the case in De Wutz v.
Hendricks61, which involved a loan in support of Greek rebels against their Turkish
government.62 Also, of relevance here is the well-known decision in Regazonni v. KC
Sethia Ltdbi Although the contract was perfectly legal with regard to the English proper
law, it was considered null and void according to Indian law which prohibited the trade of
jute with South Africa, following the apartheid measures imposed on Indians. The court
considered that the agreement violated the laws of a friendly country. Parker L.J.
provided that:
"...if two people knowingly agree together to break the laws of a friendly country
or to procure someone else to break them or to assist in the doing of it, then they cannot
ask this court to give its aid to the enforcement of their agreement."
The preceding four examples demonstrate the application of national public policy
rules by courts to contractual relations that involve a foreign element. One should
recognise here the difficult situation for national courts when they are confronted with a
question of deciding the validity of an international contract by striking a balance
between their national public policy and the public policy rules of a foreign country. This
(1963) 2 Q. B. 352; Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co. (1988) 1 Lloyd's L. Rep.
259, 268-269; See Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws (11th ed.), p. 1466.
61 De Wutz v. Hendricks (1842) 2 Bing. 314.
62 The plaintiff, in order to raise a loan, deposited with the defendant certain papers. The loan fell
through and the purpose of the transaction, which encompassed overthrowing a friendly
government, prevented the plaintiff recovering the papers. Also see, Foster v. Driscoll (1929) 1
K. B., p. 470 C.A; Toprak Mahsullri Ofisi v. Finagrain Compagnie Commercial Agricole et
Financiere S. A. (1979) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 98, p. 106.
63
Regazonni v. KC Sethia Ltd. 1958 A.C. 301; [1957] 3 All E.R. 286.
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is further complicated by the previously stated notion that courts are not expected to have
knowledge of all of the public policy rules of different legal systems.
This situation will be more difficult for arbitral tribunals when deciding an international
commercial dispute because arbitrators do not have a lex fori as national judges do and
they are not obliged to apply the 'conflict of law rules' of the forum. Moreover,
arbitrators cannot establish a decision on the degree of disparity between the possible
injurious effect of applying a foreign law and the public policy of the forum.64 Clearly
this situation is unacceptable and therefore it has been proposed that in certain cases that
involve a conflict between public policy rules of several legal systems, courts and arbitral
tribunals could resort to a new notion of public policy. This notion is intended to assure a
"minimum standard of protection" by applying international public policy rules that have
been developed in the domain of international commercial relations. This notion will be
further examined in the following sections.
III. The Development of International Public Policy Rules
The concept of a body of international public policy rules is highly contentious.
Some writers wholly deny the existence of international public policy rules unless such
rules exist within the context of national law.65 However, by acknowledging the recent
64 Further explanation of this matter will follow in the next chapter at p. 141.
65 Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy...", op. cit., pp. 277,278;
also see Horacio A. Grigera Naon, "Public Policy and International Commercial Arbitration: An
Argentine view. Comparative Arbitration practice and Public Policy in International Arbitration,"
Pieter Sanders ed., Kluwer Law and Taxation (1987), p. 336; also see, Hussam-al Dean Fathi
Nasif, op. cit., p. 462; Aktham A. EI-Khoul, "The Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards,"
2 Journal of Arab Arbitration (2000), p. 10 at 19. In his opinion; "International public policy
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developments of international commerce and the wide adherence of states to international
commercial treaties, one should recognise that an international commercial community
has emerged and must be distinguished from the plurality of different communities. The
notion of international public policy is thus constituted upon a collection of fundamental
legal principles related to all or at least which covers the most fundamental notions of
equity and justice. This is mainly due to the development of international commerce,
which has led to a degree of co-operation between members of the international
community. To develop a modern environment for international commercial relationships
it was necessary to establish public policy rules suiting the needs of the international
commercial community and thereby avoid the confusion caused by the existence of
variable national public policy rules such as different trade prohibitions.
Achieving such harmony is possible by reducing the applicability of national public
policy rules in international transactions, as compared to their wider use in domestic
relations.66 Also, this is achievable by seeking to find mutual principles of justice and
morality67 common to the majority of countries.68 It could be argued in this respect, as is
rules express the major and basic values of a defined country and not those of all countries. They
are the national concept of national values for international dealings, of what is fair and
acceptable and what is not so by a certain country."
66
Van den Berg, op. cit., p.360. He states that: "According to this distinction what is considered
to apply to public policy in domestic relations does not necessarily apply to public policy in
international relations;" Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, "Public Policy and Arbitrability," op. cit., p.
188; Christopher B. Kuner, op. cit., p. 79.
67 Courts for instance, cannot entertain a contract for the sale of slaves at present time. This is
merely an example of the kinds of contracts that cannot be enforced around the world, as it is
internationally prohibited by the various Human Rights Conventions, and by the various legal
systems around the world. See Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "No one
shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their
forms."
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the central subject of exploration in this research, that if a domestic public policy rule
conflicts with the international public policy rules, then international public policy should
prevail. However, despite these propositions, the notion remains at heart problematic due
to the sheer diversity of fundamental issues between states, such as the different beliefs,
traditions, economic policies and political trends, which may interrupt the approach
towards establishing a new concept of international public policy. Recognising this
problem, Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, state that: 69
"...there are bound to be practices which some states will regard as contrary to the
international public policy interest, and other states will not. Agreements in restraint of
competition, for example, which are the subject of punitive regulation in some parts of
the world (for instance, in the U.S and the European Community) are treated with
indifference elsewhere. Problems abound in formulating the concept of international
public policy, but they do not vitiate the desire or need for a workable definition of it."
it is widely recognised that international public policy serves the international
community by its potential to play exactly the same role as domestic public policy in
national relations70, although the difficulties that may arise in developing such rules have
also been recognised most notably by Okezie Chukwumerije. He demonstrated that:71
68 Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit., p. 191. He states that: "Like the concept of public policy in
national law, the concept of transnational public policy presupposes the existence of "a certain
community and of certain fundamental values. Unlike national public policy, the relevant
community here is not a national community but the international community"; Pierre Lalive,
"Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 277, stating that:
"international public policy aimed at safeguarding principles common to all civilised nations";
Ahmed S. El-Kosheri, "Extent and Nature of Private International Law," Legal and Economy
Journal, 1 ed., (1968), p. 128; Abu Zaid Redwan, op. cit., p. 119. He provides that: "There are
modem rules which govern international commercial relationships, the source of these rules does
not come from national laws but from the international commercial customs and modem means
of international transactions"; Hussam-al Dean Fathi Nasif, op. cit., p. 487. He states that: "some
legal systems, such as, those in the 'Arabic countries' share principles that acquire their origin
from the same source, which may institute, at least, a minimum level of interconnection and
therefore, an international level ofpublic policy between these states."
69 Redfem and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p.445.
70 Abu Zaid Redwan, op. cit., p. 119.
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"... while the public policy of a state embodies the moral and ethical philosophy of
the state, transnational public policy performs the same role for the international business
community."
He went on to define international public policy thus:72
"Transnational public policy represents the fundamental values, the basic ethical
standards, and the enduring moral consensus of the international community. Its
principles are derived from "the fundamental rules of national law, the principles of
universal justice, jus cogens in public international law and the public policy accepted in
a generality of nations."
Van den Berg referred to the fundamental rules of natural law, the principles of
universal justice, in public international law and the general principles of morality
accepted by civilised nations.73
Klaus Berger mentioned that international public policy rules have been developed
within the general principles of law74 and that these international principles are agreed by
the majority of states reminding us to keep in our mind that while there may be
difficulties, this must not frustrate the acceptance of the existence of such rules. He stated
that:75
"The fact that a majority of nations might disagree with these views need not
necessarily negate their importance in shaping international public policy."




Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 361.
74 Klaus Peter Berger, op. cit., p. 673; also see, Berthold Goldman, Lex Mercatoria, Kluwer Law
and Taxation Publishers, Deventer, The Netherlands, (1986), at 115. He provides an explanation
of the general principles of law as those principles that are common to all, or to a large majority
of national legal systems. The general principles of law are determined by conducting a survey of
various national laws to determine those common principles.
73 Klaus Peter Berger, op. cit., p. 673.
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Lord Denning in The Hollandia case76, highlighted the importance of applying
unified public policy rules in international trade stating that:
"... there is a higher public policy to be considered and that is the public policy
which demands that, in international trade, all goods carried by sea should be subject to
uniform rules governing the rights and liabilities - and the limitation of liability - of the
parties. They should not vary according to the particular country or place in which the
dispute is tried out. So many persons are concerned down the chain - buyers and sellers,
bankers and insurers, endorsees and consignees - that each should know what the rules
are - without having to go by the small print in any particular bill of lading...".
Lord Denning continues:
"This public policy applies not only to contracts of carriage of goods by sea, but
also to carriage by air, where again there is a statute which overrides other stipulations77,
in short, it applies to all international transport."
78
Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter also provide that:
"International public policy would not concern itself with matters of form, or of
purely domestic nature. It would look to the broader public interest of honesty and fair
dealing."
It can be argued that, whilst still contentious, there are various indications showing
how the notion of international public policy has become increasingly acceptable,
developing into a true international public policy rule.77 This can also be viewed through
the development of international conventions and statutes that relate to the enforcement
of foreign arbitral awards.
76 Owners ofCargo on Board the Morviken v Owners ofthe Hollandia (The Hollandia
and theMorviken), [1982] Q. B. 872, at p. 884; [1983] 1 A.C. 565; [1982] 3 W.L.R. 1111.
77 See Corocraft v. Pan American Airways Inc. [1969] 1 Q.B., p. 616.
78 Redfem and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 445.
79 See Christoph Liebscher, "European Public Policy- A Black Box?," 17:3 J.Int.Arb. (2000), p.
73 at 74.
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A. Public policy in international conventions
International conventions play an important role in unifying the rules of different
contracting states, to treat the same issue similarly within the contracting states and
accordingly, reduce the differences between different legal systems.80 This has been the
intention in conventions concerning international economic and commercial rules, in
addition to other conventions concerning the enforcement of foreign judicial and arbitral
awards.
Rules aiming to prevent the violation of public policy are explicitly provided in
almost all international commercial conventions, in order to provide the member states
with a method with which to protect their national, fundamental interests against potential
violations of their public policy.81 Some of these conventions combined the notion of
public policy with other principles such as good morals, religious and fundamental
principles of law. For example, Article 30(a) of the Riyadh Arab Convention on Judicial
Co-operation provides that:
80 Julian Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration, op. cit., p. 443. He states
that: "... the individual purpose of the uniform laws is to establish internationally accepted rules
to regulate the various aspects of the commercial relations to which they relate."
81
See, Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 360. He provides that: "A public policy provision can be found
in almost every international convention or treaty relating to these matters. Its function is
basically to be the guardian of the 'fundamental moral convictions or policies of the forum'."
82
Riyadh Arab Convention on Judicial Co-operation, signed on 6 April 1983; in force October
1985. Intl. Handbook on Comm. Arb. Suppl. 11. January 1990. Annex 1-2; also see, Abdul Hamid
El Ahdab, "General Introduction on Arbitration in Arab Countries," op. cit., p. 23.
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.. the recognition of a judgement may be refused in the following cases: (a) if it is
contrary to the provisions of the Moslem Shari'a or the Constitution or the public policy
or good morals of the signatory State where enforcement is sought".
The Geneva Convention of 1927 provides in Article 1 (c), a ground to refuse the
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards by stating that:
"(c) ... the recognition or enforcement of the award is not contrary to the public
policy or to the principles of the law of the country in which it is sought to be relied
upon."
Accordingly, the Geneva Convention referred to the principles of the law of the country
in which the enforcement of the foreign award is sought. This indicates that the trend in
the Geneva Convention is towards applying the domestic public policy rules of the state
where enforcement will take place. It clearly used the term public policy in addition to
the 'principles of law of the state', as an indication to apply the national legal system of
the country where the enforcement will take place.
However, the New York Convention used another formula, in Article V (2)(b) the
Convention provides that:
"Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the
competent authority in the country where recognition or enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of
that country."
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In Muslim Shari'a rules, the concept of public policy is based on the respect of the general
spirit of the Shari'a and its sources (the Koran and the Sunna, etc.) and on the principle that
"individuals" must respect their clauses, unless they forbid what is authorised or authorised what
is forbidden by Shari'a rules. See Abdul Hamid El- Ahdab, "General Introduction on
Arbitration...", op. cit., p. 14; also Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab, "Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in
the Arab Countries," I 1 Arb.Int., (1995), p. 169; Mohamed I.M. Aboul-Enein, "Liberal Trends in
Islamic Law (Shari'a) on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes," 2 Journal ofArab Arbitration (2000),
p. 1 at 6.
87
The New York Convention evades using the phrase "principles of law" as used in the
Geneva Convention. Van den Berg considered this difference as an indication that the
New York Convention refers to international public policy as distinct from domestic
04
public policy. He established his assumption on the discussion, which followed the
ECOSOC Draft Convention of 1955, which provided that: "clearly incompatible with
public policy or with fundamental principles". The Working Party No. 3, however,
proposed to limit it to public policy alone, considering that "the provision should not be
given a broad interpretation".86 Van Den Berg continues that this limitation was accepted
by the conference, which moreover, rejected a Brazilian proposal to re-introduce
"fundamental principles of law".87
More clarification is required with regard to the phrase "contrary to the public
policy of that country" as used in the New York Convention, since reference to "that
country" at the end of article V (2)(b) may lead to different interpretations. It may refer to
the country where enforcement is taking place or to the country(ies) with which the
dispute has the closest connection. It is also unclear whether this formula refers to the
domestic public policy of a particular country or to international public policy rules.
84 Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 361. He states that: "the new formula of public policy ground, clearly
reflect the convention's intention to base this ground on the restrictive notion of international
public policy."
84 Statement of the chairman of working party no. 3, UN DOC E/CONF. 26/ SR. 17; also see,
Rene David, op. cit., p.400. He states that: "The draft of ECOSOC referred to 'the fundamental
principles of the law'. It was considered in the New York Convention that such adjunction were
unnecessary."
86 Statement of the chairman of Working Party no.3, UN. DOC E/CONF.26/SR.17; Van Den
Berg, op. cit., p. 361.
87
Ibid., p. 362; UN DOC E/CONF.26/SR.17.
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Therefore, it would have been preferable if the New York Convention had used the term
88international public policy or at least the term "public policy" alone , leaving the
interpretation of this article to the courts of each state. This would have provided an open
invitation to courts to develop international public policy rules according to the needs
emanating from the development of international commercial relations. Ultimately, this
could serve to drive the courts to apply less restrictive public policy rules in the domain
of international commercial arbitration.
In deliberations over the Model Law handling of the matter, this proposition (giving
preference to the notion of international public policy or just public policy) was not
employed (while not explicitly rejected) due to a lack of consensus on the working party
and that the term was thought to lack precision.89 The Model Law, in keeping with the
New York Convention refers to 'public policy of this state'.90 However, the debate
remains open and in agreement with the here stated position, Redfem and Hunter argue
88
Examples can be found in international conventions that use the term "public policy" alone,
without giving any indication to the country where the enforcement will take place. For example,
Article 35 of the Amman Arab Convention on Commercial Arbitration which provides that: "...
the Supreme Court of each contracting state must give leave to enforce awards of the arbitral
tribunal. Leave may only be refused if this award is contrary to public policy." Amman Arab
Convention on Commercial Arbitration, signed 14 April 1987, Intl. Handbook on comm. Arb.
Suppl.. 11, January 1990. Annex 2-1.
89 It has been reported that: "During the deliberations of the Model Law the UN Secretariat
suggested, in conformity with a trend in recent case law, to use the restricted term of international
public policy as a ground for setting aside and refusing enforcement. The Working Group
ultimately rejected this proposal because its underlying idea was deemed to be 'not generally
accepted' and, above all, the term 'international public policy' was said to lack the necessary
precision, (UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.2/WP.35, para.30). There was thus no outright rejection of the
principle and its application depends on the doctrine prevailing in the country that has adopted the
Model Law." Redfem and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 443.
90 Article 36(l)(b)(ii) of the Model Law provides that: "the recognition and enforcement of the
award would be contrary to the public policy of this state."
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that the Model Law conclusion "underestimated" the trend towards favouring the term
international public policy in commercial relations.91
International commercial conventions cannot ignore the need of international
commercial relations. There is an implied duty on such conventions to support the
application of the concept of international public policy rules rather than relying on
traditional rules of domestic public policy. This approach would effect the development
of international arbitration as a reliable way to resolve international commercial disputes,
and the integrity of international arbitral awards.
B. Statutory and judicial trends towards international public policy
The trend towards applying international public policy is rapidly growing.92 As
countries become more interested in attracting arbitration, the application of the notion of
international public policy has become more acceptable either in the legislative text or in
court decisions.
91 Redfem and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 443. The authors here added that: "It seems that the
Working Group's evaluation of the current status of international doctrine underestimated the
driving force of the trend towards a restricted notion of public policy"; also see, Klaus Peter
Berger, op. cit., p. 671.
92 Redfem and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 445. The writers provide that: "...there is nothing new,
so far as arbitration is concerned, in differentiating between national and international policy;
indeed it is a consistent theme, to be found in the legislation and judicial decisions of many
countries."
90
The first use of the term international public policy in a statute was in the French
Code ofCivil Procedure, as Article 1502.5 of the civil code provides:93
"An appeal against a decision granting recognition or enforcement of an award may
be brought ...If the recognition or enforcement is contrary to international public
policy."
Likewise, this approach was followed by other countries, such as Lebanon94, Algeria95,
Portugal96, Tunis97, Romania98 and Italy.99 This statutory trend in fact, recognised two
types of public policy: "national public policy", which may be concerned with truly
domestic considerations; and "international public policy", which leads to a more
93 Article 1502.5, 7 .B. Com. ARB. 281- 82(1982); John Y. Gotanda, op. cit., p. 102; Redfern and
Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p.445, stating that: "The concept of 'international public policy' (order
public International) has been devolved by French jurists and is embodied in the New French
Code of Civil Procedure. This Code allows an international arbitral award to be set aside if the
recognition or execution is contrary to international public policy"; Klaus Peter Berger, op. cit., p.
670, stating that: "The French Decree on International Arbitration of 1981 was the first modem
law to adopt this terminology as ground for setting aside international awards and refusing
recognition and enforcement."
94 The Lebanon's New Code of Civil Procedure Article 814 (Leb.), reprinted in Adel Nassar,
"International Arbitration in Lebanon," 10 Arb.Int., (1994), p. 295, 301. He provides that:
"Arbitral awards are recognised and enforceable if... they are not manifestly contrary to
international public policy."
95 Article 458 bis 23(h) ofDecree No. 83.09 (1993).
96 Article 1096(f) of the Code ofCivil Procedure (1986).
97 Article 81. II of the Tunisian Arbitration Code (1993), makes reference to "public policy as
understood in private international law", Tunisian Arbitration Code (1993), Law No. 93-42,
Annex I- 1, Int. Handbook on Comm. Arb. Suppl. 18 September 1994.
98 Articles 168(2) and 174 of Law 105/1992 on the Settlement of Private International Law
Relations, which provide that enforcement will be refused if the award "violates the public policy
of Romanian private international law", Capatina, "Romania", Handbook, Suppl. 21, Aug. 1996,
p. 49, in which the author states that "public policy is understood here as the public policy of
private international law, which is narrower than domestic public policy."
99 The Italian approach has been illustrated by, Rubino Sammartano, M., "New international
Arbitration Legislation in Italy," 11 J.Int. Aeb., p. 77, at 85 (Sept. 1994). The wrtiter summurised
the changes in the Italian international arbitration law which took place in 1994. He provides that
arbitral awards will be enforced if there is no "conflict between the award and Italian
international public policy"; John Y. Gotanda, op. cit., p. 102.
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restricted use of national public policy rules. Moreover, this trend will provide courts
with a statutory rule that would be considered part of their national legal system. This in
turn will lead to the application of public policy rules in a less restrictive fashion and to a
greater understanding of international commercial relations, particularly in cases
concerning the morals and obligations of the international community.100
However, this approach towards using the term international public policy in
statutory provisions, is not yet recognised by all legal systems. Nevertheless, this does not
mean that other legal systems wholly disregard the application of international public
policy rules. Pierre Lalive illustrates the courts' practice in this regard:101
"In an increasing number of cases, a national judge, although a state organ having
the function to state and apply the law of a particular state and to ensure the respect of its
fundamental principles (in particular by means of the traditional concept of external
public policy) has not hesitated to recognize and give effect to a wider notion, more
international or perhaps supranational, of public policy, based on the vital interests not
only of the national community to which the judge belongs but also of a broader, regional
or universal, international community."
For example, while the English Act of 1996 did not use the term international
public policy102, this does not mean that English courts do not recognise the application
of this notion. There is evidence proving that English courts have applied the notion
'international public policy' for the enforcement of international awards. The
jurisprudence of the English courts restricts the application of national public policy in
100 John Y. Gotanda, op. cit., p. 102.
]01 Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 286.
102 Section 103(3) of the 1996 Act, provides that: "Recognition or enforcement of the award may
also be refused if the award is in respect of a matter which is not capable of settlement by
arbitration, or if it would be contrary to public policy to recognise or enforce the award."
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the context of international commercial disputes.103 This is a longstanding principle. As
early as 1889, in re Missouri Steamship Company104, the court held that: "Where a
contract is void on the ground of immorality, or is contrary to such positive law as would
prohibit the making of such a contract at all, then the contract would be void all over the
world, and no civilised country would be called on to enforce it". Also in Foster v.
DriscollW5 the court nullified a contract by stating that: "not because it was illegal here
but as a matter of public policy based on international comity ... and would be contrary to
our obligation of international comity as now understood and recognised, and therefore
would offend against our notions ofpublic morality."
In Soleimany v. Soleimany106 the court applied international public policy
considerations. It viewed both the violation of a foreign law, and of the concept of
international dealings, as a violation of public policy. In this case the parties
acknowledged that the goods (Persian carpets) were to be imported into a foreign country
contrary to the revenue law and export controls of Iran. The parties, both Iranian Jews,
signed an arbitration agreement providing for arbitration to take place before the Beth
Din in accordance with Jewish law. The Beth Din recognised that the carpets had been
103
See, V. V. Veeder, op. cit., p. 66; This was also illustrated in Dalmia Dairy Industries Ltd v.
National Bank of Pakistan [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep 223; Deutsche Schachtbau und
Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH v. Ras Al Khaimah National Oil Company [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep., p
246.
104
re Missouri Steamship Company. (C.A.) (1889), 42 Ch.D, p. 336.
105 Foster v. Driscoll. (1929) 1 K. B., p. 496 at p.510.
106
Soleimany v. Soleimany, Court of Appeal, February 19, 1998. Reported in [1998] 3 W.L.R.
811; [1998] C.L.C. 779.
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exported illegally, but regarded that fact as irrelevant since such illegality would have no
effect on the rights of the parties under Jewish law. The court held that:
"... where a foreign arbitration award was made pursuant to a valid arbitration
agreement, but was based on a contract which was illegal under the law of a friendly
foreign state, where that law governed the contract or the contract was to be performed in
that state, the English court would not enforce that award on the grounds of public
policy." 107
These cases illustrate that, notwithstanding the absence of a direct reference in English
law to the application of international public policy, the application of international
public policy norms by the courts has been acknowledged practice for some time.
The same approach is followed by the Egyptian courts, since the Egyptian
arbitration law of 1994 does not refer to international public policy, Article 58 (2)(b)
refers to public policy in the Arab Republic of Egypt.108 However, the case law reveals
that the concept of international public policy is not unusual to the Egyptian doctrines and
in courts' jurisprudence.109 Discussing this point, Hussam-al Dean Fathi Nasif110 stated
that "a national judge must not misuse public policy in private international law to
disregard the applicable foreign law, particularly when he uses that to justify his
107 Also see, Foster v. Driscoll.(1929) 1 K. B. p. 522, in which Sankey L.J. held that: "To sum up,
in my view an English contract should and will be held invalid on account of illegality if the real
object and intention of the parties necessitates them joining in an endeavour to perform in a
foreign and friendly country some act which is illegal by the law of such country."; Westacre
Investments Inc v. Jugoimport-SPDR Holding Co Ltd. Court, (Q.B.D. (Comm Ct)) Commercial
Court, December 19, 1997. Reported in. [1998] 3 W.L.R. 770; [1998] 4 All E.R. 570; [1998] 2
Lloyd's Rep. Ill; [1998] C.L.C. 409.
'°8 Article 58 provides in sub-section (2): "The application to obtain leave for enforcement of the
arbitral award shall not be granted except after having ascertained the following, (b) that it does
not violate the public policy in the Arab Republic ofEgypt."
109 Ibrahim Ahmmad Ibrahim, op. cit., p. 333; Moneer Abed al Majeed, Arbitration in
International Commercial Disputes, Dar al Mabo'at al Gam'iah, (1995), p. 280. (in Arabic).
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confusion and unfamiliarity with the foreign law, otherwise this will hinder private
international relations". The Court of Cassation, on April 5th 1967, took the view that, it
was necessary to consider the application of international public policy, taking into
consideration the fact that the application of public policy in private international
relations would be found on principles substantially different to those contained within
the relevant Egyptian law. Recognising the potential for this violating the interests of the
state, the court provided that:111
"According to Article 28 of the civil law, it is not allowed to exclude the
application of an applicable foreign law unless it is contrary to the Egyptian public policy
and morality or it contradicts with the state constitution or a public essential interest of
the community. Elowever, a court must consider the application of international public
policy in that if the difference between the foreign law and the Egyptian public policy
rules is not substantial, then the court should not consider that difference as leading to a
violation of national public policy."
Reference to international public policy in international commercial arbitration was
112
clearly emphasised in Arabic Continental Navigation v. Arabic Gulf Contractors. The
Egyptian Court of Cassation demonstrated the apparent approach of the Egyptian courts
by differentiating between the application of public policy in international and in
domestic relations. This case relates to the requirement to nominate the arbitrators in the
arbitration agreement (before the legislation of 1994), in accordance with Article 502(3)
of the Procedures Law No. 13 of 1968.113 Pursuant to a charter agreement the plaintiff,
110 Hussam-al Dean Fathi Nasif, op. cit., p. 467.
111 The court of Cassation on April 5. 1967, the Collection of the Cassation Decisions (Civil
department) s 18 1967, p. 79.
112 Cassation Court, Decision No. 714/ 47 k, the Collection of Cassation's Decisions. 26 April
1982. Vol. 32, p. 422.
113 The requirement of nominating the arbitrators in the arbitration agreement will be handled in
more details later in Chapter Five, see p. 232.
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Arabic Continental Navigation, claimed for the revocation of the contract by the
defendant. The defendant replied by asking the court to refer the dispute to arbitration as
agreed in the charter agreement. The court decided to reject this petition as it considered
the agreement to arbitrate null and void, because it did not contain the names of the
arbitrators in accordance with the conditions cited in Article 502(3) of the Procedures
Law No. 13 of 1968. Therefore, it was considered contrary to Egyptian public policy.114
The appeal court confirmed this decision. Then the Court of Cassation dismissed the
appeal on the ground that:
"... it is not reasonable to apply the Egyptian law on international arbitration where
the applicable law was the English law and England is the country where the arbitration
should take place."
The court held further that:
"... as the charter agreement revealed, any dispute will be settled by arbitration in
London. Therefore, the law applicable to the arbitration shall be the English law, and
accordingly, it is not convenient to nullify the agreement to arbitrate by applying Article
502(3) of the Egyptian procedural law and to exclude the application of a foreign law,
due to Article 28 of the Civil Law. The exclusion of a foreign law can only occur if that
law violates the essential issues of social, political, or moral attitude in Egypt and relates
at the same time with the maximum interests of the community. Therefore, it is not
sufficient if it merely contradicts a mandatory rule. Thus, Article 502(3) of the procedural
law does not apply, as it does not represent a public policy rule of international relations."
The same result was reached in Egypt Insurance Co. v. Alexandria agency for
navigation.115
Similarly, the international trend towards applying the notion of international
public policy has been clearly accepted as evidenced by the decisions of the courts in
several different states. Mention should be made of some significant decisions that have
114 Article 58(2) of that Procedures Law No. 13 of 1968 which refers to the public policy of the
Republic.
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been considered by writers who provided examples from different countries following
this trend. For example, the Court for Civil Justice in the Canton of Geneva clearly drew
a distinction between domestic and international public policy in a decision on September
17, 1976. The Federal Tribunal, in a case where the Geneva Convention was applicable
declared that:116
"The purport of the exception based on ordre public is narrower when the matter
involved is the execution of foreign arbitral awards than when it is the execution of
foreign judgements. The exequatur to a foreign arbitral award shall only be refused when
a fundamental principle of the Swiss legal order has been violated, so that our sense of
justice is intolerably offended ... An appeal to ordre public ought not to serve as an
instrument for the avoidance of the application of International Conventions which have
been signed by Switzerland and which are therefore part of Swiss law. The result of such
a manipulation would eventually amount to a refusal to apply Swiss law. In a word,
recourse to public policy ought not to be employed to violate a Convention, whose
purport is precisely to take into account the existence of different laws and to co-ordinate
different legal systems."
However, inconsistency of the application of international public policy was most evident
in the Swiss Supreme Courts severe rejection of the notion of ordre public international,
wherein it provided that:117
"It concerns rather a formula proposed by certain authors, who do not, however,
give it a precise and unambiguous meaning. It cannot be ascertained how this ordre
public international would limit the application of the foreign law more, or in another
manner, than Swiss public order does."
The latter decision was heavily criticised and described as a "true horror case" since it
does not reflect the true Swiss judiciary practice.118
115 Decision no 1259/49,13 June 1983, Collection ofCassation's Decisions. Vol. 34, p.1416.
116 Trib. Cant. Geneva, Sept. 17, 1976, Sem. Jur. 1977, 505 Yearbook IV (1979), 311. Cited in,
Rene David, op. cit., p. 400.
117 Societe des Grands Travaux de Marseille (SGTM) v. People's Republic ofBangladesh and the
Bangladesh industrial Development Corporation (BIDC), Swiss Tribunal Federal, May 5, 1976,
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In conclusion, there is growing international awareness of the notion of
international public policy that is distinct from the notion of national public policy.119
Recognition of the importance of this distinction can be found in the following doctrines:
John Gotanda stated that:120
"Unlike domestic public policy, which includes all of the imperative rules of the
state in which enforcement is sought, international public policy encompasses only those
basic notions ofmorality and justice accepted by civilised countries."
Bockstiegel121 illustrates the development of a "truly international public policy":
"[as]... comprised only of the common denominators in values and standards of
the international community, despite the fact that many of these obviously differ from the
public policy of individual member states."
Sever provides that:122
"... transnational public policy essentially refers to a system of rules and
principles, including standards, norms and customs, that are accepted and commonly
followed by the world community."
1 7^
Buchanan provides that:
Arrets du Tribunal Federal 102 la 574, summarised in yearbook Vol. 5(1980) p. 217. Cited in,
Van den Berg, op. cit., p.361, fn. 344.
"8 Klaus Peter Berger, op. cit., p. 675.
119 Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 286. He
provides here that: "it is no longer rare today that the courts of the forum take into consideration,
in international economic relations, basic requirements of solidarity and of 'comity'. When
performing this often delicate, not to say political, function, the judge of the forum, of course
within the well-understood limits of its international public policy, accepts the task ofprotecting a
common international public policy."
120 John Y. Gotanda, op. cit., p. 102.
121 Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, "Public Policy and Arbitrability," op. cit., p. 180.
122 R. Sever, "The Relaxation of Inarbitrability and Public Policy Checks on U.S. and Foreign
Arbitration: Arbitration Out ofControl?," 65 TUL.L.REV. (1991), p. 1661.
123 Mark A. Buchanan, op. cit., p. 514.
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"The concept of transnational public policy, a much debated notion itself, is said
to represent the existence of an international consensus a universal standard or accepted
norms of conduct that must always apply."
Gary Born further states that:124
"While the traditional concept of international public policy is still based upon
domestic public policy, transnational public policy originates in substantive norms
derived from international sources and not from domestic ones thus making it truly
international."
1 7S
Julian D.M Lew refers to common principles of international public policy
rules by stating that:
"This doctrine of international public policy includes an abhorrence of slavery,
racial, religious and sexual discrimination, kidnapping, murder, piracy, terrorism;
opposes any effort to subvert or evade the imperative laws of a sovereign state; upholds
fundamental human rights (as declared in the U.N. Universal Declaration on Human
Rights) and the basic standards of honesty and bona fides\ and endorses certain rules and
practices contained in the major and widely accepted uniform laws and international
codes of practice."
The development of these rules was been described by Pierre Lalive:126
".. it is interesting to observe how judicial practice, in its recent evolution, has
gradually broadened its horizons, from the sole taking into consideration of the public
policy of the forum to that of the public policy of a foreign state, then of the public policy
common to several States, and finally of a public policy more and more international".
All the above evidence suggests that international commercial relations should be
subject to international public policy rules. In order to achieve this the application of
domestic public policy rules must be restricted while at the same time the international
124
Gary B. Bom, International Commercial Arbitration in the United States, (1994), p. 538-539.
125 Julian D.M Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration, op. cit., p. 534-
535.
126 Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 260.
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public policy rules and moralities of the international community must be applied. It is
also necessary to distinguish between the two concepts of public policy, according to
127their purpose : while domestic public policy rules serve the interests of the community
in a given state, international public policy defends the interests of the international
community, such as; drug smuggling, bribery, slavery, racial, religious and sexual
discrimination, kidnapping, murder, piracy, terrorism; fundamental human rights, and
environmental issues etc.
To avoid any potential conflict in deciding public policy issues, all parties should
be familiar with the public policy of the countries to which their agreement relates. Each
party should respect the public policy of the country that might relate to the contract,
whether because the contract will be performed in that country or because the law of that
country is the applicable law. The application of public policy rules should be considered
128
throughout the different stages of international arbitration. The next chapters of the
study will explore the applicability of public policy (whether national or international) in
each of the successive stages of the arbitration process and enforcement of the award;
during the arbitration proceedings to examine the arbitral tribunal's duty to respect and
apply public policy, then the court of the forum, if it was asked to set the award aside and
finally the court where the award will be enforced as a foreign award.
P7 This distinction will occur repeatedly in the rest of the topics of this research.
128 As has been stated above, the application of public policy rules in arbitration may occur at
different stages. However, in international commercial arbitration the problem is to decide which
public policy rules are to be applied.
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CHAPTER THREE
DECIDING ON PUBLIC POLICY RULES
BY THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL
Chapter Three
Deciding on Public Policy Rules by the Arbitral Tribunal
As has been previously stated, the question of applying public policy rules may
arise at different stages of the arbitration process, which ultimately would affect the
recognition and enforcement of the final arbitral award. One should consider in this
respect that the extent of applying public policy may differ between these different
stages: for example, what an arbitrator may consider as the applicable public policy rules
to determine the validity of the arbitration agreement, or the applicable law to the
arbitration procedures or the substance of the dispute may not necessarily be the same as
what a court may consider as applicable. This is mainly due to the difference between
how arbitrators and courts perceive their functions. Courts are the guardians of their
national legal systems and therefore they are obliged to give preference to the public
policy rules of their national legal systems over any foreign mandatory rule. On the other
hand, international commercial arbitrators are not guardians of a particular national law
and they have no allegiance to a particular state1, since they derive their authority from an
agreement between two private parties. Thus they are not bound to protect a particular
1 For an international commercial arbitrator, all state laws are on an equal footing and none of
them has a privileged status. See, Bernard Hanotiau, "What Law Governs the Issue of
Arbitrability?," 12 Arb.Int., No.4 (1996), p. 391; Daniel Hochstranger, "Choice of Law and
'Foreign' Mandatory Rules in International Arbitration," 11 J.Int.Arb., (1994), p. 57 at 59. This
writer considers that: "The arbitrator has no duty whatsoever to respect the mandatory rules of the
forum because he does not have a forum, and even less to respect public policy of a state, the law
ofwhich has not been chosen by the parties, just because this law pretends to be applicable."
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2national interest. Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated later in this chapter, an arbitrator
in international commercial arbitration has a duty to provide the parties with an
enforceable arbitral award, which would entail consideration of the application of the
various national mandatory rules that are relevant to the dispute.3
In this chapter the main question to be examined does not concern the problem of
deciding the validity of the arbitration agreement by the arbitral tribunal or the ability of
the arbitral tribunal to rule on the existence and scope of its own jurisdiction. The latter
question relates to the principle of Competence-Competence by virtue of which an
arbitrator can give a final ruling on his own jurisdiction which generally should be raised
at the early stages of the arbitration process before submitting the respondent's statement
of defence.4 The Competence-Competence principle is closely related to the concept of
separability or independence of the arbitral clause, since in deciding its own competence
the tribunal needs to refer to the arbitration clause. The separability doctrine and the
competence of the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction are now fully
2 The duty of arbitrators to consider the application of public policy rules as a distinction from
courts' obligation to apply public policy of their national law has been taken into account in ICC
award Case No. 2178 1973. Cited in, Yves Derains, op. cit., p. 253, the award contained the
following statement, "The narrow links between State Courts and their national law which
compel the application of their national law to the solution of problems of conflict of law that
present themselves to national jurisdictions are absent in arbitration proceedings which are based
on the parties will. As long as it does not relate to a law of public policy which applies to the
parties within the realm of their respective rights and which the arbitrators must take into
consideration."
3 Gunther J. Horvath, "The Duty of the Tribunal to Render an Enforceable Award," 18:2 Journal
ofInternational Arbitration (2001), p. 135.
4 See for example, Article 16 of the Model law; Article 22 of the Egyptian Law; Carlos E. Alfaro
and Flavia Gumerey, "Who Should Determine Arbitrability? Arbitration in a Changing Economic
and Political Environment," 12 Arb.Int., No.4 (1996), p. 415 at, 419; Bernard Hanotiau, op. cit.,
p. 391.
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recognised by several conventions and rules of arbitration.5 For example, Article 23 (1) of
the LCIA Rules; Article 6 (4) of the ICC Rules6; Article 16 of the Model law; Article 22
of the Egyptian Law of 1994; Section 7 and Section 30 (1) of the English 1996 Act.7
Based on the above consideration, this chapter will examine the potential conflict of
public policy rules that could be raised during the arbitration process. The question
mainly relates to determining the applicable public policy when the dispute involves
claims that more than one law is applicable. This requires that the following questions be
addressed: firstly, whether or not arbitral tribunals have a duty to consider the application
of public policy rules during the arbitration process and secondly how an arbitrator can
determine the conflict of public policy rules in the domain of international commercial
arbitration. In order to answer these questions it will be necessary first to examine the
rules applicable to international commercial arbitration and how they can be determined.
This will be followed by an analysis of the arbitral tribunal's duty to comply with the
public policy rules.
5
Many countries recognise the effect of an arbitration agreement even where the validity of the
main contract is in issue or is void. See, Julian DM Lew, "Determination of Arbitrators'
Jurisdiction and the Public Policy Limitation on that Jurisdiction", Contemporary Problems in
International Arbitration, Julian Lew ed., (1987), p. 73 at 76.
6 This has been confirmed in ICC final Award Case No. 6437 (1990) reprinted in ICC
International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, vol. VIII/1 (May 1997) at 64. "It is universally
accepted that an arbitral tribunal or arbitrator is competent to determine its own competence to
hear the dispute. This power is based not on the rules of local procedure, but derives simply from
powers granted to it pursuant to Art. 8(3) of the ICC Rules."
7
See, Westacre Investments Inc v. Jugoimport SPDR Holding Co Ltd., [1998] 3 W.L.R. 770;
[1998] 4 All E.R. 570; [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 111.
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I. Applicable Rules in International Commercial Arbitration
Generally, international commercial arbitration is subject to different legal systems,
which vary according to the different stages of arbitration. These bodies of law include;
the law which governs the parties' capacity to enter into arbitration and to constitute a
8 0
valid arbitration agreement ; the law which governs the arbitration agreement ; the law or
the set of rules which governs the proceedings of arbitration10; the law, or set of rules
which governs the substantive issues of the dispute11; and finally the law governing the
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award.
8 This legal system has a considerable effect on the arbitral award, since the New York
Convention emphasised the necessity for a valid arbitration agreement. Article V (l)(a) of the
New York Convention states that recognition and enforcement of an award may be refused if the
parties were, "under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is
not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon,
under the law of the country where the award was made"; see Article 34 (2)(a)(i) and Article 36
(l)(a)(i) of the Model Law; The importance of considering the application of this law has been
subject to a great deal of analysis by several writers, see for example, Lawrence Collins, "The
Law Governing the Agreement and Procedure in International Arbitration in England,"
Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration, Julian Lew ed., (1987), p. 126; Redfern and
Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 72.
9
See Article V (2)(a) of the New York Convention; Articles 34 (2)(a)(i) and 36 (l)(a)(i) of the
Model Law.
10
How the applicable procedural rules are determined is of great importance and needs to be
discussed in more detail since the effect of procedural public policy rules will repeatedly occur
through the different stages of this study.
" Redfem and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 96. The authors demonstrate the meaning of the law that
governs the substance of the dispute, providing that: "... the law that supports the main contract is
the governing law, the applicable law, the proper law of the contract. These various terms all
denote the particular system of law which governs the interpretation and validity of the contract,
the rights and obligations of the parties, the mode of performance and consequences of breaches
of the contract."
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Since arbitration is founded on a contract, it follows that parties to an international
commercial contract can autonomously agree to settle any disputes.12 In international
commercial arbitration, "parties' autonomy" means that parties can, within certain
limitations, determine which law governs issues involving the nature of their obligations,
the validity of their contract13, the arbitration proceedings and the law applicable to the
substance of their dispute.14
The general trend in international commercial arbitration is to give parties a
complete discretion in designating the applicable law15, providing that the application of
the choice of law rules does not lead to a violation of the public policy of the countries
12 The autonomy of the will of the parties is fully recognised in this connection. See Rubino-
Sammartano. M., op. cit., p. 283, "Parties autonomy has been recognised as one of the cardinal
elements of international commercial arbitration"; Redfern and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 97;
Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit., p.79; A.J.E Jaffy, Topics in the Choice of Law. The British
Institute of International and Comparative Law. (1996), p. 20, where the author explains the
reasons which drive the parties to make their own choice of law; also see, Clive M Schmitthoff,
"Finality of arbitral awards and judicial review," Contemporary Problems in International
Arbitration, Julian Lew ed., (1987), p. 230; J. G. Collier, op. cit., p. 159.
13
Subject to the rules of public policy, the parties are free to agree upon such terms as they may
decide. Such limitation, for example, is clearly provided in Section 1 (b) of the English 1996 Act,
which provides that: "the parties should be free to agree how their disputes are resolved, subject
only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest."
14 Parties' choice when choosing the 'procedural rules' may vary when deciding the applicable
'substantive rules'. The distinction between the choices involved in selecting procedural rules and
the applicable substantive rules has been recognised in Cie Tunisienne v. Cie d'Armement (1971)
A.C., p. 572. The arbitration proceedings were governed by the English law and the French law
was the law applicable to govern the substantive issues as it was the law which is most closely
connected to the dispute.
13 See ICC Award, Case No. 1581/1971, ICC International Court ofArbitration Bulletin, p. 14.
The arbitral tribunal expressly stated that: "... the arbitral tribunal derives from the terms of
reference the entire scope of its powers and of its competence and unlike a State Court, it is
bound by the will of the parties where such parties are unanimous on the question"; see also, Yves
Derains, op. cit., p. 238.
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closely connected to the dispute.16 In the absence of the parties' choice, arbitrators will
be obliged to decide the applicable rules. This duty emanates from their paramount duty
to resolve the dispute and to provide the parties with a binding decision that can be
recognised and enforced by national courts.17
Determining the applicable law in international commercial arbitration affects the
decision as to applicable public policy rules during the arbitration process, and may be
relevant later in the process if the award is challenged before a competent authority for
being contrary to rules of public policy.18 It is therefore important to examine the freedom
of the parties to choose the applicable procedural and substantive rules and in the absence
of the parties' choice, to study the decision of the arbitral tribunal in determining these
rules.
A. Parties choice of procedural rules
In determining the rules that should govern arbitration procedures, parties have a
wide degree of freedom to agree to rules of arbitral procedure, and have a wide variety of
16 See Kolkey, "Attacking Arbitral Awards : Rights of Appeal and Review in International
Arbitrations," (1988) International Lawyer, p. 693.
17 Such obligation could be inferred from Article 32 (2) of the LCIA Rules and Article 35 of the
ICC Rules (1998); in Carlisle Place Investments Ltd v. Wimpey Construction (UK) Ltd., 15 BLR
109 (1980), Robert Goff J stated: "the arbitrators duty is to decide the matter which has been
submitted to him, and he also has a duty to act fairly as between the parties"; also see, John A
Tackaberry, "The Conduct of Arbitration Proceedings Under English Law", Contemporary
Problems in International Arbitration, Julian Lew ed., (1987), p 216 at 217; Pierre Lalive, op.
cit., p. 273, provides that an arbitrator "must strive to render a valid award capable of being
recognized and enforced."
18 See Comment, "General Principles of Law in International Commercial Arbitration," (1988),
101 Harv. L.Rev., p. 1816 at p.l817. He explains the importance of the choice of law, which is
made either expressly or impliedly, in an arbitration or jurisdiction clause as it reduces the
uncertainty arising from the existence of divergent national laws.
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rules and laws to choose from. They can agree to submit the arbitration proceedings to be
dealt with under the national arbitration law of a specific country19, where quite often
70
parties prefer to choose the law of the state in which the arbitration is administered.
They may also choose to apply the arbitration procedures of an institutional body, such as
the ICC or the LCIA Rules. Finally, they can determine the applicable procedural law by
21
directly composing the rules with which the arbitral tribunal must comply.
The parties' free consent to choose the rules that govern the arbitration procedures
has been recognised by international conventions22, international institutions of
19
Many contracts contain clauses which expressly submit them to the law of a certain country.
This may be done for several reasons, for instance, in order to obtain the co-operation of the
courts in that state. Also a national system of law will be a known and existing system, capable of
reasonably accurate interpretation by experienced practitioners. Parties often want a neutral law
or a well-developed law to apply. See, Ole Lando, "The law applicable to the merits of the
dispute," Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration, Julian Lew ed., (1987), p. 104;
ICC Case No. 1512/1971, Journal du Droit International, p. 905. Date of publication 1974; Y.
Comm. Arb., 1976, p. 128; S. Jarvin and Y. Derains, Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards: 1974-
1985 (Deventer, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, (1990); also see, James
Miller and Partners Ltd. v. Whitworth Street Estates Ltd. [1970] 1 All E.R. 796; cited also in,
[1970] 2 Weekly Law Review, p. 728 (H.L.).
20
However, this does not prevent the parties from choosing a national procedural law different
from the law of the forum. This possibility was discussed in Bank Mellat v. Helleniki Technik
Court ofAppeal, England, June 28, (1983) 3 All ER 4J1.
21 Abu Zaid Redwan, op. cit., p. 93. He states that: "This kind of arrangement is usually followed
in Ad Hoc arbitration, where parties initially undertake the formation of the arbitration
procedures. But due to practical difficulties which may arise from allowing the arbitral
procedures to be determined directly by the parties, a process which may conflict with the
mandatory procedural rules, parties of international commercial arbitration often choose
arbitration rules that are more suitable and are specifically designed to govern such arbitration
procedures." Emphasis added); The difficulty of composing the arbitral procedures by the parties
was also emphasised by Marianne Roth, "False Testimony at International Arbitration Hearings
Conducted in England and Switzerland," 11 J. Int. Arb., (March 1994), p. 8. The writer provides
that: "... such an arbitration agreement would require not only skilled draughtsmanship but also
time consuming negotiations between the parties, and is, therefore, rarely done, especially if the
dispute involves parties of different legal cultures."
22 For example, Article 2 of the Geneva Protocol provides that the constitution of arbitral
tribunals and arbitral procedure shall be governed by the will of the parties and by the law of the
country in whose territory the arbitration takes place; Article 1 of the Geneva Convention of 1927
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commercial arbitration23 and by the domestic laws of different countries.24 For example,
Section 16 of the English 1996 Act demonstrates the procedures that should be followed
when appointing an arbitral tribunal and gives the parties a free choice in deciding this
issue. Moreover, Section 35(1) provides that:
"The parties are free to agree- (a) that the arbitral proceedings shall be consolidated
with other arbitral proceedings, or (b) that concurrent hearings shall be held, on
such terms as may be agreed."
Also Section 38 (1) provides that:
"The parties are free to agree on the powers exercisable by the arbitral tribunal for
the purposes of and in relation to the proceedings."
In Egypt, Article 25 of the law No. 27 of 1994, provides that:
"The two parties to the arbitration are free to agree on the procedure to be followed
by the arbitral tribunal, including the right to submit the arbitral proceedings to the
rules prevailing under the auspices of any arbitral organisation or centre in the Arab
Republic of Egypt or abroad. In the absence of such agreement, the arbitral tribunal
'
may, subject to the provisions of this law, adopt the arbitration procedures it
considers appropriate."
The UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985 specifies in Article 19(1) that:
provides the parties with freedom to decide the manner in which the arbitral tribunal is to be
constituted; the New York Convention in its list of grounds for refusal to enforce foreign arbitral
awards does not include the question of the law applicable to the dispute, nevertheless, Article V
(l)(d) of the New York Convention requires that the arbitral procedures are agreed by the parties.
23 For example, Article 14 (1) of the LCIA Rules of 1998 provides that: "The parties may agree
on the arbitral procedure, and are encouraged to do so"; Article 15(1) of The ICC Rules of 1998
provides that: "The proceedings before the arbitral tribunal shall be governed by these rules, and,
where these rules are silent, by any rules which the parties or, failing them, the arbitral tribunal
may settle on, whether or not reference is thereby made to the rules of procedure of a national law
to be applied to the arbitration."
24 Most states allow parties some flexibility to choose the procedural rules applicable to the
arbitration. See Baker and Davis, "Establishment of an Arbitral Tribunal Under the UNCITRAL
Rules: The Experience of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal," (1988) 23 Int.Law., p. 81 at
83.
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"Subject to the provisions of this Law, the parties are free to agree on the procedure
to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting the proceedings."
This can also be inferred from Article V (l)(d) of the New York Convention since it
requires the composition of the arbitral authority and the arbitral procedure to be "in
accordance with the agreement of the parties" otherwise, recognition of the arbitral award
may be refused.
These different provisions exemplify the international trend in recognising the
freedom of parties to decide the applicable procedural rules. However, while parties can
agree to the rules of procedure that will apply to their arbitration, they cannot derogate
from the control function of the courts at the seat of arbitration, except to the extent that
the law of the arbitration site permits them to do so. This will be explored in more depth
later in this chapter.
B. Deciding the applicable procedural rules
Where the parties' clear intention is absent, the arbitral tribunal will decide the
applicable procedural rules according to what the arbitrators consider appropriate to
govern the arbitration proceedings. The procedural rules of the country in which the
arbitration is taking place (the forum) are perhaps, those most likely to be applied. The
defenders of the so-called 'seat theory' assert that applying the law of the country in
which arbitration takes place is inevitable.25 There may be several reasons for this.
23 See Andrew Beck, "Floating Choice of Law Choices," [1987] LMCLQ, p. 523 at 529; ICC
Award 5029/1986, Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards, Volume II, 1986-1990, Sigvard Jarvin,
Yves Derains, Jean-Jacques Arnaldez, p. 69, 480.
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Firstly, there is the matter of the impact of these rules on the enforceability of the final
arbitral award. In this respect Article V (l)(d) of the New York Convention indicates that,
in the absence of the parties' choice, enforcement of the arbitral award may be refused if
the composition of the arbitral authority and the arbitral procedure "was not in
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place."26 This may
indicate that arbitrators are required to comply with the procedural law of the place of
arbitration or at least to consider the mandatory procedural rules of this law as
accompanying a national law. Nevertheless, it has been submitted that:27 "the Convention
seems only to regulate the consequences of certain invalidities in the arbitration
agreement and of its setting aside by given courts of law. It does not state that the award
must be made under a national procedural law, or that an award cannot be recognised if it
has not been made under a national procedural law."
Secondly, the law of the forum may also be applied because of a necessary
interrelation between the arbitral tribunal and national courts.28 This can be recognised by
considering two aspects of this relationship. Firstly, the law of the forum helps to fill the
gaps in the procedural rules of the choice of law if the law chosen by the parties or by the
tribunal fails to provide a solution for the prospective procedural deficiency.29 Secondly,
this relationship can be recognised by considering that there are rules of law which
26 Also see, Article 2 of the Geneva Protocol of 1923.
27 Rubino-Sammartano. ML, op. cit., p. 289.
28 In this regard one should recognise the importance of choosing a particular country to be the
forum of arbitration procedures since the familiarity of a particular law in a certain place may be
effective in helping the arbitration process and in reducing problems which may arise before,
during or after an international arbitration. See Adam Samuel, "The Effect of the Place of
Arbitration on the Enforcement of the Agreement to Arbitrate," (1992) Arb.Int., p. 257.
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provide national courts with the authority to give orders, which reach beyond the parties
agreement and the tribunal's power, such as, the freezing of Bank accounts or the
OA
detention of goods.
Thirdly, a main reason that has been presented to justify the jurisdiction of the
forum's law is the national courts' right to supervise the arbitration process. This reason
is based mainly on the hypothetical theory that once the parties choose a particular
country to be the forum of their arbitration they accordingly agree to submit their
arbitration to the legal framework of the forum which will both assist and, to some
degree, control the arbitration proceedings.31 In this regard Mann commented that:32
"A state has the right to supervise and regulate every activity which occurs within
its territory, and every arbitration even if it relates to international transactions should be
subject to a specific system of national law in order to give national courts the right to
supervise the conduct of the arbitration to insure that the proceedings are in conformity
with requirements ofjustice and fairness."
29 William W. Park, "The Lex Loci Arbitri and International Commercial Arbitration," 32 INT'L
&COMP.L. Q., (1983), p. 27.
30 It is essential to have regard to the usual rules and practice of the place in which the arbitration
is held, which is likely to include such matters as disclosure of documents, rules of evidence,
freedom of the parties to be represented by counsel of their own choice and so on. See, for
instance, Article 27 of the Model Law (1985); J Martin H Hunter, "Judicial assistance for the
arbitrator," Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration, Julian Lew ed., (1987), p. 195;
Berthold Goldman, "The Complementary Roles of Judges and Arbitrators in Ensuring that
International Commercial Arbitration is Effective," 60 Years of ICC Arbitration-A Look at the
Future, ICCpublication (1984) No. 412, p. 275.
31
See, Dalmia Dairy Industries Ltd v. National Bank ofPakistan [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep., p. 223;
Marine Contractors Inc v. Shell Petroleum Development Co ofNigeria, [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep, p.
77.
32 F. A. Mann, "Lex Facit Arbitrum," in P. Sanders (ed.) International Arbitration: Liber
Amicorum for Martin Domke (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), p. 133 at 159; also see,
Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit., p. 86.
Ill
Finally, this relationship could be established upon the concept of "nationality of
arbitral awards", whereby the arbitral award assumes the nationality of the forum.33
This trend which calls for the application of the law of the forum, however,
conflicts with the 'delocalisation theory\34 This theory calls for detaching of
international commercial arbitration from the control of the national legal system of the
forum. Its aim is to allow arbitral tribunals to resort to other procedural rules and not to
be confined to the national procedural rules of the forum. Under this approach an arbitral
tribunal is free to apply the rules of any legal system even if these rules do not belong to a
particular national law.
Contrary to the 'seat theory', the 'delocalisation theory' argues that selecting a
place for international arbitration does not necessarily mean that parties have intended to
33 The importance of deciding the nationality of an arbitral award could be attributed to the
reservation clauses that can be found in several international conventions for the enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards, as countries may insist on applying the convention only between the
member states. See, Klaus Peter Berger, op. cit., p. 656; Enonchong, "Public Policy in the
Conflict of Laws: a Chinese Wall Around Little England," INT'L & COMP. L. Q., (1996) 45, p.
633; W. Laurence Craig, "Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and Practice of
International Commercial Arbitration," 30 Tex. Int'l L.J. 1, (1995), p. 23.
34 Redfern and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 82; Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit., pp. 85 and 88;
Rubino-Sammartano. M., op. cit., p. 287; Jan Paulsson, "The extent of Independence of
International Arbitration from the Law of the Situs," Contemporary Problems in International
Arbitration, Julian Lew ed., (1987), p. 141; Texas Overseas petroleum Company and California
Asiatic Oil Company v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic (1979) IV Yearbook
Commercial International, p. 177; Saudi Arabia v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 27 I.L.R. 117,
159-83 (1963).
35 Article 15 (1) of the ICC Rules of (1998) supports this theory. It provides that: "The
proceedings before the arbitral tribunal shall be governed by these rules,... ,whether or not
reference is thereby made to the rules of procedure of a national law to be applied to the
arbitration"; In Dallal v. Bank Mellat, Q. B., June 2, 3, 26, 1985 (1985) 1 All ER., p. 239, the
English High Court held that: "English law does not deny the possibility of a different curial
law".
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apply the procedural law of the forum.36 In fact parties may wish to avoid the procedural
law of the forum, the country they choose to be the forum of their arbitration might not
necessarily have any connection with the parties or the dispute.37 This may frequently
happen in international commercial arbitration, as parties may choose the forum for
reasons which may be entirely fortuitous, and which bear no relation whatsoever to the
dispute submitted to the arbitral tribunal.38 Furthermore, as previously stated, parties are
allowed to choose the procedural law by themselves, so they can choose procedural rules,
which may not relate to any national legal system.39 Therefore, in the absence of the
parties' choice, arbitrators can act on behalf of the parties and select the rules that they
may find suitable.40 Finally, applying the procedural rules of the forum may lead to the
36 The place of arbitration, however, may not even be chosen by the parties, but could be
designated instead by an arbitration institution, such as the ICC. The Arbitral Tribunal in ICC
Case No. 1512 /1971, Y. Comm. Arb., (1976), p. 128; Clunet 1974, at 905, S. Jarvin and Y.
Derains, Collection ofICC Arbitral Awards: 1974-1985 (Deventer, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law
and Taxation Publishers, 1990) 3 at 4-5. The award provided that the parties, having agreed to
have their dispute settled under the Rules of the ICC Court of Arbitration, which gave the Court
of Arbitration the power to fix the place of arbitration when it was not agreed upon by the parties.
See Article 14 (1) of the ICC Rules of 1998; Article 16 of the LCIA Rules; Article 16 (1) of The
Cairo Regional Center for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA) which provides that:
"Unless the parties have agreed upon the place where the arbitration is to be held, such place shall
be determined by the arbitral tribunal, having regard to the circumstances of the arbitration."
37 The importance of having a connection between the forum and arbitration was considered in
Bank Mellat v. Helliniki Techniki (1984) Q.B, p. 291.
38 The selection of the place of arbitration may depend on considerations that have no connection
with the dispute between the parties. For example, arbitration may take place in a neutral country,
in the sense that it is not the home of either of the parties to the arbitration. See R Pagnan and
Fratelli v. Corbisa industrial Agropacuaria Ltd., (1971) 1 All ER 165; [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1306.
However, in regard to this particular point, Van den Berg argues that this argument was valid
some 2o years ago, but nowadays parties generally choose a place of arbitration that provides an
adequate legal framework for their arbitration. A J van den Berg, "The Efficacy of Award in
Intercom Arbitration," 58 The Journal of the Chartered Institute ofArbitrators (1992), 267 at
271.
39 We have already seen how parties, are granted complete liberty to establish the arbitral
procedure by a number of rules drafted by arbitral institutions, such as the ICC Rules.
40
A. J. Jaffy reflects this tendency as transferring the freedom of the parties to the arbitral
tribunal. He comments that: "If the parties are free to decide the law applicable to their dispute
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application of national public policy rules to an international arbitration and to the
subjection of international commercial relations to the requirements of national rules
which may be obscure, narrow and may vary considerably from country to country.
Nevertheless, the "delocalisation theory" may encounter a number of difficulties.
Laurence W. Craig argues that41, "States have been unwilling to accept the idea that there
is no link whatsoever between arbitral proceedings in their territory and the state's legal
regime, and the idea that arbitral awards made in their territory should be considered
national awards."42 The real problem is that most legal systems insist on keeping some
measure of control over arbitrations conducted in their territory, in order to ensure that
mandatory provisions of that law are applicable to arbitrations whose seat is in that
country.43 Thus, if the national law of the place where arbitration is taking place, requires
that the arbitral tribunal should follow certain procedures, then the tribunal should
comply with that law, otherwise its award could be challenged under the national public
then why should the principle not extend to allowing them to empower the arbitrators to make the
choice for them" A. J. Jaffy, op. cit., p. 80; also see, Hans Smit, "A-national Arbitration," (1988)
63 Tul. L.Rev., p. 1311, who illustrates that the rules of procedure applied in international
tribunals frequently do not follow the pattern of any national legal system. Instead, international
arbitrators are developing a procedural system of their own; also see, London Export Corporation
Ltd v. Jubilee Coffee Roasting Co Ltd [1958] 2 All ER 411, [1958] 1 WLR 661.
41
W. Laurence Craig, "Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and Practice of International
Commercial Arbitration," op. cit., p. 23.
42 See in this regard Naviera Amazonica Peruana S.A. v. Compania Internacionial de Seguros Del
Peru, [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 116 (CA.). The court found, at that time, that English law rejected
the idea of a floating or delocalised arbitration and found that "every arbitration must have a
'seat' or locus arbitri or forum which subjects its procedural rules to the municipal law which is
there in force."
43 National courts' concern is that arbitrators must be bound to respect the mandatory national
procedural rules of the forum.
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policy rules of the forum. This may lead to the refusal to enforce the award in other
countries under Article V (l)(e) of the New York Convention.44
The trend in international commercial arbitration is to allow the arbitral tribunal to
enjoy more flexibility than that of a national court when choosing the applicable
procedural rules.43 There is a growing consensus among theorists and practitioners to free
arbitrators from any local rules of procedure, in particular, from the procedural law of the
country where the arbitration has its seat.46
As Lord Diplock said in Bremer Vulkan v. South India Shipping Corp. Limited:47
"The parties make the arbitrator the master of the procedure to be followed in the
arbitration. Apart from a few statutory requirements under the Arbitration Acts ... he has
complete discretion to determine how the arbitration is to be conducted, from the time of
his appointment, to the time of his award, as long as the procedure he adopts does not
offend the rules of natural justice."
The arbitrators' power is derived from the arbitration agreement, and arbitrators are not
state judges, therefore, they are not obliged to follow the procedural rules provided for
44 The objections that have been presented against the "Delocalisation theory", based on the New
York Convention, were challenged by Okezie Chukwumerije on the ground that: "the Convention
should be read as requiring a geographical connection between the award and a particular
jurisdiction, without demanding that such awards be governed by the national law of that
jurisdiction", Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit., p. 95; see also Rubino-Sammartano. M., op. cit., p.
289.
43 Article 19(2) of the Model Law (1985); Lawrence Collins, op. cit., p. 133; Article 4(3) of The
Washington Convention of 1965; Yves Derains, op. cit., p. 232; See Whitworth Street Estates
(Manchester) Ltd. v. JamesMiller &amp; Partners Ltd. [1970] A.C. 583.
46 Jan Paulsson, "The Extent of Independence ..." Julian Lew ed., op. cit., p. 141 at 148.
47 Bremer Vulkan v. South India Shipping Corp. Limited. [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 253.
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state judges of the state where they are sitting, especially if the parties, arbitrators and the
dispute are not related to the place where the arbitration is to take place.48
One can reply to defenders of the 'seat theory', that there is no affront to the integrity of
the national legal system, if parties or arbitrators decide to apply procedural rules
different from the forum rules, because the procedural public policy rules of the place of
arbitration will provide a safety net to ensure that the main principles of justice in the
national legal system are upheld. It will always remain possible for a state to set the
award aside or to refuse recognition and enforcement of an award if this award is contrary
to public policy however that may be conceived in that state. Therefore, if the arbitral
proceedings take place in a given state, arbitrators must not disregard the mandatory
procedural rules of that state, as will be explained later in this chapter.
C. Parties' choice of substantive rules
The substance of the dispute is a particularly sensitive area. The difficulty arises
in international commercial arbitration since various national laws may be deemed
applicable to the substance of the dispute due to international commercial relations often
involving several foreign elements, which connect the dispute to different countries with
different laws and rules.49
48 See BankMellat v. Helliniki Techniki, per Kerr L.J. Q.B. [1984], p.301; also in Dallal v. Bank
Mellat, [1986] Q. B., p. 441; (1985) 1 All ER., p. 239, the High Court held that: "English law
does not deny the possibility of applying a different curial law."; Saudi Arabia v. Aramco,
International Law Reports (1963) 27 ILR 117; see also, Rubino-Sammartano. M., op. cit., p. 283.
49 G. Guedji Thomas, "Theory of the Lois de Police - A Functional Trend in Continental Private
International Law (a Comparative Analysis with Modem American Theories," 39 AJIL (1991), p.
660; Nathalie Voser, "Mandatory Rules of Law as a Limitation on the Law Applicable in
International Commercial Arbitration," Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. (1996) 7, p. 319; James Miller &
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Generally, the parties' freedom to choose foreign laws to govern the substance of
their dispute is subject to the courts' control in order to ensure that their agreement does
not contravene the national mandatory rules.50 However, the modem trend in
international commercial arbitration tends towards liberating commercial arbitration from
the control of national courts where the freedom of the parties to choose the applicable
substantive rules has gained a considerable amount of respect. International entities and
several legal systems have accepted the application of this concept.51 For example,
Article 28 of the Model Law (1985) provides that:52
"The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with such rules of law
as are chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute."
Article 17(1) of the ICC Rules (1998) provides that:53
"The parties shall be free to agree upon the rules to be applied by the arbitral
tribunal to the merits of the dispute."
Section 46 (1) of the English law provides that:
Partners, Ltd. v. Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester), Ltd., [1970] AC 583, [1970]2 Weekly
Law Report, p. 728(H.L.).
",0
Marc Blessing, "Mandatory Rules of Law versus Party Autonomy in International Arbitration,"
(1997) 14 J.Int.Arb., p. 23.
31
It has been reported that: "Despite their differences, common law, civil law and socialist
countries have all equally been affected by the movement towards the rule allowing parties to
choose the law to govern their contractual relations". Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit., p. 108;
Julian Lew, op. cit., p. 75; Abu Zaid Redwan, op. cit., p 93; Ashraf al Rifaie, op. cit., p. 217.
52 See also, Article 33. (1) of the UNCITRAL Rules of (1976) providing that: "The arbitral
tribunal shall apply the law designated by the parties as applicable to the substance of the
dispute."
53 See ICC Case No. 1512 /1971, Y. Comm. Arb., (1976), p. 128; Clunet 1974, at 905, S. Jarvm
and Y. Derains, Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards: 1974 -1985 (Deventer, The Netherlands:
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1990) 3 at 4-5; See, Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit., p. 108.
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"The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute- (a) in accordance with the law
chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute, or; (b) if the
parties so agree, in accordance with such other considerations as are agreed by
them or determined by the tribunal."
Article 39(1) of the Egyptian law provides that:
"The arbitral tribunal shall apply to the substance of the dispute the rules that have
been agreed upon by the two parties."
Parties to an international contract may sometimes agree to have their dispute
governed by a particular national law or may choose to apply the customs and usage of
international trade that are common to all or most of the states connected with the
dispute54 or international trade law (lex mercatoria).55 The latter has been considered
preferable by parties involved in international commercial arbitration, which may prefer
to apply a special set of rules made in consideration of their needs. Businessmen dealing
with international commercial relations need to apply a developed commercial law
54 This approach is in conformity with certain rules of arbitral institution such as ICC, since
Article 13 (5) of the ICC Rules of 1988, which has been repeated in Article 17 (2) of the 1998
rules which provides that: "In all cases the Arbitral Tribunal shall take account of the provisions
of the contract and the relevant trade usages". See, ICC Award 6527/1991, Y. Comm. Arb.,
(1993), p. 45; ICC Award 4629/1989, Y. Comm. Arb., (1993), p. 11; ICC Award 6076/1989. Y.
Comm. Arb., (1990), p. 83.
55 Berthold Goldman defines the Lex Meractoria rules as: "lex mercatoria is, at the least, a set of
general principles and customary rules spontaneously referred to or elaborated in the framework
of international trade, without reference to a national system of law." Berthold Goldman, "The
applicable law: general principles of law - the lex mercatoria" Contemporary Problems in
International Arbitration, Julian Lew ed., (1987), p. 116. He also considers lex mercatoria as the
result of the rules and principles arising from various sources: from multinational systems,
national legal systems and spontaneous sources, including the fundamental principle of
international law and the principles which drive their binding nature from the knowledge of the
international community rather than from a given national legal system; Julian Lew defines it as a
"non-national or transnational commercial law which governs those aspects of international trade
not regulated by some national law, and are applied by arbitrators." Julian Lew, Applicable Law
in International Commercial Arbitration, op. cit., p. 532; Hans Smit, op. cit., p. 629 at p. 632.
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different in some measure from the state laws, which the courts would apply.56 Awards
based on the lex mercatoria are now placed on the same footing as awards rendered on
the basis of domestic or international law rules in the sense that, in both cases, the courts
will not sit in judgement as to what is the correct or incorrect construction by the
57arbitrator of the rules on which the award is based.
Arbitrators are bound to apply the laws or rules that have been determined by the
58
parties. If the parties' intention is not clear or absent, then it is for the arbitral tribunal to
decide the applicable rules in order to proceed with the arbitration and decide on the
outcome of the dispute.
D. Deciding the applicable substantive rules
Deciding the applicable substantive rules, a matter for the arbitral tribunal, may stir
up difficult problems. Considering that in international commercial relationships several
legal systems may be applicable to the contract, and that these various legal systems may
56 B. Goldman provides that: "This is the case especially in international commercial contracts
that deal with specific types of goods, where they prefer to apply rules derived from commercial
usage or (lex mercatoria) of an international nature, which is or may be, different from the
applicable national law. The Tex mercatoria' is precisely an assemblage of principles, institutions
and rules from all sources, which have nourished and still do nourish the legal structures and the
legal functioning specific to the collectivity of operators in international commerce." B.
Goldman, La Lex Mercatoria dans les Contrats et 1'Arbitrage Internationale. Translated from
French by Wolfgang Peter, op. cit., p. 94.
57 Vanessa L.D. Wilkinson, "The New Lex Mercatoria Reality or Academic Fantasy?," 12
J.Int.Arb., (1995), p. 103; Georges R. Delaume, op. cit., p. 9.
58 In ICC award Case No. 1581/1971, ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, VI/1
(1995), p. 14. The award states that: "... the arbitral tribunal derives from the terms of reference
the entire scope of its power and its competence and contrary to a State Court, is bound by the
will of the parties where such parties are unanimous on the question."
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treat the contract in different ways, the contractual relationships will differ according to
the applicable legal system. In order to decide which substantive rules the arbitral tribunal
may apply, the following questions will be examined:
1. Does the arbitral tribunal have a free choice in its search for the applicable law (as
parties acting autonomously do), or should it first search for any indication of what could
be considered as an implied choice by the parties?
2. If there is no indication of the parties' choice, then is it permissible for the arbitral
tribunal to apply whatever system it deems appropriate in order to govern the dispute?
1. Searching for the tacit choice
Parties may refer to arbitration without providing a clear intention as to which law
or set of rules should govern their dispute. Nevertheless, there might be indications that
would guide the arbitral tribunal in determining the applicable law.59 It may be possible
to infer the choice of law from the nature and terms of the parties' contract and the
relevant surrounding circumstances.60 Arbitrators may be guided by the parties' previous
relationships and, in their absence, from current practice in the countries to which the
39 The law governing a contract could be inferred from the parties' intentions, whether they are
expressed or implied. This was the view in Sapphire Int. Petroleum Ltd. v National Iranian Oil
Co. (1967) International Law Review, p. 136; also see, the Texaco case (1979) International Law
Review, p. 389; ICC Award 3572/1982, Y. Comm. Arb., (1989), p. 111; ICC Award 4145/1984, Y.
Comm. Arb., (1987), p. 97.
60 This can be established if it appears from the circumstances of the case that the contract has its
most significant connection with the law of a particular country. See Dicey and Morris, The
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contracting parties belong. They may also be guided by searching for a suitable solution
that is as near as possible to the expectations of both parties.61 In such circumstances
arbitrators are bound to search first for such indications before they decide on the
applicable rules by using their discretionary power.62
The most important factor used to determine the tacit choice of the parties is
whether or not the parties have agreed to hold the arbitration in a particular country.63 If
so, this would be a strong indication to consider their 'choice offorum as choice of
law'.64 According to this concept, the parties' choice of country as the seat of their
Conflict ofLaws, 7th ed., Stevens, (1958); Redfem and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 122; See Amin
Rasheed Shipping Corporation v. Kuwait Insurance Co. (1987) A.C. 50.
61 For example, if in the course of their pre-contractual negotiations the parties had held
diametrically opposed points of view on the question of the applicable law, and for this reason did
not specify such a law in their contract. Arbitrators in such circumstances may apply the law that
best conforms to the parties' legitimate expectations. See Yves Derains, op. cit., p. 234. To the
same extent this was the trend followed in Article 3 (1) of the Rome Convention (Convention on
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (19 Jun 1980)), which provides that: "A contract
shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice must be expressed or
demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the
case. By their choice the parties can select the law applicable to the whole or a part only of the
contract."; Rubino-Sammartano. M., op. cit., p. 275; Klaus Peter Berger, op. cit., p. 691; Bernard
Hanotiau, op. cit., p. 397.
62
In order to consider a tacit choice as a choice made by the parties, and therefore, binding on the
tribunal, there should be a clear indication that it represents the genuine choice of the parties. See
Julian Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration, op. cit., p. 181; Redfem and
Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 123; Ole Lando, "The law applicable to the merits ...", op. cit., p. 112;
J. G. Collier, op. cit., pp. 185-188; Rubino-Sammartano. M., op. cit., p. 256; Okezie
Chukwumerije, op. cit., p. 122; Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation v. Kuwait Insurance
Company (1984). E.C.R. 1351.
63
Thomas, D. Rhidian, "Commercial Arbitration: Arbitration Agreements as a Signpost of The
Proper Law," [1984] LMCLQ, p. 141.
64
English courts have held that an agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts or to go to
arbitration in a particular country is evidence of the intention to apply the law of that country. In
most cases this has led to the application of English law. NV Kwik Hoo Long Handel
Maatschappij v. James & Co. Ltd, [1972] AC 604 HL; Tzortzis v. Monark Line AB, [1968] 1
WLR 406 CA. In the latter case, the choice of arbitration in London by a Greek and a Swedish
party was considered to be a choice of English law; see also Sojuzenfterexport v. Joe Oil Ltd.
(1990) Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration (1992), p. 384, in which it was agreed that all
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arbitration will automatically involve the application of the domestic law of that country,
which in practice should prevent the arbitrators from choosing a different law. This
method of considering the choice of forum as the choice of law provides an easy solution.
The English court of appeal in Tzortzis v. Monark Line A/B considered this solution as
"irresistible" in deciding the law applicable to international contracts.65 The court viewed
the choice ofEngland as the seat of arbitration as a factor indicating the choice ofEnglish
law which "overrides all other factors".
However, the application of this concept is not acceptable in all cases, especially if
arbitration takes place in different countries, or if the choice of a specific forum is made
for reasons unconnected with the law of that forum. For example, the parties may choose
a country to be their forum for geographical convenience if it provides a suitable neutral
venue especially if each party is sceptical about receiving fair treatment in the other
state's courts or about the reputation of the arbitration service to be found in that forum.66
Moreover, the trend followed by international doctrines tends to detach international
commercial arbitration from the forum, stating that "there is no lex fori to international
arbitral tribunals".67
disputes were to be referred to arbitration in Moscow without specifying the proper law of the
agreement, and in which the Bermuda Court decided that the Soviet law was the proper law to use
in order to decide the scope of the agreement.
In Tzortzis v. Monark Line A/B (1968) 1 All E.R. 949, also can be viewed in, 1 W.L.R. (1968)
at 406.
66 O Lando, op. cit., p. 105; Redfern and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 123; Rubino-Sammartano.
M., op. cit., p. 123; W. Michael Tupman, "Challenge and Disqualification of Arbitrators in
International Commercial Arbitration," 38 INT'L & COMP. L. Q., (1989), p. 26 at 42; Also see,
Compagnie d'Armement Maritime S.A. Appellants v. Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation S.A.
Respondents (1971) A.C. 572.
67
B. Stem, "Three Arbitrations, the Same Problem, Three Solutions," Rev. Arb. 1957, p. Ill,
referring to the arbitrator in Aramco where he reached to the conclusion that: "the arbitral tribunal
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Therefore, to consider a choice of forum as a tacit choice of law, there must be
some relevant relationship between the arbitration and that forum.68 For instance, if the
parties choose an arbitration institution established in a particular country which is also
the country where the contract has been or would have been performed, then it is likely
that it will be considered that the tacit choice has been to apply the law of that country.69
2. Deciding which rules govern the substance of the dispute
The modern trends of international commercial conventions and rules of arbitration
give considerable freedom to the arbitral tribunal to choose the rules that govern the
substance of the dispute.70 This trend has been reflected in the rules of various
international commercial institutions and international conventions:
For example, Article 28(2) of the Model Law (1985) provides that:71
has no lex fori"; Pierre Lalive, Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy op.cit., p.
271; Redfem and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 125; Yves Derains, op. cit., p. 232; Rubino-
Sammartano. M., op. cit., p. 258; Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit., p. 124; J. G. Collier, op. cit., p.
17.
68
Yves Derains, op. cit., p. 231.
69 Sometimes when parties select an arbitrator from a certain country and place the seat of
arbitration in that same country, this may provide an indication that they expect him to apply the
law of that country.
70 The freedom of arbitrators to choose the rules that they consider appropriate was asserted in the
award made in ICC Case No. 2735/1976, Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards, Volume I, 1974-
1985, Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains, p. 301; Journal du Droit International, Clunet (1977), p.
947. Here the tribunal decided to apply French law as the proper law to govern the dispute; Paolo
Contini, op. cit., p. 283 at 290. However, there were objections to the freedom of arbitrators to
apply the rules as they think fit on the grounds that this leads to uncertainty; A.J.E Jaffy, op. cit.,
p. 78; also see, Rubino-Sammartano. M., op. cit., p. 258; Redfern and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p.
128.
71 See also Article 33(1) of the "UNCITRAL" Arbitration Rules (1976).
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"Failing any designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law
determined by the conflict of law rules which it considers applicable."
The same essential provision can be found in Article 17 (1) of the ICC Rules (1998), in
which the word 'appropriate' is used.72 Article 17 (1) of the ICC Rules provides that:73
"The parties shall be free to agree upon the rules of law to be applied by the
arbitral tribunal to the merits of the dispute. In the absence of any such agreement,
the arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of law which it determines to be
appropriate".
Several legal systems follow this trend, by giving arbitrators a free choice in
deciding the applicable substantive rules according to what they may find appropriate and
closely connected to the dispute. For example, this was the method followed in Article 39
(2)(3) and (4) of the Egyptian law of (1994) which provides that:
"(2)- if the two parties have not agreed on the legal rules applicable to the
substance of the dispute, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the substantive rules of
the law it considers closest to the dispute.
(3)- the arbitral tribunal, when adjudicating the merits of the dispute, shall decide
in accordance with the terms of the contract in dispute and the usage of the trade
applicable to the transaction."
The English Arbitration Act of 1996 provides in Section 46 (3):74
72 The "Model Law" and the "UNCITRAL" uses 'applicable'.
73 See also Article 17 (2) of the ICC Rules which provide that "In all cases the arbitral tribunal
shall take account of the provisions of the contract and the relevant trade usages"; also see Article
7 (1) of the European Convention on Commercial Arbitration (1961) which provides that: "...
Failing any indication by the parties as to the applicable law, the arbitrators shall apply the proper
law under the rule of conflict that the arbitrators deem applicable."
74 Also this was the trend before the 1996 Act. In Deutsche Schachtbau unci Tiefbohrgesellschaft
mbHv. Ras Al-Khaimah National Oil Co, [1988] 3 W.L.R. 230; [1988] 2 All E.R. 833; [1988] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 293. The English court of appeal considered the validity of an agreement under
which arbitrators had chosen the "international accepted principles of law governing contractual
relationships". Lord Donaldson held that: "By choosing to arbitrate under the rules of the ICC and
in particular Article 13. (3), the parties have left the proper law to be decided by the arbitrators
and have not in terms confined the choice to national systems of law. I can see no basis for
concluding that the arbitrators' choice of proper law - a common denominator of principles
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"(3) If or to the extent that there is no such choice or agreement, the tribunal shall
apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable."
The question here is: how can arbitrators determine the appropriate rules? One
should consider here that the arbitrators have a duty to resolve the dispute and to provide
the parties with an enforceable award, and must therefore determine the law that should
govern the dispute. Therefore, they are required to search for links between the matter
under arbitration and a particular legal system. This can be made by examining several
relevant factors notably75, the place of business or habitual residence of the parties76, the
place of contractual performance, the place of arbitration77, and even the nationality of
the arbitrator.78
underlying the laws of various nations governing contractual relations - is outside the scope of
the choice which the parties left to the arbitrators"; also see, James Miller & Partners, Ltd. v.
Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester), Ltd., 1 All E. R. 796, 801-02, 809-10 (House of Lords
Mar. 3, 1970).
75 See Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 11th ed., Stevens (1987) Vol. II, p. 1161. It has
been stated that: "the term 'proPer law °f a contract' means the system of law by which the
parties intended the contract to be performed, or where their intention is neither expressed nor to
be inferred from the circumstances, the system of law with which the transaction has its closest
and most real connection."
76 The principal office and the habitual residence of the seller at the time in question, and the
place of conclusion of sales contracts were considered in deciding the applicable law in ICC
Award 6281/1989, Y. Comm. Art., (1990), p. 96; Collection ofICC Arbitral Awards, Volume III,
1991-1995, Jean-Jacques Arnaldez, Yves Derains, Dominique Hascher, p. 409. Also, the place of
performance of contract was considered in ICC Award 4650/1985, Y. Comm. Arb., (1987), p. 110;
ICC Award 5460/1987, Y. Comm. Arb., (1988), p. 104; See, A. Rogers, "Contemporary Problems
in International Commercial Arbitration," (1989) 17 IBL, p. 154 at 158; M. N. Howard, "Floating
Choice of Law Clauses," (1995) LMCLQ, p. 1 at 5; Dicey and Morris, The Conflict ofLaws, 8th
ed., Stevens and Sons Ltd., (1967), p. 1048.
77 See ICC Award 6268/1990, Y. Comm. Arb., (1991), p. 119.
78
However, applying the law of the country of which an arbitrator is a national was criticised as
being less relevant in choosing the applicable law. See Rubino-Sammartano. M., op. cit., p. 261.
125
Most frequently, arbitrators in international commercial arbitration apply the
following systems for determining the applicable law:79
a- Application of the rules of the forum;80
b- Cumulative application of the legal systems of the countries that have close links
with the dispute;81
c- Application of the rules chosen directly by the arbitral tribunal, by directly selecting
the applicable law that it may find the most relevant to the contract.
79
In an arbitral award issued under the auspices of the Cairo Centre, (Arbitration case No.
95/1997, March 12, 1998, 1 Journal of Arab Arbitration (1999), p. 45). The tribunal relied on five
different criteria to determine the applicable law: "When an issue of conflict of laws arises, the
arbitral tribunal relies on five criteria in its endeavour to determine the applicable law, namely:
the arbitration venue, the venue of signing the contract, the residence of the parties to the
contract, the venue of executing the contract and the language of the contract or the language of
the arbitration if they are different."
80 See ICC Case No. 1598/1971, Y. Comm. Arb., (1978), p. 216; S. Jarvin and Y. Derams,
Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards: 1974-1985. Deventer, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law and
Taxation Publishers, (1990), p. 167; See also ICC Case No. 1455/1967, Y. Comm. Arb., (1978),
p. 215; S. Jarvin and Y. Derains, Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards: 1974-1985. Deventer, The
Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, (1990), p. 167; S. Baker and M. Davis, The
"UNCITRAL " Arbitration Rules in Practice: The Experience of the Iran - United States Claims
Tribunal (Deventer, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, (1992), p. 127;
Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit., p. 127; A.J.E. Jaffey, op. cit., p. 79. However, the same criticism
that has been addressed to the application of the forum's procedural rules (mentioned above), can
be imposed on the application of the forum's substantial rules.
81 This method can be used when there are competing sets of rules in conflict with each other,
such as the conflict between rules of the parties' country of nationality or residence and the rules
of the seat of arbitration; and that between the rules of the country where the contract is to be
performed and the country where the award would be enforced), see Yves Derains, op. cit., p.
233. This method was applied by the arbitral tribunal in ICC Case No. 953/1956, Y. Comm. Arb.,
(1978), p. 214; see also, CC Award No 4434/ 1982, Journal du Droit International (1983), p. 893;
Collection ofICC Arbitral Awards, Volume I, 1974-1985, Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains, p. 458;
ICC Award No 2886/1977, Journal du Droit International (1978), p. 996; Collection of ICC
Arbitral Awards, Volume I, 1974-1985, Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains, p. 332; ICC Award No
3235, reported in Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards, Volume I, 1974-1985, Sigvard Jarvin &
Yves Derains, p. 410; Journal du Droit International (1981), p. 925; ICC Award No. 4434/1982, :
Collection ofICC Arbitral Awards, Volume I, 1974-1985, Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains, p. 458;
Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit., p. 128. The problem with this theory occurs when the dispute
involves a conflict of rules which involves different substantial laws.
82 Here arbitrators should weigh up the different criteria, on a case by case basis and their relative
importance in relation to the centre of gravity of the contract. See Yves Derains, op. cit., p. 236;
Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 305. He
considers the tribunal's choice in determining the closest connection to the dispute, on the same
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83d- Application of general principles of conflict of laws;
e- Applying the lex mercatoria rules84, which would meet with the requirements of
international commerce.85
As previously stated, arbitrators are responsible for making an award that must
have a legally valid basis in order to be enforced. Therefore, it is imperative to choose a
legal system or set of rules, which are closely connected to the dispute86, and which also
• • • 87
corresponds to the parties' legitimate expectations. In order to accommodate these
level as the autonomy of the will of the parties; Ole Lando, "The law applicable to the merits...",
op. cit., pp. 107 and p.133; also in this regard see, ICC Award No. 6281/1989, Egyptian Co. v.
Yugoslav Co. Award (August 26, 1989), 15 Y. Comm. Arb., (1990), p. 96.
83 This includes applying the law applicable to conflict of rules that is common to the majority of
countries and which is accepted by most modem jurisdictions and international conventions,
having become international commercial practice. See ICC Case No. 4650/1987, 12 Y. Comm.
Arb., (1987), p. 110; ICC Case 6527/1991, Y. Comm. Arb., (1993), p. 44 at 46; ICC Award No
4434/ 1982, Journal du Droit International (1983), p. 893; Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards,
Volume I, 1974-1985, Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains, p. 458; ICC Award No 3880/1983, Y.
Comm. Arb., (1985), p. 44; Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit., p. 129; Ole Lando, "The law
applicable to the merits...", op. cit., p. 109.
84 One should consider that arbitrators might need authorisation from the parties, since otherwise
arbitrators would be considered as acting as aimable compositeurs. Kluas Berger pointed to
examples in Germany and Switzerland. See Klaus Peter Berger, op. cit., p. 685. Notwithstanding
that, Berger considers "the arbitrator's decision according to the rules of lex mercatoria as
decisions made according to the law, not equity", at p. 686.
83 Arbitrators may resort to the application of such rules and/ or usage where there are no efficient
connecting factors as in cases where there is more than one place of execution and performance
of the contract. See for example, ICC Award, Case No. 1375/65; ICC Award, Case No. 1859/73;
ICC Award No 1675/1969, Journal du Droit International (1974), p. 895;Collection of ICC
Arbitral Awards, Volume I, 1974-1985, Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains, p. 197; see also, Deutsche
Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaft GmbH (D.S.T.) v. Ras Al Khaimah Nat'/ Oil Co. (Rakoil),
[1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 246, which concerns the enforcement of an arbitral award which was based
on lex mercatoria-, See Berthold Goldman, Julian Lew ed., (1987), op. cit., p. 117; Ole Lando,
"The law applicable to the merits...", op. cit., p. 107; Ole Lando, "The Lex Mercatoria in
International Commercial Arbitration," International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 34 (1985),
p. 747 at 768.
86
Compagnie d'Armement Maritime S.A. Appellants v. Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation S.A.
Respondents (1971) A.C. 596.
87 Yves Derains, op. cit., p. 233; Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or Truly International) Public
Policy...", op. cit., p. 305.
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different aims arbitrators should consider what the parties would have decided if they had
considered the question of the law applicable to their contract, and arbitrators should also
avoid the possibility of violating the public policy of countries closely connected to the
dispute. Whilst the latter consideration is integral to creating an award which could be
enforceable, arbitrators may encounter the problem of determining the extent to which
public policy should be applied and which public policy rules are applicable particularly
in situations where they are not acting according to the rules of a particular national
law.88 Accordingly parties or arbitrators have to select the law most appropriate to the
needs of the arbitration and the merits of the dispute, in order to avoid as far as possible a
decision to set the award aside because it has violated national public policy rules.
II. The Duty to Respect the Applicable Rules
In general, arbitrators' duties can be divided into two categories: their duties
89
towards the arbitrating parties, and their duties towards the applicable law. The first
category is of a contractual nature as it establishes the relationship between parties and
arbitrators. The second category can be inferred from the duty of the arbitral tribunal as it
assumes the role entrusted to a court of the state in resolving disputes. This accordingly
imposes the duties of reaching a just decision between the parties and balancing the
interests of the parties with the interests of the community or communities that would be
88 Gunther J. Horvath, op. cit., p. 146.
89 Julian D.M. Lew, "Determination of Arbitrators' Jurisdiction..." op. cit., p. 73.
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affected by the resulting award.90 The latter duty could be discharged by considering the
application of public policy rules, as illustrated below. However, it will be important
firstly to scrutinise the nature of the duties of both parties and arbitrators, and then to
examine the duty of the arbitral tribunal in considering the application of public policy
rules.
A. Mutual obligations imposed by the arbitration agreement
The relationship between parties and arbitrators is generally regarded as
contractual in nature, and is recognised by several legal systems. In 'Common Law
Jurisdictions', this relationship has been described as a 'contract for services'.91 In 'Civil
Law Jurisdictions' there are two tendencies: some consider the relationship as being a
contractual relationship, while others consider that arbitrators are discharging a public
task.92 In Islamic Law and generally in Arab countries which apply the "Sharia" legal
system, this relationship is considered as contractual, since the contract consists of an
offer from one of the contracting parties and an acceptance from the other.93 Accordingly,
90 Redfem and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 262. The writers provide here that there are two groups
of duties imposed on arbitrators. These are; duties imposed by the agreement of the parties; and
those imposed by the law such as the duty to act with due care the duty to act with diligence, the
duty to act judicially and ethical duties.
91 See Michael J. Mustill and Stewart C. Boyd, The Law and Practice ofCommercial Arbitration
in England, 2nd ed., Butterworths, London, (1989), p. 280; Rubino-Sammartano. M., op. cit., p.
189.
92 Ibid. p. 190.
93
See, for example, Article 87 of the Jordanian Civil Law of 1985, where it defined contracts as:
"The contract is a joining and consistence of the offer from one of the contracting parties with the
acceptance from the other in a manner which proves the effect thereof on the object of the
contract and the obligation of each party by what he is bound with to the other." See Hisham R.
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an offer made by the parties to an arbitrator must meet with an acceptance of appointment
by that arbitrator, as a condition of the institution and enforcement of the arbitration
agreement.94 As a consequence of their contractual relationship, both parties and
arbitrators will have mutual obligations.
1. Duties of the parties
During the arbitration proceedings, parties are obliged to comply with the
procedures of arbitration. For example, they are obliged to provide the tribunal with a
document which can support their claims.95 Parties are also obliged to enforce "partial
awards" and "interim measures", in order to help the arbitral tribunal to conduct the
arbitration.96 For example, if the arbitral tribunal ordered one of the parties to present a
document held in his possession97, then that party must comply with that order.98 Parties
are also obliged to co-operate in good faith and not to aggravate an on-going arbitration99,
Hashem, The Civil Law Code ofMoslem Jurisprudence, (1990), Al- Tawfiq Printing Press, p. 13.
(in English).
94 Samir Saleh, Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Middle East, Graham and Trotman, London,
1984, at 21-39.
93 Article 23(1) of the Model Law (1985); Article 15 of the LCIA Rules of 1998; Article 30 of the
Egyptian law of 1994; Section 40 of the English law of 1996.
96 Article 17 of the Model Law (1985).
97 Arbitrators can order parties to produce a particular document. See, Kenneth S Rokison, "The
Sources and Limits of the Arbitrator's Powers in England," Contemporary Problems in
International Arbitration, Julian Lew ed., (1987), p. 95.
98
For example, see Article 20 (5) of the ICC Rules of 1988; Section 40 (2)(a) of the English 1996
Act.
99
Bremer Vulkan v. South India Shipping Corp. Limited. [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 253; (1981) A.C.,
p. 909. The court expressly provided that: "The parties were equally under an obligation to keep
the procedure moving, both were under an obligation to apply to the arbitrator to prevent
inordinate delay."
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and they must avoid acts which make enforcement more difficult.100 They are also
obliged to pay the cost of arbitration and arbitrators' fees, whether this is paid directly to
the arbitrators or through an arbitral institution with a supervisory function.101
Parties are also obliged to comply with the public policy rules of the countries that are
closely connected to the dispute. They are also required to choose rules or laws that do
not contradict international public policy.
2. Duties of the arbitral tribunal
In accordance with their contractual obligations, arbitrators have to respect the will
of the parties as expressed in their arbitration agreement. They also have a duty to give
the parties an equal opportunity to present their case102, and a duty to respect what the
parties decide are the most suitable rules to govern their dispute. Where parties agree to
apply a particular law to govern their dispute, arbitrators are obliged to enforce their
agreement.103 If they fail to make their choice according to the law that has been chosen
by the parties, arbitrators will be deemed not to have carried out the task entrusted to
100
Sigvard Jarvin, "The Sources and Limits of the Arbitrator's Powers," Contemporary Problems
in International Arbitration, Julian Lew ed., (1987), p. 63.
101 Article 30 and 31 of the ICC Rules (1998); Section 59 of the English Law of 1996.
102 Arbitrators must consider the need to secure quick arbitration procedures and they should
avoid going through lengthy presentations of evidence, which will add to the cost and time of the
arbitration. See, for example, Article 15 (2) of the ICC Rules (1998) which provides that: "In all
cases, the Arbitral Tribunal shall act fairly and impartially and ensure that each party has a
reasonable opportunity to present its case."; Article 14 of the LCIA Rules; Article 18 of the
Model Law. The right of the parties to have a fair chance to present their case will be handled in
more detail later in Chapter Five, at p. 187.
103 Section 46(1) of the English law (1996) provides that: "The arbitral tribunal shall decide the
dispute - (a) in accordance with the law chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the
dispute".
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them by the arbitration agreement.104 This may affect the enforcement of the award since
a party can challenge the arbitral award if the arbitral tribunal applied rules other than
those chosen by the parties.103 Therefore, arbitrators should keep in mind that
disregarding the parties' choice might lead to a defective award.106
In spite of the arbitrators' obligation to apply the law chosen by the parties they are
not completely barred from applying other rules to the dispute, particularly if the choice
of the parties leads to a violation of public policy rules, and if by disregarding the parties
choice arbitrators would avoid derogation of the public policy of other countries
connected to the dispute.107 The fact that the arbitrator can apply other rules to the dispute
despite the parties' choice, reflects his duty towards the community that has a close
connection with the dispute and in this respect he must take into account the applicability
of public policy rules. Finally, one should say that, regardless of the argument which
states that arbitrators are not public servants like national judges, and are not bound
therefore by the same duties as a national judge, the fact that they have the duty to
provide the parties with an enforceable award, should ensure that they address the
applicable public policy rules.
104 Robert H. Smith, "An Inside View of the ICC Court," (1994) Arb.Int., p. 53 at 58.
103 For example, Article 33(d) of the Egyptian law (1994) provides, that the arbitral award may be
nullified where it " failed to apply the law agreed upon by the parties to govern the subject matter
in dispute". Also see, Article 36 (l)(a) of the Model Law; Article V (1) of the New York
Convention.
106 Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit., p. 80; Redfem and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 100.
107 In ICC Case No. 3267/1979, Y. Comm. Arb., (1982), p. 96. The arbitral tribunal concluded
that, "It is a generally accepted principle of international arbitration that the first duty of the
arbitrator, even if he is an amiable compositeur, is to apply the contract entered into between the
parties, unless it is established that the clauses which are quoted to him are manifestly contrary to
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B. The duty of respecting public policy rules
As stated above, the duty of considering the applicability of public policy rules may
originate in the arbitration agreement. In addition to their contractual duties, arbitrators'
duties have another dimension, emanating from their duty to consider the interests of the
parties along with the interests of the community or communities that are connected to
108 • • ....
the dispute. They have to resolve the dispute between the parties by achieving justice
and equity109, while at the same time they have to take into account factors which might
be injurious to public policy.110 Therefore, arbitrators must evaluate two sets of interests:
those of the parties and those of the community, although ultimately they are always
bound to give preference to the public interests.111 Furthermore, arbitrators are required to
act as an alternative to national courts. Therefore, because of the power allocated to them
in this capacity, they should consider the applicable public policy rules of the countries
that have the closest connection with the dispute, such as the country where the
the real intention of the parties or that they break a principle of public policy which is generally
admitted". Rubino-Sammartano. M., op. cit., p. 216; Yves Derains, op. cit., p. 230.
108 Ole Lando, "The law applicable to the merits...", op. cit., p. 107. He considers arbitrators as
responsible for the legitimacy of their award, and states: "... the arbitrator has a double concern.
As the servant of the parties he must persuade them and especially the losing party of the justice
of his award. Furthermore, he must make sure that the award is enforceable in the country or the
countries where enforcement may be sought"; Yves Derains, op. cit., p. 233.
'09 See Hagop Ardohalian v. Unifer International SA (The "Elissar") [1984] 2 Lloyd's Law
Reports 84 at pp 87, 87.
110 Arbitrators are not authorised to take a decision contrary to an absolutely constraining law,
particularly in matters concerning public order. See ICC Award 1677/1975, 3 Y. Comm. Arb.,
(1978), p. 217; William W. Park, "National Legal Systems and Private Dispute Resolution",
(1988) 82 AJIL., p. 616.
111 See A.J.E. Jaffey, op. cit., p. 1.
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arbitration proceedings are held112, or the country where the contract will be performed or
enforcement of the arbitral award will take place. One should recognise however, that
arbitrators are not the guardians of a specific national law as court judges are and they are
not 'completely bound' to apply the public policy rules of a particular country.
Accordingly, arbitrators are only expected to 'consider' the public policy rules of
countries that are closely connected with the dispute.
Another source of this duty comes from the arbitrators' duty to protect the rules and
customs of international trade. This is the view of Julian Lew"3, for whom arbitrators
are:
"... the guardians of the international commercial order: they must protect the
rights of participants in international trade; give effect to the parties' respective
obligations under the contract; imply the presence of commercial bona fides in every
transaction; respect the customs followed in international trade practice and the rules
developed in relevant international treaties; uphold the commonly accepted views of the
international commercial community and policies expressed and adopted by appropriate
international organisations; and the fundamental moral and ethical values which underlie
every level of commercial activity."114
112 For example, it is necessary for arbitrators to consider to what extent the law of the place of
arbitration applies when deciding the arbitrability and the validity of an arbitration agreement.
See ICC Final award 6162/1990, Y. Comm. Arb., (1992), p. 153; Alsing Trading Co.Ltd. v. The
Greek State (1956) International Law Review, p. 633; Sapphire Int.Petroleum Ltd. v. National
Iranian Oil Co. (1967) International Law Review 136; BP v. Libyan Arab Republic (1979) ILR
297; Wintershall AG v. The Government of Qatar, (1989) International Legal Materials, p, 798;
also see, William W. Park, "The Lex Loci Arbitri...", op. cit., p. 23.
113 Julian DM Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration, op. cit., 532; also
see, Sigvard Jarvin, "The Sources and Limits of the Arbitrator's Powers," Julian Lew ed., (1987),
op. cit., pp. 67-68.
114 See also, Geoffrey Beresford Hartwell, "The New York Convention of 1958. A Basis for a
Supra National Code," Internet address: (http:www.hartwell.demon.co.uk/nyc_asa.htm), p. 1. He
holds that, "...arbitrators, even in an international context, have some overriding responsibility to
the public interest or to the concept of public order"; Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit., p. 180. He
states that, "... the integrity of international arbitration and its endurance as a viable alternative to
litigation would seem to rest on arbitrators' continual respect for the public policy of states whose
legitimate interests are implicated in arbitration disputes. Arbitrators therefore have to balance
134
By examining the dispute in this light, arbitrators will provide an award that is more
likely to be recognised and enforced. This approach corresponds to the modern tendency
followed in international commercial arbitration, where arbitrators are obliged to ensure
the validity of their award.115
For example, Article 32 (2) of the LCIA Rules provides that:
"In all matters not expressly provided for in these rules, the court and the tribunal
shall act in the spirit of these rules and shall make every reasonable effort to
ensure that the award is legally enforceable."
Article 35 of the ICC rules of (1998) provides that:116
"In all matters not expressly provided for in these rules, the court and the arbitral
tribunal shall act in the spirit of these rules and shall make every effort to make
sure that the award is enforceable at law".
One can add here that the examination of the dispute by the arbitral tribunal could
be considered a preliminary stage prior to inspection by the court, which may lead to
more respect and confidence in international commercial arbitration.
their respect for the autonomy of the parties' will with the need to apply the mandatory provisions
of laws that are relevant to the dispute."
115 Klaus Peter Berger, op. cit., p. 673. He provided that arbitrators are always concerned about
the effectiveness of their decision: "The arbitrator has at least a moral obligation to give the
parties an award which can be expected to stand, both in the case of setting aside procedures and
in the case of enforcement procedure, before national courts"; Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, "Public
Policy and Arbitrability," op. cit., p. 185, appears to concur and adds, "...the arbitrator should
therefore make every effort possible to find out and respect also mandatory or at least public
policy rules of countries where such court procedures might be expected."; John Y. Gotanda, op.
cit., p. 100.
116 The same was provided in Article 26 of the ICC Rules of 1988. For the application of this rule
see ICC Case No. 5485/1987, reported in 14 Y. Comm. Arb., (1989), p. 156, 162; ICC Case No.
5505/1987, reported in 13 Y. Comm. Arb., (1988), p. 110, at 110, 112, which states, "In order to
fulfil the obligation imposed by article 26 of the ICC rules the arbitrator should probably also
deviate from the law chosen by the parties if it would appear that such a choice, if applied by the
arbitral tribunal, could prevent that the award be implemented. The arbitrator must ensure that his
award is ultimately enforceable."
Having established these points, it is now necessary to analyse which public policy
rules are applicable in international commercial arbitration.
C. The applicable public policy rules
The arbitrator must take into account the rules of several legal systems in deciding
the applicable public policy rules in international commercial arbitration. The process by
which the arbitral tribunal determines the applicable public policy rules may be examined
under two categories, these are:
1- The public policy of the law chosen by the parties.
2- The proper public policy rules.
1. Public policy rules of the law chosen by the parties
If an arbitration agreement includes a clear choice of law, then arbitrators will be
required to apply that law, and thus the public policy behind that law.117 The problem that
may occur here is that parties may deliberately choose a particular law in order to avoid
118
applying the mandatory rules of another law. They may also make a "negative choice
117 In an award made in 1980 in ICC Case No. 3380/1980, Y. Comm. Arb., Vol. VII, (1982) p.
116. The arbitrators considered that a clause phrased, "...this Agreement shall be subject to and
constructed in accordance with the laws in Syria" meant that "the contract is governed by and
should be interpreted in accordance with Syrian law in its entirety without restriction." Cited in
Yves Derains, op. cit., p. 240; see also ICC Case No. 2119/1978, Journal du Droit International
(1979), p. 997; Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards, Volume I, 1974-1985, Sigvard Jarvin & Yves
Derains, p. 355.
118 For example, if it appeared that by choosing a given law the parties had deliberately decided to
take themselves outside the field of operation of another law, for instance, the law of the place of
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of rules", for example, by excluding some provisions of the applicable law, particularly
the mandatory rules, which conflict with their private interests.119 This problem emanates
from the right of the parties to choose the applicable law which will govern their dispute
even if that entails that the dispute will be governed by general principles of law or the
lex mercatoria.120 According to this freedom, it is argued that parties should also be
allowed to exclude certain provisions of the applicable law that they do not consider
121 122
appropriate to their transaction , and that which conflict with their interests. The
177
arbitrator is faced here with a potential conflict of loyalties. On the one hand, should
performance of the contract or the law of the country where the enforcement of the contract is
likely to take place, see Paczy v. Haendler & Natermann [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 302 at pp. 307-
308.
119 Rubino-Sammartano. M., op. cit., p. 274. He illustrates the negative choice of the parties and
states that, "... 'the negative choice of the parties' means that the parties intended to avoid
accepting provisions which they were not aware of in order to avoid finding themselves subject to
unanticipated regulation."
120
Vanessa L.D. Wilkinson, op. cit., p. 103.
121
See, Arbitral Award in ICC Case No. 7528/1993 reprinted in 22 Yearbook Commercial
Arbitration 125 (1997). The tribunal in this case distinguished between national and international
arbitration when determining whether or not to consider the parties' exclusion of a national
mandatory rule. In this case the arbitration agreement stipulated that French law would be the
governing law but made the proviso that French Law No. 75-134 of 1975 - the purpose of which
was to protect the sub-contractor from the consequences of the contractor's bankruptcy - was to
be avoided. The tribunal noted that even in international arbitration the parties' agreement should
not be allowed to prevail over all mandatory rules of national laws and in all circumstances: some
rules are so important to the economic or social welfare of the country that international
arbitrators must enforce them irrespective of the contrary intent of the parties. However, the
tribunal recognised in this case that, "while French Law No. 75-134 of 1975 has a mandatory
character (d'ordre public) in domestic transactions, given the international character of the
contract and its place of performance outside France, the parties intent to avoid the provisions of
Law No. 75-134 of 1975 must be upheld."
122 Yves Derains, op. cit., p. 235. He refers to the system of"... the incorporation of the law into
the contract" where he emphasises that, "... the law applicable to the international contract has no
mandatory effect except insofar as the will of the parties has given it that effect. This is the
system known as 'the incorporation' of the law into the contract whereby the law is part of the
contract and therefore has no greater or lesser value than its other provisions."
123 See in this regard Ceroid Herrman, "Does the World Need Additional Uniform Legislation on
Arbitration?," 15(3) Arb.Int., (1999), p. 173. He highlighted this conflict and considered that
Article V (l)(d) of the New York Convention might lead to "an unacceptable dilemma." Article V
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arbitrators be loyal to the interests of the parties and thereby bind themselves to apply the
rules that they prefer? On the other hand, should arbitrators submit to their duty to act as
a court (to act in a quasi-judicial capacity), to protect the public interest if the exclusion
of the mandatory rule would lead to a violation of such public interests?124 The latter
means that the arbitral tribunal will be obliged to examine the contract and make sure that
the law which has been chosen by the parties is not injurious to the public policy of the
125
country that has closest connections with the dispute.
The freedom of the parties to exclude the applicable mandatory rules has been
arguable, because if the parties choose a law to govern their relations, arbitrators have to
apply that law as a whole together with its mandatory rules.126 Moreover, parties and
arbitrators are private individuals and do not have the power to exclude what the
legislators consider to be important mandatory rules which have to be applied in all
(l)(d) requires that the procedural rules should be in accordance with the parties' will, which may
lead an arbitrator either to disregard such procedural stipulations and follow the mandatory local
provisions, with the result that enforcement of the award may be refused under Article V (l)(d),
or to comply with the stipulation, with the result that the award may be set aside on the grounds
that it violates a mandatory local provision, in which case, by virtue of Article V (l)(e), its
enforcement abroad could be refused.
124 Berthold Goldman, Julian Lew ed., (1987), op. cit., p. 116. In this regard he states that, "One
may meet clauses that expressly exclude the application of every municipal law, and provide for
the exclusive application of general principles and usages of international trade. In reality, such
clauses cannot prevent the arbitrator (and possibly the judge) from referring, in some instances, to
a municipal law: for example, where the validity of the consent to the contract or the personal
capacity of one of the parties is challenged." See ICC Award, case No 1569/70.
12:1 This trend was applied in ICC Case No. 1859 (1973) Rev. Arb. 122, in which the arbitral
tribunal held that, "... since the contract must be performed in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, it is a sure
fact that the Lebanese importer was obliged to comply with the mandatory rules of the countries
of importation and that the Japanese party cannot now claim that those rules cannot be raised
against him". Cited in Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit., p. 189; also see, Daniel Hochstrasser, op.
cit., p. 73.
126 Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit., p. 184, states that: "...when the parties have made an express
choice of law, the arbitrator must apply that law, together with its mandatory rules. In most
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cases. Accordingly, there are limits to the principle of 'parties' autonomy' even in
international commercial arbitration128, where protecting the public interest takes
precedence over private interests.129 As guardians of the international commercial
order130, arbitrators are thus required to disregard the clause in the parties' agreement131
which restricts the application of the public policy rules of the law that has a close
connection to the dispute where these rules are part of the international public policy.
This will be explained below.
2. Searching for proper public policy rules
One should distinguish here between searching for the proper public policy rules
and deciding which law is the proper law governing the dispute, as the former comes
awards in which the applicability of the mandatory rules of the law chosen by the parties arose,
arbitrators applied those rules as a matter of fact."
127 Daniel Hochstrasser, op. cit., p. 69; Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit., p. 187, "...justice is not
always to be controlled by the individual as distinct from the community of which the individual
is a part."
128
See, Rubino-Sammartano. M., op. cit., p. 252. He states that: "Even the parties' freedom of
choice is not unlimited. In fact, if the choice of a given applicable law is the result of the joint
attempt by the parties to avoid mandatory provisions which would otherwise be applicable, this
choice is not valid, since it is an attempt to evade the law. This is generally referred as fraude a la
lor~, see also, A.J.E. Jaffey op. cit., p. 80.
129 ICC award No. 1434/1975, : Journal du Droit International (1976), p. 978; : Collection ofICC
Arbitral Awards, Volume I, 1974-1985, Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains, p. 263.
130 See Klaus Peter Berger, op. cit., p. 692. He states that: "... international arbitrators carry an
enhanced responsibility towards the international legal community which is a major factor for the
functioning of the international arbitral process as an effective and reliable dispute settlement
mechanism."
131
However, see in this regard Pierre Lalive who believes that arbitrators are obliged to apply the
public policy rules of the law chosen by the parties since the autonomy of the will should be
considered as part of international public policy. Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or Truly
International) Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 301-302.
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after deciding which law is the appropriate law. To illustrate the application of the
proper public policy rules, we assume that the public policy rules of several legal systems
which have a connection to the arbitration are at stake and that the task of the arbitrators
is to decide which public policy rules should prevail. Searching for the proper public
policy rules in this sense will generate a conflict of public policy rules of the different
legal systems that are related to the dispute. The proper public policy rules in this sense
are determined according to what arbitrators consider are most closely connected to the
dispute.133
One should consider in this regard that Article V (2)(b) of the New York
Convention does not provide a clear indication as to which public policy rules are to be
applied. There is no reference to any particular legal system in the Convention, therefore,
an arbitrator has the power to decide that a court in the country of enforcement may
examine the award under the public policy rules of any legal system involved in the
arbitration.134 This imposes on arbitrators the duty to respect the relevant public policy
rules as part of their duty to provide an enforceable award. If an arbitrator made a
132
However, exceptions may occur in international commercial arbitration, an award in ICC Case
No. 4123 in 1983, Yearbook, Vol. X (1985), p. 49, where the arbitrator was dealing with a dispute
regarding a contract that had to be performed by a party in Korea and another party in the EEC.
He considered the question of the application to the contract of the Korean mandatory rules and
the EEC before determining the law applicable to the contract. Cited in , Yves Derains, op. cit., p.
245.
133 This approach was followed by the European Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations. Article 3(3) of the Convention provides that, "... the fact that the parties
have chosen a foreign law, whether or not accompanied by the choice of a foreign tribunal, shall
not, where all the other elements are connected with one country only, prejudice the application
of rules of the law of that country which cannot be derogated from by contract mandatory rules."
134 Public policy rules of the country where enforcement of the award is taking place is commonly
applicable by the courts in the country of enforcement, by virtue of being the public policy rules
of their national legal system.
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decision without considering the applicable public policy rules, he would be infringing
the duty he is expected to respect and abide by. The question that follows is: which public
policy rules is it most appropriate to apply?
There are several aspects of legal systems that have to be considered in this respect.
These are:
1. The public policy rules of the forum.
2. The public policy of the country (or countries) where enforcement is likely to take
place.135
3. The public policy of other countries, where a close link exists between the case and
that country and when there are grounds for applying that law (e.g. place of
performance of the contract).136
4. The application of international public policy rules.
Each of these aspects of legal systems may relate to the dispute, as has been
previously discussed. The first possibility for arbitrators is to examine the dispute
according to the public policy rules of the forum, which may be explained in two ways.
133
It should be taken into account that assets in international commercial contracts are often
distributed between different countries, and that an arbitrator may not be able to predict where the
award will be enforced. However, once the facts are presented before the arbitrator, he may be
able to envisage the probable place or places where the award might be enforced. However, there
is a debate about the duty of arbitrators to consider such rules. See, Bernard Hanotiau, op. cit., p.
398. He states that, "... a majority of arbitrators consider that there is no 'moral duty' to apply the
foreign rules of public policy of the place where the award could be enforced". Also see the
decision of the Federal District Court Eastern District of New York, of 29 March 1991, (760 F
Supp. (1991) 1036, Yearbook International Commercial Arbitration (1992) at p. 686.), in which
the court refused to rely on the public policy of the law in the country where the enforcement of
the award would take place.
136 See Yves Derains, op. cit., pp. 252 and 249.
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Firstly, it is due to the possibility of setting the award aside by the court of the forum
under the ground of public policy rules, which might accordingly effect the enforcement
of the award in other countries under Article V (l)(e) of the New York Convention.
Secondly, it is due to the arbitrator's duty to undertake the role of the courts of that
country in resolving disputes.137 Accordingly, an arbitrator will be obliged to apply the
138
same rules as a national court of the forum. Thus, if an arbitrator acknowledges that the
substance of the dispute or the applicable rules contravenes the public policy of the
forum, he will be bound to apply what a national court of the forum would apply. A
national court will apply its national law.139 It seems then that examining the legitimacy
of an issue under the concept of public policy must be established upon the forum's own
public policy rules.140
137 Rene David, op. cit., p. 56.
138 In ICC Award 5505/1987. Y. Comm. Arb., (1988), p. 110. The choice of Switzerland as the
place of arbitration implied the application of the Swiss mandatory provisions.
139 See Sigvard Jarvin, "The Sources and Limits of the Arbitrator's Powers," op. cit., p. 61;
Lawrence Collins, op. cit., p. 126 at 137. He states that, "It has been the policy of English law that
arbitrators are subject to English law"; A. J. E. Jaffey, op. cit., p. 88. He states: "If during the
arbitration, the courts of the country in which the arbitration is held actually make an order that
the arbitrators should apply a particular law, they must comply, for being present in the country
when they act, they must obey the orders of its courts.. .they must regard themselves as bound by
any rules of that country directing them which law to apply"; Yves Derains, op. cit., p. 242, states
that: "The mandatory rules of the forum have a natural priority which the judge has to apply,
whatever the proper law of the contract"; see Orion Compania de Seguros v. Belfort (1962) 2
Lloyd's Rep 257; Rsler v. Rottwinkel (E.C.J.) Q.B. [1986] 53, the court held that: "Such legal
rules include mandatory provisions which must be observed in deciding the dispute, regardless of
the law governing the contract, and which are therefore in the nature of public policy."
140 This has been asserted by the Egyptian Courts in Case No. 521 (1944), Collection ofCourt of
Cassation (29), p. 472; see also, Ashraf al Rifaie, op. cit., p. 20; Jonathan Hill, International
Commercial Disputes, 2ed, London: LLP, (1998), p. 640. He states that: "...the principle of party
autonomy must be subordinate to the public interest of the country in which the seat of arbitration
is located. Since the law of the seat has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the arbitral process
meets certain basic standards of justice and fairness, the parties to an arbitration cannot be entitled
to exclude procedural rules which are mandatory according to the law of the seat."
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However, as previously mentioned in this chapter, the "seat theory" has been
criticised on the ground that it is not necessary to have a connection between the
arbitration and the forum, especially where this choice was merely a place in which to
hold the arbitration proceedings.141 Therefore, it seems inappropriate to apply the public
policy rules of the forum.142 Okezie Chukwumerije, clearly illustrates this point:143
"Unlike national courts, international arbitrator tribunals do not owe strict
allegiance to the laws of the place of arbitration ... an arbitral tribunal could decide to
conduct the arbitration proceedings in different countries, in which case it is unrealistic to
categorise the stringent public policy of the forum as applicable to the merits of the
dispute. Even in cases where the proceedings are held in one country, international
arbitrators still do not, as a theoretical matter, owe strict allegiance to the laws of that
seat, in the sense that they are not constrained to apply all the imperative rules of the
forum in the same way that national courts are."
One should bear in mind though, that in practice arbitrators cannot act without
considering the public policy rules of the forum. Article V (l)(d) of the New York
Convention incorporates this idea, that non-observance of the procedural rules of the
forum would be considered as a ground on which to refuse enforcement of the award.
141
A forum can be completely foreign to the arbitration, especially if the forum was not the place
were the contract made and where it should be performed; or neither parties nor arbitrators have
the nationality of the forum; or the applicable rules to govern the procedures and the substance of
the dispute were foreign laws.
142 See Yves Derains, op. cit., p. 243. He states that: "... The international arbitrator does not go
into the question of the application of mandatory rules in the same way as the judge. He takes no
account of the distinction between the mandatory rules of the forum and foreign mandatory rules.
He can only take account of the distinction between mandatory rules of the lex contractus and
mandatory rules of another legal system."
143 Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit., p. 182; see also A.J.E. Jaffey, op. cit., p. 81, who states that
according to the English conflict of law rales, arbitrators are bound to apply English domestic
public policy, unless if the dispute is outside the English court jurisdiction. He writes that: "...
when the English court would not have had jurisdiction to try the dispute, in the absence of the
agreement of the parties, England may have been chosen as the place of arbitration precisely
because neither party belonged to it. In such a case English conflict rales, even those providing
for the application of mandatory rules, have no claim to be applied, so that the question of their
being avoided does not arise"; also see, Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or Truly International)
Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 271.
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Accordingly, arbitrators cannot wholly disregard the public policy rules of the forum144,
whether they are embodied in the procedural public policy rules or in the substantial rules
of the forum. For example, if a given country considers a particular issue an offensive
violation of their highest social values and principles, then any arbitration proceedings
which take place in its territory will be considered as null and void, even if the
enforcement of the arbitral award would be performed in another country which
considers such agreements valid.
Arbitrators are also expected to take account of the public policy rules of the
countries that are closely connected to the dispute as long as their interests are affected
directly or indirectly by the dispute145, especially if the transaction conceals an illegal act,
which is severely injurious to the public policy of such countries.146 For example, if the
144 Public policy rules of the forum should be considered as long as they relate to the facts and
circumstances of the case, thus demonstrating that the disputed matters in the arbitration are most
clearly related to that law. See ICC Case No. 2178 (1973); AJE Jaffey, op. cit., p. 27, referring to
Kaufman v. Garson [1904] 1 K.B. 591.
145 See A.J.E. Jaffey op. cit., p. 90. He states that: "Arbitrators in international commercial
arbitration are under some sort of duty to apply the international public policy rules of countries
closely connected with the contract, even though they do not regard themselves as bound to apply
any country's conflict rules, and even if they are applying the lex mercatoria"; See Regazzoni v.
K.C. Sethia (1957) 3 All ER p. 286. In which the contract was held to be null and void because
Indian law did not allow the trade of jute with South Africa, because of apartheid practised by
that country. The Indian legal system was applied to the sale even though it was not the designed
law to govern the dispute or the forum, but merely the law of a third country. See, Okezie
Chukwumerije, op. cit., p. 183, who states: "...Arbitrators have a responsibility to apply the
mandatory rules of those jurisdictions whose national interests are substantially involved in the
matter under arbitration"; See ICC Case No. 2930/1982, Y. Comm. Arb., Vol. IX (1984), p. 105;
ICC Case No. 4123/1983, Yearbook, Vol. X (1985), p. 49; See Yves Derains, op. cit., p. 245.
146 ICC Case No. 1782/1973, Journal du Droit International (1975), p. 923; Collection of ICC
Arbitral Awards, Volume I, 1974-1985, Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains, p. 230. This case
concerned the refusal of agreement by the authorities of the place of performance of a contract
which was subject to another law; also see, ICC Case No. 2216/1974, Journal du Droit
International (1975), p. 917; Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards, Volume I, 1974-1985, Sigvard
Jarvin & Yves Derains, p. 225.
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dispute concerns acts, which would threaten the social security of another country147, then
148arbitrators should consider the public policy of that country. In this regard, mention
should be made of the significant Articles provided in the European Convention of
1980149, which gave considerable consideration to the conflict of public policy rules,
where Articles 3(3)150, Article 7 and Article 16 provide guiding rules for deciding on the
applicable public policy rules.
Article 7 provides that:
"In the application of this convention effect may be given to the mandatory rules of
any state with which the situation has significant connection, if and in so far as,
under the law of that state, those rules must be applied whatever the law applicable
to the contract."151
147 See ICC award Case No. 2136/1974, Collection ofICC Arbitral Awards, Volume I, 1974-1985,
Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains, p. 456. A dispute involving problems of performance of licence
granted by a German firm to a Spanish firm. Based on lack of authorisation by a mandatory rule
of the place of performance, the tribunal held that: "Even though the licence contract would have
been subject to German law, the consequences of a failure to obtain authorisation must be
examined according to Spanish law"; See the Crete Rubles' case in De Wutz v. Hendricks (1824)
2 Bing. 314; Regazzoni v. K.C. Sethia (1944) Ltd. (1958) A.C. 301.(1956) Q. B. p. 490; J. G.
Collier, op. cit., p. 211.
148 Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit., p. 185, states that: "The tribunal might have to balance the
interests of other countries that are equally connected with the transaction. The tribunal's
objective should be to determine which of them has a greater claim to the application of its
mandatory rules by virtue of its connection with the dispute."
149 The Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, the Rome Convention
(1980), was concluded between the member states of the European Community. This Convention
was designed to achieve harmonisation of the relevant conflict rules of the member states and was
said to be a logical and necessary consequence of the Brussels Convention of (1968) on
Jurisdiction and Judgements in Civil Commercial Matters. It has also been argued that it
introduces certainty into the rules of the conflict of the laws. However, the convention does not
apply to arbitration agreements, see Article l(2)(d); J. G. Collier, op. cit., p. 182.
150 Article 3(3) of the Convention provides that: "the fact that the parties have chosen a foreign
law, whether or not accompanied by the choice of a foreign tribunal, shall not, where all the other
elements are connected with one country only, prejudice the application of rules of the law of that
country which cannot be derogated from by contract mandatory rules."
'7l See J. G. Collier, op. cit., p. 211. He states that this article ".. .allows the court to give effect to
the mandatory rules of another country with which the situation has a close connection if and in
so far as, under the law of the latter country, these rules must be applied". However, this provision
has not been enacted into United Kingdom law; See, Redfern and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 100.
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Article 16 provides that:
"The application of a rule of law of any country specified by this convention may
be refused only if such application is manifestly contrary to public policy."
An arbitrator is also required to consider the public policy of the country where the
parties are likely to seek enforcement of the award and to ensure that his award is
ultimately enforceable, by making sure that his award does not contravene the national
152
public policy rules of that country.
However, applying these rules exclusively might not be sufficient to ensure the
enforceability of the arbitral award since applying domestic mandatory rules to some
questions and foreign mandatory rules to others presents considerable difficulties.
Moreover, arbitrators cannot investigate every public policy rule contained in various
legal systems as they are not expected to "scientifically investigate" the public policy
rules of different legal systems153 and they do not have the time nor the knowledge to do
so. It would be more rational if it were expected from arbitrators to base their test, when
determining which public policy rules apply to international commercial arbitration, on
more suitable grounds, rather than blindly searching through the diversity of several legal
systems for the applicable public policy rule. Thus, one could reach the conclusion that it
152 Julian D.M Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration, (1978), op. cit., p.
537; Mohammad Reza Baniassadi, "Do Mandatory Rules of Public Law Limit Choice of Law in
International Commercial Arbitration?" (1992) 10 INT'L TAX & BUS. L.J. 59, p. 81; John Y.
Gotanda, op. cit., p. 103, fn. 216.
153 It was noted in ICC Award 4695/1984, Y. Comm. Arb., (1986), p. 149, that if a tribunal
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the possible difficulties of a future enforcement in
a given country, then there would be no award at all.
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would be more rational if arbitrators were to consider the application of internationally
accepted public policy rules as the most appropriate public policy rules to govern
international commercial relations.154
D. Applying the international public policy rules
Applying the international public policy rules in international commercial relations
will provide arbitrators with a suitable way of avoiding the problems which may arise
from the conflict of public policy rules.155 There are several reasons for this. Firstly,
international arbitrators are in a better position than national judges to understand the
specific needs of international commerce, which is one of the reasons that drives parties
to resort to international commercial arbitration. Secondly, international arbitrators do not
have conflict of rules of their own or any particular concept of national "public policy".
Moreover, arbitrators are not expected to comply with national standards of public policy,
especially where the national rules in question were designed to govern domestic
relations only.156 This approach was followed in a decision made under the ICC Rules.157
In a case between an Italian and a Belgian party (in which Italian law was the governing
154 In ICC Case 8891 (unpublished). Cited in, ILA Report, London Conference (2000), op. cit., p.
23, in which "... the tribunal itself raised the issue of illicit commissions and invited submissions,
and noted in its award that the illicit character of contracts for the payment of bribes was well
established in arbitral jurisprudence and that arbitrators may properly base their decisions in such
matters on general principles of law or transnational public order."
155 Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 287.
156 Arbitrators should comply with the narrower, and less constraining, standards of international
public policy rather than with the broader test of domestic public policy. See, Pieter Sanders,
"Commentary on "UNCITRAL" Arbitration Rules," 2 Y.B. COM. ARB. (1977), p. 172.
157 See ICC Case No. 6379/1990, 17 Y. Comm. Arb., (1992), p. 212- 218; Okezie Chukwumerije,
op. cit., p. 191.
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law), the arbitrator refused to apply a Belgian mandatory rule because it "... does not aim
at binding the international arbitrator".158
Applying international public policy rules also serves as a remedy in situations
where parties expressly exclude the mandatory rules of the law of their choice. Not giving
effect to the parties' intentions as such should not be considered as tantamount to
disregarding the parties' choice provided that arbitrators based their decision on the
grounds that such exclusion would violate a truly international public policy rule.159 For
example, in cases such as corruption160, or if the parties have chosen a law the application
of which establishes racial discrimination against one of the parties.161 Whilst the parties
are precluded from excluding mandatory rules of the law applicable to the dispute, an
arbitrator conversely may exclude the application of a mandatory rule although provided
by the proper law, if it is incompatible with truly international public policy.162
138 The arbitrator found that the rule was designed for application by Belgian courts.
139 Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 304. He
states that: "... what can be, and indeed should be admitted, it is submitted, is not only the
freedom of the international arbitrator but also the duty to disregard the choice of the parties, if
this is required by a really international or transnational public policy. This is both a logical,
advisable and inevitable transposition, to the domain of international arbitration, of the
relationship which, in domestic private international law, exists between the normally applicable
law and international public policy (of the State)."
160 For more information see Chapter Six, at p. 242.
161 Yves Derains, op. cit., p. 251, "... An arbitrator should not agree to be an accomplice in a
deliberate fraud on a mandatory rule that the arbitrator considers has an undisputed right to be
applied"; Hisham Sadik, op. cit,. p. 317. He states that: "International public policy must be
imposed on both parties and arbitrators. As for the parties, they will not get an enforceable award
if its subject includes a matter which is contrary to public policy, such as, a violation of moral
values, drug smuggling, terrorist acts, corruption, etc. As for the arbitrator, he will be considered
as committing a violation of international public policy if he accept such conduct."
162 See for example ICC Award, Case No. 7063/1993 reprinted in 22 Yearbook Commercial
Arbitration 87 (1997). The defendant argued that pursuant to the doctrine of riba embodied in
Saudi law, the claimant is not entitled to interest on any arbitration award. The tribunal held that
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As stated above, for practical considerations international commercial arbitrators
are required to consider the application of the public policy rules of the countries that
have a nexus with the arbitration. The forum, the place or places where enforcement may
take place, the public policy of the law chosen by the parties and the public policy of the
place where performance of the contract will take place163 all have to be respected as long
as, in the view of the tribunal, these laws have a serious right to be applied.164 However,
the application of these rules does not mean that arbitrators are obliged to apply purely
domestic public policy rules to international relations. Arbitrators must ascertain the
public policy rules that a national law considers essential to the protection of its national
interests and moral values, those which cannot be derogated by any other rule. Also,
when such laws require the application of their public policy rules to both national and
international commercial relations, this could be treated as constituting an international
public policy rule for that country.165 This has been illustrated in an ICC award, where the
tribunal held that:166
the doctrine of riba does not bar all awards of compensation for financial loss due to a party who
has not had the use of a sum ofmoney to which they would have otherwise been entitled.
163 See Ralli Brothers v. Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar, (1920) 2 K.B. 287 C. A; J. G. Collier,
op. cit., p. 212; Klaus Peter Berger, op. cit., p. 689.
164
This, for example, was followed in the ICC award rendered in 1973 in Case No. 1859. The
arbitrators in this case decided to combine the application of national rules concerning the general
principles and customs of international trade and the policy laws of the states where the contract
was carried out. See, Yves Derains, op. cit., p. 252.
163 Daniel Hochstrasser, op. cit., p. 61. He referred to Werner Wenger, Die Internationale
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, in Easier Juristische Mitteilungen, 1989, pp. 337, 353 and 354., where he
states: "Towards the law declared applicable by the parties or the arbitral tribunal, a public policy
reservation exists: the arbitral tribunal has to respect fundamental principles of law which are
valid in the sense of a transnational public policy, independent of the relation of the facts of the
case to a special state. Furthermore, the arbitral tribunal has to respect the international public
policy of such third countries (countries other than the one whose law is applicable) who have a
close connection to the matter."
149
"arbitrators are not bound to apply such rules in the same strict manner at some state
courts."
In the following chapters several judicial decisions which concern the concept of
international public policy in the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, will be
reviewed. In the next chapter the application of public policy rules by national courts in
the country of origin will be examined.
166 ICC Award No. 1434/1975,: Journal du Droit International (1976), p. 978; Collection of ICC
Arbitral Awards, Volume I, 1974-1985, Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains, p. 263; Pierre Lalive,
"Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 300, footnote (121).
CHAPTER FOUR
PUBLIC POLICY AS A GROUND FOR SETTING ASIDE
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS
Chapter Four
Public Policy as a Ground for Setting Aside International Arbitral Awards
In this chapter, various questions need to be answered. The first concerns the finality
of international arbitral awards: whether an arbitral award should be considered to be a
final decision on the dispute and therefore beyond the control of the courts in the country
of origin, or that it must be subject to courts' control in that country. The second question
concerns the extent of control that can be exercised by the courts in the country of origin
over international arbitral awards and whether or not invoking public policy would lead
to widening the grounds for control. This requires firstly examination of the conflict
between the finality of arbitral awards and the courts' control.1 Then one must determine
the extent of applying public policy as a ground of setting the award aside. The latter
requires consideration of the distinction between domestic and international arbitral
awards, and whether or not arbitral awards should be treated similarly under the concept
of public policy regardless of which of the two categories they fall under. Finally, it is
important to examine the effect of setting aside an international arbitral award for
considerations of public policy in the country of origin, when enforcement is to take
place in other countries. This is important because setting the award aside in the country
1 See W. Michael Reisman, Systems of Control in InternationaI Adjudication and Arbitration:
Breakdown and Repair, Duke University Press, (1992) pp. 1-10. He explains this tension by
stating that: "The interest of finality means that an arbitrary limit for control systems must be
established. The interest of justice means simply that justice must be done no matter what the cost
nor how long it takes"; David L. Shapiro (Directing Editor), International Commercial
Arbitration, Cases, Materials and Notes on the Resolution of International Business Disputes,
(1997) The Foundation Press, INC, p. 965.
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of origin is one of the grounds for refusing enforcement in foreign countries under Article
V (l)(e) of the New York Convention.
I. Finality of the Award and Court's Control
After making the final arbitral award the arbitral tribunal's mission comes to an
end. Then, the question of how the award will be enforced will depend on the losing
party's conduct. He may either submit to the award by executing it voluntarily, or he may
resist the award by raising an action to set the award aside.2 The latter contradicts the
modern trend, which calls for considering the award to be final and binding on the parties
from the day when it is decreed.3 This is mainly due to the nature of the arbitration
agreement, in that it is founded as a result of the parties' autonomous consent and
therefore parties are obliged by their agreement to consider the resulting award as binding
on them.4 Moreover, most of modern national arbitration laws and rules of international
arbitration institutions consider arbitral awards to be final and binding on the parties once
it is issued. For example, Section 58 (1) of the English Act of 19965; Article 55 of the
2 See above, Chapter One, p. 29.
3
Henry P. De Vries, op. cit., p. 47.
4 Clive M Schmittoff, "Finality of arbitral awards and judicial review," Contemporary Problems
in International Arbitration, Julian Lew ed., (1987), p. 230.
3 Section 58 (1) of the English Act of 1996 states that: "Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an
award made by the tribunal pursuant to an arbitration agreement is final and binding both on the
parties and on any persons claiming through or under them." See, Gbangbola v Smith and
SherriffLtd [1998] 3 All ER 730, at 738; Westacre Investments Inc v. Jugoimport SPDR Holding
Co Ltd, [1998] 3 W.L.R. 770; [1998] 4 All E.R. 570; [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. Ill; [1998] C.L.C.
409.
152
Egyptian law of 19946; Article 35 (1) of the Model Law7; Article 26 (9) of the LCIA
Rules8; Article 28 (6) of the ICC Rules; Article 32 (2) of the Cairo Regional Centre for
International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA).9
However, in spite of such provisions, most national arbitration laws impose some
measure of control on the arbitral award, exercisable by state courts at the seat of
arbitration. Accordingly, a party who is not satisfied with an award can protest against the
award before the court of the seat of arbitration, where he may use whatever legal
grounds are available including public policy, in order to disrupt the finality of the award
and delay its enforcement.
A. The conflict between finality of the award and the court's control
The conflict between the finality of arbitral awards and the control exercised by
state courts can be demonstrated by analysing two conflicting schools of thought. On the
one hand some scholars argue that international arbitration is 'delocalised'10 from the
6 Article 55 of the Egyptian Law No. 27 of 1994 provides that: "Arbitral award rendered in
accordance with the provisions of this law shall have the authority of res judicata and shall be
enforceable in conformity with the provision of the present law"; See Ahmed S. El-Kosheri,
"EGYPT," op. at., p. 41.
7 Article 35 (1) of the Model Law: "An arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was
made, shall be recognized as binding and, upon application in writing to the competent court,
shall be enforced subject to the provisions of this article and of article 36."
8 Article 26 (9) of the LCIA Rules: "All awards shall be final and binding on the parties."
9 Article 32 (2) of the (CRCICA) states that: "The award shall be made in writing and shall be
final and binding to the parties. The parties undertake to carry out the award without delay."
10
To delocalised an arbitral award means "to remove the power of the courts at the place of
arbitration to make an internationally effective declaration of the award's nullity". See Jan
Paulsson, "The Extent of Independence..Julian Lew ed., op. cit., p. 141.
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country of origin and an arbitral award constitutes a definitive ruling on the dispute,
which does not require to be dealt with by another forum.11 On the other hand many
scholars believe that international commercial arbitration must be controlled by national
12
legal systems.
The advocates of the first trend base their argument on the purpose of resorting to
arbitration. Parties engaged in international commerce resort to arbitration because they
want a binding decision of the kind that would be given by a court. By going to
13arbitration they expect to settle their dispute with a minimum court control. Therefore,
adding layers of control imposed by the courts of the seat will increase time and costs,
which do not serve the interests of the parties. Reisman explains this by stating that,14 "a
delayed victory may deprive the winner of substantial economic value." Moreover, the
cost generated by control systems is imposed not only on the parties but also on the
community that funds the control system. Reisman reached the conclusion that,
"...national courts would impose costs on the functioning of international commercial
arbitration that could price it out of business." This is also the view of Jan Paulsson 5,
" Jan Paulsson, "Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration: When and Why It
Matters," 32 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 53 (1983); W. Michael Reisman, op. cit., pp. 1-10.
12
Bruno Laurent, "Reflection on the International Effectiveness of Arbitration Awards," 12:3
Arb.Int., (1996), p. 269-285; Hong-Lin Yu, "Defective Awards must be Challenged in the Courts
of the Seat of the Arbitration - A Step Further than Localisation?," 65:3 The Journal of the
Chartered Institute ofArbitrators (1999), p. 195 at 202; Jonathan Hill, op. cit.. p. 640; also see,
Japan Line Ltd v Aggeliki [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep 288. Lord Denning stated, "... the court has, as
well as its statutory powers, an inherent jurisdiction to supervise the conduct of an arbitral
tribunal."; Minmetals Germany GmbH v. Ferco Steel Ltd, [1999] 1 All E.R. 315.
13
Henry P. De Vries, op. cit., p. 47.
14 W. Michael Reisman, op. cit., p. 3.
15
Jan Paulsson, "Delocalisation of international Commercial Arbitration...", op. cit., p. 53.
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who states that, "If the international currency of awards depended ineluctably on their
treatment in the hands of local magistrates in their countries of origin, the hopes for a
more open and more universal system of international arbitration would be disappointed".
In his reply to the opponents of 'delocalised arbitration' he affirms that although
delocalised awards are independent of the legal order of their country of origin, they are
not independent of all legal order, since they are still subject to the control of the court in
the country of enforcement.16 Therefore, he prefers to leave the control over the award in
the hands of the courts of the country in which enforcement is sought, and he considers
this a sufficient control for international commercial arbitration.
Contrary to this trend, many scholars believe that international arbitration requires
control by the national legal systems of the country in which arbitration takes place, as
this reduces the possibility of having any effect on the public interest of the country of
origin.17 The defenders of this trend argue that finality of the award is based on the
assessment of what would be in the interests of the winning party.18 However, it is more
important to consider the interest of the losing party and the public, respect for their
interests and justice calls for some measure of court control. Therefore, it would be unjust
16
Ibid., p. 54; also in, Jan Paulsson, "Arbitration Unbounded ..." op. cit., p.375. He argues that
the control function of international arbitration has been shifted from the place of arbitration to
the place of enforcement; also see Klaus Peter Berger, op. cit., p. 712.
17 Michael Kerr, "Arbitration and the Courts: The UNCITRAL Model Law," 34 Int'l & Comp.
L.Q. 1 (1985). He states that: "there is virtually no body, tribunal, authority or individual in
England whose acts or decisions give rise to binding legal consequences for others, but who are
altogether immune from judicial review"; Jonathan Hill, International Commercial Disputes, 2ed,
London: LLP, 1998, p. 640.
18
It is not in the interests of the winning party to have an award reviewed by the court as this
merely adds delay and expense.
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to pursue the goals of speed and finality sought by winners at the expense of procedural
justice.19 However, the defenders of this opinion do not undermine the binding effect of
arbitral awards on the parties, since they are obliged by their agreement to consider the
resulting award as binding. But they argue that such an award is not binding for the state
and the public since they were not party to that agreement. Therefore, an arbitral award
must be subject to measures of control in order to protect the interests of members of the
public who are not in dispute.
Also, one should consider that eliminating all examination of awards at the seat of
arbitration may lead to unacceptable results. Firstly, if an award is not challenged in the
country of origin, the loser will not be able to challenge errors or defects made by the
20 • • •arbitral tribunal , for instance, where the minimum standards of procedural fairness are
violated or a power is exercised ultra vires. If the loser cannot challenge these defects in
the country of origin then the only hope for him is to challenge the defective award at a
later time in any country in which enforcement may take place. Secondly, if the loser was
the claimant in an international arbitration, then he may lose his right to recourse against
the arbitral award for the simple reason that the other party (the defendant in an
arbitration dispute) may not have any interest to enforce the award in other countries.
This runs the risk of depriving arbitration of its reliability and would discourage parties
from going to arbitration.
19 William W. Park, "National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in
International Arbitration," 63 TJJL. L. REV., (1989), p. 647, 684 -689.
20 This may deprive the losing party from the possibility of having his case reviewed in proper
new proceedings. See, Van den Berg, "The Efficacy of Award in International Commercial
Arbitration," 58 The Journal of the Chartered Institute ofArbitrators (1992), 267 at 272.
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In addition to that, one can argue that entrusting the court of the seat of the
arbitration with equitable control over international arbitral awards has several
advantages. A control mechanism serves to ensure that all aspects of the case have been
fairly considered. This is also required to keep arbitration on the right track in order to
prevent any possible corruption of the arbitral tribunal, such as the denial of a fair hearing
21
or the violation of public policy. After all, a state court cannot be expected to lend
assistance to arbitration held within its territorial jurisdiction, whenever its assistance is
22
required , without imposing measures of control over the resulting award, for instance,
9 "3
ensuring that the award was not obtained by fraud.
Finally, some scholars consider supervision of the arbitral award by the courts of
the seat of arbitration as a requirement under the New York Convention, because the
Convention is founded on a system of dual state control, firstly at the place of arbitration
and secondly at the place of enforcement of the award.24 Also, when a state allows an
arbitral award to be made within its territory, it gives the award an international currency
21 See Georges R. Delaume, op. cit., p. 18. He states that: "Acceptance of a reasonable amount of
control may have both a preventive and a curative effect ... it may make the arbitrators alert to
the fact that their behaviour and their decisions cannot altogether escape judicial scrutiny."
22 Courts assist arbitration proceedings by compelling arbitration, by appointing arbitrators, by
their revoking or replacing arbitrators, by compelling the attendance of witnesses; by taking
evidence and by ordering conservatory measures by way of attachment of assets.
23
V. V. Veeder, op. cit., p. 59; Henry P. De Vries, op. cit., p. 47; Jacques Werner, "Application of
Competition Laws by Arbitrators," 12 J.Int.Arb., (1995), p. 21 at 26. He states that: "...
international commercial arbitration, whose existence is dependent on the assistance it receives
from the legislative and judicial state authorities, can expect their support only to the extent it is
perceived as not undermining or weakening the existing legal order."
24 Eric A. Schwartz, "A Comment on Chromalloy. Hibnarton a I'Americaine," 14 J.Int.Arb. 2,
1997, p. 128.
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or a nationality that facilitates the enforcement of the arbitral award against assets in
jurisdictions that adhere to the New York Convention.25
One may reach the conclusion that the meaning of finality in the context of arbitral
awards as it is used in the various provisions of national arbitration laws and rules of
international institutions, implies that the courts ofmost countries of the world should be
prepared to recognise and enforce the award as constituting a final decision on the
dispute. The most important effect of finality is that neither party can unilaterally
withdraw from the resulting award, as it is annexed to the binding effect of the arbitration
agreement. This gives the award a res judicata effect, so that the losing party cannot
bring a court action against the other in relation to the subject matter of the arbitration
based on the same cause of action.26 Therefore, the concept of finality should lead the
court to dismiss the action on the grounds that the disputed issue had been conclusively
27
disposed of and the resulting award was res judicata.
25 Klaus Peter Berger, op. cit., p. 656. He states that, "... almost all forms of review are derived
from a sense of national responsibility to control the integrity of a process that receives state
support. A nation that gives the arbitrator power to bring about legal consequences takes upon
itself an obligation to ensure respect for the limits imposed on the arbitrator's authority and for
fundamental procedural rights. The winner's interest in finality, privacy and economy must be
weighed against the loser's concern for fair proceedings."
26 For example, Article 55 of the Egyptian Law of 1994 provides that: "Arbitral awards rendered
in accordance with the provisions of this the present Law shall have the authority of the res
judicata and shall be enforceable in conformity with the provisions of this Law." Egyptian
doctrines consider that the award becomes res judicata as of the day on which it is signed. The
Egyptian court of Cassation, 14 March 1957 have held that awards became res judicata when
they are made. See Abdul Hamid El Ahdab, "The New Egyptian Act...," op. cit., p. 89.
27 Redfem and Hunter, 2"d ed., op. cit., 396; Robert D. A. Knutson, "The Interpretation ofArbitral
Awards Wlien is a Final Award not Final!," 11 J.Int.Arb. (1994), p. 99 at 100. He states that: "...
in the context of international arbitration res judicata means that you cannot (or should not) have
two bites at the cherry."
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Accordingly, a control system exercised by the courts in the country of origin of
the international arbitral award is necessary in order to guarantee the integrity of
international arbitration, although to ensure respect for the finality of arbitral awards the
courts' control must be limited to a finite number of grounds. Therefore, the real question
should concern the extent ofjudicial control over the award.
B. Courts control over arbitral awards
Legal systems may either have various grounds upon which a party can challenge
the arbitral award or may limit these grounds to certain points. Generally, there are two
ways in which the court may exert control: there can be a full review on the legal merits
including procedural and substantive grounds, or a limited review of conformity to
28fundamental procedural fairness. The latter may include, for example, the right to be
heard, arbitrator fraud and excess of authority.
One should take into consideration a very important point here, that in practice the
degree of control ultimately rests upon the approach of the national courts. This can be
demonstrated by considering that the limits of control may differ between state A and
state B, even if they have adopted the same arbitration rules, such as, the Model Law
Rules. The degree of control may still differ between the two countries according to the
28 Klaus Peter Berger, op. cit., p. 654. According to his view "... the striving for finality of
international arbitral awards has shifted the emphasis of court control almost exclusively to the
procedural side."
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courts' approach in each country.29 As a result, the extent of the judicial control will then
depend on where the arbitration happens to be held. For example, courts in state A may
have a more liberal approach towards the concept of parties' autonomy and respect to the
finality of arbitral awards. Such an approach may aim to attract international arbitration
to their country. In this regard, it has been reported that in England, "One of the reasons
advanced for the Arbitration Act 1979 by its supporters was that interference by the
courts over arbitrations held in England was so great that parties to disputes avoided
holding arbitrations in England and thereby the country was losing a valuable invisible
export (i.e., lawyers' fees) which had somehow been quantified at £500 million a year,
according to the Commercial Court Committee".30
On the other hand, ifwe consider in the example above the approach of the courts in state
B, which adopted the same arbitration rules, we see that it may have a more conservative
approach towards international arbitration. This may be due to several factors, such as,
the political or economic policy of the state and how familiar the courts of that state are
with international commercial arbitration.31
29 Some countries may have a relaxed attitude towards arbitration on their territory, others may
be more hostile to arbitration.
30 Michael Kerr, op. cit., p. 161; William W. Park, "Judicial Supervision of Transnational
Commercial Arbitration," 21 Harv.Int.L.J., (1980), p. 87. He states that, "... In 1979 England
abolished the "case stated" procedure by which courts exercised control over the arbitrator's
decision on the merits of the dispute. The background of the Act is enlightening with respect to
the perceived economic advantages of subjecting international arbitration to less rather than more
guidance at the place of the proceedings"; also see, Georges R. Delaume, op. cit., p. 8. By
referring to the liberal approach of French arbitration law, he suggests that, "... This positive
attitude, clearly geared to ensuring the finality of international awards, should contribute to
making France an attractive venue for international arbitration."
31 See Ahmed S. El-Kosheri, "Public Policy Under Egyptian Law," International Council for
Commercial Arbitration (ICCA) New York Arbitration Congress, (1986), p. 322. He states that in
Egypt there are two doctrines. The first tendency favours a restrictive interpretation of the
concept of public policy, the second favours avoiding international commercial arbitration as
much as possible. He goes on to explain the negative effect of the latter approach as it leads to a
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Clearly, adopting a well-developed arbitration law that consists of an exclusive list of
limited grounds does not by itself guarantee limited control by the courts. In deciding on
an attack against the validity of the award, courts that do not recognise the particular
character of international commercial arbitration, particularly in countries which do not
frequently host international arbitrations, may extend their control beyond the limited
grounds which their national law includes. In contrast, a court that is aware of the
international character of arbitration will keep the award within acceptable limits. It will
be expected to maintain the delicate balance between recognising the finality of the
32arbitrators' decision and its duty as a guarantor of arbitral integrity. However, keeping
reviews within acceptable limits is not easy in practice, particularly as courts may find in
the concept of public policy a loop-hole whereby they may extend their supervision of the
arbitral award.33
II. The Extent of Public Policy as a Ground on which to attack the
Award
A party who is reluctant to honour the award may challenge the award in the
country of origin in order to set it aside or at least to postpone its enforcement.34 In order
wide interpretation of the concept of public policy which includes all matters falling normally
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Egyptian courts.
32 In Arab African Energy Corp. Ltd. v. Olieprodukten Nederland B. V., 2 Lloyd's Law Report
[1984], 419, 423. Leggat j. states, "True it is that formerly the court was careful to maintain its
supervisory jurisdiction over arbitrators and awards. But this aspect of public policy has now
given way to the need for finality. In this respect the striving for legal accuracy may said to have
been overtaken by commercial expediency."
33 William W. Park, "National Law and Commercial Justice...", op. cit., p. 687. He states that:
"Terms such as 'public policy' and 'ordre public' are malleable, and represent ill-defmed
concepts that risk lending themselves to court scrutiny on the merits of the award."
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to achieve this goal he would seek to scrutinise the national law of that country searching
for possible grounds upon which he can set the award aside. To this end, he may attempt
to establish his challenge on any discrepancy between the mandatory rules of the law of
the seat and the law the tribunal applied to the dispute.35 The latter may concern the
substance of the dispute or involve non-compliance with the mandatory procedural rules
that are applicable in the country of origin. One here must address the question of how a
national court would decide on such claims and according to which legal system? The
answer to this depends on considering the distinction between the public policy rules
which apply to domestic arbitral awards and international arbitral awards respectively.36
A. The public policy rules applicable to domestic arbitral awards
Traditionally, a court in the country of origin has legitimate authority over purely
domestic arbitral awards, and parties are bound by all the mandatory rules applicable in
34
"Experience shows that parties dissatisfied with the award usually 'leave no stone unturned' to
have the award set aside by the competent court at the seat of the arbitration, irrespective of their
prospects in such proceedings." See, Klaus Peter Berger, op. cit., p. 648.
35 Several writers recognise this potential attitude; see, Steven C. Nelson, "Alternatives to
Litigation of International Disputes," (1989) Int.Law., 187, pp.192-193. He states that:
"Sometimes the process of the courts may be abused by the recalcitrant party seeking to have the
arbitration agreement found not enforceable on the ground that the arbitration offends public
policy."
36 The importance of this distinction has been highlighted by Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or
Truly International) Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 261. He states that: "... one should carefully
avoid the automatic assimilation or the confusion between those two kinds of 'public policy.' The
confusion is particularly dangerous, and frequent, with regard to the procedural public policy of
the state where the award has been rendered if such a sate, or rather its legislation or case law, has
not become fully conscious yet of the specificity of international arbitration by contrast to
domestic arbitration and therefore applies to international arbitration, without adaptation nor
exception, mandatory rules enacted and conceived for domestic arbitration."
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37that state. This is mainly due to the function of the national courts, as their duty is to
consider the consequences of enforcing the award in their own territory, and because they
are the guardians of their national law they will ordinarily be expected to invoke the
TO
national public policy rules. Accordingly, a domestic arbitral award may be set aside if
it infringes a national rule that is considered mandatory in that state. The only exception
would be the possible application of foreign public policy rules to purely domestic
arbitral awards, if for example, the award infringes a vital public interest of a foreign
country39, where this concerns the 'duty of comity owed by one state to another'.40
B. The applicable public policy rules to international arbitral awards
One should bear in mind here that parties may agree to hold arbitration in a
particular country without having any connection whatsoever with that country, merely
because it provides a neutral and convenient place, and provides a good location for the
parties or the arbitrators to hold their meetings. The question here would be: do national
courts recognise the specific character of such international arbitration when they are
asked to set aside the resulting award for considerations of public policy?
37 See above, Chapter Two at p. 73.
38
See, Klaus Peter Berger, op. cit., p. 673. He considers national courts as ".. guardians of the
public policy of its lex foriOkezie Chukwumerije, op. cit., p. 182. He considers that the court
will have no choice as to whether or not to apply the mandatory rule of its national law because,
"... as a creature of the national legal system, its jurisdiction and powers are regulated by national
law: it is constrained to apply the imperative laws of its forum."
39 For example, smuggling in breach of foreign revenue laws; trading with the enemy or preparing
a revolution to be instigated abroad. See De Wutz v. Hendricks (1824) 2 Bing. 314; Foster v.
Driscoll [1929] 1 K.B. 470.
40 See Dennis Lloyd, Public policy: a Comparative Study in English and French Law, London:
Athlone Press, (1953), p. 26; Dicey, Conflict ofLaws, 6th ed., Stevens and Sons Ltd., p. 615; A. J.
E. Jaffey, op. cit., p. 56; Regazonni v. KC Sethia Ltd., 1958 A.C. 301; [1957] 3 All E.R. 286.
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There are two possibilities in this regard. First, a national court may consider its
jurisdiction as being complete and thus the court may treat the award in exactly the same
way as it would in a domestic arbitral award or at least courts may be tempted to turn
toward national standards of public policy for guidelines. This may lead the court to
apply national public policy rules to international arbitration. The second prospect
generally relies upon applying a narrower doctrine ofpublic policy.
The first possibility leads to an improper conclusion that includes treating an
international arbitral award on the same footing as a purely domestic arbitral award,
despite the difference between the two types.41 Dealing with international arbitral awards
under national law conditions ignores the fact that the dispute may not involve any
national interest for the state of origin, since the economic or social impact of the award
will take place outside the borders of that country. Therefore, one should consider here
that several elements connect the award to other legal systems which would even be more
concerned with the validity and impact of the resulting award. Thus, it would be more
rational to consider that the validity of the award hinges upon the degree of its connection
with one or more of the relevant foreign legal systems by using the relativity of public
policy criterion. Pierre Lalive illustrates this criterion as:42
"... such conditions of application of public policy can be summed up by the
formula of the 'relativity' of public policy, from three points of view: it must be
appreciated in concreto, in relation to the circumstances of the concrete case and not
(unless in extreme and particularly shocking cases) in relation to the abstract contents of a
foreign rule; public policy is also relative in space (in the absence of a sufficient
connection with the legal order of the forum, it will not come into play or will only have
41
See, Chapter One at p. 23.
42 Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 262-263.
164
an indirect effect (effet attenue). Finally, public policy is relative in time (the exception
will only intervene against a present attack against the fundamental rules of the forum."
Deciding the applicable public policy rules according to the relevant connections
between the dispute and the infringed public policy rule can be illustrated by using the
following hypothetical example.
Presume firstly, that an action to set aside an international arbitral award for
considerations of infringement of public policy was applied for in the country of origin
where the latter was chosen for convenience reasons. Presume secondly, that the
applicable law to the arbitration procedures and to the substance of the dispute was
foreign to that country and finally that enforcement of the award was intended to take
place in a foreign country.
To determine the validity of the award in the above example, courts should first
consider the applicable law that governs the disputed issue, by considering whether or not
that law has been chosen on the basis of being the most closely connected to the dispute.
If there is strong evidence of that connection, such as, it is the law of the country in which
the contract will be performed and it is the place where the award would most probably
will be enforced, then determining the validity of the award should be based on what that
law states. The award then must be set aside if it tends to damage the public interest
which the annulling rule of that law is designed to protect.43 Attention should also be paid
43 See A. J. Jaffy, op. cit., p. 43.
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to the ultimate purpose of the foreign mandatory rule, by examining whether or not it
aims to protect a vital interest of that state.44
However, one should consider that it may not be easy to determine the validity of
an award made under the public policy rules of a foreign legal system. This is because a
court in the country of origin cannot determine to what extent public policy has been
violated. For example, a court using a western legal system may not be able to understand
the subtleties of application and the exact extent of a public policy rule deriving from the
'Shari'a' rules whereas a court in Saudi Arabia which is more familiarised with the
precise nature and texture of such rules would. A similar problematic could occur the
other way around. Also a court in the country of origin cannot decide what a foreign rule
is particularly designed to prevent or how an international arbitral award would be treated
under the legal system of that country. Moreover, according to the above hypothetical
example, enforcement of the award will take place in a foreign country, therefore one
should consider the possibility that the courts in such a foreign country may consider the
award valid.
The situation would be different if in relation to the preceding example, the award
was challenged for being contrary to the public policy of the country of origin although
valid according to its proper law. One should consider that courts in the country of origin
44
Cheshire, Private International law, 7th ed, p. 143. He gives guide-lines as to what should be
considered foreign law in such situations. A court in the country of origin when ascertaining
whether "[the public policy rule of the foreign law] is all-pervading or merely local, must
consider it in the light of its history, the purpose of its adoption, the object to be accomplished by
it, and the local conditions"; also see, Dennis Lloyd, op. cit., p. 92.
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are not necessarily precluded from setting aside an award merely because it was governed
by a foreign legal system, or because it was intended to be enforced abroad. In some
cases, an award, whilst valid by the proper law or according to the law of the country
where it is intended to be enforced, may nevertheless be considered null in the state of
origin for considerations of national public policy.45 However, the public policy of the
state of origin should be invoked only in exceptional cases, particularly when the court of
origin recognises that there is likely to be a possible connection between the award and
the country of origin and when a vital national public interest might be at stake.
Consideration of national public policy may also be based upon moral principles if the
principles involved are so weighty as to lead the court of origin to set an international
arbitral award aside. This is so irrespective of which country enforcement will take place
in or of the attitude of the courts in that country.46 Courts may also invoke national public
policy rules in order to make sure that certain requirements of justice have been
respected. This includes substantial and procedural irregularities, such as unequal
treatment of the parties, fair notice of both the appointment of arbitrators and the conduct
45 See A. J. E. Jaffy, op. cit., p. 43. He provides examples of this kind, stating that: "the public
interest may be injuriously effected even by an act performed abroad, as with laws designed to
protect national security, or exchange control or anti-trust legislation"; Dennis Lloyd, op. cit., p.
85, states that: "It is recognised however that the 'ordre public' of the forum may be applied
where the lex fori regards the provision of the foreign law as unacceptable"; Dennis Lloyd, op.
cit., p. 93; Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit., p. 181; also see, Kaufman v. Gerson [1904] 1 K.B.
941.
46 Dennis Lloyd, op. cit., p. 84 states that: "the court may still reserve to itself the right to refuse
to lend its aid to a foreign transaction, though completely unconnected with the country of that
court, where it is of a type which shocks the conscience or is utterly contrary to its notions of
civilised standards." He also gave examples of "contracts which involve gross sexual immorality,
or personal slavery and transactions which are regarded as fundamentally inadmissible". Also see,
Santos v. Illidge (1860) 8 C.B. (N.S.) 861; Foster v. Driscoll [1929] 1 K.B. 470; Lemenda Ltd. v.
African Middle East Co. (1988) Q.B.D., p. 461.
167
of proceedings and the existence of a fair opportunity to present the case.47 However,
applying these grounds to procedural requirements should be giving careful consideration
to the distinction between procedural requirements in national arbitration and the
requirements of equity and justice in international arbitration. For example, an award
should not be annulled if arbitrators have failed to comply with procedural requirements
of the local law, which are merely designed for reasons of formality, such as, examining a
witness or an expert or setting out the names of the parties and the arbitrators.49
If the infringement involves procedural irregularities, then examining the award should
be based upon the law that governs the arbitration procedures.50 Consideration must also
be given to the parties' expectations.51 This is because when parties choose a particular
47 Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 299. He
considers these requirements as "general principles of international due process"; Articles 19(3)
and 24(3) of "UNCITRAL" Model Law; Rubino - Sammartano. M., op. cit., p. 303 to 313;
Aktham A. El Kholy, The Enforcement ofInternational Arbitral Awards. Al- Tahkim Al- Arabi,
Vol. 2, January 2000, p. 20.
48 The importance of this distinction has been recognised in many cases. See for example,
International Tank v Kuwait Fuelling 1975, Court of Appeal. (Q.B.), p. 224; Whitworth Street
Estates (Manchester) Ltd. v. James Miller and Partners Ltd. [1970] A.C. 583; see also Dicey and
Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 8th ed. Stevens and Sons Ltd., (1967), p. 1048; Redfern and
Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p.445. The writers state that: "The differences between the domestic
public policy requirements of states means that there is a risk that one state may set aside for
reasons of public policy an award which other states would regard as unimpeachable."
49 Aktham A. EL Kholy, op. cit., p. 13. In this regard he states that: "Even if the position of the
Egyptian Court of Cassation may have some justification for domestic awards, it appears to have
no valid basis for international awards issued under different procedural rules such as those of the
ICC."
50 See Dalmia Cement v. Nat Bank ofPakistan 1975, Q.B. p 8; Stephen M. Scluuebel and Susan
G. Lahne, op. cit., p. 207; Michael John Mustill, Transnational Arbitration and English Law.
Current Legal Problems, (1984), p. 134.
51
Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation SA v. Compagnie d'Armement Maritime SA,
[1971JA.C.576; [1970] 3 W.L.R. 389. In this case it was provided that: "Subject to public policy
the English court must give effect to the intention of the parties expressed in their contract and
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law to govern the arbitration procedures their intention is to comply with the mandatory
rules of that law, not to the procedural rules of the place where they held the arbitration
proceedings, if these two were different.
The conclusion that can be drawn thus far is that examining the validity of
international arbitral awards should be based on taking into consideration several
elements. The first consideration should be the connection between the award and the
legal system with which the award is most closely connected. Unless in exceptional
circumstances as outlined above, there will be no rational reason for the court of origin to
set the award aside for considerations of national public policy, particularly if the award
is considered valid according to the applicable law and enforcement of the award is to
take place in a foreign country.
A reasonable approach would be to apply the concept of international public policy,
which includes examining the validity of the award according to its conformity with the
mutual principles of justice and morality that are common to the majority of countries.52
This alleviates the problem of a court of the country of origin attempting to apply the
public policy of a foreign legal system with which it is not familiar, as in the given
example concerning the application of 'Shari'a' rules. By applying international public
policy rules the court of the country of origin thereby leaves the determination of the
exact extent of public policy to the courts of enforcement, which may increase the
demonstrated by the surrounding circumstances"; also see, Bank Mellat v. Helliniki Techniki SA
[1984] Q.B. 291. 301.
52 Redfern and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. citp. 445.
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chances of enforcing the award in other jurisdictions. This may also preserve the integrity
of the court's decisions when the award has been presented before the courts of another
jurisdiction as a foreign arbitral award. As will be demonstrated in the following topic, an
arbitral award that has been set aside in the country of origin may still be enforced in
other countries if the court of enforcement considers that the nullification order of the
court in the country of origin was based on unreasonable grounds.
III. The Consequences of Setting an Arbitral Award Aside in the
Country of Origin
Generally, a successful challenge may deprive the award of its binding effect, not
only in the country of origin but also in other countries.53 This is due to the effect of
Article V (l)(e) of the New York Convention, which provides that recognition and
enforcement of an award will be refused if, "...the award has not yet become binding on
the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in
which or under the law ofwhich, that award was made."
In practice an award may be set aside by a court in the country of origin on the
basis of national public policy rules where the same issue does not constitute a violation
of public policy in the country in which enforcement takes place. This situation raises the
following question: is it possible to enforce a foreign arbitral award where it has been set
53
Georges R. Delaume, op. cit., p. 18. He describes this situation as, "... success at the seat of
arbitration may turn to be a pyrrhic victory if it is followed by defeat in that country."
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aside by the courts of origin for considerations of national public policy? In order to
answer this question it will be necessary to review Article V (l)(e) of the New York
Convention, and to scrutinise the recent international trends in this regard, particularly
those which call for narrowing the application ofArticle V (l)(e).
A. The concept of binding arbitral award under article V (1)(e)
Albert Van den Berg explains the reasons for formulating Article V (l)(e) of the
New York Convention in this way.54 He states that this mainly aimed to avoid the
requirement of "double exequatur", a requirement which has been introduced in Article 4
(2) of the Geneva Convention of 1927. The Geneva Convention requires the arbitral
award to be "final".55 Such a requirement has created difficulties for the practitioners of
international commercial arbitration. According to Article 4 (2) of the Geneva
Convention the winning party is obliged to prove to the court whose task is to enforce the
arbitral award that no objection has been taken to the award or that its enforcement has
not been suspended by a competent authority in the state of origin.56 This can be done
either by arguing that the time limit for challenge has been exceeded57, or that the court
54
Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 332.
53 Article 4 (2) of the Geneva Convention provides that: "The party relying upon an award or
claiming its enforcement must supply, in particular: (2) Documentary or other evidence to prove
that the award has become final, in the sense defined in Article 1 (</), in the country in which it
was made."
56 The same requirement can be found under Article 37 of the Riyadh Arab Convention on
Judicial Cooperation of 1983. Signed 6 April 1983; in force October 1985. Intr. Arab Countries'.
Annex I - 1. January (1990).
37
Determining the time limit will depend on the applicable law as this varies from country to
country. In this respect many countries limit this procedure to a very short space of time
following publication, or in some cases the granting of the award. For example, the Model Law
requires that an action for the annulment of an award must be brought within three months of
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has rejected such a plea. Otherwise the party seeking enforcement of the award will be
obliged to obtain a leave for enforcement from the court of origin in order to confirm its
finality, together with another request to the court of enforcement which leads to what is
known as the "double exequatur".59
To avoid such confusion, the word "final" in the Geneva Convention has been
replaced with the word "binding" in the New York Convention which provides a clear
indication that Article V (l)(e) does not require an enforcement order to be issued by the
court of origin.60 This was intended to provide a solution or a compromise between legal
systems which require an enforcement order to be issued by a competent authority in the
state of origin, and other legal systems which accept the enforcement of foreign awards
without this requirement.61 The problem that persists is how to determine at what point an
notification of the final award to the party wishing to make the challenge; under Article 54(1) of
the Egyptian law 1994 the action for annulment of the arbitral award must be brought within
ninety days of the date of the notification of the arbitral award to the party against whom it was
made; and according to the English 1996 Act, a party may lose the right to object (see Section 73)
and the right to apply is subject to the restrictions in section 70(2) and (3).
58 One should bear in mind that this may provide the losing party with an effective technique to
be used for in order to delay matters since the award does not become "final" until the end of the
challenging procedures.
59 As a result of applying article 4(2) of the Geneva Convention many countries require that a
foreign award should be confirmed by the court of its origin before it can be enforced in its
territory, see W. Michael Reisman, op. cit., p. 972.
60 See Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 332. He refers to the International Chamber of Commerce,
Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards. Report and Preliminary Draft Convention, ICC
Brochure no. 174 (Paris 1935) p. 11, (reproduced in UN DOC E/C.2/373), in which it was
reported that: "The International Chamber of Commerce left the word 'final' out in its Draft
Convention of 1953. It reasoned that it has appeared advisable to consider the problem from a
more practical angle and to envisage only the case of awards effectively set aside."
61 Article V (l)(e) of the New York Convention was drafted by Working Party No. 3. See UN
Doc E/CONF. 26/SR.17; Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 335.
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arbitral award becomes binding according to the meaning of Article V (l)(e) of the New
York Convention?
Van den Burg illustrates the meaning of the word binding thus:62
"The award can be considered to have become "binding" for the purposes of Article
V (l)(e) at the moment on which it is no longer open to a genuine appeal on the merits to
a second arbitral instance or court in those cases where such means of recourse are
available."
The general trend is to decide the question of when an arbitral award becomes
binding by referring to the national law of the country of origin.63 Article V (l)(e) of the
New York Convention refers to the law of the country in which, or under the law of
which, that award was made. Therefore, an award becomes binding within the meaning
of Article V (l)(e) at the moment when it becomes ready for enforcement under the law
governing the award. 64 This general and simple definition of the term 'binding' may not
be sufficient since there are various legal systems the consequence of which would lead
to various interpretations of this term. However, the modern trend is to move away from
the requirement of obtaining leave for enforcement or proving that the award is final
62
Ibid., p.357.
63 In England the past situation according to Section 38(l)(b) of the 1950 Act, requires from the
party who seeks to enforce a foreign award in England, proof that the award has become "final"
in the country of origin. See Union Nationale des Co-opratives Agricoles de Cereales v Robert
Catterall and Co. Ltd [1959] 2 QB 44; Andrew and Keren, op. cit., p. 303.
64 Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 339. He states that, "... several courts appear to search under the
applicable law for the moment at which the award can be considered to be inchoate for
enforcement in the country of origin. Others attempt to find an equivalent of the term 'binding'
under the arbitration law of the country of origin." However, for some countries this would be
after proving that the award becomes final in the sense of becoming definitively valid. For other
states the meaning of 'binding' is when it is ready for enforcement and not when it has already
been enforced; Ibid., p. 340, referring to the Swiss Conseil Federal.
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where the term binding may be narrowly defined to reduce court control at the
enforcement stage.65
B. Enforcing nullified arbitral awards
It has been argued that even where an award is set-aside by a court in the country of
origin, it can still be upheld in the place of enforcement. There are two trends in this
respect. The first trend refuses to enforce arbitral awards that have been set aside by a
court in the country of origin. The second trend upholds enforcement of such awards if
reasonable circumstances exist, for example, where justice and fairness are at issue.
The first trend is founded on the mandatory status of Article V (l)(e), as the
annulment of the award in the country of origin generally leads to depriving the award of
its legal effects which makes the award become non-existent in that country. Van den
Berg advocates this trend by stating that:66
65 The concept of binding international arbitral awards is now recognised world-wide. See, ILA
Report, London Conference (2000), op. cit., p. 15. The report provides that: "... courts in a
number of countries have referred to a policy in favour of giving effect as far as possible to the
finality of international arbitral awards and discouraging the relitigation of issues already
determined. This reflects the 'general pro-enforcement bias' of the New York Convention.";
Gerold Herrman, op. cit., p. 236; see the Egyptian court of Cassation decision in 1944 (decision
no. 521/1944, Collection of Cassation's Decisions, year 29, p. 472). The Court held that an
arbitral award is binding from the moment when it has been rendered, therefore the wining party
can proceed to enforce it directly, since the binding affect of the award is different from the
requirement of having an order to enforce it.
66
Van den Berg, "Annulment of Awards in International Arbitration," in R. Lilhch and C.
Brower (eds.), International Arbitration in the 21s' Century: towards "Judicialization" and
Uniformity? Transnational Publishers Inc., Irvington, New York., (1992), 133, 161; Gray H
Sampliner, "Enforcement of Nullified Arbitral Awards," J.Int.Arb, p. 145; also, Van den Berg,
op. cit., p. 355. He provides that enforcing an annulled award may lead to an uncertain results that
can only be prevented by refusing to enforce such awards, "...a losing party could be pursued by
a claimant with enforcement actions from country to country until a court is found, if any, which
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"The fact that the award has been annulled implies that the award was legally
rooted in the arbitration law of the country of origin. How then is it possible that courts in
another country can consider the same award as still valid? Perhaps some theories of
legal philosophy may provide an answer to this question, but for a legal practitioner this
phenomenon is inexplicable. It seems that only an international treaty can give a special
legal status to an award notwithstanding its annulment in the country of origin."
Professor Pieter Sanders also supported this conclusion by emphasising that, once an
award has been set aside by the courts of the country of origin "...the courts of the
enforcing countries will...refuse the enforcement as there no longer exists an arbitral
award and enforcing a non-existing arbitral award would be an impossibility or even go
against the public policy of the country of enforcement".67 This has also been expressly
emphasised by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, which provides that:68
"The setting aside of an award at the place of origin prevents enforcement of that
award in all other countries by virtue of Article V (l)(e) of the New York Convention and
Article 36 (l)(a)(v) of the Model Law."
The second trend expresses the desire to reduce the ability of the court of origin to
obstruct the enforcement of the award in other states.69 This trend has emerged after the
grants the enforcement. A claimant would obviously refrain from doing this if the award has been
set aside in the country of origin and this is a ground for refusal of enforcement in other
Contracting States."
67 Pieter Sanders, "New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards," 6 Netherlands Int'l L.R. 43, 55 (1955); William W. Park, "The Lex Loci
Arbitri ...", op. cit., p. 23.
68
Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, U.N.Doc. A/40/17 (United Nations ed., 1994), at 7 (b)(24).
69
Jan Paulsson, "Enforcing Arbitral Awards Notwithstanding a Local Standard Annulment"
(1998) 9 (1) ICC Bulletin 14; Gray H Sampliner, "Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards after
Annulment in their Country of Origin," 11 Mealey's int'l Arb Rep. (September 1996); also Gray
H Sampliner, "Enforcement of Nullified Arbitral Awards," J.Int.Arb, p. 141, at 151. He states
that: "... the success of our global system of enforcement of arbitral awards has reached the point
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issuance of two famous decisions: one in the United States in the Chromalloy
Aeroservices v. The Arab Republic of Egypt case70 and the other in France in the
Hilmarton v. OTV case. 71 Both the Hilmarton and Chromallory cases demonstrated that
some courts are willing to enforce awards annulled by the competent authorities of the
countries in which or under the laws ofwhich those awards were made.
The first observation that should be made here relates to the background of these
two decisions as they were made by the French and United States' courts. Both countries
have widely differing legal traditions, and this demonstrates a growing international trend
in favour of the enforcement of an arbitral award that has been set aside by a court of
■ • 72
origin.
The conclusion to which these two cases have come, is mainly based on an
interpretation of Article V (1). The phrase "may refuse" in this Article indicates that the
grounds included are discretionary and not mandatory. In addition to this, the result is
built upon consideration of Article VII of the Convention, which states that no provisions
of the Convention "...deprive any interested party of any right he may have to avail
where informed parties should expect that nullification of an award in the rendering country will
not necessarily prevent enforcement elsewhere."; H. G. Gharavi, "The Legal Inconsistencies of
Chromalloy12 Int'l Arb. Rep. 21 (May 1997); Eric A. Schwartz, op. cit., p. 131. He provides
that: "... enforcing an annulled award assumes from the outset that, despite its annulment, there
still remain[s] in existence an award capable of enforcement."
70
Chromalloy AeroServices and the Arab Republic ofEgypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996); 11
Mealey's Int'l Arb. Rep. (august 1996) at C-54.
71 OTV v. Hilmarton, Cour de Cassation, June 10, in JDI, 1997, no. 4.
72 This could be considered as establishing a judicial precedent in the practice of international
commercial arbitration.
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himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the
treaties of the country where such award is sought to be relied upon."
In the Chromalloy case the US District Court granted enforcement ofChromalloy's
award, in spite of its nullification by the Egyptian Court of Appeal. This case concerned a
military procurement contract signed in 1988 between an American corporation
"Chromalloy AeroServices Inc." and "Air Force of the Arab Republic ofEgypt". In 1991,
Egypt terminated the contract and Chromalloy directly started arbitration proceedings in
Egypt under Egyptian law. On 24 August 1994, the Arbitral Tribunal issued its final
award, based on the facts presented and upon the Egyptian Civil Law. The decision held
that Egypt had not properly terminated the contract, and therefore was ordered to pay the
amount of US$ 16.2 million plus interest. Thereafter, Chromalloy sought enforcement in
the United States, by requesting the US District Court to enforce the award. As a
response the losing party, the government of Egypt, filed a court action before the
Egyptian Court of Appeal seeking to nullify the award, on the grounds that the award
failed to apply the "administrative law" of Egypt.
In December 5, 1995, the Cairo Court of Appeal issued a final decision in favour of the
Egyptian government, ruling that the arbitrator had erred in law and nullified the final
award. The Egyptian government then raised an action in the United States with a view to
dismissing the petition, arguing that the District Court is obliged to repudiate the award
under Article V (l)(e) of the New York Convention. In addition to that, the District Court
is obliged to recognise and give effect to the ruling of the Egyptian court, a duty imposed
under the notion ofjudicial comity in respect of foreign judgements.
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Despite the Egyptian court's decision on July 31 1996, the US District Court
granted Chromalloy's petition to recognise and enforce the arbitral award. The court
recognised that there was consensus between the parties to the contract that made their
arbitral award final and binding and not "subject to any appeal or other recourse". The
Court also found that there existed a strong US public policy in favour of the judicial
enforcement of this clause. Accordingly it held, pursuant to the long-established public
policy exception to judicial comity in respect of foreign judgements, that a decision to
recognise the Egyptian court decision would violate this clear US public policy.73
Moreover, the court recognised that Article V (l)(e) of the New York Convention
provided a discretionary standard for refusing to enforce an award, by reference to the
phrase "recognition and enforcement may be refused"74, and that Article VII of the
Convention required courts to grant parties all the rights they could have under the
domestic law of the country where enforcement was sought.75
The court, however, found that enforcement of the Egyptian judgement would
violate public policy in the United States regarding arbitration, and refused to recognise
73
Gary H. Sampliner, "Enforcement ofNullified Arbitral Awards," op. cit., p. 144.
74 The language of Article V (2)(b) is permissive, that is, the court may deny enforcement but is
not obliged to do so. See, Christopher B. Kuner, op. cit., p. 73; Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 265;
however, some scholars refuse to interpret Article V (1) as giving the court discretion to enforce
the award. Gerold Herrman, op. cit., p. 235. He suspects that the drafters never intended to give
room for discretion.
73 The US district court concluded that Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act provided
Chromalloy with a claim to enforcement of the award because the basis on which the Egyptian
court annulled the award (an error in law) was not in their view a valid ground for setting aside an
award under Section 10. Chromalloy, 939 F. Supp. At 910-911.
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it, rejecting thus the argument raised by the Egyptian party that the judgement of the
Egyptian court had to be recognised under the principles of international comity.
Six months later, the Court of Appeal in Paris upheld a lower court order made in
France making an arbitral award in favour of Chromalloy, that it was to be enforceable in
France, under Article VII and French law, despite the annulment of the award by Egypt's
Court ofAppeal.76
The other important decision in this regard is the decision of the French Court of
Cassation in Hilmarton v. OTV.11 The award relates to a dispute regarding the payment of
a substantial payment of fees from OTV to Hilmarton. On August 19th 1988, the arbitral
tribunal rendered a decision against the claimant "Hilmarton", on the grounds that the
contract violated Algerian public law, and specifically Algerian rules forbidding the use
of intermediaries. On April 17th 1990 the Swiss Federal Tribunal78 annulled the arbitral
award, on the grounds that the arbitrator could only base his decision on the law chosen
by the parties or on the genuine rules of international public policy but could not rely
solely on the rules of any given legal system. In spite of this, OTV sought recognition and
enforcement of the arbitral award in France where the Paris Court of Appeal held on
December 19th 1991, that the award was enforceable in France. This decision became
76 La Republique Arabe d'Egypte v. Chromalloy AeroServices I?ic., Paris App., First Chamber,
Section C, published in 12 Mealey's Int'l Arb. Rep. (April 1997) at B-l. Cited in Gary H.
Sampliner, "Enforcement ofNullified Arbitral Awards," op. cit., p. 142.
77 OTV v. Hilmarton, Cour de Cassation, June 10, in JDI, 1997, no. 4.
78
Judgement of 17 April 1990 (Hilmarton v. OTV), Tribunal Federal Suisse, 1993 Rev. Arb. 315,
322, translated in XIX ICCA Yearbook 220 (1994).
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final on March 23rd 1994, when the Court of Cassation rejected the appeal.79 While the
French enforcement proceedings were pending, Hilmarton, obtained a judgement from a
different French court recognising the Swiss courts' annulment of the award and started a
new and a second arbitral process which gave its decision in Geneva on April 10lh 1992.
This second arbitral award ordered the defendant, OTV, to pay Hilmarton the
commission provided for in the contract. The Swiss courts confirmed the second arbitral
award. Following this, the Court of Appeal of Versailles granted enforcement of this
award and confirmed the recognition of the Swiss judgement that had nullified the first
award. In June 1997 the French Court of Cassation, reversing the lower court's decision
held that the recognition in France of the first arbitral award by a final decision relating to
the same controversy between the same parties, was res judicata, thereby creating an
obstacle to any recognition of court decisions or arbitral awards that were subsequently
found to be incompatible.80
Based upon these two cases81, there is now a growing tendency towards recognising
and enforcing arbitral awards that have been set aside by a court in the country of
79
Judgement of 23 March 1994 (Hilmarton v. OTV), Cass. Civ. L'ere, 1994 Rev. Arb., at 327-28,
translated in XX ICCA Yearbook 663, 664-65 (1990).
80
Judgement of 10 June 1997 (Hilmarton v. OTV), excerpt translated in XXII ICCA Yearbook
(France No. 27), 1997.
81 One should mention here that there are several other cases which concern the same issue, for
example, Sonatrach v. Ford, Bacon and Davis, Inc., Trib. Pr. Inst. De Bruxelles, 6 December
1988, excerpted translation in XV ICCA Yearbook 370 (1990). Cited in Gary H. Samphner,
"Enforcement of Nullified Arbitral Awards," op. cit., p. 156, footnote 60; Baker Marine v.
Chevron and Chevron Corp, 288. United State Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 12 August
1999, Nos. 97-9615, 97-9617, Yearbook Comm. Arb'n XXIV (1999).
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82 • • ...
origin. This approach has increased the possibility of actually enforcing international
arbitral awards.
The question that has not been settled yet is under which circumstances can a court
recognise and enforce a foreign award that has been set aside by the court of origin?
As has been dealt with above, in the Chromcilloy and Hilmarton cases, Article V
(l)(e) was considered as providing a discretionary ground since the formulation ofArticle
V (1) of the Convention "Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused"
indicates that the court is not compelled to refuse the enforcement. A court, thus, is
empowered with discretion which can allow enforcement to "be refused" if the court
considered it right and proper. In addition to that, Article VII of the Convention confers
the parties to all the favourable rights that they could obtain under the domestic law of the
country where enforcement is sought.
However, this approach should not lead to disregarding the importance of the rule
that Article V (l)(e) is designed to protect. The importance of controlling the award by
the courts in the country of origin cannot be overstated. In order to strike a balance
between the requirement of respecting the decision of the court of origin and that of
enforcing annulled awards, one may say that, enforcing a nullified arbitral award should
82
See, Emmanuel Gaillard, op. cit., p. 3. He states that: "...these two decisions, and the growing
international consensus which they exemplify, can only be lauded"; Gary H. Sampliner,
"Enforcement of Nullified Arbitral Awards," op. cit., p. 142, stating that, "I supported the U.S.
decision, noting that it was, a major victory for supporters of binding international arbitration";
Jan Paulsson, "Enforcing Arbitral Awards ...", op. cit., p. 27.
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only be confined to exceptional cases. For example, when the court of enforcement finds
83that the nullification order by the court of origin has been obtained by fraud or that the
84nullification was based on unreasonable grounds as when considerations of national
public policy in the state of origin conflict with neither international public policy nor the
public policy rules of the country of enforcement. Consideration should be given in these
circumstances to the connection between the arbitral award and the country of origin.
Thus, if the award has no connection to that country other than that it was chosen for
convenience as a neutral forum then the decision to set the award aside because it violates
purely national public policy rules may not be recognised in other countries. One might
add here that enforcing an annulled arbitral award should not be considered as a mark of
disrespect directed at the court of origin. If it were, then the same criticism could be made ,
when the court of enforcement refuses to enforce an award that has been deemed
enforceable by the court of origin85; for example, where an award is made that is contrary
to the public policy of the state in which it is to be enforced.
83 This may occur, for example, in cases where the annulment of the arbitral award was based on
corruption, bias, or the impartiality of the court which set the award aside. For example, if the
courts in the country of origin were biased, because one of the parties was the state of origin
itself, and accordingly did not afford the winning party any procedural right to present a case in
favour of enforcing the award. See Andrew and Keren, op. cit., p. 295; William W. Park, "The
Lex Loci Arbitri...", op. cit., p. 23. He states that: "post-annulment recognition of awards would
be appropriate either where permitted by an international treaty, such as under the European
Convention, or when the local judiciary in the country of origin is "corrupt or biased"; Redfem
and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 431.
84
Gary H. Sampliner, "Enforcement ofNullified Arbitral Awards," op. cit., p. 162.
83 The New York Convention and the Model Law principle impact is, "...that recognition
(iexequatur) in the country where an arbitral award is rendered is not necessary for it to be
recognised and enforced elsewhere." See Jan Paulsson, "Arbitration Unbound..." op. cit., p. 366.
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Finally, it is open to question why enforcement of an arbitral award that was
annulled in the country of origin is not possible, especially if there are grounds on which
the enforcement could be justified. For example, if the court of origin had set the award
aside due to merely formal requirements of the national procedural law such as where an
arbitrator refused to sign the arbitral award, this not being required according to the
applicable procedural law. Why does this necessarily lead to a refusal to enforce the
award in a foreign country? Could the country of enforcement recognise the award
simply by maintaining that under its law the result of the arbitration is perfectly valid and




FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS CONTRARY TO PUBLIC
POLICY (PROCEDURAL ISSUES)
Chapter Five
Foreign Arbitral Awards Contrary to Public Policy (Procedural Issues)
The enforcement of a foreign arbitral award in a country other than that in which it was
made is one of the stages in the arbitration process in which the court may exercise some
control in respect of public policy considerations. At this stage, the court or the competent
authority in the country in which the enforcement is sought may examine the award in order
to ensure that it complies with particular national regulatory requirements. It is precisely
because such conditions vary from country to country that the New York Convention is so
important, as it serves to harmonise the enforcement requirements of foreign arbitral awards
between the member states.
Since this study is concerned with examining the effect of public policy on the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the focal point will be Article V (2)(b) of the New
York Convention. As mentioned earlier in this study, Article V (2)(b) of the Convention has
created a great amount of complexity.1 This is due to the fact that there are no clearly defined
limits to what can be considered contrary to the public policy of countries that are party to the
New York Convention. The interpretation of this ground has been left to the national courts
emanating from different legal systems and diversity of political, economic, religious and
social considerations. Therefore, the concept of public policy has, perhaps inevitably, been
applied in different ways, where various categories of public policy issues have emerged
since 1958 when the Convention came into being.
1 See Chapter One, at p. 55.
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It is the intention here to work towards a clearer and more coherent application of
public policy by attempting to search for certain standard of public policy rules applicable to
foreign arbitral awards. To this end, the ongoing distinction under question in this thesis,
between applying domestic or international public policy as a ground for refusing the
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award will be further explored. This is to be achieved
through analysing the cases which have considered the same public policy questions, and
comparing their approach in order to determine whether, and if so to what extent, the public
policy provision has been an effective defence against the enforcement of foreign awards.
The evidence supports the argument that the notion of an 'international public policy' is
increasingly recognised in the courts as a basis for interpreting Article V (2)(b) of the New
York Convention.
To address this argument sufficiently, public policy issues can be categorised into two
main areas, procedural public policy rules and issues that relate to the subject matter of the
dispute. One should consider that the arbitration procedures may be subject to a measure of
control by the court of enforcement in order to ensure that they comply with the requirements
of procedural fairness and public policy rules in the state of enforcement.3 Also, one should
recognise that public policy covers a wide range of issues which relate to the subject matter
of the dispute including moral, social, political, economic or any other aspect considered a
fundamental issue affecting the interests of the state in which the enforcement of the award is
taking place. This may be termed 'substantive public policy'. Substantive public policy is
distinct from procedural public policy, in that substantive public policy relates to the
2
Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 300 and 376; Rubino-Sammartano. M., op. cit., p. 301; see the comments
in the 1985 UNCITRAL Commission's Report, UN Doc. A/40/17 paras. 297 and 303; the ILA
Report, London Conference (2000), op. cit., p. 15, states that: "Public policy includes both substantive
and procedural categories"; Klaus Peter Berger, op, cit., p. 676.
3 Rubino-Sammartano. M., op, cit., p. 297; Stephen M. Shwebel and Susan G. Lahne, op cit., p. 207.
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recognition of rights and obligations by a tribunal or enforcement court in connection with
the subject matter of the award as opposed to procedural public policy, which relates to the
process by which the dispute was adjudicated.4
The scope and the extent of application of public policy according to these two
categories must be carefully analysed. Therefore, this chapter will be confined to reviewing a
number of situations and judicial decisions that have been considered as constituting a
violation of procedural public policy issues, leaving examination of the substantive public
policy issues to the following chapter.
I. Procedural Public Policy Issues
Enforcement of a foreign arbitral award may be refused if the arbitral procedures (on
which the award was based) infringe the standards of procedural due process5, as conceived
by the courts in the country where enforcement is taking place. This is due to the fundamental
values of justice and fairness, such as respecting the right of defence and equity as upheld by
the concept of public policy in the state of enforcement. In this regard, the courts of
enforcement may invoke the public policy ground as a safety net to remedy the procedural
irregularities that emerged during the arbitration proceedings. For example, courts in the
country of enforcement may find that the applicable foreign law to the arbitral procedures,
although is proper to govern the arbitration procedures, but it obstructs justice. Accordingly,
4
See, ILA Report, London Conference (2000), op. cit., p. 17.
5 The defence of denial of due process is a procedural irregularity which incorporates the infringement
of procedural public policy rules. See, Stephen M. Schwebel and Susan G. Lahne, op. cit., p. 208;
Klaus Peter Berger, op, cit., p. 677; Hussam Fatahi Nasif, Supervising Foreign Awards by the
National Courts, Dar A1 Nhdah al Arabiah (1996), p. 41. (in Arabic).
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procedural public policy as a ground concerns the procedural fairness which relates mainly to
the question of whether or not the requirements of natural justice have been observed in the
arbitration proceedings.6 This requires the examination, for any issue that would hinder
justice between the parties, of a wide range of procedural requirements upon which
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award may be refused.
To illustrate the extent to which public policy is applied to procedural issues, several
examples considered as requirements of procedural public policy need to be examined. The
first issue under examination will be the parties' right to be treated equally. The second issue
concerns whether the absence of a strong basis for the award having been made can be a valid
ground for refusing to enforce the award. Finally, lack of impartiality will be examined as a
public policy issue since lack of impartiality is a lack ofjustice.
A. Equity and Fair Opportunity to Present the Case
Generally, equity in arbitration demands that each party should have an equal right to
present his case before the arbitral tribunal. According to this principle, each party should be
made aware of the issues the other party is attempting to prove and which issues the opposing
party will have to meet7, so that neither party will be taken by surprise by either the evidence
6 Public policy also intervenes to repair the possible unevenness that may originate from the concept
of "parties' autonomy", to restore equilibrium between the parties where one party would otherwise
be more dominant in an arbitration agreement, as the dominant party in an arbitration agreement may
impose additional or difficult conditions on the other party. It may be, for example, the dominant
party coerces the other party to accept the appointment of a sole particular arbitrator, under its
influence, to decide on the dispute, or that only the dominant party can be heard by the arbitral
tribunal. Such conditions are invalid, even if both parties had agreed to it. This was the view of the
Egyptian Court of Cassation in case No. 97/ 1977 year 28, p. 511; Klaus Peter Berger, op, cit., p. 677,
see particularly his comments on this issue according to the Dutch and Swiss laws.
7
See, Irvani v. Irvani, [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 412; [2000] C.L.C. All. The facts of this case include
that the sole arbitrator, who was appointed to resolve the dispute, had relied upon information which
had not been made available to one of the parties. The court held that: "the arbitrator's conduct had
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or the arguments advanced by the other party. This includes the right of the claimant to
present his case and the right of the respondent to discuss the position of the other party.9
Therefore, in order to achieve this, each party should be fully informed of any issue of fact or
law which is raised by the other party, whether or not he may have anticipated it.10
The parties' right to have an equal opportunity to present their case raises several
issues. Parties, for example, have the right to be notified of the appointment of the arbitral
tribunal, the arbitral proceedings, and the allegations which have been raised against them.
Parties also have the right to be afforded an opportunity adequately to present their case11 and
arguably given rise to a breach of the rules of natural justice, which could establish that (A) had been
'unable to present his case' for the purposes of S.103 (2)(c)"; also see, Montrose Canned Foods Ltd v.
Eric Wells (Marchants) Ltd [1965J 1 Lloyd's Rep 597; Government of Ceylon v. Chandris [1963] 2
Q.B., 327; Van den Berg, op, cit., p 307. He states that: "The principle of due process implies that the
arbitrator must inform a party of the arguments and evidence of the other party and allow the former
to express an opinion thereon."
8 In Government ofCeylon v. Chandris (1963) 2 QB 327, [1963] 2 All ER 1, [1963]2 WLR 1047, Mr
Justice Megaw stated that: "It is, I apprehend, a basic principle, in arbitrations as much as in litigation
in the courts (other of course, than ex parte proceedings) that no one with judicial responsibility may
receive evidence, documentary or otherwise, from one party without the other party knowing that the
evidence is being tendered and being offered an opportunity to consider it, object to it, or make
submissions on it. No custom or practice may override that basic principle"; also see, Woolridge
Timber Ltd v. Branntorps Travaru (1982) The Times 14 June. Mr Justice Parker held that: "... if an
award was, or might have been based on points which were not put to the other side, the interests of
justice required that the award be set aside or remitted"; Scrimaglio v Thornett and Fehr (1923) 17 LI
L Rep 34; See, John Parris, Arbitration Principles and Practice, Granada Publishing (1983), p. 122.
9 Berthold Goldman, "Commentary", in 60 Years On, A Look at the Future, op. cit., p. 267. He
distinguished between the right of a party to present his case and the right of the other to discuss the
position of his opponents: "these two requirements are not identical, since the first implies that every
party must have the opportunity to develop fully its claims and arguments in defence, whilst the
second ordains that no question shall be decided by the arbitrator until each party has been afforded
the opportunity of discussing it"; also see, Moran v. Llovd's (1983) The Times 3 March.
10 D. Mark Cato, op, cit., p. 55. He states that: "An arbitrator must give each party a fair and proper
opportunity to meet the other's case. In order for this to occur, each party must be able to find out
what the other side's case is, and this will involve the arbitrator in ensuring that all pleadings, reports
and other relevant documents, e.g. any written submissions, are copied to all interested parties."; This
duty was also emphasized by Megaw J. in Montrose Canned Foods Limited v. Eric Wells (Merchants)
Limited [1965] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 597.
" Van den Berg, op, cit., p. 307; Roger K. Ward, "The Flexibility of Evidentiary Rules in
International Trade Dispute Arbitration- Problems Posed to American- Trained Lawyers," 13 J.Int.
Arb., September (1996), No. 3., p. 11. He emphasised that: "parties to an arbitration should have an
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to be represented in arbitration if they wish by an attorney or other representative.12 General
hearings should be convenient, efficient, and fair for all parties.
Such procedural conditions aim to guarantee equality between the parties, since equity
is the most vital element in any kind of dispute resolution, including litigation before a court
of law. Therefore, the parties' right of having a fair opportunity to present their case is
generally protected by mandatory rules that can be found in most national arbitration laws13,
which impose upon arbitrators the obligation to observe high standards of conduct and to
maintain fairness in arbitration.14 Under the New York Convention, the parties' right to
present their case has been expressly mentioned in Article V (l)(b)15, which provides that
absolute right to have, at a very least, an opportunity to contradict the evidence introduced against
them."
12
See, for example, Section 36 of the English Act 1996: "Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a
party to arbitral proceedings may be represented m the proceedings by a lawyer or other person
chosen by him"; this right was considered in Arbitral Case No. 112/1997, Issued under the auspices of
The Cairo Regional Center for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA), 1 Journal ofArab
Arbitration (1999), p. 45. The tribunal examined the requirements of parties representatives under
Article 4 of the UNCITRAL Rules, and provided that: "Article 4 does not stipulate that the parties'
representatives should be lawyers, neither do they provide for any particular conditions -whether
formal or informal - for the methods of representation. The previous wording of this article provided
that the parties should be represented by lawyers or agents, but in the current wording this condition
was revoked and the parties are allowed to be represented by any persons of their choice without
procedural conditions"; also see, Henry Bath & Son Ltd v. Birgby Products (1962) 1 Lloyd's Rep 389;
Tatem Steam Navigation v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co Ltd (1935) LI. L. R 161; Canon IV of the
Code of Ethics 1977 for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, prepared in 1977 by a joint committee
consisting of a special committee of the American Arbitration Association AAA and a special
committee of the American Bar Association ABA; (1985) X Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, p.
239.
13 The right of the parties to have an equal and fair opportunity in presenting their case has been
asserted by several legal systems, for example: Section 33 of the English law of the 1996 Act; Article
18 of The UNCITRAL Model Law which states that: "The parties shall be treated with equality and
each party shall be given a full opportunity of presenting his case"; Article 26 of the Egypt law of
1994: "The two parties to arbitration shall be treated with equality, and each shall be given an equal
and full opportunity of presenting its case"; also see, Canon III(A)and (C) of Code of Ethics of 1977.
14 Parties must be given the opportunity to address the arbitrator on any finding of facts; see Fox v.
P.G. Wellfair Ltd [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep 514; Gbangbola v Smith & SherriffLtdGbangbola v. Smith &
SherriffLtd, (QBD) [1998] 3 All E.R. 730; see Canon I of the Code of Ethics of 1977.
15 The right of a party to be given a notice of the arbitration proceedings in sufficient time to enable
him to present his case and to be properly represented is also a condition for enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards under Article 2 (b) of the Geneva Convention of 1927.
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recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused if "(b)...the party against whom
the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of
the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case."16 One could
recognise here that the first part of Article V (l)(b) expressly refers to two important
procedures: the proper notice of both the appointment of the arbitrator17 and of the arbitration
proceedings. In the second part of Article V (l)(b), the phrase "or was otherwise unable to
present his case" implies that a court may refuse the enforcement whenever it finds other
procedural irregularities that would affect justice between the parties. Public policy here takes
precedence whenever a violation to the due process.
It could be argued that, as long as the right of both parties to present their case is
explicitly maintained in various national laws and international conventions, then there
should be no grounds for the issue of public policy to be raised under Article V (2)(b) of the
New York Convention. The answer to such an argument lies in the fundamental value of
1 o
e _
protecting such rights. One should keep in mind here that even if such provisions are not
explicit in the law, ensuring that the principle of equality between the parties to present their
case should be strictly observed as a fundamental right.19 To justify the interference of the
16 Article V (l)(b) succeeded Article 2 (l)(b) of the Geneva Convention of 1927, which provides that:
"(b) That the party against whom it is sought to use the award was not given notice of the arbitration
proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to present his case; or that, being under a legal incapacity,
he was not properly represented." However, Article V (l)(b) of the New York Convention has a wider
application as it includes all cases that involving a serious violation of due process.
17 Notice of the appointment of the arbitrator has been held to imply notification of the name of the
arbitrator. Without knowledge of the name of the arbitrator, the right of a party to challenge the
appointment of the arbitrator would be lost. See Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 305.
18 Van den Berg states that Article V (l)(b) has been inserted in the Convention because of the
specific importance attached to the fundamental requirement of a fair hearing. He also emphasised the
importance of this ground which could be protected under Article V (2)(b) of the Convention. Van
den Berg, op, cit., p. 300.
19
In regard to the link between due process and public policy, Professor Berthold Goldman
emphasised that: "... the details of mandatory public policy requirements concerning the arbitral
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courts on the public policy ground, one should consider the difference between Article V (1)
and Article V (2) of the New York Convention. The grounds which are provided under
70
paragraph (1), should be raised by one of the parties , whereas under paragraph (2) they can
be raised by the court of enforcement on its own motion. Therefore, if a court finds a
procedural irregularity that violates the national procedural public policy, then it may refuse
enforcement on its own motion.
Furthermore, one should recognise that Article V (l)(b) does not identify under which law a
court can determine whether a party has been given proper notice and whether or not he was
able to present his case. The absence of a clear reference to the applicable law might provide
the court of enforcement with a legitimate reason to apply its national mandatory rules under
Article V (2)(b) of the Convention. Van den Berg provides that several legal systems have
applied their national law in examining the validity of foreign arbitral awards under Article V
21
(l)(b). To some writers, the absence of a clear reference as set above, has been considered
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as constituting a truly international rule detached from any national law. However, to
determine the applicable law concerning the question of whether or not a party was afforded
a reasonable opportunity to take part in the arbitral proceedings, regard should be made first
to the law or rules under which the parties have elected the arbitration to take place, as this
hearing and related procedures . . . are so obvious. They lay down that each party's right to present its
case and to discuss the position of the other party must be respected." Berthold Gdldman, 60 Years
on, op., cit., p 267; also see, Stephen M. Schwebel and Susan G. Lahne, op cit., p. 216; Rubino-
Sammartano. M., op, cit., p. 307; Redfem and Hunter, 2nd ed., op, cit., p. 293.
20
It has been reported that the defence of a violation of due process enjoys a high popularity amongst
the defence allowed by the Convention. See, Van den Berg, op, cit., p.297. He also states that parties
may prefer to raise this defence under Article V (2)(b) as a respondents may think that the invocation
of public policy of the forum is more impressive. Ibid., p. 300.
21 Van den Berg, Ibid., p. 298. He states that: "although that no court has held that Article V (l)(b)
constitutes an international rule, many have affirmed that standards of due process are basically to be
judged under their own law". See in particular footnote 186, where several court decisions are
provided therein.
22 G. Gaja, New York Convention (Dobbs Ferry 19978-1980) "Introduction" I.C. 4; Van den Berg,
op, cit., p. 298.
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reflects the parties intentions.23 In the absence of a specific choice, the applicable law should
be based upon the standards of due process of the originating state. This reflects the
importance of the law of the country of origin in assisting the tribunal during the arbitration
proceedings.24
As an additional control a court in the country where enforcement is sought may refuse
to enforce the award under its national mandatory rules in virtue of Article V (2)(b). For
example, this could possibly occur if one of the parties was not properly notified of the
arbitration proceedings and where such procedural deficit was so serious that it may lead the
court of enforcement to apply the mandatory procedural rules of its national law in order to
75
ensure that justice has actually been invoked in arbitration. However, this might lead to an
inappropriate result, since several procedural laws and rules could have close link to the
arbitration and the resulting award. Therefore, to examine the validity of a foreign award a
court should consider such potential conflict between its national mandatory procedural rules
and the rules that was applied to the arbitration procedures.
The question here is what if the court finds that the procedure which was followed
during the arbitration, although correct according to the applicable law to the arbitration
procedures, is not fair and does not guarantee an equal opportunity for the parties to present
their case according to the national procedural mandatory rules in the country of
enforcement? For example, if parties were notified of the appointment of the arbitral tribunal
23 Mustill and Boyd, 2nd ed., op, cit., p. 283.
24
See, Andrew and Keren, op cit., p. 306; Georges R. Delaume, op, cit., p. 16; also see, Parsons and
Wliittemore Overseas Co. Inc. v. Societe Generale du I'lndustrie du Papier (RAKTA) (1974) 508 F
2d 969 at p. 975 (U.S. no. 7). The court highlighted the importance of the law of the country of origin,
it held that: "the New York Convention essentially sanctions the application of the forum State's
standards of due process."
25 Rubmo-Sammartano. M., op, cit., p. 306.
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by regular mail, where the law in the country of enforcement requires specific procedures
under the penalty of nullification of such notification. The rational procedure that could be
followed by a court in such situation is to scrutinise the purpose of its national procedural rule
before it decides to refuse the enforcement for considerations of due process. Many scholars
assert that in such situation a court must examine whether a serious violation of due process
has occurred and whether or not the arbitral award would not have been different in case the
irregularity in the procedure had not occurred.26 Moreover, a court is required to give more
attention to its ultimate duty which should be confined to considerations of justice between
27the parties and not to enforcing formal requirements imposed by its national procedural law.
Therefore, a defence that is based on the ground of violation of due process should not be
accepted except in very serious cases only. For example, the court must examine whether or
not notice was actually received, rather than to whether the technical service requirements of
2 p
its domestic law were met. ' .
29
In England, for example, in Minmetals Germany GmbH v. Ferco Steel Ltd , the
court held that:
"A court deliberating whether to set aside leave to enforce a foreign award had to
examine the alleged injustice of the arbitral procedure."
26
Van den Berg, op, cit., p. 301.
27 See for example, Egmatra vMarco Trading Corp [1998] CLC 1552. In this case the arbitral tribunal
refused to permit a party's expert witness to give evidence. When the award was challenged on this
ground, the court took a non-interventionist approach and held that this had not caused that party a
substantial injustice.
28
Stephen M. Schwebel and Susan G. Lahne, op cit., p. 217. The writes state that: "sufficient notice is
an element of international public policy,... in the international context courts will look to the
substance of whether notice was actually received, rather than to whether the technical service
requirements of its domestic law were met"; Van den Berg, op, cit., p. 303. He states that: "the word
'proper' can also be interpreted in the sense that the notice of the appointment of the arbitrator and the
arbitral proceedings must be adequate... the notice need not be in a specific (official) form."
29 Minmetals Germany GmbH v. Ferco Steel Ltd, January 20, [1999] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 315; [1999]
C.L.C. 647; (1999) XXIV Yearbook 739.
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The court reached the conclusion that an arbitral award must be examined according to the
actual purpose of the procedure and whether or not notice has actually been received or
merely that there has been a breach of technical service requirements. In this case two
arbitration awards were made under the auspices of the China International Economic and
Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC). Ferco applied to set aside the leave granted to
Minmetals under Section 101 of the English Arbitration Act 1996, for being denied an
opportunity to present its case. The court was asked to decide whether the procedure for
arriving at the awards had been in accordance with the parties' agreement, thus complying
with the CIETAC rules, and whether Ferco had shown that the means of arriving at the
awards was contrary to English public policy to enforce them. The court dismissed the
application, and held that:
"It followed from the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 Art. V, which applied to the awards, that an enforcee had to be
given a reasonable opportunity to present its case in relation to the findings of fact resulting
from the investigations undertaken by the arbitrators."
Another significant decision worth mentioning in this regard was made by the Mexican
courts30, in which the petitioner had served its notice of arbitration by mail in accordance
with the procedures according to the ICC Rules. This method however violated the Mexican
law, which requires initial personal service. The Court held that the parties, by agreeing to
arbitration, had waived the service formalities of Mexican law, which was not part of
Mexican public policy, providing that the award: "did not violate Mexican public policy,
especially since actual notice to the other party had been clearly proved."
It is to be recognised from these two decisions that courts favoured the application of
international public policy rules over the requirements of national public policy. This
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approach is based on a modern approach which considers the latest developments in
international commerce and the modem means of communication, which offers many
advantages over traditional means of communication.31 It also based its test upon answering
the question of whether or not the breach of the national rule has a significant effect upon
justice between the parties for example whether or not parties have had an equal opportunity
to present their case.
B. Considerations of due process and the parties' right to present their case
There are several issues that have to be considered in examining the requirements of
due process. The broad wording of Article V (l)(b) of the New York Convention provides an
indication to potential procedural irregularities. This could be inferred from the second part of
Article V (l)(b) which provides that: "or was otherwise unable to present his case", the
phrasing of this article indicates that enforcement of the award could be refused for other
serious irregularities that would affect the right of each party to present his case. Since
preventing a party from presenting his case, sufficiently, is an infringement of justice, which
may drive a court to examine such procedural irregularity under its national mles for
consideration of public policy.
30 The Eighteenth Civil Court of First Instance for the Federal District of Mexico, Yearbook Vol. IV
(1979), at 301 (MexicoNo.l); see also, Stephen M. Schwebel and Susan G. Lahne, op tit., p. 218.
31 The future indicates that international commerce and arbitration as a means to resolve commercial
disputes will use new systems of communication, such as telefax and electronic mail. Parties of an
international commercial arbitration and arbitral tribunals may prefer to hold arbitration in a country
that recognises modern means of communication as legally valid. See, List of Matters for Possible
Consideration in Organising Arbitral Procedures, United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL), at its twenty-ninth session (New York, 28 May - 14 June 1996).
195
There are several examples that can be addressed in this regard. For example, when a
statement given by a witness on which it was claimed the arbitrators based their award,
conflicted with testimony he had given on previous occasions , or if the award was based on
a false testimony and thus could be considered as having been obtained by fraud.33 The latter
case could be raised as a sufficient ground to refuse enforcement of a foreign award for
considerations of public policy, in addition to the civil and criminal liability.34 Also,
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award could be refused if the arbitrator receive an evidence
from one party in the absence of the other or without giving the other party the chance to give
a full evidence in rebuttal, or a key witness gave his evidence to the arbitrator in the absence
of the other party, which could be considered as a procedural defect that violates the
procedural mandatory rules of the country where enforcement is sought. Another example
that could raise questions under the requirements of due process, is when an arbitrator refuses
to hear offered evidence. The refusal of an arbitral tribunal to give one of the parties the
chance to present what that party believes to be a relevant evidence to prove his case, without
providing any legitimate excuse for its refusal, contradicts with the party's right to have a fair
opportunity to present his case, which could be considered as a violation ofpublic policy.35
32 See Christopher B. Kuner, "The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards in the United States and West Germany Under the New York Convention," 71 Journal of
International Arbitration (1990), p. 84.
33 This issue was considered by the English courts in Westacre Investment Inc. v. Jugoimport-SDPR
Holding Co. Ltd, [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 65. It was alleged that the award had been obtained by
perjured evidence and should be unenforceable on grounds of fraud. The court held that "a party will
not normally be permitted to adduce in the English courts additional evidence to make good an
allegation of fraud, unless it is established that: (a) the evidence to establish the fraud was not
available to the party alleging the fraud at the time of the hearing before the arbitrators; and (b) the
evidence of perjury must be so strong that it would reasonably be expected to be decisive at a
hearing"; also see, Owens Bank Ltd v. Bracco, [1994] Q.B. 509; [1994] 2 W.L.R. 759; [1994] 1 All
E.R. 336.
34 For example, in England, see the Perjury Act 1911, Section 1. (2) expressly states that the term
"Judicial proceedings" includes proceedings before any tribunal or person having by law power to
examine evidence on oath; also see, Marianne Roth, op. cit., pp. 21 and 22.
35 See Roger K. Ward, op. cit., p. 5 at 8.
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Before seeking to examine how could a court decide on these issues, one should
consider that arbitrators, unlike the courts of law, are not obliged to comply with all the
national mandatory rules that regulate the presentation of evidence.36 This is mainly due to
the practical consideration in international commercial arbitration, as arbitrators are often
expected to decide the dispute in a short time where such requirement could be found in most
of the modern arbitration laws and institutional rules.
For example, Section 33 of the English 1996 Act requires from the arbitral tribunal to adopt
procedures which best resolve the matter fairly without causing unnecessary expense and
37
delay. Therefore, one may presume here that arbitrators are given a wide discretion to
determine the evidence that could be presented before the tribunal, and thus arbitrators can
decide the evaluation of the presented evidence in terms of their relevance and importance.
One should consider here that this may contradict with the parties rights to decide the
TO
procedure for their reference under Section 34 (1) of the 1996 Act. However, this potential
conflict could arguably be determined if we consider Section 40(1) of the 1996 Act which
requires that parties shall do all things necessary for the proper and expeditious conduct of
the arbitral proceedings including, "complying without delay with any determination of the
36
Arbitrators, therefore, are not guilty of misconduct if they accept evidence not in accordance with
the strict rules of the court or do not require a document to be proved with the strictness required by
the law. In GKN Centrax Gears Ltd. v. Matbro Ltd [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep 555, Lord Denning said that:
"One of the reasons for going to arbitration is to get rid of the technical rules of evidence and so
forth"; Carlisle Place Investments Ltd v. Wimpey Construction (UK) Ltd. (1981), 15 B.L.R. 109, Mr
Justice Goff stated that: "... no requirement that an arbitrator must allow each party to call all the
evidence which he wishes to call"; John Parris, Arbitration Principles and Practice, op, cit., p. 121.
37 Section 33 (1) "The tribunal shall: (b) adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the
particular case, avoiding unnecessary delay or expense, so as to provide a fair means for the resolution
of the matters falling to be determined"; also see, Article 20 (1) of the ICC Rules which provides that:
"Arbitral tribunal shall proceed within as short a time as possible to establish the facts of the case by
all appropriate means.
38 Section 34 (1): "It shall be for the tribunal to decide all procedural and evidential matters, subject to
the right of the parties to agree any matter."
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tribunal as to procedural or evidential matters, or with any order or directions of the
tribunal."39
One should also consider that the methods and requirements of presenting evidence are
different in international commercial arbitration from the same requirements in litigation
before national courts. For example, in practice it may happen that an arbitrator may refuse to
hear a fresh evidence which was presented to him by one of the parties after conclusion of
hearing but before the award. Also, it may happen that an arbitrator might stop the counsel of
one of the parties from emphasising a point because the arbitrator thought that he is being
long-winded.40 The question here is, can such decisions, which were made during the
arbitration process, affect the enforcement of the award on the ground that the tribunal
refused to hear certain evidence which amounted to fundamental unfairness, and therefore
could be used as a sufficient ground to refuse the enforcement of the foreign arbitral award
under Article V (2)(b) of the New York Convention?
The rational view that could be considered here is that detennining on such issues
should be established upon a careful examination of whether or not arbitrators have
considered fairness in making the award and whether or not parties have had a fair
opportunity to present their case.41
39 See Andrew and Keren, op cit., p. 122.
40
D Mark Cato, op, cit., p.261.
41
See, O'Sullivan v. Joseph Woodward & Sons Ltd [1987] I.R. 255; Estcheap Dried Fruit Company
v. N.V. Geroeders Catz' Handelsvereeninging [1962] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 283; D Mark Cato, op, cit.,
p.258 and 259.
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This pinot of view was considered by the District Court in the United States in Tempo Shain
Corp. v. Bertek Inc.42 This case relates to challenging of an arbitral award because, during the
arbitration proceedings, Bertek intended to call a witness to provide what Bertek believed to
be crucial testimony concerning issues that related to the negotiations and dealings between
the parties. However, although the witness was willing to testify, he became temporarily
unable to attend the hearings because of his wife's illness. Bertek urged the panel to keep the
case open until the witness could testify either in person or by deposition. Despite Bertek's
request, the panel closed the hearing without waiting for the witness's testimony, and
rendered an award in favour of Tempo. However, the district court confirmed the award
based on its conclusion that "the arbitration panel was required to decide whether Pollock's
testimony would add to the panel's knowledge or merely be a cumulative "rehash" of what
the panel had already heard from other witnesses". The court decided that:
"... except where fundamental fairness is violated, arbitral determinations will not be
opened up to evidentiary review, and arbitrators must give each of the parties to the dispute
an adequate opportunity to present its evidence and argument."43
The above examples demonstrate instances where a foreign arbitral award can be
subject to courts' control for considerations of procedural public policy. The problem that
concerns this study is that a court in the country of enforcement may examine the
enforcement of equality between the parties and the fair opportunity to present their case
under the requirements of its national public policy. Such control exercised by the courts may
cause confusion to parties and arbitrators, as under the threat of refusing the enforcement of
42
Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek Inc, 120 F3d 16 (2d Cir. 1997). Cited in, Julie A Klein, "Agreeing or
refusing to Hear Evidence," 2 The New York Law Journal February (1998).
43 See also, Generica Ltd. v. Pharmaceutical Basics Inc. 125 F3d 1123 (7th Cir. 1997). The court held
that "the arbitrator's refusal to permit continued cross examination from a witness that the arbitrator
deemed immaterial to the proceedings at issue, did not deny the party Due Process"; Iran Aircraft
Industries v. Avco Corp. 980 F2d 141 (2d Cir. 1992), cited in, Julie A Klein, op cit., p. 4.
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the arbitral award they would have to give absolute priority to national legal procedural
considerations rather than to the factors of fairness, convenience, and neutrality, besides that
it is difficult for arbitrators to consider the application of the procedural requirements of all
countries that have connection to the dispute. For the sake of avoiding such confusion in
international commercial arbitration, most of arbitration laws and arbitration rules of
international institutions have abandoned the formal procedural requirements which are
normally required in litigation before the courts. For example, in presenting of evidence, as
arbitrators have the power to evaluate the evidence in terms of its relevance and importance.
This evidently can be seen, for example, under Section 33 and 34 of the English Arbitration
Act of 1996, Article 20 of the ICC Rules and Article 20.3 of the LCIA Rules.44
Examining the validity of foreign arbitral awards according to the national procedural
public policy rules of the country of enforcement is problematic since such procedural rules
are multiple and varied.43 This may raise a conflict of public policy rules since what may be
considered as contrary to the public policy rules of the country of enforcement may be
considered valid according to the procedural law which has been applied to the arbitration
proceedings. For example, arbitrators in some legal systems can decide whether or not to
examine witnesses and parties under oath or affirmation.46 This may create problems in the
44 Article 20.3 of the LCIA Rules provides that: "Subject to any order otherwise by the Arbitral
Tribunal, the testimony of a witness may be presented by a party in written form, either as a signed
statement or as a sworn affidavit."
45 See David W Shenton, "Supplementary rules governing the presentation and reception of evidence
in international commercial arbitration," Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration, Julian
Lewed., (1986), p. 187 at 190.
46 Marianne Roth, op. cit., p. 11. The writer distinguishes between affirmation and oath as:
"Affirmation is the alternative form of solemnly declaring to tell the truth before giving evidence or
making an affidavit. As distinguished from an oath, an affirmation does not refer to God and is used
by persons who object to being sworn on oath"; Peter R. Griffin, "Resent Trends in the Conduct of
International Arbitration, Discovery Procedures and Witness Hearings," 17 J.Int.Arb. (2000), p. 19 at
28. He states that: "Some legal systems allow arbitrators to administer oaths, while others do not. A
common practice in international arbitration is to have the witness state that they will be truthful and
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enforcement of foreign arbitral awards if enforcement takes place before courts where their
national procedural law requires providing testimony on oath and considers this issue a
fundamental requirement.47 Therefore, such courts may refuse enforcement of the award on
48the ground that the arbitral award was improperly produced. Also, it is said that such
differences in the methods and regulations of presenting evidence can be found between the
civil and common law systems.49 For example, the civil law system does not have
"discovery" procedure as understood by the common law system.50 Also, in the civil law
system, the preparation of witnesses for their examination on the trial is considered
unethical.51 This is intended to keep witnesses out of the proceedings except for their own
testimony as it serves the truth finding process in proceedings where there is no pre-trial
that they are aware that false declarations may lead to criminal penalties. While this is not the same as
taking oath, it does serve to highlight the solemnity of the proceedings, and remind the witness of the
duty to tell the truth"; see for example, the Oaths Act 1978 (English lav/), the prescribed words for the
affirmation are: "I, A.B., do solemnly, sincerely and truly declare that the evidence I shall give shall
be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth"; John Parris, Arbitration Principles and
Practice, op, cit., p. 127; See Kirkawa Corporation v. Gatoil Overseas Inc. [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep.
158.
47 Article 33 (4) of the Egyptian Arbitration Law of 1994 clearly provides that: "The hearing of
witnesses and experts shall be taken without oath". This has been considered by some of the Egyptian
doctrines that the Egyptian legislator has abandoned a fundamental rule by decisively declaring this
rule in Article 33 (4), in order to make it clear for the Egyptian courts that hearing of witnesses and
experts under oath is no longer a matter of public policy in Commercial arbitration. Nariman Abd al
Khader, op. cit., p. 142.
48 This also applies to cases when the administration of oaths by arbitrators in a country where the law
only allows oaths to be administrated by judicial officers. See Redfem and Hunter, 2nd ed., op, cit., p.
294, at footnote 29.
49 Arbitration procedures and the law of evidence differ in the common law and civil law systems.
See, Roger K. Ward, op. cit., p. 6; the ILA Report, London Conference (2000), op. cit., p. 10; David
W Shenton, op. cit., p. 188; Redfem and Hunter, 2nd ed., op, cit., p. 326.
50
Discovery is a procedure according to which, each party is obliged to disclose to the other party in
advance the documentation comprising the written part of the evidence. See, John A Tackaberry, "The
conduct of arbitration proceedings under English law," Julian Lew ed., (1986), p.216 at 221; Peter R.
Griffin, op. cit., p. 19 at 20; for more information about the principle of discovery, See Redfem and
Hunter, 2nd ed., op, cit., p. 330; D. Mark Cato, op, cit., p. 171.
51 Marianne Roth, op. cit., p. 11; Redfem and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p.443, at footnote 8. The writers
provide an example of this kind: "In common law systems, it is usual for lawyers to take statements
from witnesses before the hearing ... a practice which is frowned upon (and indeed regarded as
improper) in many civil law countries."
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discovery, whereas, according to the common law system, parties and their counsel are
permitted to prepare a witness for a witness hearing. In this regard Peter Griffin emphasises
that:52
"As a general rule, there is nothing untoward in assisting a witness in general
preparation for a hearing. Indeed, many witnesses require some form of preparation as they
may never have testified before. Parties must, of course, bear in mind that nothing in the
preparation of a witness should compromise his or her ability to testify truthfully."
International commercial arbitral awards are in most cases based on foreign laws that
should be respected.53 Therefore, an award that is correctly produced under a foreign law
must not be refused unless the resulting award leads to a serious violation of justice between
the parties.54 Accordingly, not every procedural irregularity constitutes a sufficient reason to
refuse enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.55 A distinction should be made between
national and international public policy, where in the latter, courts should be more flexible
and should give regard to considerations of justice rather than insisting on the literal
application of their national law, for example in presenting evidence and providing the parties
with proper notice of the arbitration proceedings.56 Applying the concept of international
52 Peter R. Griffin, op. cit., p. 19 at 28.
53 In the conflict of laws theory it has been said that it is necessary to apply foreign laws in cases
involving a foreign element because not to do so would constitute a disregard of the sovereignty of
another state within its territory and thus show a lack of comity towards it. See, J. G. Collier, op. cit.,
p. 379.
54 Courts would not intervene unless the breach of rules of evidence is fundamental to the arbitrator's
decision or amounts to a breach of the rules of natural justice. The Government ofCeylon v. Chandris
[1963] 1 Lloyd's Rep 214; Agroexport v. NV Goorden Iport SA [1956] Lloyd's Rep 319; Kenneth S
Rokison, op. cit., p. 96.
35 The ILA Report, London Conference (2000), op. cit., p. 14, where the report provides that: "the
award must be so fundamentally offensive to that jurisdiction's notion of justice"; In Dalmia Dairy
Industries Ltd. v. National Bank of Pakistan [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 223, 269, Kerr J. stated that:
"Article 20 of the ICC rules merely provides that the arbitrator shall have the power to hear witnesses.
It gives him a discretion but imposes no obligation. Indeed, the procedure followed by the arbitrator in
this case is in my experience the usual procedure in ICC and other continental arbitrations. There can,
therefore, be no question of any infringement of any rule of English public policy."
36 Aktham A. EI-Khoul, op, cit., p. 19. He states that: "The equality between the parties is also a
principle of international public policy, but the equality is not supposed to be mathematical."
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public policy in determining whether or not equity has been upheld in arbitration, could
resolve problems arising from differences between several legal systems.57 Referring to the
concept of international public policy in such cases leads to narrowing the domain of formal
conditions that are imposed by national public policy which ultimately leads to searching for
the justice and equity between the parties where the latter by itself is the object of procedural
public policy rules.
II. Lack of Reasons in the Award
The absence of adequate reasons behind an arbitral award has on occasion led to a
refusal to enforce the award in countries which consider the provision of the reasons for
which an award v/as made as a fundamental requirement.58 Article V (2)(b) of the New York
Convention may be invoked in support of such a refusal. The question here is whether a court
can refuse to enforce a foreign arbitral award which does not contain reasons, because the
57 One should consider in this regard the role of the IBA Rules (International Bar Association Rules)
concerning the presentation and reception of evidence in international commercial arbitration which
mainly aims to bring the gap between the common law and civil law systems, and to resolve problems
that often arise in international arbitration. The International Bar Association Rules, adopted in 1983,
see (1985) 1 Arbitration International). These rules have been revised and now new IBA Rules on the
Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration were adopted by the IBA Council in June
(1999). Published in Arbitration, Vol. 65, No. 4 (1999), p. 297, and in Redfem and Hunter, 3rd ed.,
(1999), Appendix K; also see, Michael Buhler and Carroll Dorgan, "Witness Testimony Pursuant to
the 1999 IBA Rules of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration: Novel or Tested
Standardes?," 17 J.Int.Arb., (2000), p. 3 at 5. He states that: "The advantage of the IBA Rules is that
they placed witness testimony within a rigid framework and appeared to reflect a somewhat uneasy
compromise between the common law and civil law systems."
58 The question of whether providing arbitral awards with reasons is a procedural or a substantive
matter was determined by the French Court of Cassation in Compagnie d'Armement Maritime v.
Ompagnie Tunisienne de Navigation, Court of Cassation (France), March 18 (1980), Rev. Arb. 1980,
at 496. In deciding whether the reasons of an award are compulsory or not, it held that this must be
decided under the applicable procedural law and not under the substantive law. Cited in, Rubino-
Sammartano. M., op, cit., p. 311.
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national law of that court considers providing reasons in an award as a fundamental
requirement? The answer to this requires recognition of the following points:
The requirement to provide an award with reasons differs from country to country. In
several legal systems, the requirement of providing an arbitral award with reasons is
fundamental.59 Other legal systems do not consider reasoning an award as vital in order to
enforce an award.60 This difference between legal systems could obstruct the process of
enforcement of arbitral awards. Therefore, it was deemed important to reach a solution that
could make enforcement of foreign arbitral awards more obtainable.
Secondly, it must be noted that most of the international conventions concerning the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards do not provide a clear stand on whether or not
providing an award with reasons is a requirement for the enforcement of foreign arbitral
59 Rubino-Sammartano. M., op, cit., p. 310. He referred to examples from several national laws: "The
requirement that the award be reasoned is so strongly rooted in several legal systems that in some of
them, the Italian one for example, it is even a requirement specified in the Constitution. The
Constitution of the Republic of Italy states that: 'All decisions of courts of law must be reasoned.'
This requirement seems also strongly rooted in Spanish, Dutch, German, French, Japanese, Article 41
of the Saudi Arbitration regulations (Saudi Arabia, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 1984, Vol. IX,
at 29)"; M. Chafik, Egypt, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 1979, vol. IV, at 53; Abid el Wahab A1
Bahi, "Thoughts Concerning Providing Awards with Reasons According to some International,
Regional and Legislative Framework," 2 Journal of Arab Arbitration (2000), p. 132 at 139. (in
Arabic). The writer provides that this is a fundamental requirement according to Article 204 of the
Qatar Law, Article 183 of the Kuwaiti law and Article 760 of the Libyan Law, Article 48 of the
Yemeni Law of 1992, Article 270 of the Iraqi Procedural law and Article 318 (2) of the Moroccan
Law; also see, Rene David, op. cit., p. 323, concerning the Swiss courts attitude in this regard.
60 Van den Berg, op, cit., p. 381. He states that: " in several Common law countries it is customary not
to give reasons in the award"; Rubino-Sammartano. M., op, cit., p. 311 who provides that: "Other
legal systems do not give so much importance to this and thus relieve arbitrators of the task of giving
reasons. This seems to be the case in Austrian, Indian, Australian and English legal systems"; Mustill
and Boyd, op. cit., p. 543; Rene David, op. cit., p. 319; Stephen M. Schwebel and Susan G. Lahne,
op cit., p. 224. The writers state that: "In the United States, an arbitrator is not required to give reasons
in his award"; Howard Holtzmann, National Report United States, Yearbook Vol. IX (1984) IX at 62;
Trave Schiffahrts GmbH v. Ninemia corp [1986] 802. Q.B; see also the United States courts decision
in re Aimcee Wholessale Corp. & Tomar Prods., 21 N.Y 2d 621, 626-27, 237 N.E, 2d 223, 225
N.Y.S. 2d 968, 971 (1981). The court stated that: "arbitrators are not obliged to give reasons for their
rulings or awards. Thus our courts may be called upon to enforce arbitration awards which are directly
at variance with statutory law and judicial decision interpreting that law." Cited in Henry P. De Vries,
op. cit., p. 73.
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awards.61 Neither the Geneva Protocol of 1923 nor the Geneva Convention of 1927 dealt with
this issue. The New York Convention does not provide a specific rule in this regard. It seems
that the Convention left this issue to be determined by the national law of the country where
enforcement is taking place. An alternative approach may be based upon Article V (l)(d)
from which one could infer (as this is not explicit) that the requirement to provide reasons in
arbitral awards will depend on the law that was applied to the arbitration procedures. Article
V (l)(d) states that: "the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the
parties or, failing such agreement, in accordance with the law of the country where the
arbitration takes place". Therefore, in examining whether to refuse enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award because of a lack of reasons, a court should base its decision upon the
agreement of the parties and in the absence of such, on the law of the country where the
arbitration takes place.
Finally, it is important to understand the purpose of providing an award with reasons as this
may illustrate the connection between doing this and the notion of public policy. Providing
reasons in an award is important to justify the grounds upon which it is based, in order to
provide the parties with an explanation of how and why the arbitral tribunal reached its
61 In this regard, one can mention that some international conventions may provide explicit conditions
to provide an award with reasons. For example, Article 32 of the Amman Arab Convention (Amman
Arab Convention on Commercial Arbitration, signed 14 April 1987), which requires that arbitral
tribunals must state the reasons upon which the award is based. However, Article 34 of the Amman
Convention does not include non reasoning of an award as one of the grounds to set an award aside.
The consequence of this may drive the courts in the countries (which are members of the Amman
Convention) to refuse enforcement of arbitral awards (which are subject to this convention) under the
public policy ground for violating a mandatory rule in the convention itself. In addition to that, Article
35 of the Amman Convention provides that: "The Supreme Court of each contracting state must give
leave to enforce the awards of the arbitral tribunal. Leave may only be refused if this award is
contrary to public policy". See, Hamza Haddad, "The Arbitration Decision according to Amman
Convention for International Commercial Arbitration of 1987," 1 Journal ofArab Arbitration (1999),
p. 24; Article 24 (5) of the Agreement on the Settlement of Disputes Between Arab Investment
Receiving States of 1974 provides as a ground to set an award aside that: "The award has failed to
state the reasons on which it was based." Abdul Hamid El Ahdab, "General Introduction on
Arbitration ...," op, cit., p. 13.
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conclusion62, and to enable the court to consider questions which may arise from the award.
Therefore, it is considered fundamental that the parties are informed how justice has been
done to their case. This includes that the award must be specific, unambiguous and capable of
performance by the party against whom it is directed. It may also be important for the
enforcing body, when it is imposed by its national legal system, to provide reasons in the
award to enable the award to stand on its own sufficient information.63
A distinction, thus, has to be made between the parties' request to provide an award
with reasons, as part of the parties' right to know how the arbitral tribunal reached its
decision, and the requirement of the law to provide reasons, in order to review the merits of
the award by the courts so as to supervise how justice has been considered in the case.
It is now common in many modern legal systems to find provisions of law which give
the parties a free choice to decide whether or not to provide the award with reasons according
to the concept of parties' autonomy in international commercial arbitration.64 For example, in
deciding the form of the award, Section 52 of the English law of 1996 provides that:
"(1). The parties are free to agree on the form of an award. (2). If or to the extent that
there is no such agreement, the following provisions apply. (3). The award shall be in
writing signed by all the arbitrators or all those assenting to the award. (4). The award
62 See Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 381.
63 Redfem and Hunter, 2nd ed., op, cit., p. 390; Universal petroleum v. Handels Unci [1987] 1 Lloyd's
Rep. 517; Henry P. De Vries, op. cit., p. 74, stating that: "arbitrators must refer to rules with the
authoritative weight of law to aid in reaching a decision and to justify that decision to the parties ...
particularly if an award is to be recognised and enforced internationally, it should state reasons with a
legal basis, including reference to the process by which that legal basis was selected."
64
Regard here should be made to the arbitral awards which takes the form of settlement awards,
where arbitrators are merely expected to record the terms agreed upon by the parties and do not render
a decision on the merits. Therefore, settlement awards do not require reasons since arbitrators do not
reach their conclusions through any reasoning; Rene David, op. cit., p. 324; See Section 52 English
1996 Act; see Chapter One, at p. 16.
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shall contain the reasons for the award unless it is an agreed award or the parties have
agreed to dispense with reasons."65
Article 43(2) of the Egyptian law of 1994 provides that:66
"The arbitral award shall state the reasons upon which it is based, unless the two
parties to arbitration have agreed otherwise or the law applicable to the arbitral
proceedings does not require the award to be supported by reasons."
Article 31(2) of the Model Law provides that:
"(2) The award shall state the reasons upon which it is based, unless the parties
have agreed that no reasons are to be given or the award is an award on agreed terms
under article 30."
However, giving parties the autonomy to decide whether the provision of reasons
should be a requirement is limited to countries that recognise such freedom in their national
arbitration rules. On the international level, one can establish the requirement of providing
reasons according to the prevailing trend that distinguishes between national and international
arbitral awards. For example, the Court of Appeal of Northern Lebanon, made a clear
distinction between internal arbitral awards that are subject to internal public policy, (which
65 See also Section 70 (4) which provides in this regard that: "If on an application or appeal it appears
to the court that the award- (a) does not contain the tribunal's reasons, or (b) does not set out the
tribunal's reasons in sufficient detail to enable the court properly to consider the application or appeal,
the court may order the tribunal to state the reasons for its award in sufficient detail for that purpose."
66 It has been reported that prior to the law of 1994, the prevailing doctrine used to consider as public
policy the explicit requirement stipulated in Article 507 of the Egyptian Code of Procedures
concerning the necessity of expressing the reasons of the award. Accordingly, the absence of reasons
prevents an award from being enforceable in Egypt, regardless of whether or not the law of the
country where the award has been made requires the issuance of a reasoned award. However, now
Art. 43(2) of the Egyptian law of 1994 entitles the parties to agree to permit the arbitral tribunal to
provide an award without reasons; Aktham A. EI-Khoul, op, cit., p. 20. He considers that: "The lack
of reasons of an award issued under a law which does not require reasons may be a violation of
internal public policy but not of international public policy."
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considers it compulsory to back-up an award with reasons), and international arbitral awards
that are subject to international public policy, (which does not require such reasons).67
The Italian courts, in S.A. Tradax Export v. S.p.a. Carapelli68, considered the
enforcement of an arbitration award that was rendered without reasons under the rules of the
Grain and Feed Trade Association (London). The court noted that English law permits
awards without reasons and that the New York Convention does not require reasons, stating
that; "what is fundamental in Italian law of procedure cannot be imposed upon foreign
legislatures or judicial authorities". The same Court also enforced an arbitration award of the
American Arbitration Association despite its lack of reasons.69 The decision states that: "the
fact that the reasoning constitutes a principle of the Italian Constitution is not important
because what is fundamental in Italian law of procedure may not be considered as such by
foreign legislative and judicial authorities". The distinction between domestic and
international public policy has also been considered in Italy by the Court of Appeal of Genoa,
in Efxinos Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Rawi Shipping Lines Ltd, which held that:70
67 The Court of Appeal, North Lebanon, May 29 (1974), Clunet 1979, at 414. Cited by, Rubino-
Sammartano. M., op, cit., p. 312; See also, Abid el Wahab A1 Bahi, op, cit., p. 132 at 136, referring to
Article 817 of the Lebanese Law ofCivil Procedures of 1983, which does not require the provision of
reasons in international arbitral awards, although it is a requirement for national arbitral awards
according to Article 790.
6X The Court of Appeals of Florence judgement of 22 October 1976, see Yearbook Vol. Ill (1978) at
279 (Italy No. 18). Cited by Stephen M. Schwebel and Susan G. Lahne, op cit., p. 224.
69
Judgment of 8 October of 1977, see Yearbook Vol. I V at 289 (Italy No. 29).
70
Judgement of 2 May 1980 of the Court ofAppeal of Genoa, Yearbook Vol. VIII (1983) at 381, 383
(Italy No. 51); also see, Stephen M. Schwebel and Susan G. Lahne, op cit., p. 224, where several
examples to this regard are provided therein: "The French decision in Denis Coakley Ltd. v. Ste.
Michel Reverdy, judgement of 23 July 1981, Yearbook Vol. IX ( 1984) at 400 (France :Vol. 6), which
came to the same conclusion with regard to an English (GAFTA) award; and of similar import and
reasoning were the judgement of a Hamburg Court of 27 July 1978, see Yearbook Vol. IV (1979) at
266-68 (FR Germany No. 18), and the judgement of 29 January 1983, in European Grain & Shipping
Ltd. v. Seth Oil Mills Ltd., High Court of Bombay, see Yearbook Vol. IX (1984) at 411, 414 (India
No. 9).
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"... it appears to be no longer contrary to Italian public policy to recognise a foreign
award which does not contain reasons, provided that the parties have agreed in advance that
reasons shall not be given".
To the same extent, the Paris Court of Appeal in Compagnie d'Armement Maritime11,
held that: "the lack of reasons does not affect international public policy and that therefore it
is a ground for nullity only of domestic awards". Also, the district court ofNancy in France,
on November 14, 1955 refused to declare an arbitral award enforceable, since it did not give
any reasons. The Nancy Court of Appeal reversed this judgement, considering that the lack of
reasons, although contrary to a rule of French procedural law, was not contrary to ordre
public international in France.72 The Court of Cassation rejected the appeal made against this
judgement, where it states that "taking into account the wide powers granted to English
courts and which allow them to intervene in arbitration procedures ... the lack of motives in
the award rendered in the case was not, in itself, contrary to French ordrepublic"
Finally, mention should be made to the situation when the arbitral tribunal makes
serious mistakes in the reasoning of the award. For instance, where the reasoning is in
contradiction with the decision. This situation had occurred before the Supreme Court in
Sweden in GNMTC v Gotaverken73, where the Libyan respondent, "GNMTC' opposed an
ICC award74 because the reasoning of the award was contradictory. However, the Swedish
Supreme Court refused this objection on the ground that the New York Convention does not
allow a review of the merits of the award.
71
Compagnie d'Armement Maritime v. Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation, Court of appeal of
Paris, April 28 (1976), Rev. Arb. 1978, at 154. Cited by, Rubino-Sammartano. M., op, cit., p. 311.
72 Cass. Civ., un 14, 1960 Rev. crit. Dr. int. pnve 1960, 393, J.C.P. 1961. II. Cited by, Rene David, op.
cit., p. 322.
73 GNMTC v. Gotaverken, Supreme Court, Augest 13, 1979 (Sweeden no.l). Cited in Van den Berg,
op. cit., p. 271.
74 Award ofApril 5, 1978, Yearbook Vol. VI (1981), p. 133.
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The conclusion that can be drawn in this part is that the prevailing trends are to enforce
foreign arbitral awards that do not contain reasons, as long as the parties have agreed not to
include reasons in the arbitral award.75 Therefore, if the parties have clearly agreed to exclude
reasons from the arbitral award and the law which governs the arbitration procedures allows
this, then the award should be recognised and enforced. This is regardless of whether or not
giving reasons is a fundamental requirement under the law of the country of enforcement.
However, one should also consider that courts of many jurisdictions may still not have had
experience with international commercial arbitration. They may consider that providing an
award with reasons is a fundamental requirement for the enforcement of an award to ensure
that the award does not conceal a violation of public policy, or that the lack of reasons in the
award was intended to cover some neglect of the defendant's rights. Therefore, arbitrators are
advised to consider that enforcement of the award might take place in a country that does not
provide a clear determination in this regard. Even if enforcement will take place in countries
which do not require the provision of reasons in arbitral awards, arbitrators have been urged
to provide reasons in the awards, which they issue. This was emphasised in Trave Schiffahrts
GmhHv. Ninemia corpb where Sir John Donaldson M.R. stated that:
"The giving of reasoned awards is to be encouraged, for, as was said at para. 26 of the
Commercial Court Report on Arbitration (1978) (Cmnd. 7284): 'The making of an award is,
or should be, a rational process. Formulating and recording the reasons tends to accentuate its
rationality'."
Also in Bermer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Westzucker GmbH, Lord Justice Donaldson
provided a useful guidance. He said that:77
75 See Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 380-382 and cases cited therein; Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or
Truly International) Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 301. He considers this tendency as part of the
modem trend towards the application of international public policy rules.
76 Trave Schiffahrts GmhHv. Ninemia corp [1986] 802 at 808 Q.B. [Court of Appeal].
77
Bermer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Westzucker GmbH (No. 2); (1981) Lloyd's Rep. 130 CA; also
see, Geoffrey Beresford Hartwell, "The Reasoned Award in International Arbitration," Internet
address-, (http://www.hartwell.demon.co.uk/intaward.htm), p. 1.
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"No particular form of award is required .... all that is necessary is that the arbitrators
should set out what, on their view of the evidence, did or did not happen, and should explain
succinctly why in the light of what happened, they have reached their decision and what that
decision is."
However, arbitrators are not required to give all the details in the arbitral award. What
is required here is to provide the award with persuasive reasons, "concise as possible and
78limited to what is necessary, according to the nature of the dispute".
III. Lack of Impartiality
Lack of impartiality is a ground according to which a party to arbitration can challenge
a nominated or appointed arbitrator. The challenge can be raised in any of the different stages
of the arbitration process.79 A challenge to remove an arbitrator may take place after
i 80
nominating the arbitral tribunal but prior to the issuance of the final arbitral award' or after
that, by challenging the resulting award before a competent authority in the country of
origin.81 A party can also challenge the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award for the lack of
78 See Redfem and Hunter, 2nd ed., op, cit., p. 391; John Parris, Arbitration Principles and Practice,
op, cit., p. 141; also see, D. Mark Cato, op, cit., pp. 104-110.
79 See for example Article 12 (1) of the Model Law.
80 The competent authority before which such challenge takes place differs according to the applicable
procedural rules which the parties have been selected. For example, if they have selected rules of an
international constitution, then challenging a prospective arbitrator should be made according to such
rules. See for example, Article 11. 1 of the ICC Rules, which provides that challenging the appointed
arbitrator, should be made before the ICC Court, by the submission to the secretariat of a written
statement specifying the facts and circumstances on which the challenge is based; see also, Article
10.2 of the LCIA Rules; Article 18 of the Egyptian law of 1994; See also Article 13 (2) of the Model
Law; Section 24 (1) of the English 1996 Act, which concerns the removal of an arbitrator during the
arbitration proceedings; Damond Lock Grabowski v. Laing Investments (Bracknell) Ltd, (1992) 60
BLR 112; Save and Prosper Pensions Ltd v. Homebase Ltd (Ch D) [2001] L. & T.R. 11.
81 For example, lack of impartiality is a ground to challenge the award under Section 68 (2) of the
English 1996 Act for "serious irregularity affecting the tribunal, the proceedings or the award".
Section 68 (2) subsections (a) to (i) provide an illustration to what can be considered as "serious
irregularity", according to which a court may consider the arbitration procedures containing
substantial injustice to one of the parties, the most important of which in this regard is subsection (a)
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impartiality of an arbitrator which, according to the central interest of this study, will be
82examined under Article V (2)(b) of the New York Convention.
The court of enforcement may refuse to enforce a foreign arbitral award if one of the
parties proves to the court that the award is based on a lack of impartiality because the
appointed arbitrator has a personal interest in the dispute, or was biased towards one of the
parties. Under the New York Convention, such a challenge can only be established under
Article V (2)(b) on the grounds of public policy, as Article V (1) does not contain a clear
basis for such action.83 This is also due to the doctrine of Natural Justice, which establishes
84that an adjudicator has a duty to act without bias, fairly, in good faith and judiciously.
Therefore, the impartiality and independence of an arbitrator is a basic principle of justice in
which refers to "failure by the tribunal to comply with section 33 (general duty of tribunal)". Section
33, imposes on an arbitrator mandatory duties which he cannot disregard, particularly in paragraph
(l)(a) which provides that: "The tribunal shall- a- act fairly and impartially as between the parties,
giving each party a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his opponent."
82 One should take into consideration that raising this ground before the Court of Enforcement must be
based on circumstances that were not previously known to the party who is raising this ground to
refuse enforcement of the award. See, AAOT Foreign Assoc. Technostoryexport v. International Dev
and Trade Sendees Inc., No. 97-9075 (2d Cir. Mar. 23, 1998). In challenging the enforcement of an
arbitral award on the ground that enforcement of the arbitral award was rendered by a corrupt tribunal
and would therefore violate the public policy of the United States. The Second Circuit held that "the
law precludes attacks on the qualifications of arbitrators on grounds previously known by a party but
not raised until after the award has been rendered. By remaining silent during the arbitral proceedings
despite knowledge of possible corruption, a party waived the right to object to the award at the
enforcement stage". Cited in International ADR web site address,
(http://www.Intemationaladr.com/judicial.htm), IADR Ref. No. 129.
83
Although that Article V (l)(d) is deigned to govern the situation which relates to the composition of
the arbitral tribunal, as it provides that enforcement of an award could be refused if "the composition
of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the
parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the
arbitration took place." However, this does not provide a direct ground to refuse the enforcement for
lack of impartiality; see W. Michael Tupman, op. cit., p. 26 at 39; See Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 377;
Stephen M. Schwebel and Susan G. Lahne, op. cit., p. 210.
84 See for example, Section 1 of the English 1996 Act. It confirms the importance of providing the
parties with an impartial and fair arbitration. It could be inferred from Section 1 that this right is one
of the main principles of the 1996 Act. It provides that: "The provisions of this Part are founded on
the following principles, and shall be construed accordingly - (a) the object of arbitration is to obtain
the fair resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal without unnecessary delay or expense"; also see
Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that: "Everyone is entitled
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arbitration, which implies the duty on the person who acts as an arbitrator to undertake
serious responsibilities to the parties as well as to the public, notwithstanding that this is also
part of the arbitrator's ethical obligations.
Before examining the possibility of refusing to enforce foreign arbitral awards on the
grounds of lack of impartiality and independence, one should take into consideration that
there are many circumstances that have to be considered in order to determine this issue,
which vary from case to case. In this regard a distinction should be drawn between two
circumstances. The first relates to the existence of justifiable doubts about the impartiality or
independence of the arbitrator himself (for example, by communicating with only one of the
parties in the absence of the other or to the exclusion of the other, including the receiving of
o r
evidence and/or argument from one side in the absence of the other). The second depends
on the existence of circumstances that may create doubts about the impartiality of an
arbitrator, for instance, if the chairman or sole arbitrator is of the same nationality of one of
the parties.86 Also one may consider that under the procedural law in some countries, there
in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the
determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him."
83 See London Export Corporation Limited v. Jubilee Coffee Co. Limited [1958] I Lloyd's Rep. 197;
Woodridge Timber Ltd v. Branntorps Travaru (1982) The Times 14 june; also see, Henry P. De Vries,
op. cit., p. 69. He states that: "... the failure to obtain such standards of behavior is a breach of a
fiduciary duty, a serious procedural defect which may result in the setting aside of the award"; Judith
O'Hare, "The Denial of Due Process and the Enforceability of CIETAC Awards under the New York
Convention, the Hong Kong Experience," 13 J. Int. Arb., (December 1996), p. 180; Andrew and
Keren, op, cit., p. 117.
86 See Article 6.1 of LCIA Rules of 1998, which provides that: "Where the parties are of different
nationalities, a sole arbitrator or chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal shall not have the same nationality
as any party unless the parties who are not of the same nationality as the proposed appointee all agree
in writing otherwise"; also Article 9.5 of the ICC Rules of 1998; Article 6.4 of the Cairo Regional
Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA); also Article 11 (5) of the Model Law
1994 requires from a court (or other authority) if it has been asked to appoint an arbitrator to consider:
"any qualifications required of the arbitrator by the agreement of the parties and to such
considerations as are likely to secure the appointment of an independent and impartial arbitrator and,
in the case of a sole or third arbitrator, shall take into account as well the advisability of appointing an
arbitrator of a nationality other than those of the parties"; Michael A. Calvo, "The Challenge of the
ICC Arbitrators. Theory and Practice," J.Int.Arb., 15(4):63-72, 1998, 69. He states that in one case the
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are mandatory requirements that concern the composition of the arbitral tribunal which aims
to guarantee the impartiality of the arbitrators, such as the requirement that an arbitral
tribunal should be composed of an uneven number of arbitrators, or that all arbitrators should
participate in the deliberation when rendering the final award or finally, that arbitrators
should be nominated in the arbitration agreement. It could be argued here that such
requirements might affect the impartiality of arbitrators without necessarily being based upon
a positive attitude from the appointed arbitrators. The following material will deal with the
first scenario, followed by an explanation of the second type.
A. Impartiality and independence of arbitrators
Impartiality means that an arbitrator should not have any personal interest either by
0-7
being biased in favour of one of the parties or in relation to the issues in the case. ' The
concept of independence indicates some past or existing relationship of the arbitrator either
with one of the parties or with their lawyers, either business, professional or social, which
00
would influence his decision. Therefore, independence relates to the relationship between
the arbitrator and the parties; impartiality relates primarily to the relationship between the
arbitrator and the subject-matter of the dispute.89
court decided to appoint a Hungarian Chairman for arbitration between British and Yugoslav parties.
The British claimant opposed this direct appointment, claiming that the nationality of the Chairman
provokes a violation of the balance of the contract and of required neutrality.
87 Redfern and Hunter, 2"d ed., op, cit., p. 220; Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 377; Huang Yanming, "The
Ethics of Arbitrators in CIETAC Arbitrations," J.Int.Arb., 12(2):5-17, (1997), p. 10; also see,
Catalina (Owners) v. Norma (Owners) (1938) 61 LI. L. Rep. 360, D.C.
88
W. Michael Tupman, op. cit., p. 29.
89
See, Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C) Ltd. Lannon [1969] 1 Q.B. 577. In which Lord Denning
said: "A man may be disqualified from sitting in a judicial capacity on one of two grounds. First, a
direct pecuniary interest in the subject matter. Second, bias in favour of one side or against the other."
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Generally, the responsibility of proving the partiality or lack of independence of an
arbitrator is on the party who claims the existence of one or more of such circumstances.
Some legal systems may require a party to prove the 'actual bias' on the part of the arbitrator,
by proving that the arbitrator is in fact incapable of carrying out his office in an impartial
manner.90 In other legal systems, such as the English law, it would be sufficient to prove a so-
called 'imputed bias'.91 For example, if in the circumstances of the case that any right-minded
person, a "reasonable man", would conclude from the arbitrator's conduct that there was a
real likelihood of bias on the part of the arbitrator or that his relationship with one of the
parties is close enough to be objectionable.
If an arbitrator thinks that a reasonable man might take this view then he should
disclose to the parties any facts or circumstances which might question his impartiality. The
arbitrators' obligation to disclose any circumstances that may prejudice their impartiality is
90
AT&T Corp v Saudi Cable Co (CA) [2000] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 625.
91
See, Dublin & County Broadcasting v. Independent Radio and TV Commission & Others, 12 May
1989, (unreported case). In this case, Murphy J. said at p. 13 that: "Certainly it does seem to me the
question of bias must be determined on the basis of what a right-minded person would think of the
likelihood, of the real likelihood of the prejudice, and not on the basis of a suspicion which might
dwell in the mind of a person who is ill informed and did not seek to direct his mind properly to the
facts... If it is shown that there is on the facts circumstances which would lead a right-minded person
to conclude that there was a real likelihood of bias, then this would be sufficient to invalidate the
proceedings of the tribunal." Cited in, D. Mark Cato, op, cit., p. 58; also see, R v. Cough (1993) A.C.
646; Save and Prosper Pensions Ltd v Homebase Ltd (Ch D) [2001] L. & T.R. 11. The court decided
to apply as an objective approach "the standard of the reasonable man", where the court decided to
consider the circumstances that constitute a real danger of bias.
92 The English courts have applied this test in several cases, see Hagop Ardahalian v. Unifert
International SA (The Elissar), [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep 84, at 89; Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v.
ETS Soules et Cie [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep 160; Tracomin SA v. Gibbs Nathaniel (Canada) Ltd, [1985] 1
Lloyd's Rep 586; see Clive M Schmitthoff, op. cit., p. 230 at 234; also see the judgement of Griffiths
J. in Corrigan v. The Irish Land Commission [1977] I.R. 327. The court provided that: "A person in a
judicial or quasi-judicial capacity in a matter which is otherwise within his jurisdiction may be
disqualified from hearing that matter by reason of actual or presumed bias on his part. However,
before such disqualification can take place, there must be a 'real likelihood' of bias"; also see, Rex
(Taverner) v. Justice ofCounty Tyrone [1909] 2 I.R. 763, in regard to the necessary bias Lord O'Brien
L.C.J, said (at p. 768) that: "By bias I understand a real likelihood of an operative prejudice, whether
conscious or unconscious. There must, in my opinion, be reasonable evidence to satisfy us that there
was a real likelihood of bias."
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important in order to avoid the appearance ofbias in their conduct. ~ This includes the duty of
disclosing all details that an arbitrator believes that are important to be disclosed to the
parties. An arbitrator must also inform the other arbitrators of the same tribunal of these
circumstances94 but unlike the parties, an arbitrator of the same tribunal cannot challenge the
appointment of other arbitrators, as this right is confined to the parties. The only procedure
that an arbitrator can do if he disagrees with the appointment of another arbitrator is to
withdraw from the arbitration procedures.95
The circumstances which must be disclosed by an arbitrator are those which may put
the arbitrator in a state of mind where the arbitrator becomes willing to rule contrary to what
he would otherwise have ruled. Therefore, arbitrators are required to disclose to the parties
any previous or present relation the arbitrator has with, the parties, or any interest m the
outcome of the dispute. One should consider here that national laws do not include detailed
information of what should be disclosed by the arbitrators.96 Nevertheless, some of the
93
Disclosing such circumstances could be made by submitting a written statement of independence,
for example, Article 7.2 of the ICC Rules provides that: "Before appointment or confirmation, a
prospective arbitrator shall sign a statement of independence and disclose in writing to the Secretariat
any facts or circumstances which might be of such a nature as to call into question the arbitrator's
independence in the eyes of the parties. The Secretariat shall provide such information to the parties in
writing and fix a time limit for any comments from them." The burden of proof of disclosure falls on
the arbitrator, however, if a party claims that there has been a fact that may affect impartiality, then
the responsibility of proving it will rest on that party. See, Stephen R. Bond, "The Selection of ICC
Arbitrators and the Requirement of Independence", 4 Arb. Int., p. 300, 307 (1988).
94 In this regard Canon II (D) of the Code of Ethics of 1977 provides that: "Where more than one
arbitrator has been appointed, each should inform the others of the interests and relationships which
have been disclosed."
93 For example, in arbitration between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia, the arbitrator which
was nominated by the United Kingdom resigned because of the obvious lack of independence of the
Saudi nominee. The latter passed notes to the Saudi agent during the sittings of the tribunal, and had
rehearsed certain witnesses prior to the giving of their evidence. See J. Gillis Wetter, The
International Arbitral Process [The Buraimi Oasis Arbitration], International Commercial
Arbitration, The Foundation Press, INC. (1997), p. 565; Martin Hunter, "Ethics of the International
Arbitrator," 53 Arbitration (1987), p. 219 at 221; D. Mark Cato, op, cit., p. 59.
96 National laws some times provide examples of what sort of circumstances that are important to be
disclosed by an arbitrator, mainly that which relates to the arbitrators' status. For example, Article 16
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international arbitration institutions may provide in their rules examples to guide arbitrators
as to what they should disclose, for example, Canon (I) of the Code of Ethics provides that:97
"arbitrators in performing their duties have to uphold the integrity and fairness of the
arbitration process". In paragraph (D) the code provides several examples of what type of
98
circumstances arbitrators are required to disclose:
"After accepting appointment and while serving as an arbitrator, a person should
avoid entering into any financial, business, professional, family or social relationship,
or acquiring any financial or personal interest, which is likely to affect impartiality or
which might reasonably create the appearance of partiality or bias. For a reasonable
period of time after the decision of a case, persons who have served as arbitrators
should avoid entering into any such relationship, or acquiring any such interest, in
circumstances which might reasonably create the appearance that they had been
influenced in the arbitration by the anticipation or expectation of the relationship or
interest."99
Due to the parties' freedom to agree on the procedure for the appointment of the arbitral
tribunal and to choose the members of the arbitral tribunal by themselves, a practical problem
may exist in international commercial arbitration. It is common to find in international
commercial arbitration a previous relation between an arbitrator and the party who appointed
of the Egyptian law provides: "1. The arbitrator cannot be a minor, under guardianship, have been
deprived of his civil rights by reason of a judgement against him for a felony or misdemeanour
contrary to honesty or due to a declaration of his bankruptcy; unless he has been restored to his
status." Also, in paragraph (3) it provides that: "The arbitrator's acceptance of his mission shall be in
writing. When accepting, he must disclose any circumstances which are likely to cast doubts on his
independence or impartiality."
97 The Code of Ethics of 1977.
98 See also the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators of The Chamber of National and International
Arbitration ofMilan, Web Site address:
http://www.mi.camcom.it/eng/arbitration.chamber/etic.htm.
99 See Canon II of the 1977 Code of Ethics, op. cit., which also provides that an arbitrator should
disclose any interest or relationship likely to affect impartiality or which might create an appearance
of partiality or bias. See also the AAA Fact Sheet, Web Site address, http://www.adr.org, in which it
provides as guidelines for the exercise of arbitrator discretion in this area that: "the following
circumstances were deemed sufficient by the courts to require vacatur of the award on the ground of
partiality: Relationship of consanguinity within six degree (e.g. second cousins); Business dealings
which are significant, ongoing, or regularly conducted; Close social relations or friendships."
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him.100 This is the case especially where the arbitration is administered by a trade association,
as arbitrators are likely to be chosen from a small circle of member merchants who regularly
do business with each other. In other situations a party may appoint his counsel to be one of
the arbitrators with the view of having his own advocate within the tribunal. In such
situations the nominated arbitrators may find himself under the pressure of the party who
nominated him. However, this should not affect the arbitrator's impartiality. The arbitrator's
relationship with the party nominating him should be based upon an independent professional
relationship, since although an arbitrator provides his professional services in return for a fee,
his position is very different from that of an employee of the party. An arbitrator owes no
general duty to such a party as his relationship with the party nominating him is temporary,
terminating once the professional work for which his services have been retained has been
completed.101
If a previous relationship existed between an arbitrator and one of the parties, then the
arbitrator will be obliged to disclose all details about this relationship to the other party, in
100
Stephen R. Bond, op. cit., p. 308. He reported that: "the most common basis for refusal by the ICC
Court to confirm or appoint a prospective arbitrator is a past or present direct professional link
between the arbitrator and a party or between a business associate of the arbitrator and a party or an
entity connected to a party"; also see the 1977 Code of Ethics. Canon VII clearly endorses the view
that a non-neutral arbitrator (party-appointed) "may be predisposed toward the party who appointed
him"; In Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968), the Supreme
Court of the United States set aside an arbitral award for the reason that a close business connection
existed between "neutral arbitrator" and a party to arbitration that was not disclosed to the other party.
The court held that: "It is true that arbitrators cannot sever all their ties with the business world, since
they are not expected to get all their income from their work deciding cases, but we should, if
anything, be even more scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators than judges, since the
former have completely free rein to decide the law as well as the facts and are not subject to appellate
review." Cited in, Henry P. De Vries, op. cit., p. 70.
101 D. Mark Cato, op, cit., p. 58.
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order to avoid any doubts about his impartiality and independence. For example, when
submitting his disclosure an arbitrator should give details about:102
"The nature of this relationship; whether the relationship is in the past, present, or anticipated
in the future; the duration of relationship (from when to when); whether business is being
conducted directly or indirectly; whether the disclosed relationship is professional, social or
familial; the extent of contact—daily, weekly, monthly, yearly; and, the contact event (e.g.,
business meetings; occupying space in the same building; consultation; legal professional
representation; professional or trade association meeting or committee work; intimate social
gathering; large group social gathering; etc.)"
If the arbitrator has disclosed to the parties all circumstances that may cause concerns
about his partiality and neither of the parties raised any questions having being informed
about these circumstances, then the lack of independence or impartiality cannot be used as a
basis for challenging the arbitral award.103 One should consider here two exceptional
situations: the first is when one of the parties becomes aware of new circumstances which
affect the arbitrator's impartiality after the appointment has been made.104 The second
situation is when a party waives his right to object; for example, if he accepted that the other
party may call the arbitrator alone to produce books of accounts, he cannot then object to the
arbitrator on the grounds that there had been a private meeting between the arbitrator and the
other party105 or if he participated in the proceedings following the arbitrator's
appointment.106 However, if parties are allowed, in some situations, to waive their right to
l<r See the AAA Fact Sheet, Web Site address, (http://www.adr.org/).
103 If a prior relationship is disclosed before or during the arbitration and a party not object at the time,
the right to oppose enforcement on this ground is waived. See W. Michael Tupman, op. cit., p. 26 at
48; see also, Art. 12 (2) of the Model Law; Eckersley v. Mersey Docks [1894] 2 QB. 667.
104 This ground could be raised by a party against the arbitrator appointed by that party or in whose
appointment he has participated. See for example, Article 12 (2) of the Model Law; Article 18 (2) of
the Egyptian law of 1994; Abdul Hamid El Ahdab, "The New Egyptian Act...," op, cit., p. 78.
105 Hamilton v. Bankin (1850) 64 ER 703; (1850) 3 De G. &amp; Sm. 782; Shield Properties &
Investments v. Anglo-Overseas Transport Co , (1985) 273 E.G. 69.
106Rustal Trading Ltd. v. Gill & Duffus SA, [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 14; [2000] C.L.C. 231. In this case
Rustal applied to have the award set aside on grounds of serious irregularity pursuant to the
Arbitration Act 1996 Section 68 of the 1996 Act, contending that the arbitrator's impartiality was in
doubt due to his involvement in a recent and unusually acrimonious dispute involving much the same
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object on the arbitrator's acts, as in the above example, then this should not lead to the
presumption that a party can, by agreement, give up his right to challenge the impartiality and
independence of an arbitrator. Parties are not allowed to exclude by their agreement the
1 07
fundamental rights which are protected by the principle of due process.
The most important issue that has to be considered when claiming grounds for refusing
to enforce a foreign arbitral award is the distinction between national and international
arbitration. In this regard, it has been reported that the doctrinal trends give more
108consideration to disputes that involve elements of international commerce. For example,
the duty of an arbitrator to disclose all the circumstances that may raise questions about his
impartiality has been considered with more liberal understanding in cases that relate to
international commercial arbitration. This is due to the modern approach which calls for more
consideration being given to the specific character of international commercial arbitration.
This has been considered in Fertilizer Corp. of India v. I.D.I. Management, Inc.109The
US district court was reluctant to refuse to enforce an award under the New York
Convention. In this case the defendant learned only after the award had been rendered that the
arbitrator appointed by the plaintiff had been its counsel in at least two other legal
proceedings. Although public policy generally favoured "full disclosure of any possible
personalities as in the present case. The court dismissed the application on the ground that Rustal's
submission that it was unaware of the arbitrator's continued involvement in the case until after
publication of the award was rejected because it could, with due diligence, have made the discovery
earlier.
107 See in this regard W. Michael Tupman, op. cit., p. 26 at 52. In his view, "Parties to an arbitration
agreement could not violate public policy by providing for the appointment of an arbitrator who is
less than independent."
108
Stephen M. Schwebel and Susan G. Lahne, op cit., p. 210.
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interest or bias ...whenever one is in a position to determine the rights of others", the US
district court held that: "... the 'stronger public policy' in favour of international arbitration
must prevail to enforce the award in this case, particularly because non-disclosure had not
otherwise tainted the proceedings".
Other cases similarly reveal that the existence of a previous relationship between a
party and the arbitrator does not necessarily lead to the refusal of enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award. This has been applied in a decision made by the French courts in Denis
Coakley Ltd. v. Sle. Michel Reverdyu0 The award was attacked under Article V (2)(b) of the
New York Convention for considerations of violation of public policy on the basis that,
subsequent to rendering the award, an arbitrator had acted as counsel for one of the parties
when the award was on appeal before an appeal board constituted under the Arbitration Rules
of the Grain and Feed A ssociation. The French Court111 upheld the award on the grounds that
the arbitration panel on which the arbitrator had served "was definitively no longer competent
at the time he acted as counsel for the party, and because such a manner of proceeding is in
conformity with English law adopted by the parties". The court considered that Article V
(2)(b) of the New York Convention referred to international public policy, thus confirming
that: "the public policy governing the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is not domestic
public policy, but the public policy of international law of the state where the decision is
109 Fertilizer Corp. of India v. I.D.I. Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948 (1981); 530 F. Supp. 542
(SD Ohio 1982), Yearbook Vol. VIII (1983) at 419 (USA No. 41). Cited in W. Michael Tupman, op.
cit., p. 26 at 49.
110
Denis Coakley Ltd. v. Sle. Michel Reverdy, Court of Appeal of Reims (Civil Chamber), Judgement
of 23 July 1981, Yearbook Vol. IX (1984) at 400 (France No. 6). Cited in, Stephen M. Schwebel and
Susan G. Lahne, op cit., p. 210; Jacques Werner, "The Independence Of Arbitrators in Totalitarian
States," 14 J. Int. Arb., 1, (March 1997), p. 141.
111
See, Ibid, the judgement of 23 July 1981 of the Court of Appeal ofReims.
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invoked". The court asserted that the award rendered by the appeal arbitration board did not
112violate "the French concept of international public policy or due process."
Another example is the decision of the American Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
in Imperial Ethiopian Government v. Baruch Foster Corp.113 The respondent, Baruch Foster,
a United States corporation, had opposed the award because the arbitrator, the French
professor Rene David, was disqualified to act as an arbitrator since between 1954 and 1958
he had drafted the Ethiopian Civil Code. The Court of Appeals rejected the contention of
Baruch Foster by referring to Prof. David's integrity and reputation, and by adding that
Baruch Foster had failed "to come forward with anything tending to show that the claim was
asserted in good faith and for any reason other than delay." The US Court of Appeal rejected
that grounds as the court recognised that any relationship between the arbitrator and the
Ethiopian Governmen had ended 16 years prior to the date of the award.114
The above examples demonstrate the modern trends to the challenge of foreign arbitral
awards on the ground of lack of impartiality or independence. The test that has been followed
shows a considerable awareness of the importance of recognising that in international
commercial arbitration arbitrators may belong to a certain economic group or may have a
professional relationship with the parties115, which does not justify any influence on the
112 This decision was based on the French legislative distinction between international arbitration and
domestic arbitration. See French Code of Civil Procedure, Book IV, Arts. 1442-1507; Stephen M.
Schwebel and Susan G. Lahne, op cit., pp.210 -211; Ven den Berg, op. cit., pp. 377-380.
113 U.S. Court of Appeal (5th Cir.), Imperial Ethiopian Government v. Baruch Foster Corp. (U.S. no.
10); see also, Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 376.
114 The court also stated that: "Professor Rene David... is one of the most respected comparative
lawyers in Europe and throughout the world and a "man of honour and absolute integrity", to whom
bias therefore would not be easily imputed under any circumstances"; also see, W. Michael Tupman,
op. cit., p. 47.
115 See the decision of the Court of Appeal of Basle (Obergericht of Basle, June 3, 1971 (Switz. No.
5)). The court rejected the objection that the arbitral tribunal could not be considered independent
because all arbitrators came from the circle of merchants in raw materials, whilst no person
represented the leather manufacturing industry. The Court observed that the Swiss Supreme Court has
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arbitrator's mind, or create an actual appearance of bias.116 This shows that foreign arbitral
awards are subject to narrower public policy rules than the national standards, where
examining the validity of a foreign arbitral award on this ground requires a careful analysis of
each case separately, according to the surrounding circumstances and according to the
applicable law requiring the disclosure.
B. Other Procedural Requirements in the Arbitral Tribunal
There is another category of circumstances that could affect the validity of arbitral
awards whereby mandatory procedural rules are breached without that breach being based
upon the arbitrators' attitude. For example, some legal systems may require that an arbitral
tribunal should be composed of uneven number of arbitrators, which is a condition that aims
to assure the impartiality of the arbitrators. Also, some legal systems require that all
arbitrators should participate in the deliberation when rendering the final award. Finally,
some legal systems insist on nominating the arbitrators in the arbitration agreement as a
formal condition to constitute a validly composed arbitral tribunal.
In some legal systems, these are public policy requirements. However, there have been
substantive changes in such legal systems, which have started to distinguish between national
and international arbitration, and in practice national courts have recognised the importance
of distinguishing between the mandatory procedural requirements under their national laws,
been very reluctant to accept the composition of an arbitral tribunal in international commercial
arbitration as a violation of public order. The fact that an arbitrator belongs to a certain economic
group, according to the Court, did not justify considering him beforehand as not being independent.
The Court stated that the crucial question is whether in a specific case an arbitrator has been
dependent on one of the parties. The latter had not appeared to be the case for the arbitral tribunal in
question", cited in Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 378.
116 William W. Park, "Neutrality, Predictability and Economic Co-Operation," 12 j.Int.Arb., (1995),
p. 99 at 106.
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and the requirements of international public policy. This will be illustrated in the following
topics.
1. Uneven number of arbitrators
Many legal systems require that an arbitral tribunal should be composed of an uneven
number of arbitrators and consider this requirement as a mandatory procedural rule.117 Such
requirement can also be found under the rules of international arbitration institutions, for
example, in Article 8 (1) of the ICC Rules; and Article 5 of the Cairo Regional Centre for
International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA), which provide that an arbitral tribunal can
be composed of either a single or of three arbitrators.
Accordingly, an arbitration agreement that includes a clause providing for appointing
an even number of arbitrators might be considered as null and void, and therefore arbitral
awards that have been made by a tribunal composed of an even number of arbitrators can be
118refused for violating the due process in the country of enforcement. Van den Berg
illustrated this attitude form the point of view of these countries:119
117 See for example, Article 15 of the Egyptian law of 1994, which provides that: "The arbitral panel
consists, by agreement between the parties, of one or more arbitrators. In the absence of such
agreement on the number of arbitrators, the number shall be three"; Mohamed I.M. Aboul-Enein,
"The Development of International Commercial Arbitration Laws In the Arab World," a paper
presented to the conference of "International Commercial Arbitration" Cairo. January 28. (2000), p. 8.
He states that: "the Egyptian law requires, at risk of nullity, that if more than one arbitrator is to be
appointed, their number should be odd"; also see, Redfern and Hunter, 2nd ed., op, cit., p. 162, where
the authors refer to examples from several legal systems.
118 This is the case in Egypt, an award that results from a decision of an uneven number of arbitrators
is considered null and void for considerations of public policy. See Ahmad Abu al Wafa, op. cit., p.
172; Ashraf Al Rifaie, op. cit., p. 241; Abdul Hamid El Ahdab, "The New Egyptian Act...," op. cit.,
p. 65 pp 97-98. He states that: "it is a ground to set the award aside for being contrary to an imperative
provision of the law such as a choice of an even number of arbitrators"; One should mention here that
this is not a requirement under the Shari'a law. Mohamed I.M. Aboul-Enein, "Liberal Trends in
Islamic Law (Shari'a) on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes," 2 Journal ofArab Arbitration (2000), p. 1
at 7. He states that: "The study of the arbitrated cases according to Islamic Law proves that there are
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"In these countries it is considered that if the arbitrators are even in number, they will
almost always be appointed by the parties and be inclined to defend the point of view of the
party who nominated him. This inclination is less likely if there are three arbitrators, one of
which is not appointed by one party alone."
Nevertheless, some legal systems have adopted more flexible rules. For example,
Section 15 (2) of the English Arbitration Act of 1996 considers as valid the parties'
agreement to appoint two arbitrators or any other even number of arbitrators.120 If such
agreement was made then, unless the parties have otherwise agreed in writing, a court under
121Section 15 (2) could appoint an additional member to act as presiding arbitrator. This has
also been confirmed in Section 16 (4) which provides that: "If the tribunal is to consist of two
arbitrators, each party shall appoint one arbitrator not later than 14 days after service of a
request in writing by either party to do so."
The diversity of procedural rules which concern the number of arbitrators, may create a
problematic situation for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. A foreign arbitral award
that was made under a procedural law which permits the parties to compose the arbitral
tribunal of an even number of arbitrators, may encounter such problems if enforcement of the
award takes place in another country, and that country considers the composition of the
tribunal of an even number of arbitrators as contrary to its national mandatory rules.
no restrictions on the number of arbitrators. The two parties to a dispute may appoint one or more
arbitrators. The number of arbitrators may be odd or even. The matter was always left to the parties."
119 Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 380.
120 This is also the trend in other common law countries, also in France, Belgium, and Netherlands.
See Rene David, op. cit., p. 227; V. V. Veeder, op, cit., p. 29; the same may also exist in practice
under the procedural rules of certain trades, such as, the Rules of Refined Sugar Association. See
Redfem and Hunter, 2nd ed., op, cit., p. 52 and p. 204; Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 380.
121 Section 15 (2) of the English law of 1996 provides that: "Unless otherwise agreed by the parties,
an agreement that the number of arbitrators shall be two or any other even number shall be understood
as requiring the appointment of an additional arbitrator as chairman of the tribunal."
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Therefore, such grounds could arguably be established upon Article V (2)(b) of the New
York Convention.
Raising such ground could also be made under Article V (l)(d) of the New York
Convention, since Article V (l)(d) provides that an award may be refused if: "The
composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of
the country where the arbitration took place". However, one should recognise here that
refusing to enforce a foreign arbitral award under Article V (l)(d) could only be established if
one of the parties proves to the court that the composition of the arbitral authority was not in
accordance with the arbitration agreement or the law of the country where the arbitration took
place. Therefore considering this ground under Article V (2)(b) is important for the court of
enforcement, as the court could still refuse the enforcement if such composition violates the
mandatory rules of its national law and may refuse the enforcement of the award according to
Article V (2)(b) of the Convention.
Due to the importance of international commercial arbitration, an international public
policy rule has emerged in the domain of enforcement of foreign arbitral award, which
requires the national courts to accept the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award that was
made by even number of arbitrators. In this regard, several legal systems distinguish between
domestic and international public policy.122 In accordance with this distinction courts have
accepted the need to enforce foreign arbitral awards made by two arbitrators, as long as the
121
See, Rubino-Sammartano. M., op, cit., p. 312. He reported that the Italian courts consider this
matter as concerning the Italian domestic public policy and not the Italian international public policy.
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arbitral panel composition is valid according to the applicable rules of the particular
arbitration procedures. 123
Moreover, one could say that it is irrational to consider the requirement of composing
the arbitral tribunal of an odd number of arbitrators as a necessary requirement to guarantee
their impartiality, since the lack of impartiality of an arbitrator could only be established upon
the existence of certain circumstances which require to be proved, which differ from case to
case. Also, one should consider that, in practice, parties may appoint two arbitrators and
choose one of them as an umpire, which could be considered as appointing a sole arbitrator.
Therefore, an award which results from a decision of even number of arbitrators should be
enforced as long as the two arbitrators were impartial and have examined all the evidence
after giving each of the parties a fair.opportunity to present his case or defences.
2. All arbitrators should participate in the deliberations
It is generally acknowledged that if the arbitral tribunal consists of more than one
arbitrator then all arbitrators must participate in the deliberation.124 Some legal systems
consider the failure of all arbitrators to deliberate at the same time and place as a ground to
125annul the award for considerations of public policy. This is intended to guarantee that the
123
See, Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 380. He states that: "The even number of arbitrators is not a ground
for refusing enforcement of the award on account of public policy if an arbitral tribunal composed of
an even number of arbitrators is valid in the country in which, or under the law of which, the award
was made."
124 One should mention here that most of legal systems do not require in an award to be made by the
unanimous decision of all arbitrators, as an award could be made by the majority decision, but it
requires that an award must be made after a deliberation in which all arbitrators have taken part. In
this regard see Rene David, op cit., p. 315. He provides that: "unanimity is required in only a few
laws, for example, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela."
125 Aktham El kholy, op cit., p. 326. He reported that this was the case under Article 507 of the
Egyptian procedural law of (1968): "The Egyptian procedural law authors tend to consider as public
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award was made after a true exchange of views among all of the arbitrators, and to ensure
that justice has been considered by taking into consideration the opinion of all arbitrators.126
The first question that may arise here is whether or not arbitrators are necessarily
required to be physically present during the deliberations at the same time and place?
127This question was considered in Russell on Arbitration where it is said that:
"All must make award together. Where there are two or more arbitrators, all should
execute the award at the same time and place. If they do not, the award may be invalidated,
but as the objection is one of a formal character, if no other objection is shown, the court may
• • *128remit the award to the arbitrators for correction."
However, nowadays, the practice in international arbitration shows that an arbitrator
can draw up a draft and send it to the other or others for their consideration and comments.
After a draft is agreed, it then can be sent round and signed by each arbitrator separately.129
This situation was considered in European Grain v. Johnston.'"<0 In this case one arbitrator
signed a blank form of award which was filled in when the remaining two arbitrators reached
a decision. The sellers in this agreement accepted part of the award then sought to set aside
that part of the award that contradicts with their interest, holding them in default. In an appeal
policy the implicit requirement under the same Article 507 related to the need for all arbitrators to
participate in the deliberations."
126
See, Kenneth Smith Carlston, "The Process of International Arbitration," (1972). Cited in
International Commercial Arbitration, Cases, Materials and Notes on the Resolution of International
Business Disputes., (1997) The Foundation Press, INC,International Commercial Arbitration, p. 953.
127
Russell, F. Watson, Anthony., Russell on Arbitration, 19th ed. Stevens and Sons, (1979), p. 247;
See also, UN Doc. A/40/17, para. 246.
128
In Lord v. Lord (1855) 5 E. &amp; B. 404, each of two arbitrators signed the award but did so at a
different time and place. Coleridge J. said, at p. 406 that: "It is now clearly established that every
judicial act, to be done by two or more, must be completed in the presence of all who do it; for those
who are to be affected by it have a right to the united judgment of all up to the very last moment."
129 Hiscox v. Outhwaite [1992] 1 A.C. p. 562; [1991] 3 W.L.R. p. 297; [1991] 3 All E.R. p. 641;
[1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep. P. 435.
130
European Grain v. Johnston [1983] Q.B. 520; [1983] 2 W.L.R. 241.
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process, Lord Denning M.R. stated that:131 "whenever all [arbitrators] have signed, each must
be regarded as having assented to it, even though each signed it at a different time or place
from the others. That principle applies to an award of arbitrators just as it does to a written
agreement or any other document to be executed by two or three people." However, in
accordance to the facts of the case the court held that:
"... where persons were appointed to act together as arbitrators they were required to
reach a decision jointly; that it was misconduct on the part of the arbitrator to sign the award
form in blank without taking part in the decision process and for the other arbitrators to
endorse his action, that accordingly the whole award was defective but, since the sellers had
taken the benefit of the award, they were not entitled to have it set aside."
The second question that needs to be examined here is, whether or not the absence of
the signature in the award could be construed as a procedural defect, which indicates that not
all the arbitrators took part in the deliberation, and therefore a sufficient ground to refuse the
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award for considerations of violating a national procedural
mandatory rule.
Legal systems differ at this point, for example, Article 43 of the Egyptian law of 1994
provides that: "If the arbitral tribunal consists of more than one arbitrator, the signatures of
the majority of all arbitrators shall suffice, provided that the reasons for which the minority
did not sign is stated in the award". One can recognise that Article 43 of the Egyptian law of
1994 requires to state in the arbitral award the reasons for which the award is not signed by
the dissenting arbitrator.132 The latter is a mandatory requirement, which aims to prove that
all arbitrators have participated in the deliberations. Whereas, under Section 52 of the English
131
European Grain v. Johnston [1983] Q.B. at 525.
132 See also Article 31 of the Model Law, provides: "The award shall be made in writing and shall be
signed by the arbitrator or arbitrators. In arbitral proceedings with more than one arbitrator, the
signatures of the majority of all members of the arbitral tribunal shall suffice, provided that the reason
for any omitted signature is stated."
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Act of 1996, for example, parties have the freedom to agree on the form of the award, they
are allowed to agree on this issue. In the absence of the parties' agreement, Section 52
provides that the award can be "signed by all the arbitrators or all those assenting to the
award". Accordingly, unless otherwise agreed by the parties133, an arbitrator who does not
assent to the award does not have to sign it.134 Also under Section 52 of the English 1996 Act
it is not a requirement to specify the reasons for which a dissenting arbitrator did not sign the
award.135
It has been reported that the requirement of providing the dissenting opinion in the
arbitral award is a matter that differs between the Civil Law and Common Law systems. Such
a requirement contradicts with the practice of the civil law system, as one is not authorised to
mention the dissident opinion because this is considered to be a violation of the secrecy of
deliberations.136 In this regard, Laurent Levy explained the view of such legal systems.137 He
provides that: "The goal oi secret du delibere [confidentiality of deliberation] is to preserve
the collegial nature of the courts, to keep the judges immune from the parties' grudges, and so
138
to bolster their independence.' On the other hand, under the common law system,
133 If such requirement exists according to the parties' agreement and a dissenting arbitrator refused to
sign the award, this will be considered as a breach of the arbitrator's duty under Section 33. See
Cargill International SA v. Sociedad Iberica de Molturacion SA [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 489.
134 Andrew and Keren, op cit., p. 170.
135 See Rene David, op cit., p. 317. He states that: "...this mention is not required in the Common
Law countries nor in various countries of Latin America"; see Bank Mellat v. GAA Development &
Constriction Co., 2 Lloyd's Rep. 44, 49-51 (1988).
136 Abdul Hamid El Ahdab, "The New Egyptian Act...," op. cit., p. 78; Ronald Bernstein, "General
Principles, in Handbook of Arbitration Practice," (1987), p. 101; W. Laurence Craig, Et A.L.
"International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration 332-35 (2d ed. 1990). Cited in the "International
Commercial Arbitration, Cases, Materials and Notes on the Resolution of International Business
Disputes," (1997) The Foundation Press, INC., Directing Editor, David L. Shapiro.
137 Laurent Levy, "Dissenting Opinions in International Arbitration in Switzerland," 5 Arb. Int.,
(1989), 35-39.
138
However, according to Laurent Levy's opinion, "Such considerations are largely foreign to
arbitration where the parties appoint the judges." Ibid., p 39.
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providing the dissenting opinion in the arbitral award is not a violation to the secrecy of
deliberation.
Therefore, one should consider here that there are countries which consider mentioning
the dissenting opinion in the award as a violation to the secrecy of the deliberation, while
other countries do allow mentioning the dissent opinion and other countries are required by
mandatory rules to state the reasons for which the dissenting arbitrator did not sign the award.
The diversity between the procedural laws in this regard may lead to obstruct the enforcement
of foreign arbitral awards as the application of such requirement to the enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards would be unacceptable.
There is a growing tendency to enforce foreign arbitral awards even if the law of the
country where enforcement takes place requires rendering the award according to the
deliberations of all arbitrators, particularly if one of the arbitrators had deliberately attempted
to frustrate the arbitration by refusing to participate in the deliberations.139 Also, one should
consider Article V (l)(d) of the New York Convention as it provides that enforcement of the
award may be refused if the arbitration procedure was not in accordance with the rules
chosen by the parties or to the law of the country where arbitration took place. Accordingly,
determining the validity of the award should be determined according to the law which
governed the arbitration proceedings. For example, if the parties agree to apply the LCIA
Rules, then, according to Article 26.1, the award can be signed "by the arbitral tribunal or
139 Such requirement may encourage an arbitrator, who considers himself as the representative of the
one of the parties, to deliberately refuse to participate in the deliberations or to sign the award if he
recognises that the majority decision is not in favour of the interest of the party who nominated him.
Redfern and Hunter, 2nd ed., op, cit., p. 370 and 401; also see Klaus Peter Berger, op, cit., p. 612. He
states that: "The dissenting arbitrator is not allowed to go further than communicating his legal
opinion on the merits of the case, e.g. by giving an authentic commentary and interpretation of the
award as so to provide "his party" with indications on how to attack the award before the courts of the
seat of arbitration."
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those of its members assenting to it", and according to Article 26. 2 of the LCIA Rules if one
of the arbitrators refused to attend the deliberation or refused to sign the award then, the
remaining arbitrators may proceed in his absence and state in their award the circumstances
of the other arbitrator's failure to participate in the making of the award.140
Due to the need to adopt an approach that corresponds to the latest trends in
international commercial arbitration, the Cairo Court of Appeals took a step forward by
considering the application of such mandatory rules in a less restrictive manner as required
under the notion of international public policy. In a decision on 11 August 1996 the Court
decided that non-signature of the arbitral award did not mean that deliberation of the arbitral
panel did not take place141, but it only meant that the concerned arbitrator did not approve the
award after the deliberations in the case under review. The Court also indicated that the
arbitral award was not obliged to outline the reasons for the refusal by an arbitrator to sign
the arbitral award if he did not mention those reasons himself.
3. The requirement of nominating the arbitrators in the arbitration agreement
First, a distinction should be made here between the requirement of disclosing the
names of the arbitrators in the arbitration agreement and the requirement of informing the
parties of the identity of the selected arbitrators. The latter relates to the proper notice of the
appointment of the arbitrators, which is subject to Articles V (l)(d) and V (2)(b) of the New
140 Article 26.2 of the LCIA Rules: "If any arbitrator fails to comply with the mandatory provisions of
any applicable law relating to the making of the award, having been given a reasonable opportunity to
do so, the remaining arbitrators may proceed in his absence and state in their award the circumstances
of the other arbitrator's failure to participate in the making of the award."
141 The Cairo Court ofAppeal's decision on 11 August 1996 in Commercial Case No. 61 of the 113th
judicial year. Cited in, Tarek F. Riad, "Arbitration and legal Business Environment in Egypt," 17
J.Int. Arb., (2000), p. 169.
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York Convention, as already noted in this chapter. This was considered by the Court of
Appeal in Germany on 1 June (1976), in regard to challenging of an arbitral award because
the parties were not informed of the identity of the appointed arbitrator.142 The arbitral award
related to a dispute between a Danish buyer and a Federal Republic ofGerman seller and was
made under the rules of the Copenhagen Arbitration Committee for Grain and Feed Stuff
Trade. According to the procedures of the Copenhagen Arbitration Committee for Grain and
Feed Stuff Trade, "the President of the Committee would select the arbitrators to act on a
specific case from a publicly available list, but the parties would not be informed of the
identity of the specific arbitrators selected. The resulting award would be signed only by the
President." The German Court of Appeal refused to recognise the award under Article V
(2)(b) of the New York Convention, finding that recognition would have been against the
public policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. The court emphasised the importance of
informing the parties with the names of the selected arbitrators since this clarifies any
objections against the impartiality of a selected arbitrator and guarantees fair arbitration
procedures. Furthermore, the court considered this requirement as a "fundamental principle
of both FR Germany and international legal order". The court stated that:
"The institution of challenge can be effective only if the parties have the possibility of
knowing the names of the judges or arbitrators who take part in the decision of the dispute in
question. Only if this condition is fulfilled, can it be investigated whether the judge or
arbitrator who takes part is partial and can his participation be prevented. In international law
also, great importance is attached to the disclosure of the names of arbitrators: in the New
York Convention (Art. V, para. 1 under b) as well as in the European Convention (Art. IX,
para. 1, under b), the lack of notification of the appointment of the arbitrators is mentioned
expressly as a ground for refusal of recognition and enforcement."143
142 The Cologne Oberlandesgericht, Federal Republic of Germany, see Yearbook Vol. IV ( 1979) at
258; (FR Germany No. 14). Cited in, Stephen M. Schwebel and Susan G. Lahne, op. cit., p. 212 -
213; Christopher B. Kuner, op. cit., p. 82.
143 Also see, Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 378 providing that the name of the arbitrator is a prerequisite
to be known to the parties. If that is not done, a party is deprived of the possibility to investigate
whether the arbitrator lacks impartiality and to challenge him.
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Nominating the arbitrators in the arbitration agreement on the other hand is a
requirement that concerns the validity of the composition of the arbitral tribunal. Some legal
systems consider the failure to disclose the name of the arbitrator in the arbitration agreement
as a reason to refuse the enforcement of the arbitral award. This was the situation in Egypt
prior to the 1994 law144, where this issue occurred before the Egyptian courts on several
occasions with reference to the requirement of Article 502 (3) of the Civil Procedural Law of
1968. Article 502 (3) considers not nominating the arbitrators in the arbitration agreement to
be a violation of public policy, and therefore a serious grounds for refusing to enforce a
foreign arbitral award.145 Article 502 (3) of the Civil Procedural Law necessitates the direct
involvement of the parties to select the arbitrators by names; it provides that:
"Without prejudice to the provisions contained in special legislative acts, the
arbitrators have to be nominated either in the arbitration agreement or in a separate
agreement."
In Rolaco Holdings S.A. and Casino Palace Port Said v. The Mohafazal ofPort Said
and Suez Canal Authority , the Port Said Court of First Instance ordered the stay of ICC
arbitral proceedings to take place in Egypt on the ground that the contract's provision for
arbitration was "at variance with the established judiciary rules in the Arab Republic ofEgypt
which require the two parties' agreement on the name of the arbitrator."
This was the case until the Egyptian Court of Cassation made a distinction between the
application of this rule to national arbitration and international arbitration.147 The Egyptian
144 Under Article 17of the Egyptian arbitration law of 1994 it is no longer a requirement to provide the
names of the arbitrators in the arbitration agreement.
145
See, Aktham El kholy, op cit., p. 323; Ashraf A1 Rifaie, op. cit., p. 227.
146 Rolaco Holdings S.A. and Casino Palace Port Said v. The Mohafazat ofPort Said and Suez Canal
Authority, ICC Document 410/6618. Cited in Stephen M. Schwebel and Susan G. Lahne, op. cit., p.
215.
147 The English courts have had the chance to express their opinion in this regard as early as 1894 in
Hamlyn &amp; Co. v. Talisker Distillery. [1894] A.C. 202, at p, 214. Lord Watson provided that:
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Court of Cassation was confronted with this issue on two occasions: The first was when the
Alexandria Court of Appeal refused to enforce an award on the basis that the arbitrators who
rendered the award (in England, in one case, and in France, in the other case) had not been
nominated by the parties themselves in conformity with Article 502.3 of the Egyptian Code
of Civil Procedures. The highest judicial court rejected that argument by stating in its first
decision of 26 April 1982 that:148
"It is unacceptable to claim the exclusion of the applicable English law under the
pretext that it violates Article 502 (3) Procedures, even if we assume that this is true. The
possibility of excluding the rules of the foreign applicable law is conditioned according to
Article 28 of the Civil Code upon the proof that these rules are contrary to public policy in
Egypt, i.e., in conflict with social, political, economic or moral bases which relate to the
supreme interests of the community. Thus, it is not sufficient that the foreign rules contradict
a mandatory legal text."
The second decision was made on 13 June 1983, which stated that:14'
"The validity of the arbitration agreement had to be decided under the law of the place
of arbitration and that Article 502 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedures . . does not relate to
public policy."
IV. Concluding Remarks
Several legal systems contain lists ofwhat can be considered as fundamental procedural
rules, the violation of which would justify refusing the enforcement of a foreign arbitral
award. It is difficult to specify and examine all issues that can be considered as requirements
"The rule that a reference to arbiters not named cannot be enforced does not appear to me to rest upon
any essential considerations of public policy."
148
M. V. Lela v. GulfContractors, Court of Cassation (Egypt), April 26, 1982, (Case No. 714 - judicial
year 47), Mediterranean and Middle East Arbitration Quarterly 1988, No. 2, at 1. See, Aktham El
kholy, op cit., p. 325; Rubino-Sammartano. M., op, cit., p. 234.
149
Misr Insurance v. M.V. Dominion Trader, Court of Cassation (Egypt), June 13, 1983, (Case No.
1259 - judicial year 49 ), Mediterranean and Middle East Arbitration Quarterly 1988, No. 2, at 8. See
Aktham El kholy, op cit., p. 325; Rubino-Sammartano. M., op, cit., p. 235.
235
of procedural public policy because these requirements vary from state to state150; therefore it
is possible that a defence of denial of due process, which may find success in one jurisdiction,
may be unsuccessful in another.151 National procedural public policy rules may include
formal requirements, the violation of which may not necessarily lead to a vital denial of
justice to the parties.
Mandatory procedural conditions that do not rest upon principles of universal
acceptance can be found in many legal systems. For example, some legal systems may
require the person undertaking the position of arbitrator to be of a particular nationality,
religion or gender. Some of the Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Kuwait, in
particular, do not permit woman to be appointed as arbitrators because women are precluded
from adjudicating disputes.132 The international consensus according to the vast majority of
countries, and therefore what could be considered as the international public policy rule, is
150
See, Andrew and Keren, op cit., p. 289; Rubino-Sammartano. M., op, cit., p. 303, stating that:
"Procedural public policy plays a role in arbitral proceedings which differs depending on the
applicable procedural law."
151 Paul Friedland and Robert Homick, "The Relevance of International Standards in the Enforcement
ofArbitration Agreements under the New York Convention," 6 The American Review ofInternational
Arbitration, (1995), p. 151.
152 Rene David, op. cit., p. 246; Abudl Hamid El-Ahdab, "Saudi Arabia Accedes to the New York
Convention," J. Int. Arb., p. 87 at 91; Mhaidib Al-Mhaidib, Arbitration as a Means of Settling
Commercial Disputes, Special Reference to the Kingdom ofSaudi Arabia, Thesis (Ph.D.) University
of Edinburgh (1997). However, El Ahdab indicates that there are exceptions to the conditions which
are required in an arbitrator according to Shari'a law, that is when arbitration takes place in a non-
Moslem country even between two Muslims. See Abdul Hamid El Ahdab, "General Introduction on
Arbitration...," op, cit., p. 12; also, Abdul Hamid El Ahdab, "The New Egyptian Act...," op. cit., p.
77. This has been confirmed by Mohamed Aboul-Enein, by depending on the case of the Caliph
"Omar Ibn AI-Khattab" who appointed a female called El-Shafae as a judge in the market to decide
cases that may arise between parties in disputes in the market. The simple analogy would be that if the
woman is eligible to be a judge, she could also be appointed as an arbitrator if she satisfied the
requirements for being a judge. Mohamed I.M. Aboul-Enein, "Liberal Trends in Islamic Law...", op.
cit., p. 1 at 8. It is worth mentioning that the Egyptian law of 1994 provides an explicit provision in
this regard in Article 16. 2 which does not require an arbitrator to be of any gender or nationality
unless otherwise has been agreed upon by the parties: "It is not a requirement for an arbitrator to be of
a given gender or of a specific nationality, unless otherwise agreed upon between the parties or has
been provided by law."
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that the arbitrator's gender does not constitute a sufficient reason to refuse the enforcement of
a foreign arbitral award, since such ground could not establish a justifiable claim that a vital
interest injustice has been violated.
The procedural public policy issues that have been addressed in this chapter prove that
the general trend is to construe the Convention's public policy defence narrowly by confining
the application of this ground to the minimum standards ofjustice as known in the practice of
international commercial arbitration.
Requirements of purely national public policy rules should not have any impact on the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Refusal to enforce a foreign arbitral award for
considerations of procedural public policy should only be based on the requirements of
justice between the parties, that may lead to denial of substantial justice, and where there are
matters which may gravely affect the validity of the award or the right to proceed under it.
Accordingly, national courts are required to give more consideration to applying common
sense rather than insisting on applying a formal rule, which may not be suitable for the
requirements of international commercial arbitration. Courts are also required to take into
account in their decision-making, that not all of their national rules form part of international
public policy, and that international arbitral awards should not be exposed to procedural
traditions and concepts of their national legal systems. This does not mean that all judicial
review of international arbitral awards should be abolished, since domestic courts are
required to preserve the integrity of the arbitral process. The only question the courts should
be concerned with when they are requested to review a foreign arbitral award is whether or
237
not the procedural requirements have been respected and whether there has been a serious
violation of due process.153
153
Henry P. De Vries, op. cit., p. 52.
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CHAPTER SIX
PUBLIC POLICY IN RELATION TO THE SUBJECT MATTER
OF THE DISPUTE
Chapter Six
Public Policy in relation to the Subject Matter of the Dispute
This subject matter of a dispute may raise various grounds for non-enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award. It is important to mention that the public policy element here may overlap
with the notion of arbitrability.1 Public policy in this sense could be invoked in order to
examine whether the award relates to certain kinds of disputes that by their subject matter are
excluded from arbitration. Public policy could also be invoked where the outcome of the
arbitrators' decision contradicts with interests that have significant importance to the state in
which enforcement is required. Therefore, the breadth of this topic vary, depending on how
the relevant state and their enforcing authority interprets the public policy ground. Attention
will be given, therefore, to particular examples according to what have occurred in practice
before national courts of different legal systems.
The analysis will be prefaced by a review of the various definitions of public policy,
identified in chapter two.2 Several writers interpret, and court decisions understand public
policy as reflecting the fundamental moral, political and economic interests of every
community. The subject matter of disputes has a bearing on most of these interests. This




1 The relationship between public policy and arbitrability has been examined in chapter one. See
Chapter One, at p. 54.




It is natural to find moral standards and cultural principles that are peculiar to every
community. It is also common to find rules of law that stem from moral principles, which
impose on the members of a given community orders and obligations that they cannot
derogate from by their autonomous agreements. Such mandatory moral rules may vary from
place to place and from time to time.3 It follows that any agreement of dubious morality
could be nullified for considerations of public policy, in the community in which such
mandatory moral rules are invoked.4 However, it is important to consider that there is no
clear-cut definition of what could be regarded as a moral principle that could establish (under
the head ofmorality) an obligation that would compel the members of a given community to
comply. For example, it would be difficult to determine whether or not a certain custom or a
religious principle has an imperative importance that lies at the heart of the legal system in a
given community. Therefore, it will be difficult for an arbitral tribunal, and in a later stage for
the court where enforcement of the award is sought, to determine the validity of an
international commercial transaction according to its coherence and consistency with such
variable national moral standards. No one can determine on behalf of a given culture what is
acceptable and what is offensive to the moral standards as comprehended in that culture. It
3 See Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, op. cit., p. 182. He states that: "The values and standards of
communities are not stable, they change and develop. So does public policy since it is derived
therefrom."; For example, gambling or prostitution, where the validity of such agreements may vary
from country to country; Dennis Lloyd, op. cit., pp. 101 and 113; Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 376; Pierre
Lalive, "Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 290; Mahmoud Hashim,
op. cit., p. 148.
4 See Dennis Lloyd, op. cit., p. 104. He refers to the basic principal which provides that: "one cannot
derogate by individual agreements from laws which concern public order or good morals."
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will also be difficult to establish moral standards that suit all nations and various cultures
from different backgrounds.
With these difficulties in mind, it could be argued that determining the validity of a
foreign arbitral award could only be based upon the national moral standards in the country in
which enforcement is sought. However, one should recognise that international moral
standards do also exist. This could be recognised if we consider that there are certain
agreements or activities which are prohibited world wide because they violate standards of
morality that are common to all, or at least to the vast majority of countries. For example,
agreements that violate human rights such as trafficking in human beings, or agreements that
include employment of mercenaries or terrorist actions5, organised crime, the trafficking of
arms6 or drugs7 and corruption.
In the domain of international commercial arbitration, it has long been recognised that
international arbitrators are obliged to not put into effect obligations the ultimate purpose of
which is contrary to international moral standards. Also, enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards could be refused if the subject matter of the dispute violates public policy rules and
morality of the international community. To illustrate the effect of such international moral
standards on the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, I will focus on one of the common
3 On terrorism, see, for example, General Assembly of the UN, "Resolution 34/ 145 (Measures to
prevent intentional terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardises
fundamental freedoms, ...)", ILM XIX (1980), 533; General Assembly of the UN, "Drafting of an
International Convention .Against the Taking of Hostages", ILM XVIII (1979), 1456; Pierre Lalive,
"Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 306.
6
See, for example, The Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993; Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or
Truly International) Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 585.
7 There are several UN Drug Control Conventions. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988; See, web site address,
(http://www.undcp.org/resolutions.html); also see, UN General Assembly, "Resolution 393/141
(International Campaign Against Traffic in Narcotic Drugs)"; "Resolution 39/ 142 (Declaration on the
Control of Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse)" and "Resolution 39/143 (International Campaign
Against Traffic in Drugs)", ILM XXIV (1985) 1157; Klaus Peter Berger, op. cit., p. 676.
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examples which has occurred in international commercial arbitration; this example relates to
o
bribery, corruption , or what is known as the purchase of influence in international trade.
B. Corruption and purchase of influence in international trade
Corruption is immoral behaviour whereby one of the parties obtains a contract that he
would not be able to obtain without resorting to bribery, the illegal use of personal influence
and corrupting governmental officials.9 In international commercial relations corruption is
regarded as an illegal act which violates the fundamental principles of contractual morality.10
8 One should consider that bribery is somewhat different from corruption, where a bribe is to try to
make (someone) do something for you by giving them money, presents or something else that they
want, where corruption is a dishonestly by using a position or power to achieve a personal advantage.
However, both situations may lead to the same effect, which is to obtain benefits from a person in a
public position.
9
Steven R. Salbu, "Transnational Bribery: The Big Questions," 21 J. INTL. L. BUS. (2001), p. 435;
Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed., vol. 9 (1974), para. 394, p. 268, where bribery is examined
under the heading "Agreements Injurious to Public Life"; Chitty on Contracts, 25th ed. (1983), para.
1048, p. 557, where bribery is examined under the heading "Objects Injurious to Good Government:
Domestic Affairs"; Cheshire Fifoot and Furmston, The Law of Contract, 11th ed. (1986), p. 355,
where bribery is examined under the heading "A Contract Liable to Corrupt Public Life"; In
Montefiore v. Menday Motor Components Company, Limited, 1918, 2 K.B. p 241, the court decided
that: "It is contrary to public policy that a person should be hired for money or valuable consideration
to use his position and influence to procure a benefit from the Government, and a contract for that
purpose is therefore illegal and void."
10 The effect of corruption on the economic and social development of countries around the world has
been recognised by several international conventions. See, the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating
the Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Transactions, signed on 17 December 1997, and came
into effect on 15 February 1999; also see, Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or Truly International) Public
Policy...", op. cit., p. 293. He referred to the studies, recommendations and resolutions of the United
Nations: "Bribery in contracts has been studied by the United Nations either as a subject in it self or in
the context of other subjects such as the activity of transnational corporations; See "Resolution 3514
of the General Assembly, Resolution 2014 (LXI) of the Economic and Social Council (Corrupt
Practices, Particularly Illicit Payments in International Commercial Transactions)", ILM (1976).
1222; "UN Commission on Transnational Corporations: Report of the Working Group on the
Formulation of a Code ofConduct" ILM XV I ( 1977), 709; "Economic and Social Council: Report of
the Ad Hoc Working Group on Corrupt Practices in International Commercial Transaction", ILM XV
I (1977), 1236; "Report of the Committee of the Economic and Social Council on an International
Agreement on Illicit Payments", ILM XVIII (1979), 1025; "Draft Code of Conduct of the UN on
Transnational Corporations", ILM XXII (1983), 177 and XIII (1984). 626.
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In international commercial arbitration, disputes that involve the bribery of a foreign
government official can be considered arbitrable and therefore could be determined by
arbitral tribunals.11 This may be due to the difficulty of distinguishing between illegal
agreements which include the use of influence in international trade and other legal
transactions that involve legal commissions, where the latter type of agreements are common
in international trade. Therefore, arbitrators could examine the validity of such agreements to
determine whether or not the contract is illegal on the ground of international public policy.12
This was the view of the arbitral tribunal in ICC case No. 111013, the claimant, an
Argentinean party, claimed for a commission that relates to a contract obtained by a British
Corporation in Argentina. The contract was based on an earlier agreement according to which
the claimant was to receive 10% of the value of £400,000 in return for his intervention with
the Argentinean authorities in favour of the English company. The arbitrator recognised that a
major portion thereof was to be used to bribe employees of the then Argentine government.
Whilst neither party raised the issue of public policy, the arbitral tribunal held that:
"...it is impossible to close one's eyes to the probable destination of amounts of this
magnitude, and to the destructive effect thereof on the business pattern with consequent
impairment of industrial progress. Such corruption is an international evil; it is contrary to
good morals and to an international public policy common to the community of nations."14
11
See, Northrop Corp v. Triad, 593 F. Supp. 928 (1984), where commission (or bribery) was paid to
foreign government officials. In the latter case the USA court did not find bribery inarbitrable on
grounds of public policy; also see, Judgement of Mr. Justice Colman in Westacre Investments Inc v.
Jugoimport SPDR Holding Co Ltd., [1998] 3 W.L.R. 770; [1998] 4 All E.R. 570; [1998] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. Ill; [1998] C.L.C. 409.
12 It has been established in Chapter Three that international arbitrators are not guardians of a
particular national law, therefore, an international commercial arbitrator could apply moral standards
which are common to the community of nations. See Chapter Three, at p. 147.
13 ICC case No.1110/1963, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (1996), p. 47; also see, Julian Lew,
Applicable Law International Commercial Arbitration, op. cit., p. 553; Julian Lew, '"Determination
of Arbitrators' Jurisdiction..," op. cit., p. 84; Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or Truly International)
Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 293.
14 The tribunal further concluded that: "Parties who ally themselves in an enterprise of the present
nature must realise that they have forfeited any right to ask for the assistance of the machinery of
justice, be it national courts or arbitral tribunals, in settling their disputes."
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In another ICC case15, the arbitral tribunal decided that the payment of bribes by a British
firm was the cause of the obligation undertaken by a French firm. The tribunal decided to
nullify the contract on the ground of its violation of international public policy. It held that:
"This solution is not only in keeping with internal French public policy, it is also dictated by
the concept of international public policy as is recognised by the majority of states."16
The above two examples demonstrate the condemnation of corruption by international
arbitral tribunals under the duty of protecting the interest of the international commercial
community, whereby arbitrators could examine the merits of the dispute and determine the
illegality of the subject matter of the dispute in conformity with the requirements of
international public policy.
However, national courts in the country of enforcement will always have the last word,
as they can review the arbitral award, and accordingly may revoke the award if it failed to
take into consideration the invalidity of the parties' agreement due to bribery or corruption.
Even if the arbitral tribunal had nullified an agreement on the ground of breach of public
policy, national courts could vacate the arbitral award if it appears that the agreement does
not breach national public policy. This was the case in Hilmarton v. OTV before the Geneva
Court of Appeal.17 The arbitral tribunal considered the circumstances under which the
agreement was made and found that the consultancy agreement between the parties was
15 ICC No. 3913/1981, I Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards (1981), p. 497; Pierre Lalive,
"Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 292.
16 The concept of good morals in international commercial relations was also asserted in ICC
proceedings Case No. 2730/1982, Collection ofICC Arbitral Awards Vol. I (1984), p. 490; ICC case
No. 3916/1981, 1982 1 Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards (1984) p. 507, concerning payment of
bribes between French and Iranian parties; Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or Truly International)
Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 292; Rubino Sammartano . M., op. cit., p. 315; Julian DM Lew,
"Determination of Arbitrators' Jurisdiction...," op. cit., pp. 73 and 84.
17 Hilmarton v. OTV. Reported in (1994) XIX Yearbook 214; Cited in ILA Report, London
Conference (2000), op. cit., p. 33.
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contrary to public policy, since in order to obtain the contract Hilmarton breached the
mandatory rules of Algerian law, which prohibit any intervention of intermediaries in the
obtaining of a public contract. However, the Geneva Court of Appeal did not consider the
contract to be in breach of the public policy of the Swiss law, which was the applicable law to
the contract, and therefore overturned the award on the ground that it had been rendered
without legal reason.
By contrast, a different view was followed by the English courts in Westacre
1 R
Investments Inc. v. Jugoimport - SDPR Holding Co. Ltd. The court expressed its confidence
that if the issue of illegality by reason of corruption was referred to high calibre ICC
arbitrators and duly determined by them, it would be entirely inappropriate in the context of
the New York Convention that the enforcement court should be invited to retry that very
issue in the context of a public policy submission.19 In Westacre v. Jugoimport case, the issue
concerned the enforceability of a Swiss ICC arbitral award, in respect of a 500 million USD
contract for the sale ofweapons to Kuwait. The award related to an agreement for the supply
of arms from Yugoslavia to Kuwait under which it was alleged that bribes had been made to
Kuwaiti officials to secure the sale of arms. The defendant Jugoimport contended before
both the arbitrators and the Swiss Federal Court that the contract was illegal and
unenforceable because the agreement violated public policy in Kuwait. The arbitrators
rejected these allegations and considered the contract valid. The defendant later sought,
before the English court, to introduce new evidence in support of its allegations of bribery.
18 Westacre Investments Inc v. Jugoimport SPDR Holding Co Ltd, [1998] 3 W.L.R. 770; [1998] 4 All
E.R. 570; [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. Ill; [1998] C.L.C. 409.
19 Unlike the Hilmarton case, see above, the court in Jugoimport case decided that Jugoimport would
not be entitled to reopen issues of fact already decided upon by the arbitrators under the Arbitration
Act 1975 Section 5(3).
20
A Yugoslavian state owned company.
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The court considered that the dispute has already been litigated and decided by a foreign
tribunal as it held that:
"...the arbitrators had considered the allegations and ruled that the contract was not illegal
without evidence of incompetence or bad faith that finding would be upheld."
Furthermore, the court recognised that there is an international public policy rule of priority
to be applied, which imposes the duty to recognise the finality of international arbitral
awards. The court held that:
"The court deciding on the enforcement issue, would have to consider whether the policy of
not enforcing illegal judgements outweighed the countervailing policy of encouraging finality
in judgements. The policy of encouraging the enforcement of international arbitral awards
should outweigh the policy of discouraging international corruption."21
The above decisions raise an important question; which law should be applied to decide the
validity of foreign arbitral awards that involve corruption in international commercial
transactions? The following examples shed light on the trend that was followed by several
national courts in determining this issue.
In the Hilmarton case the Geneva Court of Appeal referred to the public policy of the
22
applicable law to the contract which was, at the same time, the national law of the court."
The English courts have also expressed this view when it was asked to enforce the Hilmarton
award which has been mentioned above.23 OTV applied to set aside the award before the
21
Jugoimport appealed against the court order, but the court dismissed the appeal, it confirmed that:
"...notwithstanding that neither Swiss nor English public policy would have countenanced the claim
succeeding if bribery had been established, the arbitrators had considered the allegations and ruled
that the contract was not illegal. Without evidence of incompetence or bad faith that finding would be
upheld." See, [2000] 1 Q.B. 288; [1999] 3 W.L.R. 811; [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 65.
22 Hilmarton v. OTV. Reported in (1994) XIX Yearbook 214; Cited in ILA Report, London
Conference (2000), op. cit., p. 33.
23 Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation SA v. Hilmarton Ltd, [1999] 2 All E.R. (Comm), p 146;
[1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 222.
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English courts, contending, inter alia, that enforcement would be contrary to English public
policy under section 103 of the 1996 Act because the award assisted the use of intermediaries
in an agreement which was prohibited under the law of the place of performance (the
Algerian law). The court held, refusing the application, that the arbitral award should be
enforced even if the contract would have breached English public policy in that it required a
contravention ofAlgerian law. The court decision considered that the arbitral award had been
given effect under Swiss law (the applicable law to the contract) and that it is based on a
finding of fact that the contract was not tainted by corruption.
There may also be other circumstances where national courts may determine the
validity of such agreements by taking into consideration both their national law and other
laws that have close connection with the parties' agreement, such as the law of the country in
which the agreement will be performed.24 This view was followed by the U.S courts in
25 • •
Northrop Corporation v. Triad Financial establishment. ~ The Californian Federal District
Court refused to enforce an award concerning a contract which involved the payment of
commissions to an agent in respect of arms sales to Saudi Arabia. The court established its
decision on the grounds that the contract was based on payment of illegal commissions which
is contrary to the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA)26, and the
Saudi Arabian Decree No 1275, of September 17, 1975.27
24 It reported that in England: "Contracts for the purchase of personal influence, if to be performed in
England, would not be enforced on the basis that they are contrary to English domestic public policy.
But where such a contract is to be performed abroad, it is only if performance would be contrary to
the domestic public policy of that country (as well as of England) that the English court would not
enforce it." See the ILA Report, London Conference (2000), op. cit., p. 31.
23
Northrop Corporation v. Triad Financial establishment, 593 F Snpp 928 (1984). Cited in Julian
DM Lew, "Determination of Arbitrators' Jurisdiction...", op. cit., p. 80.
26 See Internet address: http://www.ita.doc.gov/legal/fcparev.html
27 This trend was also followed in an ICC award (Case No. 4409). An arbitrator was asked to decide
upon the legality of certain payments promised as a counterpart for services aiming to facilitate
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To determine the validity of commission agreements in relation to the relevant national
mandatory rules of a foreign law, the national courts should bear in mind that this may vary
from case to case, and could depend upon certain national rules which may prohibit
commission in certain fields of trade, for example, commission agreements in relation to oil
supply contracts. This view was followed by the English courts in Lemenda Trading Co. Ltd
v. African Middle East Petroleum Co. Ltd?% The dispute involved an agreement to pay
commission on oil supply contracts. The commission contract was declared void under the
laws of Qatar on the basis that its object was contrary to public policy in the state of Qatar.
The court distinguished between domestic contracts and international contracts. It held that:29
"English courts should not enforce an English law contract which fails to be performed
abroad where: (i) it relates to an adventure which is contrary to a head of English public
policy which is founded on general principles of morality, and (ii) the same public policy
applies to the country of performance so that the agreement would not be enforceable under
the law of that country."
In addition, the court founded its decision upon the principle of international comity as a
suitable reason for the English courts to refuse to enforce international agreements which
would raise questions of immorality.30 The decision explicitly states that: "some heads of
obtaining a military procurement contract. After adjudicating the dispute, the arbitrator declared that
the claimed payments are illegal because they were promised within the framework of an agreement
having as its exclusive purpose the corruption of vital institutions that must be kept immune from any
possible traffic of influence. In this award, Egyptian law was declared to be the governing law, and
accordingly the sole arbitrator relied on the Egyptian domestic concept of nullity for illegal cause as a
mandatory rule of national public policy; also see, Aktham A. El Kholy, "The Enforcement of
International Arbitral Awards", Al- Tahkim Al- Arabi, Vol. 2, January 2000, p. 20 at 21.
28 Lemenda Trading Co. Ltd v. African Middle East Petroleum Co. Ltd [1988] 1 QB 448 at 454; KA
297.
29
Ibid., [1988] 1 QB., p. 461.
30
In this case the court referred to Lord Halsbury L.C. in In re Missouri Steamship Co. (1889) 42
Ch.D. 321, 336., which demonstrates the English courts attitude in deciding on the validity of
agreements that involve issues of immorality. In the In re Missouri Steamship Co. case the court held
that: "Where a contract is void on the ground of immorality, or is contrary to such positive law as
would prohibit the making of such a contract at all, then the contract would be void all over the world,
and no civilised country would be called on to enforce it"; Andrew and Keren, op. cit., pp. 296 and
297.
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public policy are based on universal principles of morality".31 Under the concept of
international public policy the court recognised the duty to maintain the minimum standards
ofmorality which oblige the international community to co-operate in order to prevent such
evil agreements world-wide.32
The cases of corruption demonstrated above imply that an internationally accepted
standard of morality does exist, condemning illicit commercial practices in international
commercial agreements.33 The immoral and damaging effect of corruption on the economic
and social development of countries around the world requires national courts and
international arbitral tribunals to consider this issue as a violation of international public
policy.
The delicate problem remains to determine precisely where the line should be drawn
between legal and illegal international transactions. Generally, in reaching a conclusion as to
whether a particular arbitral award comes within a fully recognised class of situations that
will be held to be void as contrary to morality, a judge in the country of enforcement must
31 Lemenda Trading Co. Ltd. v. African Middle East Petroleum Co. Ltd., [1988] Q.B, p. 459; also see
the decision of the Italian Court of Cassation in Alarcia Castells v. Hengstenberge e Procurtore
general presso la Corte di appello di Milano, RDIPP XIX (1983), 346. The court stated that: "the
respect of international public policy is based first and foremost on the need to safeguard a legal and
moral minimum which is common to the feeling of several nations". Cited by Pierre Lalive,
"Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 277.
32 Also see, European Gas Turbines SA v. Westman International Ltd, 30 Sept. 1993, (1994) Rev. Arb.
359, and reported in (1995) XX Yearbook 198. The Paris Court of Appeal recognised that: "A
contract having as its aim and object a traffic in influence through the payment of bribes is,
consequently, contrary to French international public policy as well as to the ethics of international
commerce as understood by the large majority of States in the international community."; ILA Report,
London Conference (2000), op. cit., p. 32; Rosell and Prager, "Illicit Commissions and International
Arbitration: The Question of Proof," 15 Arb.Int., (1999), p. 329.
33 See in general Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy...", op. cit., p.
291. The writer states that: "arbitral condemnation of corruption may thus be characterised as either
the application of a general principle of law 'recognised by civilised nations', or as the recognition of
a 'substantive law of necessary application', or as the resort to a transnational public policy."
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consider all circumstances which relate to the parties' agreement when it was made. For
example, consideration should be made to the intention of the parties as whether or not they
intended to commit an illegal behaviour, the applicable law to the agreement, the law of the
country in which the agreement to be performed and the common practice in international
trade relations, where in this regard the distinction between national and international
agreements should be considered. Moreover, in arriving at a decision, a judge in the country
of enforcement must base his decision upon the most basic notions of morality and justice
that are common to all nations or at least to the vast majority of countries, which should be
considered as representing the dominant opinion of the international community whose moral
ideas should prevail.34
II. Political Issues
The enforcement of a foreign arbitral award may also be questioned under Article V
(2)(b) of the New York Convention on the ground that the award contravenes the political
stance of the state in which enforcement is required. This could arise if the award involves
actions that may threaten the political stance of the state or its good relations with a friendly
state, for example, trading with enemy aliens35, payment to be made to terrorists, etc.36 The
application of this ground to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is a subject of much
debate, since political interests vary according to the political environment of each state,
therefore this has led to different results.
34ILA Report, London Conference (2000), op. cit., p. 32; Dennis Lloyd, op. cit., p 101.
35 Ertel Bieber &amp; Co. v. Rio Tinto Co. Ld. [1918] A.C. 260; 34 T.L.R. 208; Kuenigl v.
Donnersmarck. [1955] 2 W.L.R. 82; [1955] 1 All E.R. 46.
36 This may also include diplomatic conflicts, hostility acts or the brake ofwar.
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Parties could raise this ground at the early stages before the arbitral tribunal, for
example, this could be raised by a party as a defence by claiming that the non-fulfilment of
his contractual obligations refers to a political decree which made performing his obligations
impossible, such as the situation in boycott sanctions.37 However, international arbitrators are
not obliged to comply with the political orders of a given state as arbitrators are not guardians
of a particular national law and they have no allegiance to a particular state.38 But arbitrators
may consider such situation as a 'force majeure', which may lead to exempt the defaulting
party from his obligations on the ground that the situation was beyond his control since it was
caused by external circumstances which prevents the performance of his contractual
obligation.
This was the case in a dispute that arose between a Soviet Union public corporation (Sojuzne
Ftaksport) and an Israeli private company (Jordan Investment Ltd.), concerning an agreement
for importing oil from Russia into Israel.39 The dispute erupted when the Soviet Union
Government prohibited the exportation of oil from Russia into Israel40, and therefore Sojuzne
Ftaksport was prohibited from performing its contractual obligations. In accordance with an
arbitration clause, which was included in the parties' agreement, Jordan Investment started
arbitration proceedings claiming for damages from Sojuzne Ftaksport for breaching the
importation agreement. Sojuzne Ftaksport encountered these claims and replied that the
agreement was cancelled for reasons beyond its control, and that the political decision of the
37
Boycott sanctions are political orders that could be taken against a country in order to force it to
change its policies. See Iain McLean, "Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics," Oxford University
Press (1996), p. 42.
38 Bernard Hanotiau, "What Law Governs the Issue of Arbitrability?," 12 Arb.Int., No4 (1996), p.
391; Daniel Hochstranger, "Choice of Law and 'Foreign' Mandatory Rules in International
Arbitration," 11 J.Int.Arb., (1994), p. 57 at 59.
39 Domke M., "The Israeli Soviet Oil Arbitration," American Journal ofInternational Law, (1959), p.
787; Ibrahim Ahmmad Ibrahim, op. cit., p. 6.
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Soviet Union Government made performing its contractual obligations impossible. The
arbitral tribunal decided that the breach of the contract was a result of a political decision
which prohibited the importation of oil into Israel and that Sojuzne Ftaksport is a separate
legal entity from the Russian government, therefore Ftaksport was not responsible for the
breach of the importation agreement.
However, on many occasions international arbitral tribunals have declined to rely on
political regulations of a given country as reason for revoking the parties' agreement.41 For
example, in ICC proceedings No. 3881/199442 an arbitral dispute arose between a Swiss and
a German company on the one hand, and a Syrian public body on the other hand. The
defendant "the Syrian party" argued that the claimant had breached the Syrian public policy
rules in disregarding the Syrian political stance which requires the boycott of Israel. The
arbitral tribunal distinguished between public policy and boycott rules, and held that:
"...boycott rules do not have effect on contractual relationships, in addition to that the
boycott rule did not apply until the company was put on the black list and until it became
official."
Also, an ICC award rendered in 197843 involved a dispute between Swedish shipyards and a
Libyan buyer. The arbitral tribunal refused to apply Libyan laws and boycott regulations
since the contract was subject to Swedish law.44 The tribunal held that:
40 This was based upon a political decision as a result of the war between Israel and Egypt in 1956.
41 See P. Mayer, op. cit., pp. 285 - 286. The writer gives us an example of certain boycott laws that
establish restrictions on the grounds of race and religion. He argues that an arbitrator should, in the
name of international public policy, refuse to enforce such mandatory laws because they seek to
institute racial or religious discrimination which contravenes the international public policy principles.
42 Award rendered in ICC proceedings No. 3881/1994, see, Sigvard Jarvin, Yves Derains, Jean-
Jacques Amaldez, Collection ofICCArbitral Awards, Volume II, (1986-1990), p. 257.
43 Case Nos. 2978, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, (1981), p. 133; Pierre Lalive, "Transnational
(or Truly International) Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 295.
44 Also see, A B Gotaverken v. GMTC, VI Year book Commercial Arbitration (1981), p. 133. The
arbitrator refused to give effect to the Lebanese Law on boycott regulations in order to justify the
refusal to take a delivery of vessels, where the arbitrator came to the conclusion that Swedish law was
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"The application of the Swedish law leads to the obvious consequences that the Libyan
boycott law and regulations cannot apply to these contracts - except if a special reference is
made in the contracts to this boycott law."
Accordingly, arbitrators may determine whether or not to consider the boycott
sanctions of a given state according to the applicable law to the subject matter of the dispute,
by examining whether or not the applicable law requires the same boycott sanctions.45 It is
important to draw attention to a distinction that could be considered here between situations
where the boycott regulations are imposed by one state against another and the situation when
such economic sanctions are imposed by the United Nations Security Council.46 The latter
situation could be regarded as the application of international public policy rules which
should be taken into consideration by international commercial arbitrators.
The situation before national courts is different. Unlike international arbitral tribunals
national courts are bound by the political situation of the state in which they exercise their
jurisdictions. This may require consideration of such delicate matters, as considering the
friendly relationships between the state of enforcement and a foreign friendly state. For
example, in Regazzonni v. KC Sethia Lta1 the House of Lords considered the protection of
essential interests of a friendly state. The case involved an international contract between a
businessman domiciled in England and a businessman domiciled in Switzerland, concerning
the exportation of jute from India to South Africa. The agreement was subject to English law,
applicable and that the boycott rule did not have an effect on the contractual relationship; See Rubino
Sammartano . M., op. cit., p. 315.
45
However, one should bear in mind that such arbitral awards may not be enforced in the countries
that order such boycott sanctions or even in other states that may have political interests with that
country.
46
For example, Resolution 661, U.N. Security Council, which imposed mandatory economic
sanctions against Iraq and established a committee (the Sanctions Committee) to monitor those
sanctions. (S/Res/661). 6 August 1990. See the United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume IX, 168.
47
Regazzoni v. KC Sethia. 1958 A.C. 301; [1957] 3 All E.R. 286; [1956] 2 W.L.R. 204.
253
but was considered null and void according to the Indian law, which prohibited shipment
direct or indirect from India to South Africa following apartheid measures imposed on
jO
Indians in South Africa. The following question arose, should the English courts take notice
of and give effect to the Indian law in question, given that it was responding to a hostile act
directed at another friendly Commonwealth State, or should it not be enforced because it was
intended to be ofpolitical or penal character?
After examining the nature of the case, the court recognised that the Indian law was not
aimed at safeguarding particular or selfish interests of the Indian State but rather to counter
racist legislation which was contrary to the fundamental human rights. Accordingly, the court
decided that the contract was unenforceable since an English court will not enforce a
contract, or award damages for its breach, if its performance would involve doing an act in a
foreign and friendly state which violates the law of that state. The court held that:
".. .it is not in accordance with English public policy that a foreign and friendly nation should
be harmed."49
This question was also discussed in Dalmia Dairy Industries Ltd v. National Bank of
Pakistan.50 The dispute erupted as a result of Pakistani decrees declaring any payment to an
Indian party illegal. National Bank of Pakistan disputed before an ICC tribunal51 that the
arbitrator had became ' functus officio" from continuing with the arbitration because of the
48 In exercise of the powers conferred by the Sea Customs Act, 1878, modified in December 1, 1950,
Section 19, the Central Government of India duly made an order on July 17, 1946 prohibiting the
taking "... by sea or by land out of British India of goods from whatever place arriving which are
destined for any port or place in the Union of South Africa or in respect of which the Chief Customs
Officer is satisfied that the goods although destined for a port or place outside the Union of South
Africa are intended to be taken to the Union of South Africa."
49
Regazzoni v. KC Sethia, 1958 A.C., 301 at p. 309.
50 Dalmia Dairy Industries Ltd. v. National Bank ofPakistan [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 223, C.A.
51 ICC Case No. 1512/1970, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (1980), p. 174. This dispute arose
from the non-performance by a Pakistani bank of a guarantee issued in favour of an Indian company
which was made expressly subject to Indian law. The arbitral tribunal was faced with the question of
deciding whether the bank was discharged from its obligations as a result of Pakistani decrees
declaring any payment to an Indian party illegal because of hostilities between India and Pakistan
which had broken out after the guarantee had been issued; see Yves Derains, op. cit., 250.
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outbreak of war between India and Pakistan. This objection was rejected by the arbitrator in
an interim award in December 1969. In an enforcement proceeding the English Courts
rejected the argument that it would be contrary to English public policy to enforce the award
because both countries maintained friendly relations with England.
The effect of including political notions in the numerous interpretations of public
policy raises several problems. In particular, the courts may readily be used as an instrument
of pressure by a dominant political party when in power. Public policy could thus become a
badge of discrimination ready to be used by the state courts to protect the perceived innate
superiority of the forum's political views. Therefore, it is important to not to rely on political
circumstances unless there are reasonable and serious reasons that may affect the vital
interests of the state. Therefore, national courts have been reluctant to give effect to political
orders as reasons for refusing enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. For example, in
Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Inc. v. RAKTA52, an application to enforce a foreign arbitral
award in the United States was made by RAKTA (an Egyptian corporation) against Overseas
(a United States corporation). The two corporations were parties to an agreement relating to
the construction of a paper board mill in Egypt. During the six-day Arab-Israeli war, Egypt
expelled all Americans except those who would apply and qualify for a special visa.
Thereupon, Overseas abandoned the project and notified Rakta that it regarded itself as
excused by force majeure, Rakta disagreed and obtained an award in its favour. In an
enforcement action before the United States Court of Appeal, Overseas argued that it was
obliged "as a loyal American citizen" to abandon the project as it considered that this conduct
was part of its duty to defend national interests, which it argued is integral part of United
32 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale de I'lndustrie du Papier RAKTA and
Bank ofAmerica 508 F. 2d 969 (2nd Cir. 1974).
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States public policy. The United States Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit held that
public policy did not equate with "national policy" (in the diplomatic or foreign policy
sense), and it would not refuse to enforce an award in favour of the Egyptian party merely
because tensions at that time emerged between the United States and Egypt.53 The US Court
rejected Overseas' arguments and declined any connection between article V (2)(b) of the
New York Convention and Overseas allegations, where it asserted that:
"In equating 'national policy' with United States public policy, the appellant quite plainly
misses the mark. To read the public policy defence as a parochial device protective of
national political interests would seriously undermine the Convention's utility. This provision
was not meant to enshrine the vagaries of international politics under the rubric of public
policy. Rather, a circumscribed public policy doctrine was contemplated by the Convention's
framers and every indication is that the United States, in acceding to the Convention, meant
to subscribe to this supranational emphasis. To deny enforcement of this award largely
because of the United States' falling out with Egypt in recent years would mean converting a
defence intended to be of narrow scope into a major loophole in the Convention's mechanism
for enforcement. We have little hesitation, therefore, in disallowing Overseas' proposed
public policy defence." . .
The same view was confirmed by the United States courts in National Oil Corp. v. Libyan
Sun Oil Corp.54 The court rejected a request to refuse the enforcement of an arbitral award on
the ground that the award was in favour of Libya "a state known to sponsor international
terrorism". The court refused to accept this reason as a ground to refuse the enforcement of a
New York Convention award. Furthermore, the court pointed out that the United States
recognises the government of Libya, had not declared war on it, and had specifically given it
permission to bring an action to confirm the award.
The conclusion which could be drawn here is that construing public policy to include
concepts of a political nature may seriously undermine the utility of the New York
53 Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 364.
34
A United States case, 733 F. Supp. 800 at 819, District Court, D. Del, March 15, 1990, 85
American Journal ofInternational Law 178 (1991); ILA Report, London Conference (2000), op. cit.,
p. 23.
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Convention. This could ultimately lead to negative effects on the interests of the state of
enforcement, as it would lose the reputation as an attractive forum for international
commercial and financial relations, and could thus be deprived of opportunities for
(sustainable) economic integration and development.
As was evident from the judicial practice in various jurisdictions, a defence which relies on
political reasons as a ground to challenge the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is
increasingly unsuccessful in international commercial disputes. Therefore, unless there are
reasonable and serious grounds, that may have a significant impact on the non-negotiable
interests of the state, public policy should not be interpreted to expose international
commercial relations to the unpredictable political circumstances between states.
III. Economic Issues
A. Generally
There are two contradictory policies that should be taken into consideration when
determining the validity of a foreign arbitral award for its possible violation of the economic
mandatory rules of a given state. On the one hand, one should consider the economic
strategies which many countries may adopt in order to encourage international investments to
come into their territories.55 To achieve the goals of such economic strategies, countries may
55 This could be recognised if we consider the economic strategies of both, developed and under
development countries. In general, the economic strategy of the developed countries aim to maintain
their advanced level of technological and economy progress; and the economic strategy of under
development countries is to strive to meet the standards of the development of international trade and
to catch up with the speed of international economy in order to not be left behind.
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tend to eliminate any legal barrier that may scare international investments away.56 The
positive effect of such strategies has led to liberalisation as regards the parties' autonomy in
international commercial agreements, including recognising the parties' freedom to oust the
jurisdiction of national courts in international commercial disputes and resolve their disputes
instead by arbitration.57 On the other hand, countries may impose various limitations to the
parties' autonomy on the ground that there are certain commercial activities which may have
injurious effects on the economic policy of the state. It is thus inevitable to find national
mandatory rules that constitute the substantive content of the economic policy of the state58,
which aim to protect the economic strategy goals of the state.59 One of the important
limitations that could affect the parties rights in international commercial arbitration is that a
state may prohibit the parties from resolving their disputes by arbitration, on the ground that
the interest at stake requires special treatment that could only be obtained under the
supervision of the national courts.60
56 This is due to the fact that parties of international commercial relations try to avoid being faced by
laws which they may be ignorant of, and to overcome any barriers these laws may pose in the face of
their trade.
57 See Redfem and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 103. The writers state that: "A national law which does
not permit the free flow of goods and services across national frontiers may not be the most suitable
law to govern international commercial contracts and the dispute which may arise from them."
58
Christopher B. Kuner, op. cit., p. 88. The writer comments that important norms of certain
economic policy such as antitrust rules and currency, import and price controls, are considered
matters ofGerman public policy.
59
It has been reported that national courts could also rely on international public policy as a ground to
refuse the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award even if the interest which is at stake concerns the
national mandatory rules of the state of enforcement. See, Courreges Design v. Andre Courreges, 5
Apr. 1990, (1992) Rev. Arb. 110. The Paris Court of Appeal stated that: "the rules relating to public
control over foreign investment express, via mandatory provisions, the idea of international economic
public policy, because these rules aim at preserving, in the public interest, the balance of economic
and financial relations with the rest of the world, by controlling the movement of capital across the
border." See ILA Report, London Conference (2000), op. cit., p. 24.
60
See, Redfern and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 138; Christopher B. Kuner, "The Public Policy
Exception to the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States and West Germany
Under the New York Convention," 71 J.Int.Arb., (1990), p. 88.
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Accordingly, determining the enforceability of a foreign arbitral award should be based
upon establishing a balance between the liberality and freedom of commerce and the
protection of the economic policy of the state. However, establishing such a balance is not
easy since national courts in the country of enforcement have inclusive power to decide
which kind of transactions may or may not be considered to affect the economic policy of the
state.61 The problem may arise since the differences between the economic public policy
requirements of various states might lead to the risk that one state may set aside an award for
reasons of public policy which other states would regard as unimpeachable. This is so
because under the head of public policy, a court could refuse to enforce a foreign award on
the ground that the award violates the national economic interests of the state. Also, a
national court may refuse to enforce the award under Article V (2)(a) of the Convention on
the ground that the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of being arbitrated. The
arbitrability issue may create serious problems since countries may determine which matters
may or may not be settled by arbitration in accordance with their own economic policy 62; for
example, by declaring that certain types of agreements are not capable of settlement by
arbitration for being contrary to the public policy of the state, such as certain notions of anti-
competition or antitrust disputes, intellectual property disputes, agreements to evade
exchange control regulations and awarding punitive damages in arbitration.63 Article I (3) of
61 This is the case under Article V (2)(b) of the New York Convention.
62 Article V (2)(a) of the New York Convention does not provide a sufficient explanation of what kind
of disputes could be considered non-arbitrable subject matters. Rather the Convention left determining
the arbitrabihty of the subject mater to the national law of the country where enforcement will take
place. Therefore, enforcement might be denied for considerations of national mandatory rules. See
Bernard Hanotiau, op. cit., 403.
63 In Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens SA v. Southwire Co., 484 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga.
1980), a United States Federal District Court sitting in Georgia had refused to enforce a foreign
arbitral award under the New York Convention on public policy grounds. The Georgia Court
concluded that the arbitrators' decision that interest rates should rise by an additional five per cent
constituted a penalty (which the court considered to be punitive damages) and therefore would not be
enforced. See in general, Jhon Y Gotanda, "Awarding Punitive Damages in International Commercial
Arbitrations in the Wake of Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lahman Huttun, Inc.," 38 Harvard
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the New York Convention may also be of crucial importance here, since a state could declare,
when it ratifies the New York Convention that it will apply the Convention only to
differences arising out of commercial relationships. Thereby enabling the national courts of
that state to freely construe this reservation under their national law.64 This might create
problems for the enforceability of foreign arbitral awards since the member states are under
no obligation to define what they consider to be a commercial dispute when declaring the
commercial reservation.65 Accordingly, a claimant in an enforcement procedure cannot be
sure whether the court in a country that made this reservation will declare a dispute non¬
commercial, and thus refuse to recognise and enforce the award. This may particularly be the
case in certain kind of disputes that involve intellectual property rights and technology
transfer issues.66
It is thus important to examine the limits of the discretionary powers of national courts
in applying public policy as a ground to refuse the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards for
International Law Journal (1997), p. 59; Hakan Berglin, "The Application in United States Courts of
the Public Policy Provision of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards," 4:2 Dickinson Journal ofInternational Law (1986), p. 180; Christopher B. Kuner,
op. cit., p. 81; ILA Report, London Conference (2000), op. cit., p. 21.
64 Article I (3) of the New York Convention.
63 Article V (2)(a) of the New York Convention left determining the arbitrability of the subject mater
to the national law of the country where enforcement will take place, therefore, enforcement might be
denied for considerations of national mandatory rules.
66
Some countries do not consider intellectual property disputes to be of a commercial nature. In a
decision made by the High Court of Bombay (India Organic Chemicals Ltd v. Chemtex Fibres Inc.,
April 1977 (et al. India No. 4)), the court held that technology transfer was not a commercial
transaction. Cited in Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 53; P.D. Caramichael, "The Arbitration of Patent
Disputes," 38 Arbitration Journal 3 (1983); See Mladen Singer, "International Commercial
Arbitration and Intellectual Property and Technology Transfer Disputes," Internet Address,
http://themis.Wustl.edu/ibll/contract/ComArb.htm; Mladen Singer, "Commercial Arbitration as a
Means for Resolving Industrial Property and Transfer of Technology Disputes," 3 Croat. Arbit.
Yearb. 1996, p. 107. However, one should consider that many countries recognise the commercial
nature of intellectual property rights. For example, Article 2 of the Egyptian 1994 law provides that:
"An arbitration is commercial within the scope of this Law when the dispute arises over a legal
relationship of an economic nature, whether contractual or non-contractual. This comprises, for
example, the supply of goods or services, commercial agencies, construction and engineering or
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considerations of protecting the national economic policy. The question of whether a national
court should distinguish between national and foreign arbitral awards will be examined again
under this heading. The question in this regard will be whether or not it is possible for a
national court to disregard the national mandatory rules of its law and to apply instead
notions that consider the special character of international commercial relationships.
Therefore, determining the validity of a foreign arbitral award could be established upon
drawing a distinction between situations that require the application of national public policy
rules: that is when such rules aim to avoid a result which may be injurious to the very
interests of the state's economic strategy; and situations that do not necessarily damage the
supreme national economic interest of the state.
As will be established in the following examples, there are limits to the Use of
economic norms (as reasons of public policy nature) for determining the validity of foreign
arbitral awards. Not every mandatory economic norm necessarily violates the fundamental
economic interests of the state, particularly in relationships that involve international
elements. It is also important to consider the scope of application of Article V (2)(a) of the
New York convention, as national courts are required to give a wide interpretation to
arbitrability in international commercial relations.
Since such problems could relate to various types of commercial activities, thus it
would be difficult to explore all of the various situations within the limits of this chapter.
Therefore it may suffice to examine the applicability of Article V (2)(a) and (b) in the field of
intellectual property rights and a further examination will be made in relation to different
types of trade restrictions.
technical know-how contracts, the granting of industrial, touristic and other licenses, transfer of
technology...".
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B. Intellectual property rights
Intellectual property rights67 are now regarded as one of the most valuable assets in
s o
the modern global market. The importance of intellectual property rights to the economic
strategy of the state or states in which such rights are protected has led national laws of
various legal systems to consider the protection of such rights as part of their public policy.69
This could be recognised since several legal systems require to determine the ownership and
validity of intellectual property rights to be made only by a particular competent authority,
for example, a registry office or a particular court.70 Accordingly, various limitations have
been imposed on the free will of the parties; for instance, some countries do not allow for a
private body, such as an arbitral tribunal, to decide the validity and scope of intellectual
property rights.71 The latter restriction raises the problem of non-arbitrability, as national laws
67
It would be difficult within the limits of this topic to provide a coherent definition for intellectual
property rights or all details that concern the classification of intellectual property rights. Also there
are many details that concern the different legal status of intellectual property rights, such as, patents,
trademarks and copyrights, as determining the arbitrability of such property rights may differ
according to their type. For detailed information about these issues see, William Grantham, "The
Arbitrability of International Intellectual Property Disputes," 14 Berk. J. Int'l Law, 1996, p. 172.
68 This could be recognised since the economic success of a given state is now measured by how
advanced its technology is and how sophisticated innovations that are used in its industry are. See
Gary L. Benton and Richard J. Rogers, "The Arbitration of International Technology Disputes Under
the English Arbitration Act 1996," Internet address, (www.coudert.com/practice/arbtech.htm). The
writers reported that the size of the world-wide information technology market has grown from US$
696,880 million in 1996 to $1,056,052 million by 2000; In the United States, for example, the
software industry grew at a rate of 12.5 per cent for 1990-1996, nearly 2.5 times faster than the overall
US economy, making it the third largest manufacturing industry in the country.
69 William Grantham , op. cit., p. 173.
70
In England and Wales, under the 1977 Patents Act this could be the Comptroller General of Patents;
under the Trade Marks Act 46, 47 (1994) a court may revoke or invalidate a trademark; also see the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988.
71 Marc Blessing, "Arbitrability of Intellectual Property Disputes," 12 Arbitration International No. 2
(1996), p. 191, at 198; Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, op. cit., pp 197 and 198. He refers to the Italian
Supreme Court in 1978. (Corte di Cassazione 12 May 1977 in Scherk v. Grandes Marques, Yearbook
Commercial Arbitration IV (1979) 289, which confirmed that a generally binding decision declaring
such property rights null and void cannot be issued by arbitration, but only by the state authorities or
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may reserve the determination on intellectual property rights for the exclusive jurisdiction of
the national courts.72
The problem of arbitrability has a significant importance in international commercial
relations particularly in the field of international licensing agreements73 where very often
parties include an arbitration clause under which they agree to resolve their disputes by
means of international commercial arbitration.74 This could also be the case if an international
commercial transaction involves issues of intellectual property as part of the main contract,
where the arbitral tribunal may be required to look into the validity and infringement of the
intellectual property rights that are under question. Therefore, raising doubts about the
arbitrability of intellectual property rights may create uncertainty to a wide range of
international commercial relations, since parties and arbitrators cannot be sure whether the
final award will be enforceable. For example, if an arbitral tribunal determines issues that
concern the validity or infringement of such rights, then it may be possible that such a dispute
would be declared non-arbitrable by the courts of the country where enforcement may take
place, and therefore it may refuse to recognise and enforce the award.
It is important to recognise that various legal systems do not recognise the arbitrability of
intellectual property issues at all. This means that parties to intellectual property disputes are
courts; also see Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 370; Roberto Ceccon, "Arbitration and Intellectual Property
in the Italian Legal System," 13:1 Journal ofInternational Arbitration (1996), p. 65.
72
See, Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, op. cit., p. 197; Mladen Singer, "International Commercial Arbitration
and Intellectual Property and Technology Transfer Disputes," Internet Address,
http://themis.Wustl.edu/ibll/contract/ComArb.htm.
73
Licensing agreements generally include that the intellectual property owner grants rights to use a
trade secret, to manufacture or distribute copyrighted or patented products, or to utilise a trademark in
the marketing of a product. Such agreement may also oblige a licensee to preserve the confidentiality
and secrecy of the technology. Intellectual property disputes may arise in such agreements, for
example, for allegations of improper use of the property right by the licensee. See, Gary L. Benton
and Richard J. Rogers, op. cit., p. 2.
74
Parties to such international commercial agreements prefer to resolve their disputes by arbitration
because they want to avoid the uncertainties of foreign laws and the risk of bias by foreign courts.
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prohibited from resolving any dispute that relates to determining the validity, disposal and
infringement of such rights by arbitration.75 On the other hand, various legal systems limit
this prohibition to issues that relate to determining the validity of intellectual property
rights.76
However, there is a growing tendency towards recognising arbitration as a suitable means of
resolving intellectual property disputes in international commercial relations. It is reported
that, in 1991- 1992, a comparative study of the International Association for the Protection of
Industrial Property (IAPIP/AIPPA)77 focused on the arbitrability of intellectual property
disputes between private parties according to national laws and statutes with regard to
ownership, validity, scope, infringement and licences of intellectual property rights;
according to the IAPIP summary, which was based on 24 national reports, "none of the
reported national legislations forbid arbitration in respect of intellectual property rights from
the outset".78
75
It is reported that in many countries, "questions of the validity of intellectual property titles, even on
an inter parties basis were excluded from arbitration by public policy." Note prepared by the
International Bureau ofWIPO, p. 5. Cited in Mladen Singer, "Commercial Arbitration as a Means for
Resolving Industrial Property and Transfer of Technology Disputes," 3 Croat. Arbit. Yearb., 1996, p.
15, footnote 24; also see Rene David, op. cit., p. 188.
76 Some legal systems limit the scope of the non-arbitrability to disputes that relate to determining the
validity of intellectual property rights. See Mladen Singer, op. cit., p. 15. The writer provides an
example form the Croatian Law, and concluded that: "the relevant law explicitly forbids arbitration
deciding upon the validity of industrial property rights. Article 11 of the Changes and Amendments of
the Law on Protection of Inventions, Technical Improvements and Signs of Distinctions, which is in
Croatia applied as a Law of the Republic, explicitly states that Croatian courts have exclusive
jurisdiction to decide all disputes relating to validity of industrial property rights which were
recognised by the State Patent Office or which are in force in the Republic of Croatia."; also see,
Marc Blessing, op. cit., p. 201. He states that: "arbitrators are not entitled to declare a French patent
invalid"; Under Articles 2059 and 2060 of the French Civil Code arbitrability is likely to be denied in
disputes over the validity of registered intellectual property grants, see the decision of the Cour
d'appel de Paris of 3 February 1992, published in PIBD 1992 III 359; Rene David, op. cit., p. 188-89.
77 See Web Site address: (http://www.aippi.org).
78 See IAPIP Yearbook 1991/VI; the IAPIP Yearbook 1992; Cited in Marc Blessing, op. cit., p. 200;
also see, Julia A. Martin, "The Advantages of International Intellectual Property-Specific Alternative
Dispute Resolution," 49 Stan. L. Rev. April, 1997, p. 917.
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The situation has been fully determined in the United States and Switzerland, where
arbitrability of intellectual property disputes has always been affirmed and recognised. In
1982 the American Congress added Section 294 to Title 35 of the United States Code79,
which expressly provides that all disputes related to patents, including validity and
infringement may be arbitrated.80 In 1975, the Swiss Federal Office of Intellectual Property
specifically accepted the enforcement of arbitral awards declaring the nullity of a patent and
81
the cancellation of the corresponding patent entries in its Register.
Increasingly, jurisdictions differentiate between disputes involving domestic relations,
and those arising in the domain of international commercial relations. This distinction may
lead national courts to recognise and enforce foreign arbitral awards even where a dispute
raises the validity and/or ownership of intellectual property rights. Accordingly, the fact that
79
35 U.S.C. S. 294 (1984) and 35 U.S.C. S. 135 (d) (1984); In California for example, Section
1297.16(p)-(q) of the Cal. Code Civ. Proc., provides wide protection for the integrity of international
arbitration, including disputes arising from data or technology transfer and intellectual or industrial
property, trademarks, patents, copyrights and software programs; see, Michael F. Hoellering, "New
Opportunities for Patent Arbitration," N.Y.L.J. Dec. 16, 1982, p.l; also see Fritz Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co. June 17, 1974 (U.S. no.4), in which the court distinguished between domestic relations
and disputes which involve international relations. Cited in Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 362; also see,
Redfem and Hunter, 2"d ed., op. cit., p. 143, (fn 65).
80
Also, in trademark disputes, a federal court held that the absence of an explicit statutory support for
the arbitrability of trademark disputes does not indicate that the Congress' intent to preclude
arbitration of trademarks claims. {Alexander Binzel Co. v. Nu-Teeys Co., No. 91 C. 209z, 1992 WL
26932 (ND III. 1992)). Similarly, in the copyright area, the Seventh Ciruit in Saturday EvPost
Evening Co. v. Rumbleseat Press. Inc. 816 F 2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1987). The Court held that federal law
does not forbid arbitration on the validity of copyright at least where that validity becomes an issue in
the arbitration of a contract dispute; KamakaziMusic Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 684 F.2d 228 (2d
Cir. 1982). The court held that: "the court had jurisdiction to order arbitration, and that public policy
does not prohibit the submission of copyright infringement claims to arbitration"; See Joseph T.
McLaughlin, "Arbitrability: Current Trends in the United States," 12 Arbitration International 2
(1996), p.135; Mladen Singer, op. cit., p. 23.
81 Decision of 15 December 1975. See Swiss R. Indus. Prop. & Copyright 36-38 (1976); Published in
Schweizerische Mitteilungen uber Gewerblichen Rechtsschtz und Urheberrecht; also see, the
information of the Swiss Patent and Trademark Office of 15 December 1975, published in the Swiss
Patent, Design and Trade Marks Gazette (1976), p. 9; See Marc Blessing, op. cit., p. 200; The Swiss
Federal Private International Law Statute of 1987, Article 177.1; also see, Robert Briner, "The
Arbitrability of Intellectual Property Disputes with Particular Emphasis on the Situation in
265
intellectual property matters are very closely linked to public policy interests should not lead
to undermine the importance of arbitration as a suitable means of resolving intellectual
property disputes. One could point out several reasons for acknowledging foreign arbitral
awards that involve intellectual property issues.
Firstly, national courts should recognise the nature of such disputes in that intellectual
property disputes require quick resolution which is more efficient, less complicated, and less
89 . . . .
expensive than litigation. Recognising the growing need for this type of intervention, the
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO)83 established an Arbitration and Mediation
84
Centre which among other things, specialises in resolving intellectual property disputes.
Also, it is important to select arbitrators that have the knowledge and/or technical experience
necessary for resolving complicated and High-Tec disputes which may improve the quality of
decision making in such cases.85 Moreover, intellectual property disputes may involve
sensitive issues such as, financial data, new product infomiation, and marketing strategies,
Switzerland," Arpad Bogsch, Preface, in Worldwide Forum on the Arbitration of Intellectual Property
Disputes, WIPO ed., 1994, at 55, 56-66.
82 For example, the WIPO Arbitration Centre offers arbitral proceedings in accordance with Expedite
Arbitration Rules, should make the arbitration even less expensive and faster. See Section III Article
14 which concerns the composition of the arbitral tribunal, Section IV Article 53 (b) which provides
that oral hearings (if held) cannot exceed three days, except in exceptional circumstances.
83 WIPO is an intergovernmental organisation with 155 member states. See, World Intellectual
Property Organisation (WIPO) Doc. 445(E) (1995).
84
In 1994 the WIPO founded the Arbitration and Mediation Center, based in Geneva - Switzerland,
the Centre offers arbitration and mediation services for the resolution of international commercial
disputes between private parties. Also, for this particular purpose, WIPO has enacted arbitration rules
that are drafted according to the model ofUNCITRAL Rules.
83 It is important that intellectual property disputes, which often involve complicated technical issues,
are resolved by arbitrators who are knowledgeable of both the respective intellectual property laws
and transfer technology. This is particularly important since judges of national courts are usually very
knowledgeable about the intellectual property laws of their respective countries, but the technical
questions in a dispute could be beyond their knowledge, whereas an arbitration tribunal which may
consist of arbitrates from different legal backgrounds, could provide the parties with a diversity of
knowledge and an understanding of different legal and cultural traditions. See, Najar, "The Inside
View: Companies in Need of Arbitration," 12 Arbitration International 3 (1996), at p. 364.
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therefore resolving such disputes requires a certain confidentiality that could only be obtained
by resorting to arbitration as opposed to the publicity of litigation.86
Secondly, one should recognise that prohibiting arbitrators from determining the validity of
certain intellectual property issues should not include all disputes in this field. There are
certain intellectual property issues that could exist independently of any registration
proceedings. Therefore, a distinction should be made between intellectual property - such as
patents and trademarks - whose grant is noted in public registers, and those other types of
intellectual property which are not registered, either because they exist at the moment of
creation, as with copyright or because they could be protected as confidential know-how.87
Finally, a national court in the country of enforcement must distinguish between national and
international public policy, since using the national public policy of the state of enforcement
as a barrier to arbitration in international disputes might lead to unacceptable results,
particularly if the dispute had been held to be arbitrable under the law which the arbitral
tribunal deemed applicable and/or according to the law of the seat of arbitration.88 Such a
critical situation may occur if the court deemed the dispute non-arbitrable because of
domestic public policy, notwithstanding that the dispute had been held to be arbitrable on the
86
It is important in intellectual property disputes that hearings and procedures be closed in order to
protect the confidentiality of evidence and awards. Therefore, arbitral awards that involve technology
information are usually not published, however, even if they are published, they usually do not
contain the names of the parties or other elements that may disclose their identity. The importance of
confidentiality in intellectual property and technology transfer disputes is considered in the WIPO
Arbitration Rules, which contain an entire section dedicated to confidentiality. Section VII, Articles
73-76 of the WIPO Arbitration Rules; Section IV Article 52 of the WIPO Arbitration Rules; See
Paulsson and Rawding, "The Trouble with Confidentiality" (1995) 11 Arbitration International, p.
303; Neill, "Confidentiality in Arbitration" 12 Arbitration International 3 (1996), at p. 287; Charles S.
Baldwin, "Protecting Confidential and Proprietary Commercial Information in International
Arbitration," 31 Tex. Int'l L.J. (1996), p. 451.
87 Julia A. Martin, op. cit., p. 91; Rene David, op. cit., p. 188.
88 Marc Blessing, op. cit., p. 195.
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basis of a law that is closely connected to the dispute, and which may also correspond to the
SO
parties' legitimate expectations.
The application of a foreign arbitral award may be refused, in my view, if and when
the award amounts to a violation of national fundamental interests that are so important that
they need to be protected by public policy or by the limits imposed on the basis of public
policy in international affairs. However, if the subject matter of the award concerns
intellectual property matters, for example, if the award determines questions that concern the
validity of a patent or a trademark, then it would be advisable to ascertain first whether the
particular issue is arbitrable in the country where enforcement might take place.90
C. Trade Restrictions
There is a specific public interest in prohibiting certain contractual practices that
could damage the economic policy of the state, for example, agreements which violate the
exchange control laws or which provide for the payment of obligations in gold.91 The
rationale behind prohibiting such agreements rests on the assumption that the interest at stake
is so strongly driven by economic policy, since such restrictions aim to prevent the
89 See Yves Derains, op. cit., p. 234.
90 This could be made during the arbitration proceedings, as the tribunal could stay the proceedings
until the court of law in the country where the particular intellectual property right was granted
decides the issue and, after that, to continue with the arbitration. See, Roberto Ceccon, op. cit., p.75.
He states that: "if during arbitration proceedings, questions arise which, pursuant to law, cannot be
decided by arbitration, (i.e. matters regarding the validity of patent or violation of copyright, etc.) ..
arbitrators must suspend the proceedings (under Article 819 Of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure
(CPC)) until the day when one of the parties notifies the arbitrators of the final and binding award."
91 For example, it is reported that payments of obligations in gold is prohibited in Egypt by a decree of
1935, which prohibit payments in gold in national and international transactions as this violates public
policy in Egypt. See Muhammad Kamal Fahmy, The Essence of Private International Law, 2ed
(1985) (no publisher), p. 512; See Ashraf al Rifaie, op. cit., p. 12.
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depreciation of the national currency of the state. However, for practical necessity, many
countries have accepted to enforcing such clauses as long as they relate to international
commercial agreements.93
This was the view of the United States' courts in Konkar Indomitable Corp. v. Fritzen
Schiffsagentur and Bereederungs-Gmhll.94 The court found that the "gold clause", a federal
statutory economic provision which explicitly stated that as a matter of public policy, it could
not form as the basis for a successful public policy challenge to a foreign arbitral award, since
enforcing such clauses does not "involve the United States' most basic notions of morality
and justice." Moreover, the court established that the policy of encouraging international
arbitration must prevail over domestic economic concerns. 5
A similar example is a decision of the French Court of Cassation in "Messageries
Maritimes".% Whilst the award was contrary to Canadian law, which forbids gold clauses
without distinguishing between internal and international payments97, the French Court of
Cassation examined the validity of the agreement under the French law of 25 June 1928,
92 Dennis Lloyd, op. cit., p 12.
93
Ibid., p. 12. The writer states that the English law recognises the validity of gold clauses in inter¬
national contracts; also see, Feist v. Sco. Beige d'EIectricite [1934] A.C. 161; King v. International
Trustee etc. [1937] A.C. 500.
94 Konkar Indomitable Corp. v. Fritzen Schiffsagentur and Bereederungs-GmbH, No. 80 Civ. 3230
(S.D.N.Y., 1 May 1981); Cited by, Christopher B. Kuner, op. cit., p. 77.
95 Also see the Swiss Federal Supreme Court decision in Inter Maritime Management SA -v- Russin &
Iiecchi, 9 January 1995, reprinted in (1997) XXII Yearbook 789. The court decided that the
substantive public policy is not necessarily violated where the foreign provision is contrary to a
mandatory provision of its national law; ILA Report, London Conference (2000), op. cit., p.l 8.
96
Messageries Maritimes, decided on 21 June 1950, R. 1950. 609. Cited by Pierre Lalive,
"Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 274.
97 The Gold Clauses Act of 1937 of Canada. Article 6 provides that: "Every gold clause obligation is
hereby declared to be contrary to public policy and no such provision shall hereafter be contained in,
or made in respect of, any obligation". Article 2 illustrates the meaning of a gold clause: "The
expression ' ' in this Act means any obligation heretofore or hereafter incurred (including any such
obligation which has, at the date of the commencement of this Act, matured) which purports to give to
the creditor a right to require payment in gold or in gold coin or in an amount of money measured
thereby, and includes any such obligation of the Government of Canada or of any province."
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which considers gold clauses valid. The court declared that parties are entitled to agree for the
payments of their obligations in gold, even if this may contradict the mandatory rules of a
municipal law governing their contract.98
In the latter example, the court examined the enforceability of a foreign arbitral award
according to its validity under foreign mandatory rules and the decision may indicate that the
test in determining the validity of a foreign arbitral award should be based upon its
compliance with the national mandatory rules of the state of enforcement. In other words, if
the award does not violate the national economic interests of the state, and there was no
substantial connection between the subject matter of the dispute and the country of
enforcement, then there should be no rational basis to refuse the enforcement of the arbitral
award. However, relying on this test alone could be problematical. For example, this may
damage the commercial relationships between the country of enforcement and the country
whose national economy is at stake.
Therefore, it is important to consider that there are several reasons that may drive a national
court to apply, or at least to take into consideration, the economic mandatory rules of a
foreign state. For example, in a case involving the comity of states, where a court may
consider the importance of applying foreign mandatory rules in cases involving a foreign
element, because not to do so would constitute a disregard of the interest (whether economic
or other) of another state.99 This was the view in Soleimciny v. Soleimany10 , the parties
acknowledged that the goods (Persian carpets) were to be imported into a foreign country,
98 See Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 274 54 . He
regards this decision instrumental in creating a rule of "substantive private international law specific
to international payments and different from the rule of French law applicable to domestic payments.
This new rule was that of the validity of gold clauses in international contracts"; also see, New
Brunswick RY. CO. v. British and French Trust Corporation. (H.L.(E.)) 1939, A.C. P 16.
99
J. G. Collier, op. cit., p. 379.
100
Soleimany v. Soleimany, Court of Appeal, February 19, 1998. Reported in [1998] 3 W.L.R. 811;
[1998] C.L.C. 779.
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contrary to the revenue law and export controls of Iran. The Court of Appeal considered the
violation of a foreign law as a violation of public policy in England. It held that:
"... where a foreign arbitration award was made pursuant to a valid arbitration agreement, but
was based on a contract which was illegal under the law of a friendly foreign state, where that
law governed the contract or the contract was to be performed in that state, the English court
would not enforce that award on the grounds ofpublic policy." 101
The Soleimany case shows that enforcement of a foreign arbitral award can be refused if it
violates the economic public policy rules of the state that has a close connection to the subject
1 09
matter of the dispute. However, such a connection may not in itself constitute a sufficient
reason to refuse the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. It is important to examine,
whether or not the links are such that the public interest of that country is capable of being
affected by the enforcement of the award.103
The question that arises here is thus, what is the connection between the public policy
in the country of enforcement and the mandatory rules that are designed to protect the
economic policy of a foreign state?
Generally, there are several factors which may drive a national court to consider the
mandatory rules of a foreign state. For example, great damage might be done to the economy
of a foreign state, particularly if the parties intended to circumvent the mandatory rides of that
state by choice of a foreign law or forum. Justice and comity of nations require to apply the
101 See also, Foster v. Driscoll.( 1929) 1 K. B. p. 522, in which Sankey L.J. held that: "To sum up, in
my view an English contract should and will be held invalid on account of illegality if the real object
and intention of the parties necessitates them joining in an endeavour to perform in a foreign and
friendly country some act which is illegal by the law of such country notwithstanding the fact that
there may be, in a certain event, alternative modes or places of performing which permit the contract
to be performed legally."
102
In determining the connection between the subject matter of the dispute and a given State, it might
be necessary to take account of the law governing the arbitration agreement. This could be
established, for example, if that law is considered to be the law which should govern the subject
matter of the dispute in the absence of a choice of law by the parties.
103 A.J.E Jaffy, op. cit., p. 16.
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mandatory rules which are designed to protect the interest of that state, which in certain
circumstances deserve to prevail over the parties' interests.104 Also, this could be based upon
the notion of reciprocity, in the sense of "do as you would done by".105 It is in the interest of
the country of enforcement to consider the economic policy of other states, otherwise it will
risk the possibility of being treated in the same manner.106 Moreover, this could be justified if
there are mutual economic interests between the state of enforcement and the state whose
public interests are most likely to be affected by enforcing the arbitral award. This is
particularly the case if the two countries are parties to an international commercial treaty.107
For example, an award may not be enforced by the English courts if it has the effect of
enforcing an unlawful agreement violating the mandatory competition rules of the EC
108
Treaty , for instance, agreements that restrict free competition between the member
states.109 This is the case under Article 81 of the EC competition rules (formerly Article 85 of
104
Ibid., pp. 7 and 15; also see, Ralli Brothers v. Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920J 2 K.B. 287.
105 J. G. Collier, op. cit., p. 379.
106 Richard A. Cole, op. cit., p. 380. The writer states that the fear of retaliation for non-enforcement
is one of the reasons which made the court in Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co construe the public
policy defence so narrowly (the most basic notions of morality and justice). See, Parsons and
Whittemore Overseas Co. Inc. v. Societe Generate du I'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA) (1974) 508 F
2d 969 at p. 975.
107 Pierre Lalive, "Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy...", op. cit., p. 268; Andrej
Bolfek, "Application of European Community Competition Law in Arbitration Proceedings from the
Aspect of Public Policy," 7 Croat. Arbit. Yearb. (2000), p. 141; Christoph Liebscher, "Arbitral &
Judicial Decision: European Public policy After ECO SWISS," 10 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. (1999), p. 73-
78.
108 BRTv. SABMA ( Case 127/73 [1974] ECR 51; also see, ILA Report, London Conference (2000),
op. cit., p. 20. The report states that: "In 1998, the Austrian Supreme Court reached a similar
conclusion on the status of European Community Law. It held that any provision of European
Community Law, which is directly applicable in the Member States, is - according to its supremacy -
automatically part of Austrian national public policy. Therefore, in its opinion, an arbitral award
which was in conflict with any directly applicable community law could be quashed." The decision
concerns Articles 81 and 82 EC (ex Arts. 85 and 86). 3 Ob. 115/95, dated 23 February 1998, reported
in (1999) Review. Arbitration, p. 385.
109 The Competition Law is designed to control and regulate the freedom of trade between the
Member States, it is therefore based on public policy considerations that could constitute an effective
ground to refuse the enforcement of an arbitral award under Article V (2)(b) of the New York
Convention. In Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton International NV, Court of Justice of the
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the Treaty ofRome 1957)110 and Article 82 (formerly Article 86).111 Article 81 prohibits anti¬
competitive agreements which may have a considerable effect on trade between member
112
states and which prevent, restrict or distort competition within the common market. Such
agreements or decisions are declared to be "automatically void under Article 81 (2), subject
either to express exemption being given under Article 81 (3) or to falling within one of the
block exemptions issued by the Commission113, in which case exemption is automatic. Only
the EC Commission is competent to grant such exemptions.114 It follows that arbitrators
under Article 81 (3) are precluded from exercising any jurisdiction in deciding, for example,
that an exemption would be justified pursuant to Article 81 (3).115
European Union, I June 1999, C-126/97, ECR 1-3055, [1999]; [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 44; reprinted
in 14(6) Int'l Arb. Rep., B-l (June 1999); 1999 Rev. Arb. 631. The European Court of Justice found
that the provisions of Article 85 (Article 81 of the Amsterdam Treaty) constituted fundamental
provisions essential for the accomplishment of tasks entrusted to the Community and for the
functioning of the internal market. Accordingly, they were to be regarded as a matter of public policy
within the meaning of the New York Convention; See, Andrej Bolfek, op. cit., p. 141; also see, ILA
Report, London Conference (2000), op. cit., p. 19. The report states that: "The European Court of
Justice has elevated this rule to the level of international public policy (at least within Member
States)."
110 The Treaty ofRome was amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, dated 2 October 1997.
111 Article 82 prohibits the abuse of a dominant position insofar as it may affect trade between
member states.
112 Julian DM Lew, "Determination of Arbitrators' Jurisdiction...," op. cit., p. 79.
113 The Commission can grant individual or group exemptions from this prohibition if there are
overriding countervailing benefits such as an improvement in efficiency or the promotion of research
and development.
114 See Regulation 17. To facilitate the granting of exemptions under Article 85 (3), the EC
Commission has issued several block exemptions, for example, see Regulation No. 1983/83, which
concerns Categories of Exclusive Distribution Agreements; Regulation No. 184/ 83, which concerns
Categories of Exclusive Purchase Agreements. See Julian DM Lew, 'Determination of Arbitrators'
Jurisdiction op. cit., p. 79; John Beechey, "Arbitrability of Anti-trust/Competition Law Issues-
Common Law," 12 Arbitration International No. 2 (1996), p. 197 at 180.
113
However, an arbitrator is not precluded from deciding that a contract does not violate Article 81,
but if he recognises that the contract violates Article 81, then he cannot refer the matter to the EC
Commission for exemption under Article 81 (3). See, Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, op. cit., p. 192; Julian
DM Lew, "Determination of Arbitrators' Jurisdiction," op. cit., p. 81; also see, Gemeente Almelo v.
Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij NV (Case No 393/92) (1995)XX ICCA Yearbook Cmm. Arb, p. 187; [1994] I
ECR 1477. (a decision of the European Court of justice on a reference from the Netherlands; V. V.
Veeder, "English Arbitration Act of 1996, op. cit., p. 66.
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Further restrictions on the powers of arbitrators under the EC Treaty are imposed by Article
234 of the EC competition rules (formerly Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome), which allows
for reference to be made to the European Court of Justice for ruling on questions of
interpretation of the Treaty by any court or tribunal of a Member State.116 Arbitrators are not
considered to be a court or tribunal for the purpose of such a reference; thus a reference
117
cannot be made directly by an arbitrator.
The relevant interests referred to in Articles 81 and 234 of the EC competition rules are
designed to protect communal interests between the EC member states, which compel the
member states to respect such community rules in the field of the common commercial
policy.
However, most national laws now permit disputes involving competition law and antitrust
118*
matters to be arbitrated. This trend is the clearest in the United States. In the famous
Mitsubishi case119 the United Supreme Court distinguished between domestic public policy
and the narrower concept of international public policy, the court declared that there are no
116 Bulk Oil (Zug) AG v. Sun International Ltd [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep 587; [1984] 1 W.L.R. 147
(C.A.); 2 C..M.L.R. 91 (High Court).
117
See, European Court of Justice, Case No. 102/81, March 23, 1982; Nordsee Deutsche
Hochseefischerei Nordstern GmbH v. Reederei Mond Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG & Co, and
Friedrich Busse Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG & Co [1982] E.C.R 1095. The ECJ noted that parties
are not free to create exceptions to EEC law, which must be observed in its entirety throughout the
Member States with compliance to be ensured by arbitral tribunals under supervision by the ordinary
courts. See, Andrej Bolfek, op. cit., p. 141; Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton International NV,
14(6) Int'l Arb. Rep., B-l (June 1999); 1999 Rev. Arb. 631; Christoph Liebscher, op. cit., p. 81; John
Beechey, op. cit., 181; Redfem and Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 141. Fn 55.
118 Russell on the Law of Arbitration accept arbitrability, but finds it necessary to inform the
Commission. Russell on the Law of Arbitration (19th ed 1979), op. cit., p. 417; also see Redfem and
Hunter, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 142.
119 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). Also reported in,
International Commercial Arbitration, Cases, Materials and Notes on the Resolution of International
Business Disputes', (1997) The Foundation Press, INC, p. 313; Prior to the Mitsubishi case, the
general rule was that antitrust disputes were not subject to arbitration. See the Second Circuit decision
in American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir. 1968).
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public policy reasons prohibiting the arbitration of antitrust disputes in the context of
120international agreements.
It seems that the field of arbitrable matters is expanding markedly, and countries are
racing to allow arbitration in nearly all matters. Courts ofmany countries have concluded that
not all of their respective prohibitive or proscriptive laws are relevant when considering
whether or not to enforce a foreign award. Both judicial and arbitral practice revealed that the
intervention of public policy should be based upon an analysis of the interests served and a
rational observation of the requirements of international commercial relations.121 This is both
logical and inevitable, as economic interest drives the state in order to compete in the
international market and to encourage trade in their territories. Courts are therefore called
upon to strike a balance between the interests of promoting international investments and the
public's interest in protecting the national economic policy. Also, courts have to be aware of
the effects of their decision, since determining the validity of a foreign arbitral award
according to national economic mandatory rules might lead to adverse effects, especially
since national courts' decisions that involve international commercial arbitration are carefully
122monitored by the international arbitration community. A decision that does not recognise
the development of international commercial relations and the requirements of the
120 The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Scherk v. Alberto- Culver Co. (417 US 506).
The question in Scherk was whether to allow the arbitration of a securities issue in an international
contract despite federal statutes prohibiting the waiver of a right to trial in a securities case. The Court
recognised the importance of arbitration clauses to achieve certainty in international transactions. See
Hakan Berglin, op. cit., p. 172; See, Lawrence W. Newman & Michael Burrows, "Arbitration of
Antitrust Disputes," New York Journal (may 1998); Joseph T. McLaughlin, op. cit., p. 133; John
Beechey, op. cit., p. 183.
121 In Fotochrome Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1979). The court stated that: "International
commerce has grown too large and the world too small for American courts to disregard the law of
nations, even in favor of the Bankruptcy Act". Cited in Hakan Berglin, op. cit., p. 170; also in Bermen
v. Zapata Offshore Co., The U.S. Supreme Court evidenced its attitude that: "We cannot have trade
and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms." Bremen v. Zapata
Offshore CoAOl U.S. 1 (1972) at 9; Richard A. Cole, op. cit., p. 376.
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international community of merchants might thus jeopardise the reputation of the state of
enforcement as a suitable business forum. A bad reputation therefore could be costly to the
economic interest of the state.
Moreover, courts must not ignore the fact that social or economic conditions may change and
make a commercial practice expedient which formerly was considered to run counter to the
123rules of commerce. As has been mentioned in chapter two , the notion of public policy is
not immutable. It may change from place to place and from time to time. Therefore, contracts
which at one time were deemed to be contrary to public policy, could at another time be
considered to be consistent with public policy, and for the public benefit.124 Courts cannot
remain permanently oblivious of such changes, therefore they must recognise that public
policy and public morals which are designed to protect the national economic policy in a
purely domestic context need not always have the same effect in the externa! sphere.
Therefore, there should be difference of intensity in the application of the notion of public
policy to international commercial relations, for example, by recognising that such relations
require the application of principles which accord with modem needs, such as, the lex
mercataria, the usages of international trade and the general principles which are generally
recognised by the international community ofmerchants.
However, the situation has to be considered as essentially different when the
mandatory domestic rule reflects a fundamental legal value, the protection of which is
necessary in safeguarding certain core community objectives, where in such situations the
122 See Klaus Peter Berger, op. cit., p. 653.
123
See, Chapter Two, at p. 69.
124 Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, "Public Policy and Arbitrability," op cit., p. 180. He states that: "national
public policies have changed over the years, influenced by a number of factors such as national
developments in the political and legal system the involvement of the national economy in
international trade, political decisions such as the promotion of foreign investment, or international
developments."
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public policy defence should prevail. Therefore, to invoke public policy an award must at
least violate the stringent and most imperative economic interests that would effect the
1 JC
economic status of the country of enforcement.
125 This could be achieved if courts adopt the Parsons & Wliittemore Overseas Co. guideline of the
"most basic notions of morality and justice." See, Parsons and Whittemore Overseas Co. Inc. v.





There is no doubt that public policy could affect the enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards. The lack of a clear and comprehensive definition for public policy leaves the door
wide open for domestic courts to determine the extent of those matters that are deemed
contrary to public policy, according to their notion of the concept. This is particularly the
case under Article V (2)(b) of the New York Convention, which does not clarify this ground
nor offer guidelines for national courts to determine whether or not there is a distinctive
policy to refuse the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. Giving national courts such
discretionary power in determining the scope and ambit of public policy has led to a variety
of interpretations of this notion, which may expose the award to additional conditions other
than the limited grounds provided under Article V (1) of the New York Convention.
Accordingly, whether, or to what extent, this ground must be taken into account in
determining the validity of foreign arbitral awards will ultimately depend upon the
considerable powers conceded to the courts in defining a precise limit of public policy.
The prime objective of this study was to argue that there is room for discussion about
the degree of control a state should exercise. There is also room for argument as to whether a
distinction should be drawn between international and domestic arbitration, the former being
less strictly controlled than the latter. The general trend in arbitral and court awards is to
construe the New York Convention's public policy defence narrowly by restricting the
application of domestic public policy to a minimum while at the same time the application of
public policy rules and moralities of the international community must be considered. The
discussion has drawn its inspiration from the growing international awareness of the notion of
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international public policy, which has developed according to the demands of international
commercial relations.
To illustrate the effect ofpublic policy on the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, it
was necessary to examine the application of this notion throughout the successive stages of
the arbitration process. This was done by considering the possible application of this concept
during the arbitration process by the arbitral tribunal then, by the courts in the country of
origin and finally before the courts in the country in which enforcement is sought under
Article V (2)(b) of the New York Convention.
At the first stage, it was important to examine the potential conflict of public policy
rules during the arbitration process. The questions that were dealt with at this stage were,
whether or not arbitral tribunals have a duty to consider the application of public policy rules
during the arbitration process and how an arbitrator can determine the applicable public
policy rules in the domain of international commercial arbitration. As stated in chapter three,
arbitrators are obliged to respect the 'parties' autonomy' and the rules which they have
chosen to govern their dispute. However, the efficacy of this concept is subject to public
policy limitations. It has been argued that arbitrators could disregard the parties' choice of
law if the underlying motives of their choice aimed at violating the public policy rules of
countries that have a close connection to the dispute. This may be the case if the parties
deliberately attempted to exclude parts or all of the mandatory rules of a particular national
law, for example, the law which is duly applicable according to the conflict of law rules.
Therefore, in spite of the arbitrators' obligation to apply the law chosen by the parties,
arbitrators are not completely barred from applying other rules to the dispute, particularly if
by disregarding the parties choice arbitrators would avoid derogation of the public policy of
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other countries connected to the dispute. This is due to the arbitrators' duty to make every
effort possible to provide the parties with an award that is more likely to be recognised and
enforced.1 Moreover, arbitrators have a responsibility to the process of arbitration itself. For
commercial arbitration to be effective there must be full confidence in the integrity of the
process. Therefore, arbitrators should take account of the interests of the community or
communities that would be affected by the resulting award. This may include taking into
consideration the public policy rules of the place where arbitration proceedings are
conducted, the place or places where enforcement may take place, the public policy of the
law chosen by the parties and the public policy of the place where performance of the
contract will take place. However, the diversity of legal systems that could have connection
to the dispute might make the determination of the applicable public policy rules a matter of
guesswork. The difficulty particularly arises since arbitrators have no allegiance to a specific
state, and therefore they do not have conflict of rules of their own. Moreover, they are not
expected to "scientifically investigate" the public policy rules of different legal systems and
they may not have the time nor the knowledge to do so.
The conclusion drawn at this stage is that arbitrators are not expected to comply with national
standards of public policy, especially where the national rules in question were designed to
govern domestic relations only. Therefore, arbitrators must search for the proper public
policy rules according to what they may consider to be closely connected to the dispute. They
also have to ascertain the public policy rules that a national law considers essential to the
protection of its national interests and moral values, those which are applicable to both
national and international commercial relations. Finally, to avoid any potential conflict in
1 If an arbitrator made a decision without considering the applicable public policy rules, he would be
infringing the duty he is expected to respect and abide by. As mentioned above, this approach
corresponds to the modem tendency followed in international commercial arbitration, where
arbitrators are obliged to ensure the validity of their award. See, Article 32 (2) of the LCIA Rules;
Article 35 of the ICC rules of (1998); Gunther J. Horvath, "The Duty of the Tribunal to Render an
Enforceable Award," 18:2 Journal ofInternational Arbitration (2001), p. 135.
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deciding public policy issues, it has been suggested that arbitrators should consider the
application of internationally accepted public policy rules as the most appropriate public
policy rules to govern international commercial relations, which they must protect and
guarantee.
At the second stage, it was important to examine the effect of setting aside an arbitral
award for considerations of public policy in the country of origin. This relates to the fact that
setting the award aside in the country of origin is one of the grounds for refusing enforcement
in foreign countries under Article V (l)(e) of the New York Convention. It has been
established that invoking the public policy ground to set an arbitral award aside should be
based upon considering the connection between the arbitral award and the country of origin.
In this regard it is important to keep in mind that enforcement of an award may take place in
a country that may has no connection with the subject matter of the dispute. Courts are
therefore required to consider the distinction between national and international arbitral
awards. If the award has no connection to that country other than that it was chosen for
convenience as a neutral forum then, there will be no rational reason for the court of origin to
set the award aside because it violates purely national public policy rules. This may
particularly be the case if invoking national public policy standards would create a conflict
with the mandatory rules of the law which are closely connected to the dispute. Also, it has
been mentioned that the court of origin may not be able to determine the validity of an
arbitral award according to its compliance with foreign mandatory rules, since a court in the
country of origin cannot understand the subtleties of application and the exact extent of a
public policy rule deriving from a foreign legal system. Moreover, a court in the country of
origin cannot decide what a particular foreign rule is designed to prevent or how an
international arbitral award would be treated under the legal system of that country.
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It has been concluded that applying the concept of international public policy provides a
reasonable solution for the conflict of public policy rules, and it is advisable in such cases
that a court of the country of origin leave the determination of the exact extent of public
policy to the courts of enforcement. This alleviates the problem of a court of the country of
origin attempting to apply the public policy of a foreign legal system with which it is not
familiar. Also, applying internationally accepted public policy rules might increase the
chances of enforcing the award, which might ultimately preserve the integrity of the court's
decisions when the award has been brought before the courts of another jurisdiction as a
foreign arbitral award. To this end, it has been argued that whilst Article V (l)(e) of the New
York Convention provides grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement of an award if it
has been "set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which or under
the law of which, that award was made", a successful challenge that was based upon purely
national public policy rules in the country of origin may not deprive the award of its binding
effect in other countries. By reference to the phrase "recognition and enforcement may be
refused" provided in Article V (1), it was possible to conclude that the grounds included in
Article V (1) are discretionary and not mandatory. Therefore, the courts in the country of
enforcement are not compelled to refuse the enforcement if the award was set aside by a court
in the country of origin on the basis of purely national public policy rules, this may arise in
exceptional cases, where the nullification order by the court of origin does not constitute a
violation of public policy in the country in which enforcement takes place. For example,
when the court of enforcement finds that the nullification order was based on unreasonable
grounds or that the court of origin had set the award aside due to the formal requirements of
its national procedural law, such as where an arbitrator refused to sign the arbitral award,
where this was not required by the applicable procedural law or by the public policy rules of
the country of enforcement.
The final stage concerns examining the application of public policy in the country of
enforcement. At this stage, several examples were examined in order to illustrate the extent to
which public policy is applied as a ground on which to refuse the enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards. Since public policy covers a wide range of issues, it was necessary to
categorise these issues into two main areas; procedural public policy issues and those which
relate to the subject matter of the dispute.
A foreign arbitral award may be examined by the court enforcing it for procedural
irregularities in order to ensure whether or not arbitrators have considered the fundamental
values of justice and fairness in making the award, and whether or not parties have had a fair
opportunity to present their case. Attention has been drawn to the difference between the role
of Article V (1 )(b) and the public policy ground under Article V (2)(b) of the New York
Convention. Whilst Article V (l)(b) provides grounds for refusing the enforcement of an
arbitral award for procedural irregularities, the public policy ground could still be invoked as
an additional control in order to remedy the procedural irregularities which are not covered
by Article V (1) of the Convention.
Several reasons could be drawn to justify this view. Firstly, Article V (1 )(b) provides that
recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused if "the party against whom the
award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the
arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case." The phrase "or was
otherwise unable to present his case" has been construed as implying that a court may refuse
to enforce the award on public policy grounds whenever it makes a finding of other
procedural irregularities that would affect justice between the parties.
Secondly, Article V (l)(b) grounds could be raised by only one of the parties, whereas the
public policy ground can be raised by the court of enforcement on its own motion. Therefore,
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if the court executing the award finds a procedural irregularity that violates national
procedural public policy, then it may refuse enforcement on its own motion.
Finally, Article V (l)(b) does not identify under which law a court can determine whether a
party has been given proper notice and whether or not he has been able to present his case.
The absence of a clear reference to the applicable law might provide the court of enforcement
with a legitimate reason to apply its national mandatory rules under Article V (2)(b) of the
Convention.
The study argues that examining the validity of a foreign arbitral award according to its
conformity with the national procedural public policy rules of the country of enforcement
might lead to inappropriate results, particularly that a foreign arbitral award may have been
correctly produced under a foreign law that has a close connection to the arbitral process.
This may create a conflict of public policy rules between the procedural mandatory rules of
the country of enforcement and the arbitral procedural rules that have a connection to the
dispute. An execution court is therefore, required to construe the Convention's public policy
defence narrowly by confining the application on these grounds to the minimum standards of
justice as known in the practice of international commercial arbitration. Accordingly, an
arbitral award that is correctly produced under a foreign law must not be refused unless the
resulting award leads to a serious violation of justice and equity between the parties. An
execution court should also consider that the national mandatory rules of its law might
include formal requirements, the violation of which may not necessarily lead to a denial of
justice to the parties. Therefore, not every procedural irregularity constitutes a sufficient
reason to refuse enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Moreover, a court should give more
2 For example, the law or rules which the parties choose to govern the arbitral procedures and the law
of the country in which the arbitral procedures take place.
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attention to its ultimate duty which is confined to considerations ofjustice between the parties
and not to the enforcement of formal requirements imposed by its national procedural law.
The examples that have been examined in chapter five reveal that the judicial practice of
various legal systems distinguishes between national and international public policy rules.
The latter mainly relate to the existence of mutual principles of justice common to the
majority of countries, which represent the most fundamental notions of equity and justice.
Therefore, international procedural public policy rules could be recognised as those principles
of justice that are shared among the international community and should be respected no
matter where the arbitration procedures take place. Consequently, this may lead to narrow the
domain of formal conditions that are imposed by national mandatory procedural rules that
may not be suitable for the requirements of international commercial arbitration.
Finally, the evidence which supports the argument that the notion of international public
policy is increasingly recognised as a basis for interpreting Article V (2)(b) of the New York
Convention has also been considered in issues that relate to the subject matter of the dispute.3
The conclusion that could be drawn from this study could be summed up as follows.
The growing acceptance of arbitration by the international commercial community has made
it difficult for states to adopt or retain a negative approach to arbitration. A state that wants to
participate in international trade should recognise the role of international commercial
arbitration and should allow the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards except where there
are the clearest breaches of international public policy. However, one should recognise the
difficulty of forming a precise definition of international public policy. The absence of a clear
definition should not, nevertheless, lead us to underestimate the importance of this concept.
The drive towards trade growth and economic globalisation requires international public
policy to be recognised as a guiding principle in order that judicial interference in foreign
arbitral awards is restricted to the minimum. This will rest to a great extent upon the national
courts' good conscience in providing new solutions that meet the direction of which the
international commercial community is moving. A national court that does not recognise the
necessity of transposing its domestic arbitration practice to an international level is "very
much like the mother who does more harm than good to her children by locking them up
under the pretext of protecting them from the different hidden and apparent risks and evils of
the outside world, thus depriving them of the opportunity of acquiring the necessary
experience to cope with the difficult problems of real adult life."4 A national court should
thus be aware that its role is not limited to the mechanical application of its national law as it
stands, but extends to creative interpretation that recognises the specificity of international
commercial arbitration. This will be a gradual step by step progression, and a time may come
when a compelling need for change will drive national courts to develop a stringent and
straightforward case law that recognises the necessity of transposing their domestic
arbitration practice to an international level. In order to achieve that, it will be important to
train qualified and skilled judges who can distinguish international arbitral awards from
purely national arbitral awards. All that can be expected of them is to recognise that the
development of international trade brings increasingly complex issues that may not accord
with traditional methods, procedures and ways of thinking. Therefore, they must consider that
the evolution of international commercial relations requires the application of international
public policy rules that are more suitable to international commercial disputes.
3 Various examples have been examined in chapter six to illustrate how public policy could be
interpreted to include morality, political and economic issues.




By way of final conclusion, I can do no better than to quote the comment of van den Berg
who states that:5
"The interpretation of public policy is like the movement of a pendulum. It has moved from
an earlier parochialism to the present attitude in favour of international commercial
arbitration. It may reach a point where international commercial arbitration may be favoured
too much by an overly narrow interpretation ofpublic policy, and this may produce a counter
reaction. But the pendulum has by no means reached that point. At present the judicial
attitude in favour of intentional commercial arbitration is just emerging in various countries.
This movement should be encouraged, to which end the distinction between domestic and
international public policy is a useful criterion."





CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
ARBITRAL AWARDS *
Article I
1. This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the
territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are
sought, and arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to
arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and
enforcement are sought.
2. The term "arbitral awards" shall include not only awards made by arbitrators appointed for each
case but also those made by permanent arbitral bodies to which the parties have submitted.
3. When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, or notifying extension under article X
hereof, any State may on the basis of reciprocity declare that it will apply the Convention to the
recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another Contracting State. It may
also declare that it will apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships,
whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the national law of the State
making such declaration.
Article II
1. Each contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to
submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable
of settlement by arbitration.
2. The term "agreement in writing" shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration
agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.
3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the
parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the
parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed.
Article III
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance
with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid
*
The New York Convention of 1958, United Nations Treaty Series (1959) Vol. 330, p. 38, No. 4739.
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down in the following articles. There shall not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions or
higher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to which this Convention
applies that are imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.
Article IV
1. To obtain the recognition and enforcement mentioned in the preceding article, the party applying
for recognition and enforcement shall, at the time of the application, supply:
(a) The duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof;
(b) The original agreement referred to in article II or a duly certified copy thereof.
2. If the said award or agreement is not made in an official language of the country in which the award
is relied upon, the party applying for recognition and enforcement of the award shall produce a
translation of these documents into such language. The translation shall be certified by an official or
sworn translator or by a diplomatic or consular agent.
Article V
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom
it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and
enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to them, under
some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it
or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of
the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the
submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to
arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from
those not so submitted, that part of the award which contain decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country
where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a
competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in
the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of
that county; or




If an application for the setting aside or suspension of the award has been made to a competent
authority referred to in article V(l) (e), the authority before which the award is sought to be relied
upon may, if it considers it proper, adjourn the decision on the enforcement of the award and may
also, on the application of the party claiming enforcement of the award, order the other party to give
suitable security.
Article VII
1. The provisions of the present Convention shall not affect the validity of multilateral or bilateral
agreements concerning the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards entered into by the
Contracting States nor deprive any interested party of any right he may have to avail himself of an
arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the country where
such award is sought to be relied upon.
2. The Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923 and the Geneva Convention on the Execution
of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927 [27 LNTS 157; 92 LNTS 301] shall cease to have effect between
Contracting States on their becoming bound and to the extent that they become bound, by this
Convention.
Article VIII
1. This Convention shall be open until 31 December 1958 for signature on behalf of any Member of
the United Nations and also on behalf of any other State which is or hereafter becomes a member of
any specialized agency of the United Nations, or which is or hereafter becomes a party to the Statute
of the International Court of Justice [T.S. 993; 59 Stat. 1055], or any other State to which an invitation
has been addressed by the General Assembly of the United Nations.
2. This Convention shall be ratified and the instrument of ratification shall be deposited with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article IX
1. This Convention shall be open for accession to all States referred to in article VIII.
2. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.
Article X
1. Any State may, at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that this Convention shall
extend to all or any of the territories for the international relations of which it is responsible. Such a
declaration shall take effect when the Convention enters into force for the State concerned.
2. At any time thereafter any such extension shall be made by notification addressed to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations and shall take effect as from the ninetieth day after the day of receipt
by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of this notification, or as from the date of entry into
force of the Convention for the State concerned, whichever is the later.
3. With respect to those territories to which this Convention is not extended at the time of signature,
ratification or accession, each State concerned shall consider the possibility of taking the necessary
steps in order to extend the application of this Convention to such territories subject, where necessary
for constitutional reasons, to the consent of the Governments of such territories.
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Article XI
In the case of a federal or non-unitary State, the following provisions shall apply:
(a) With respect to those articles of this Convention that come within the legislative
jurisdiction of the federal authority, the obligations of the Federal Government shall to this
extent be the same as those ofContracting States which are not federal States;
(b) With respect to those articles of this Convention that come within the legislative
jurisdiction of constituent states or provinces which are not, under the constitutional system
of the federation, bound to take legislative action, the federal Government shall bring such
articles with a favourable recommendation to the notice of the appropriate authorities of
constituent states or provinces at the earliest possible moment;
(c) A federal State Party to this Convention shall, at the request of any other Contracting
State transmitted through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, supply a statement of
the law and practice of the federation and its constituent units in regard to any particular
provision of this Convention, showing the extent to which effect has been given to that
provision by legislative or other action.
Article XII
1. This Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of the third
instrument of ratification or accession.
2. For each State ratifying or acceding to this Convention after the deposit of the third instrument of
ratification or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after deposit by
such State of its instrument of ratification or accession.
Article XIII
1. Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention by a written notification to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. Denunciation shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the
notification by the Secretary-General.
2. Any State which has made a declaration or notification under article X may, at any time thereafter,
by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, declare that this Convention shall
cease to extend to the territory concerned one year after the date of the receipt of the notification by
the Secretary-General.
3. This Convention shall continue to be applicable to arbitral awards in respect of which recognition
or enforcement proceedings have been instituted before the denunciation takes effect.
Article XIV
A Contracting State shall not be entitled to avail itself of the present Convention against other
Contracting States except to the extent that it is itself bound to apply the Convention.
Article XV
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify the States contemplated in article VIII of the
following:
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(a) Signatures and ratifications in accordance with article VIII;
(b) Accessions in accordance with article IX;
(c) Declarations and notifications under articles I, X and XI;
(d) The date upon which this Convention enters into force in accordance with article XII;
(e) Denunciations and notifications in accordance with article XIII.
Article XVI
1. This Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts shall be equally
authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit a certified copy of this Convention to
the States contemplated in article VIII.
Done at New York June 10, 1958.
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ANNEX B
LAW NO. 27 FOR 1994
PROMULGATING THE LAW CONCERNING ARBITRATION IN CIVIL AND
COMMERCIAL MATTERS *
In the Name ofPeople,
The president of the Republic,
The People's Assembly has adopted the following law and we have promulgated it.
Article 1
The provisions of the annexed Law shall apply to any arbitration pending at the time of its entry into
force or which commences thereafter, even if it is based on an arbitral agreement concluded before the
entry into force of this Law.
Article 2
The Minister of Justice shall issue the Decrees required for the execution of this Law, and shall
establish the lists of arbitrators from which selections may be made pursuant to the provisions of
Article 17 thereof.
Article 3
Articles 501 to 513 of Law No. 13/1968 promulgating the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedures
are hereby repealed, as well as any provision contrary to the provisions of this Law.
Article 4
This Law shall be stamped in the Official Gazette and shall enter into force one month from the day
following the date of its publication.
This Law shall be stamped with the Seal of State and enforced as one of its Laws.
Issued at the presidency on 18 April 1994.
Hosni mubarak
President of the Republic
Law Concerning Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Matters
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1
Subject to the provisions of international conventions applicable in the Arab Republic of Egypt, the
provisions of this Law shall apply to all arbitrations between public law or private law persons,
whatever the nature of the legal relationship around which the dispute revolves, when such an
The Egyptian Law No 27 of 1994, published in the Egyptian Official Gazette No. 16, 21 April 1994 and
became effective on the 22nd ofMay 1994. See, Intl. Handbook on Comm. Arb. Suppl. 19. August 1995, Egypt,
Annex B, p. 14. Translated from the Arabic official Text under the auspices of the "Association for Arab and
African Arbitrators", Cairo, revised under the supervision of Prof. Ahmed S. Al-Kosheri; Ahmed S. El-Kosheri,
"EGYPT," op. cit., p. 52 (Annexl).
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arbitration is conducted in Egypt, or when an international commercial arbitration is conducted abroad
and its parties agree to submit it to the provisions of this Law.
Article 2
An arbitration is commercial within the scope of this Law when the dispute arises over a legal
relationship of an economic nature, whether contractual or non-contractual. This comprises, for
example, the supply of goods or services, commercial agencies, construction and engineering or
technical know-how contracts, the granting of industrial, touristic and other licenses, transfer of
technology, investment and development contracts, banking, insurance and transport operations, and
operations relating to the exploration and extraction of natural wealth, energy supply, laying of gas or
oil pipelines, building of roads and tunnels, reclamation of agricultural land, protection of the
environment and establishment of nuclear reactors.
Article 3
Within the context of this Law, the arbitration is international whenever its subject matter is a dispute
related to international commerce in any of the following cases:
First: if the principal places of business of the two parties to the arbitration are situated in two
different States at the time of the conclusion of the arbitration agreement. If either party to the
arbitration has more than one place of business, due consideration shall be given to the place of
business which has the closest relationship with the arbitration agreement. If either party to the
arbitration does not have a place of business, then the place of its habitual residence shall be relied
upon.
Second: If the parties to the arbitration have agreed to resort to a permanent arbitral organization or to
an arbitration centre having its headquarters in the Arab Republic of Egypt or abroad.
Third: If the subject matter of the dispute falling within the scope of the arbitral agreement is linked to
more than one country.
Fourth: If the principal places of business of the two parties to the arbitration are situated in the same
State at the time of the conclusion of the arbitration agreement, but one of the following places is
located outside said State:
a) the place of arbitration as determined in the arbitration agreement or pursuant to the methods
provided therein for determining it;
b) the place where a substantial part of the obligations emerging from the commercial relationship
between the parties shall be performed:
c) the place with which the subject matter of the dispute is most closely connected.
Article 4
1. Lor the purpose of this Law, the term "arbitration" means voluntary arbitration agreed upon
by the two parties to the dispute according to their own free will, whether or not the chosen body to
which the arbitral mission is entrusted by agreement of the two parties is a permanent arbitral
organization or centre.
2. The term "arbitral panel" denotes the panel composed of one or more arbitrators for the
purpose of adjudicating the dispute referred to arbitration. As to the term "court", it means the court
belonging to the judicial system of the State.
3. The expression "the two parties to the arbitration" when used in this Law shall denote the
patties to the arbitration, whatever their number may be.
Article 5
In the cases where this Law permits the two patties to the arbitration to select the procedures which
must be followed in a given matter, this also includes their right to allow third patties to make such
selection. In this respect, any arbitration organization or centre in the Arab Republic of Egypt or
abroad shall be deemed a third party.
Article 6
Whenever the parties to the arbitration agree to subject the legal relationship between them to the
provisions of a standard contract, or international convention or any other document, then the
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provisions of such document must apply, including the provisions related to arbitration provided for
therein.
Article 7
1. Unless otherwise provided in a special agreement between the two patties to the arbitration, any
letter or written communication shall be delivered to the addressee personally or at his place of
business, his habitual residence or mailing address, known to both patties, defined in the arbitration
agreement or in the document which contains the relationship subject to the arbitration.
2. If none of these addresses can be identified after having made a reasonable inquiry, communication
to the addressee is deemed to have been received if it is sent in the form of a registered letter to the
addressee's last known place of business, habitual residence or mailing address.
3. The provisions of this article shall not apply to communications concerning judicial procedures
before the courts.
Article 8
If either party to a dispute knows that any requirement under the arbitration agreement has been
violated or a non-mandatory provision of this Law has not been complied with, yet proceeds with the
arbitration without stating his objection to the violation or non compliance within the period agreed
upon, or without undue delay in the absence of such agreement, the parry shall be deemed to have
waived his right to object.
Article 9
1. Competence to review the arbitral matters referred to by this Law to the Egyptian judiciary lies
with the court having original jurisdiction over the dispute. However, in the case of international
commercial arbitration, whether conducted in Egypt or abroad, competence lies with the Cairo
Court of Appeal unless the parties agree on the competence of another appellate court in Egypt
2. The court having competence in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall continue to
exercise exclusive jurisdiction until completion of all arbitration procedures.
PART II. THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
Article 10
1. The arbitration agreement is an agreement by which the two parties agree to submit to arbitration
in order to resolve all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in
connection with a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not.
2. The arbitration agreement may be concluded before the dispute has arisen either in the form of a
separate agreement or as a clause in a given contract concerning all or certain disputes which may
arise between the two parties. In the latter case, the subject matter of the dispute must be
determined in the Request for Arbitration referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 30 hereof. The
arbitration agreement may also be concluded after the dispute has arisen, even if an action has
already been brought before a judicial court, and in such case, the agreement must indicate the
issues subject to arbitration, on penalty of nullity.
3. The reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an
arbitration agreement, provided that such reference is such as to make that clause an integral part
of the contract.
Article 11
Arbitration agreements may only be concluded by natural or juridical persons having the capacity to
dispose of their rights. Arbitration is not permitted in matters which can not be subject to compromise.
Article 12
The arbitration agreement must be in writing, on penalty of nullity. An agreement is in writing if it is
contained in a document signed by both parties or contained in an exchange of letters, telegrams or
other means ofwritten communication.
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Article 13
1. The court before which an action is brought concerning a disputed matter which is the subject of
an arbitration agreement shall hold this action inadmissible provided that the respondent raises
this abjection before submitting any demand or defence on the substance of the dispute.
2. The fact that the judicial action referred to in the preceding paragraph is brought shall not prevent
the arbitral proceedings from being commenced or continued, or the making of the arbitral award.
Article 14
Upon request of either party to the arbitration, the court referred to in Article 9 may order the making
of an interim or conservatory measure, whether before the commencement of the arbitral proceedings
or during said proceedings.
PART III. THE ARBITRAL PENAL
Article 15
1. The arbitral panel consists, by agreement between the parties, of one or more arbitrators. In the
absence of such agreement on the number of arbitrators, the number shall be three.
2. If there is more than one arbitrator, the panel must consist of an odd number, on penalty of nullity
of the arbitration.
Article 16
1. The arbitrator cannot be a minor, under guardianship, have been deprived of his civil rights by
reason of a judgment against him for a felony or misdemeanour contrary to honesty or due to a
declaration of his bankruptcy; unless he has been restored to his status.
2. The arbitrator is not required to be of a given gender or nationality, unless otherwise agreed upon
between the two parties or provided for by law.
3. The arbitrator's acceptance of his mission shall be in writing. When accepting, he must disclose
any circumstances which are likely to cast doubts on his independence or impartiality.
Article 17
1. The two parties to the arbitration may agree on the choice of the arbitrators, and on the method and
period of time for effecting their choice. In the absence of such agreement, the following steps shall
be followed:
a) If the arbitral panel consists of a sole arbitrator, the court specified in Article 9 of this Law shall
undertake the appointment of the arbitrator upon request of either party.
b) If the arbitral panel consist of three arbitrators, each party shall appoint one arbitrator and the two
arbitrators shall then appoint the third. If either party fails to appoint his arbitrator within thirty
days of a request to do so from the other party, or if the two appointed arbitrators fail to agree on
the third arbitrator within thirty days of the date of the latest appointment between the two, the
court specified in Article 9 of this Law shall undertake the appointment upon request of either
patty. The arbitrator chosen by the two arbitrators or appointed by the court shall chair the arbitral
panel. The above provisions shall apply if the arbitral panel consists of more than three
arbitrators.
2. If either party violates the agreed procedures for the choice of arbitrators, or if the two appointed
arbitrators are unable to reach an agreement expected of them under the agreed procedure, or if a third
party fails to perform any function entrusted to him in this regard, then the court specified in Article 9
of this Law shall carry out the required procedure or the function needed upon the request of either
party, unless the agreement provides other means for securing the appointment.
3. In the choice of the arbitrator, the court shall observe the conditions required by this Law and those
agreed upon by the parties, and shall render its decision on said choice expeditiously. Subject to the
provisions of Articles 18 and 19 of this Law, such decision shall be subject to no appeal.
Article 18
1. An arbitrator may be challenged only if circumstances exist that give rise to serious doubts on his
impartiality, or independence.
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2. A party to the arbitration may challenge the arbitrator appointed by it or in whose appointment it
has participated, only for reasons of which he becomes aware after the appointment has been
made.
Article 19
1. The challenge request shall be submitted in writing to the arbitral panel, indicating the reasons for
the challenge, within fifteen days after the challenging party became aware of the constitution of
the arbitral panel or of the circumstances which justify the challenge. Unless the challenged
arbitrator withdraws from his office, the arbitral panel shall decide on the challenge.
2. A challenge request shall not be accepted from a party who had previously submitted a request
challenging the same arbitrator in the same arbitration.
3. The challenging party may lodge a recourse against the decision refusing his request, within thirty
days of receiving notice thereof, before the court specified in article 9 of this Law, and the court's
decision shall be subject to no appeal.
4. Neither the submission of the challenge nor the recourse against the decision of the arbitral panel
rejecting such request shall entail the suspension of the arbitral proceedings. However, if the
challenge of the arbitrator is successful, whether by a decision of the arbitral panel or by the court
reviewing the challenge, the arbitral proceeding already conducted, including the arbitral award,
shall be null and void.
Article 20
If the arbitrator is unable to perform his mission, fails to perform his task or interrupts the
performance thereof in a manner which causes undue delay in the arbitral proceedings, and if he does
not withdraw and the parties have not agreed to terminate his mandate, then the court specified in
Article 9 of this Law may order the termination of his mandate upon request of either party.
Article 21 , ; ii
If the arbitrator's mandate is terminated through challenge, revocation, withdrawal or.for any reason,
a substitute arbitrator shall be appointed to replace him according to the rules applicable to the
appointment of the arbitrator being replaced.
Article 22
1. The arbitral tribunal is competent to rule on the objections related to its lack of jurisdiction,
including objections claiming the non-existence of an arbitration agreement, its extinction, nullity
of said agreement, or that it does not cover the subject matter in dispute.
2. Those pleas shall be raised at a date not later than that of submitting the respondent's statement of
defence referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 30 of this Law. The appointment or participation in
the appointment of an arbitrator by one of the two parties to the arbitration shall not preclude such
party from raising such a plea. A plea that the arbitration agreement does not cover the disputed
issues, must be raised immediately, otherwise the right to raise it shall be precluded. In all cases,
the arbitral penal may admit a later plea if it considers the delay justified.
3. The arbitral panel may rule on the pleas referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article either as a
preliminary question before ruling on the merits or adjoin them to the merits in order to be ruled
upon together. If the arbitral panel rules to dismiss a plea such motion may not be raised except
through the institution of a recourse for the annulment of the arbitral award disposing of the whole
dispute pursuant to Article 53 of this Law.
Article 23
The arbitration clause shall be treated as an independent agreement separate from the other terms of
the contract. The nullity, resiliation or termination of the contract shall not affect the arbitration
clause, provided that such clause is valid per se.
Article 24
1. Both parties to the arbitration may agree to confer upon the arbitral panel the power to order, upon
request of either party, interim or conservatory measures considered necessary in respect of the
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subject matter of the dispute and to require any party to provide appropriate security to cover the
costs of the measure ordered.
2. If the party against whom the order was issued fails to execute it, the arbitral penal, upon the
request of the other party, may authorize the latter to undertake the procedures necessary for the
execution of the order, without prejudice to the right of said party to apply to the president of the
court specified in Article 9 of this Law for rendering an execution order.
PART IV CONDUCT OF THE ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS
Article 25
The two parties to the arbitration are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral
penal, including the right to submit the arbitral proceedings to the rules prevailing under the auspices
of any arbitral organization or centre in the Arab Republic of Egypt or abroad. In the absence of such
agreement, the arbitral panel may, subject to the provisions of this Law, adopt the arbitration
procedures it considers appropriate.
Article 26
The two parties to arbitration shall be treated with equality, and each shall be given an equal and full
opportunity of presenting its case.
Article 27
The arbitral proceedings commence on the date on which the respondent receives the request for
arbitration from the claimant, unless the two parties agree on another date.
Article 28 WiT f
The two parties to the arbitration are free to agree on the place of arbitration in Egypt or abroad.
Failing such agreement, the arbitral panel shall determine the place of arbitration having regard to the
circumstances of the case including the convenience of the place to the parties. This shall be without
prejudice to the power of the arbitral panel to meet in any place it considers appropriate to undertake
any of the arbitral proceedings, such as hearing the parties to the dispute, witnesses and experts,
reviewing documents, inspecting goods or other property, for consultation among its members or for
any other reason.
Article 29
1. The arbitration shall be conducted in Arabic, unless another language or languages are agreed
upon by the parties or determined by the arbitral panel. This agreement or determination shall
apply to all written statements and briefs, to the oral hearings as well as to all awards, decisions or
other communications by the arbitral panel, unless specified otherwise by the agreement of the
two parties or by determination of the arbitral panel.
2. The arbitral panel may order that all or part of the documentary evidence submitted in the case
shall be accompanied by a translation into the language or languages used in the arbitration. In the
case of multiplicity of such languages, the arbitral panel may limit the translation to some
languages to the exclusion of others.
Article 30
1. Within the period of time agreed by the two parties or determined by the arbitral panel, the claimant
shall send to the respondent and to each of the arbitrators a written statement of its case that includes
its name, address, the respondent's name and address, an explanation of the facts of the case, the
determination of the points at issue in the dispute, the relief or remedy sought as well as all other
elements which are required to be mentioned in such statement by agreement between the two parties.
2. Within the period of time agreed by the two parties or determined by the arbitral panel, the
respondent shall send to the claimant and to each of the arbitrators a written Statement of Defence in
reply to the Statement of the claimant's case. He may include in such Statement any incidental claims
related to the subject matter of the dispute or may invoke a right arising thereunder in view of
raising a plea for set-off. He may do so even in a later stage of the proceedings, if the arbitral panel
deems that the circumstances justify the delay.
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3. Both the claimant and the respondent are free to enclose with the Statement of Claim or with the
Statement of Defence, as the case may be, copies of the documents supporting the position of the
concerned party, and may add a reference to all or some of the documents and evidence it intends to
submit. This does not prejudice the right of the arbitral panel, at any stage of the proceedings, to
request the submission of the originals of the documents or materials invoked by either party to
support its case.
Article 31
All briefs, statements, documents or other information submitted to the arbitral panel by one party
shall be communicated to the other party. Similarly, copies of whatever may be submitted to the
arbitral panel such as expert reports, evidentiary documents or other elements of proof shall be
communicated to the parties.
Article 32
Either patty may amend or supplement its submissions or supporting arguments during the course of
the arbitral proceedings unless the arbitral panel considers it inappropriate having regard to avoiding
delay in adjudicating the case.
Article 33
1. The arbitral panel may hold oral hearings in order to enable each party to explain the merits of the
case and to present its arguments as well as evidence. It may also decide that the proceedings shall
be conducted exclusively on the basis of the submitted briefs and written documents, subject to
any contrary agreement by the parties.
2. The two parties to the arbitration must be notified of the dates fixed for the hearings or the
meetings which the arbitral panel decides to hold, sufficiently in advance if the scheduled date as
determined by the panel according to circumstances.
3. Summary minutes of each meeting held by the arbitral panel shall be recorded in "proces-verbal",
and a copy thereof shall be delivered to each of the two parties, unless otherwise agreed by the
parties.
4. The hearing ofwitnesses and experts shall be conducted without taking an oath.
Article 34
If without showing sufficient cause, the claimant fails to submit the written Statement of claim
pursuant to paragraph 1 of article 30 of this Law, the arbitral panel shall terminate the arbitral
proceedings, unless otherwise agreed by the parties.
If the respondent fails to submit its Statement of Defence pursuant to paragraph 2 of article 30 of this
Law, the arbitral panel shall continue the arbitral proceedings without treating such failure as an
admission by the respondent of the claimant's allegations, unless otherwise agreed by the parties.
Article 35
If either party fails to appear at any of the meetings or to submit the documents required from it, the
arbitral panel may continue the arbitral proceedings and make the award on the dispute based upon
the elements of evidence before it.
Article 36
1. The arbitral panel may appoint one or more experts to submit on specific issues determined by the
arbitral panel a written report or an oral report to be included in the proces-verbal of the meeting.
A copy of the terms of reference regarding the mission entrusted to the expert shall be sent to each
party.
2. Each party shall provide the expert with all relevant information concerning the dispute or
produce or provide access to relevant documents, goods or other property for his his
inspection. The arbitral panel shall decide on any controversy arising in this respect between the
expert and one of the parties.
3. The arbitral panel shall send to each party a copy of the expert's report immediately after its
submission, granting each parry the opportunity to express its opinion thereon. Each of the two
parties is entitled to review and examine the documents upon which the expert relied in his report.
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4. The arbitral panel may decide, after the submission of the expert's report, whether on its own
initiative or upon request of a party to the arbitration, to hold a meeting to hear the expert and to
provide for both parties the opportunity to hear him and to put questions to him about what
is contained in his report. Each of the parties may present one or more expert witnesses in order to
give testimony on the issues raised in the report of the expert appointed by the arbitral panel,
unless otherwise agreed by the parties to the arbitration.
Article 37
The president of the court referred to in Article 9 of this Law is competent, upon the request of the
arbitral panel, to do the following:
a) Condemn any of the witnesses who refrains from attending or declines to reply, by inflicting the
sanction prescribed in Articles 78 and 80 of the Law of Evidence in Civil and Commercial
Matters.
b) Order a rogatory commission.
Article 38
The proceedings before the arbitral panel shall be suspended upon occurrence of any of the grounds
for suspension and according to the conditions related thereto as provided for in the Code ofCivil and
Commercial Procedures. The effects of the suspension shall be those prescribed in the said Code.
PART V. THE ARBITRAL AWARD AND THE CLOSING OF THE PROCEDURES
Article 39
1. The arbitral panel shall apply to the substance of the dispute the rules chosen by the two parties. If
they agree on the applicability of the law of a given State, only the substantive rules thereof shall
be applicable and not its conflict of laws rules, unless otherwise agreed by the parties.
2. If the two parties have not agreed on the legal rules applicable to the substance of the dispute, the
arbitral panel shall apply the substantive rules of the law it considers most closely connected to
the dispute.
3. the arbitral panel, when adjudicating the merits of the dispute, shall decide in accordance with the
terms of the contract in dispute and the usages of the trade applicable to the transaction.
4. The arbitral panel may, if it has been expressly authorized to act as an "amiable cumpositeur" by
agreement between the two parties to the arbitration, adjudicate the merits of the dispute in
conformity with the rules of justice and fairness (ex aequo et bono), without being restricted by
the legal provisions.
Article 40
The award of an arbitral panel consisting of more than one arbitrator shall be made by the majority
after deliberations conducted in the manner determined by the arbitral panel, unless otherwise agreed
by the parties.
Article 41
If during the arbitral proceedings, the two parties agree on a settlement that terminates the dispute,
they may request that the terms of the settlement be recorded by the arbitral panel in the form of an
arbitral award on agreed terms which terminate the proceedings. Such award shall have the same
effect with regard to enforcement as all other arbitral awards.
Article 42
The arbitral panel may make interim or partial awards before making its final award which terminates
the entire dispute.
Article 43
1. The arbitral award shall be made in writing and shall be signed by the arbitrators. If the arbitral
panel consists of more than one arbitrator, the signatures of the majority of the arbitrators shall
suffice, provided that the award states the reasons for which the minority did not sign.
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2. The arbitral award shall state the reasons upon which it is based, unless the two parties to
arbitration have agreed otherwise or the law applicable to the arbitral proceedings does not require
the award to be supported by reasons.
3. The arbitral award shall include the names and addresses of the parties, the names, addresses,
nationalities and capacities of the arbitrators, a copy of the arbitration agreement, a summary of
the parties' requests, submissions, documents, the dispositive part of the award, date and place of
making, as well as the reasons whenever their inclusion is required.
Article 44
1. The arbitral panel shall deliver to each of the two parties a copy of the arbitral award signed by
the arbitrators who approved it within thirty days of the date of its making.
2. No publication of the award or parts thereof shall be authorized except with the approval of both
parties to the arbitration.
Article 45
1. The arbitral panel shall make the award terminating the dispute within the period agreed upon by
the two parties. In the absence of such agreement the award must be made within twelve months
of the date of commencement of the arbitral proceedings. In all cases, the arbitral panel may
decide to extend the period of time, provided that the period of extension shall not exceed six
months, unless the two parties agree on a longer period.
2. If the arbitral award is not rendered within the period referred to in the preceding paragraph,
either of the two parties to arbitration may request the president of the court referred to in Article
9 of this Law to issue an order either extending the period of time or terminating the arbitral
proceedings. In the latter case, either patty may bring the dispute to the court having initial
jurisdiction to adjudicate the case.
Article 46
If, in the course of the arbitral proceedings, a matter falling outside the scope of the arbitral panel's
jurisdiction is raised, or if a document submitted to it is challenged for forgery, or if criminal
proceedings are undertaken regarding the alleged forgery or for any other criminal act, the arbitral
panel may decide to proceed with the subject matter of the dispute without any reliance on the
incidental matter raised or on the document alleged to be a forgery or on the other criminal act.
Otherwise, the arbitral panel shall suspend the proceedings until a final judgment is rendered in this
respect. Such measure shall entail suspension of the period for making of the arbitral award.
Article 47
The parry in whose favour the arbitral award has been made shall deposit, at the Secretariat of the
court referred to in Article 9 of this Law, the original award or a copy thereof in the language in which
it was rendered, or an Arabic translation thereof authenticated by a competent organism if it was
rendered in a foreign language. The court's secretary shall evidence such deposit in a proces-verbal,
and each of the two parties to arbitration may request a copy of the said proces-verbal.
Article 48
1. The arbitral proceedings are terminated either by the making of the award ending the dispute or by
a court decision ordering the termination of the arbitral proceedings pursuant to paragraph 2 of
Article 45 of this Law. The arbitral proceedings can also be terminated by a decision of the arbitral
panel in the following cases:
a) If the two parties agree on the termination of the proceedings.
b) If the claimant withdraws its claim, unless the arbitral panel decides, upon request of the
respondent that the latter has a legitimate interest in continuing the arbitral proceedings until the
dispute is settled by a final award.
c) If for any other reason the arbitral panel finds that the continuation of the proceedings has become
unnecessary or impossible.
3. Subject to the provisions of Articles 49, 50 and 51 of this Law, the mandate of the arbitral panel
ends with the termination of the arbitral proceedings.
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Article 49
1. Either party to the arbitration may request the arbitral panel, within thirty days of receipt of the
arbitral award, to give an interpretation clarifying an ambiguity that appears in the dispositive part
of the award. The party requesting clarification must notify the other party of the request before
presenting it to the arbitral panel.
2. The interpretation decision shall be made in writing within thirty days of receipt of the request for
clarification by the arbitral panel. The panel may extend that period by another thirty days if it
considers such extension necessary.
3. The interpretation decision made by the arbitral panel shall form an integral part complementing
the arbitral award which it clarifies and shall be provided the same treatment.
Article 50
1. The arbitral panel shall correct any exclusively material errors in its award, whether typographical
or in computation. Such corrections shall be undertaken by the arbitral panel on its own initiative
or upon request from either party. The arbitral panel shall make the correction without holding
any hearing within thirty days following the making of the award or the receipt of the request for
correction as the case may be, and it may extend this period by another thirty days if it considers
this to be necessary.
2. The correction decision shall be made in writing by the arbitral panel and notified to the two
parties within thirty days of the date of its making. If the arbitral pane abuses its powers of
correction, its decision may be subject to recourse by means of an action for annulment in
conformity with the provisions of Articles 53 and 54 of this Law.
Article 51
1. Either party to the arbitration may, even after the expiration of the arbitration period, request the
arbitral panel within the thirty days following the receipt of the arbitral ward, to make an
additional award as to claims presented in the arbitral proceedings but omitted from the award.
Such request must be notified to the other parry before submission to the arbitral panel.
2. The arbitral panel shall make its decision within sixty days of submission of the request, and it
may extend this period for a further thirty days if it considers this to be necessary.
PART VI ANNULMENT OF THE ARBITRAL AWARD
Article 52
1. Arbitral awards rendered in accordance with the provisions of this Law may not be challenged by
any of the means of recourse provided for in the Code of Civil and commercial Procedures.
2. An action for the annulment of the arbitral award may be instituted in accordance with the
provisions of the following two articles.
Article 53
1. An arbitral award may be annulled only:
a) If there is no arbitration agreement, if it was void, voidable or its duration had elapsed;
b) If either party to the arbitration agreement was at the time of the conclusion of the arbitration
agreement fully or partially incapacitated according to the law governing its legal capacity;
c) If either party to the arbitration was unable to present its case as a result of not being given proper
notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings, or for any other reason
beyond its control;
d) If the arbitral award failed to apply the law agreed upon by the parties to govern the subject matter
in dispute;
e) If the composition of the arbitral panel or the appointment of the arbitrators was in conflict with
this Law or the parties' agreement;
f) If the arbitral award dealt with matters not falling within the scope of the arbitration agreement or
exceeding the limits of this agreement. However, in the case when matters falling within the
scope of the arbitration can be separated from the part of the award which contains matters not
included within the scope of the arbitration, the nullity affect exclusively the latter parts only;
302
g) If the arbitral award it self or the arbitration procedures affecting the award contain a legal
violation that causes nullity.
2. The court adjudicating the action for annulment, shall ipso jure annul the arbitral award if it is in
conflict with the public policy in the Arab Republic of Egypt.
Article 54
1. The action for annulment of the arbitral award must be brought within ninety days of the date of
the notification of the arbitral award to the party against whom it was made. The admissibility of
the action for annulment shall not be prevented by the applicant's renouncement of its right to
request the annulment of the award prior to the making of the arbitral award.
2. Jurisdiction with regard to an action for the annulment of awards made in international
commercial arbitrations lies with the court referred to in Article 9 of this Law. In cases not related
to international commercial arbitration, jurisdiction lies with the court of appeal having
competence over the tribunal that would have initially had jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute.
PART VII. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS
Article 55
Arbitral awards rendered in accordance with the provisions of the present Law have the authority of
the res Judicata and shall be enforceable in conformity with the provisions of this Law.
Article 56
Jurisdiction to issue an enforcement order of arbitral awards lies with the president of the court
referred to in Article 9 of this Law or with the member of said court who has been mandated for this
purpose by delegation from said president. The application for enforcement of the arbitral award shall
be accompanied by the following:
1. The original award or a signed copy thereof.
2. A copy of the arbitration agreement.
3. An Arabic translation of the award, certified by a competent organism, in case the award was not
made in Arabic.
4. A copy of the proces-verbal assisting the deposit of the award pursuant to Article 47 of this law.
Article 57
The filing of an action for annulment does not suspend the enforcement of the arbitral award.
Nevertheless, the court may order said suspension if the applicant requests it in his application and
such request is based upon serious grounds. The court shall rule on the request for suspension of the
enforcement within sixty days of the date of the first hearing fixed in relation thereto. If suspension is
ordered, the court may require the provision of a given security or monetary guarantee. When the
court orders a suspension of enforcement, it must rule on the action for annulment within six months
of the date when the suspension order was rendered.
Article 58
1. Application for the enforcement of an arbitral award shall not be admissible before the expiration
of the period during which the action for annulment should be filed in the court registry.
2. The application to obtain leave for enforcement of the arbitral award according to this law shall
not be granted except after having ascertained the following:
a) That it does not contradict a judgment previously rendered by the Egyptian Courts on the subject
matter in dispute;
b) That does not violate the public policy in the Arab Republic of Egypt; and
c) That it was properly notified to the party against whom it was rendered.
3. The order granting leave for enforcement is not subject to apeal. However, the order refusing to
grant enforcement may be subject to a petition lodged, within thirty days refusing to grant thereof,
before the competent court referred to in Article 9 of this Law.
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ANNEX C
Law No. 9 of the year 1997 Amending Certain Provisions ofArbitration Law in Civil and
Commercial Matters as Promulgated by Law No. 27 of the Year 1994 *
In the name of the people;
The President of the Republic;
The People's Assembly passed the following law and it is promulgated by us:
Article (1)
A second clause shall be added to Article (1) of the Law on Arbitration in Civil and
Commercial Matters, as promulgated by the Law No. 27 of the year 1994, reading as follows:
"With regard to administrative contracts litigations, agreement on arbitration shall be reached
with the approval of the concerned minister of the official assuming his power with respect to
public juridical persons. No delegation ofpowers shall be authorised therefore."
Article (2)
This law shall be published in the Official Journal and shall come into force effective the day
following the date of its publication.
The present law shall be stamped with the SEAL of the State and shall be enforced as one of
its laws.
Issued at the Presidency of the Republic on 6 Al-Moharram, Hejri 1418 Corresponding to 13
May, 1997).
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